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HISTORY

THE WAR

VOL. IX.

«ss5^5

PRINTING HOUSE SQUARE.

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY "THE TIMES,'
PRINTING HOUSE SQUARE, LONDON.

19 1 6.

CONTENTS OF VOL. IX.

CHAPTER CXXXVII.

The Russian Offensive of 1916 : First Phase ... ... ... ... ... 1

CHAPTER CXXXVIII.
The Battle of Verdun (III.) ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 41

CHAPTER CXXXIX.
Austrian Offensive of May, 1910, in the Trentino : Italian Politics ... 81

CHAPTER CXL.
The Battle of Jutland Bank ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 121

CHAPTER CXLI.
The Western Front in May and June, 1916 ... ... ... ... ... 161

CHAPTER CXLII.
The Work of the Y.M.C.A 179

CHAPTER CXLIII.

The Russian Offensive of 1916: Second Phase ... ... ... ... ... 201

CHAPTER CXLTV.
The Medical Service of the Royal Saw ... ... ... ... ... ... 241

CHAPTER CXLV.

The Senussi and Western Egypt ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 281

CHAPTER CXI AT.

The Intervention of Portugal ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 321

CHAPTER CXLVII.
Germany's Second Year of War ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 361

CHAPTER CXLVIII.
Operations Xorth of the Pripet Marshes : Summer, 1916 ... ... ... 391

CHAPTER CXLIX.
The Intervention of Rumania 401

CHAPTER CL.
The Law and Enemy Trading ' 441

CHAPTER CLI.
The Battle of the Somme (I.) ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 477

CHAPTER CXXXVII.

THE RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE OF 191 6

FIRST PHASE.

Results of the Austro -German Advance in 1915 — The Russian " Offensive " of March,
1916 — Russian Objects and German Exaggerations — Preparation for the Great Russian
Offensive — Analysis of Positions and Strengths — The Russian Commanders Described —
The Germans and Austrians — Austrian Confidence — Luxury in the Field — The Strategic
Problem — Russia Strikes — Analysis of the First Three Weeks — Austrian Line Broken —
Fall of Lutsk — and Dubno — Kaledin's Success — The East-Galician Front — The Bukovina
— Fall of Czernovitz — Dramatic Account of the Evacuation — Conquest of the Bukovina.

THE great Austro -German advance of
1915 had stopped without having
achieved its strategic object. It
had not attained the line on which
the initiative for further operations would have
rested exclusively with the Central Powers.*
East of the Niemen and the Bug the Germanic
armies had occupied the main strategic centre
of Vilna and the important railway junctions
of Baranovitehe and Kovel ; in the south they
had advanced their front to the line of the Ikva
and Strypa ; and on the right bank of the
Dniester they had advanced almost to the very
frontier of Bessarabia. Yet our Allies had
retained in the north the line of the Dvina
with Riga and Dvinsk, the railway junctions
of Molodetchna and Minsk, the railway across
the Pripet Marshes, the strategic centre of
Rovno — which occupied in the region south
of the Pripet Marshes a position analogous
to that of Vilna in the northern districts
— and a considerable tract of East Galicia,
which in view of its highly developed net of
roads and railways formed a useful base for
future Russian operations. Thus, on the stra-
tegic line separating Inner Russia from the

* For a detailed analysis of that line cf. Vol. VII.,
Chapter CX., especially pp. 81-82.
Vol. IX.— Part 105.

outlying Lithuanian, White Russian and Polish
provinces, the relative position of the opposing
forces with regard to the next campaign
remained one of even balance.

It was now the main task of the Russian
forces to preserve intact the advantages which
that line offered for a future offensive, whilst
behind the front new armies were raised and
trained, and arrangements were made for
equipping them and supplying them with
plentiful munitions. To have gained the
necessary respite without having anywhere
yielded ground to an enemy who had already
reached the full development of his forces was,
between the autumn of 1915 and the first days
of June, 1916, the achievement of the armies
defending the Russian front.

Numerous local encounters — the usual inci-
dents of stationary trench warfare — and two
series of bigger operations constitute the sum
of military events during the winter and spring
of 1915-1916. German imagination expanded
the operations of that period into decisive
offensives, so as to be able to proclaim their
" total failure," to speak of the " terrifying
losses of the enemy," and to repeat once more
the hackneyed tale of the " unbreakable "
nature of the German front. As a matter of

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAS.

MEN OF RUSSIA'S NEW ARMY ON THE MARCH.

fact, however, both the Russian attacks in the
Bukovina — about the New Year of 1916 — and
the operations which our Allies undertook in
Lithuania in the second half of March were
merely local actions very much restricted in
purpose and extent. In either case one of
the chief aims of the Russians was to forestall
an imminent movement of the enemy — and in
so far as that object was concerned they were
fully successful. Throughout the period inter-
vening between the close of the great Germanic
offensive of 1915 and the commencement of
the Allied offensive in 1916 the Austro-German
forces proved unable to resume the initiative
on the Eastern front.

On February 21 the Germans opened their
offensive against Verdun. In the following
weeks elaborate preparations were begun by
them also on the Dvina, evidently with a view
to similar operations against some sector of
the Riga-Dvinsk front. Partly in order to
relieve the pressure in the west, and partly in
order to forestall the offensive which, for the
coming spring, was expected on their own
front, our Allies opened on March 16 a short
counter-offensive in Lithuania. The time and

place chosen by the Russian Command by
themselves sufficiently exj^lain the aim and
nature of these operations. The blow was
delivered in the district which, north of the
Pripet Marshes, forms the most vital sector of
the German front. Vilna is the main strategic
centre for the entire region between the Niemen,
the Dvina and the Marshes ; its safety was an
essential preliminary condition for a German
offensive anywhere between Dvinsk and Bara-
novitche. Between Postavy and Smorgon the
battle-line approached, however, within from
40 to 60 miles of Vilna. Attacks against that
sector left no choice to the enemy ; he had to
counter them with all his strength. Still it is
evident that our Allies could not have expected
to carry by a coup de main a sector of such
enormous strategic importance. The strength
of the German fortifications in it was certain to
correspond to its significance, and at all times
it was held by a concentration of forces greater
than was to be found in any other part of the
line. Moreover, the neighbourhood of Vilna
and the comparatively high development of
railways and roads in that region furnished the
means for the rapid bringing up of reinforce-

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

ments. In view of the lessons taught by the
fighting round Verdun, which had been pro-
ceeding for more than three weeks when the
Russian operations were started, a strategic
rupture of the German front in the region of
Vilna could hardly have been hoped for except
as the result of long and steady pounding of
their lines. Yet the Russian " offensive " was
started in the country of the thousand lakes,
of forest and marshy valleys, at a moment
when the imminent melting of the snow was
certain soon to render the entire region unfit
for any serious military operations. But then
the Russians did not mean the attacks which
they delivered in Lithuania in March, 1916, to
be the beginning of a big offensive. They
aimed at immediate results ; by a threat which
could not have been left unheeded they meant
to disturb German calculations — and it is

evident that they succeeded in achieving that
aim. The time for decisive action against the
Central Powers had not yet arrived — either
in the east, west or south.

The attacking Russian forces operated in two
groups. South of the Bereswetsh-Postavy-
Svientsiany railway-line stood a group of three
army corps and one cavalry division under
General Baluyeff ; the isthmus between Lakes
Narotch and Vishnieff was the main objective
of its attacks. A similar force commanded by
General Pleshkoff operated between Postavy
and Lake Drisviaty. On the German side the
front between Lake Vishnieff and Lake Dris-
viaty was held by the Tenth Army under
General von Eichhorn, consisting of 1 1 \ infantry
and two cavalry divisions (besides two other
cavalry divisions in reserve), and supported on
the left wing by a few divisions of the Eighth

A RUSSIAN OFFICER INTERROGATING AUSTRIAN PRISONERS.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

Army under General von Scholtz. Thus, in so
far as numbers were concerned, the opposing
forces were fairly evenly matched.

On March 16 the Russian batteries opened a
violent bombardment of the German lines. In
the hope of forestalling, or at least disturbing,
the coming Russian attacks, the Germans
delivered on the following day an impetuous
attack against the Russian positions south of
Tverietch, and on March 18 at Miedziany.
The attacks failed completely and the enemy
had to retire in haste, leaving some booty in the
hands of the Russians. On March 19 our

GENERAL KUROPATK1N,
Commander of the Northern Armies.

Allies captured the village of Velikoie Selo,
north of Vileity. On the same day marked
progress was made by them between Lakes
Narotch and Vishnieff. After a severe fight
the Russians succeeded in carrying the village
of Zanaptche and in occupying part of the
enemy trenches near Ostrovliany and in front
of Baltagouzy. The next few days witnessed
a series of attacks and counter-attacks on the
isthmus between the lakes, during which posi-
tions were frequently changing hands. By
March 23 our Allies had advanced their lines
still farther in the direction of Blizniki and
Mokrytsa. In this region between Lakes Vishnieff
and Narotch the troops of General Baluyeff
captured during the four days, March 18 to 21,

18 officers and 1,255 men and one 5-in. howitzer
18 machine-guns, 26 field mortars, 10 hand
mortars and considerable quantities of small
arms and ammunition.

Simultaneously with the fighting on the
isthmus similar encounters were proceeding in
three other sectors of the Lithuanian front :
between the Lake Miadziol and Postavy, near
Tverietch, and north of Vidzy, on the line Lake
Sekla-Mintsiouny. Finally, on the Dvina,
half-way between Riga and Dvinsk, in front
of the curve which the river forms between
Lievenhof and Friedrichstadt, our Allies carried
by a sudden and sharp attack a series of German
trenches in the .region of Augustenhof and
Buschhof. In almost every part of the line
where fighting was proceeding the Russians
succeeded in improving their tactical position.
That was all that had been counted upon.
" On the whole, the series of engagements
latterly reported in the official communiques,'"
wrote The Times correspondent at Petrograd,
under date of March 23, " bears the character
of an encounter battle" — and warnings were
given out from well-informed quarters at
Petrograd that nothing more should be ex-
pected at that season of the year, on the very
threshold of spring. And indeed in the last
days of March the general thaw and the melting
of the snow, which was lying on the ground
several feet high, put an end to the fighting
in Lithuania. It was once more resumed in the
last days of April. By a considerable military
effort the Germans recaptured the trenches
which the Russians had taken from them in the
i?thmus between Lakes Narotch and Vishnieff,
but were unable to advance any further.

In June, when the great Russian offensive
south of the Marshes was breaking up the
Austro -German front and casting a shadow far
before it over Central Europe, the German
Headquarters felt the urgent need of reassuring
the population by means of a heroic legend.
A graphic description had to be given, so
crudely coloured as to impress itself even on
minds beginning to yield to fear. It had to
be demonstrated that every Russian offensive
must necessarily break down and end in disaster ;
it had to be shown that the sacred ground of
the Fatherland could not ever again be in
danger of contamination by a hostile foot. On
June 9 — the date is significant — German Head-
quarters published an account of the Russian
" offensive " of March, 191G. The official pen
ran riot in describing an encounter of Russians

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

GENERAL
Commander of the Russian Armies in

and Germans : " Indeed, a shattering and yet
elevating picture ! Out yonder, masses forging
forward through deep mud and swamps, driven
by blows of the knout and by the fire of their
own guns. Here the iron wall of the Hinden-
burgArmy. Firm, rigid in iron and steel. Still
firmer in the will of every single man : to hold
out even against overwhelming odds. Nobody

BRUSILOFF,
the Great Offensive south of the Prlpet,

here turns back with anxious glances, nobody
looks back at the police behind the front.
There are no police. All eyes are bent steadily
to the front, and the stones of the wall are the
soldier-hearts of the defenders "

One wonders what German soldiers must have
felt when reading the fustian of their own
Headquarters, whether rage and shame did not

105—2

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

make their blood boil when thinking of the
twaddler who, somewhere safe behind the front,
was writing down the opponent for the comfort
of nervons people at home, and making the
fighters of his own army ridiculous. And a
month later these very scribes were complaining
of the British communiqves being " written in a
style which has nothing in common with mili-
tary brevity and simplicity " and " is no longer
the language of a soldier " !

But the immediate tactical results were not
the only aim and profit of the military opera-
tions undertaken by the Russians in the autumn
and winter of 1015-10. They had also their
educational value. " In every movement,
great or small, that we have made this winter,"
said General Brusiloff to The Times correspon-
dent, Mr. Stanley Washburn, at the conclusion
of the first stage of the offensive in June, 1010,
" we have been studying the best methods of
handling the new problems which modern war-
fare presents. At the beginning of the war,
and especially last summer, we lacked the pre-
parations which the Germans have been making
for the past 50 years. Personally I was not
discouraged, for my faith in Pvussian troops and

Russian character is an enduring one. I was
convinced that, given the munitions, we should
do exactly as we have done in the past two
weeks."

The task of Russu' was in a way similar to
that of Great Britain. In the middle of the
war she had to build up new armies and devise
the means for supplying them with the necessary
war material. As against England, indeed,
Russia was favoured in having vast cadres of
highly trained officers and in possessing, in the
widest sense of the word, the tradition of a
great national army. But she was handicapped
in matters of industrial development and of
communications both within her own empire
and with the outer world. In spite of this,
however, Russia, during the period of suspense
in the fighting, accomplished results which had
never entered the calculations of the enemy and
surpassed even the hopes of her Allies. In
fact, they could never have been achieved had
it not been for the unanimous, enthusiastic
support which the entire Russian nation gave
to every enterprise connected with the war.
That is true of individuals as well as of organiza-
tions. Among the latter it was especially the
Unions of Zemstvos and Towns which did the

A CAPTURED AUSTRIAN TRENCH.
On the right is Captain Baranoff, chief of General Brusiloff's escort.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

:,it£&

RUSSIAN DUG-OUTS.
Near the fighting-line.

most important work. " The desire to work
on the part of the Unions was so great,"
said General Alexeieff, Chief of the General
Staff, " that they willingly undertook anything,
great or small, provided it was of use to the
army."

Whilst the direction of the armies in the field
rested with General Alexeieff, dependent im-
mediately on the Tsar himself, up to the end of
March General Polivanoff presided over the
work of the War Office. On March 29 General
Polivanoff was relieved of his office, and was
succeeded by General Shuvaieff . *

The summer of 1916 found the Russian
armies between the Baltic Sea and the Ru-
manian frontier grouped in three main divisions.
General Kuropatkin, who by an Imperial
Ukase dated February 19 had been appointed
Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Armies
in place of General Plehve, was in charge of
the Riga-Dvinsk line. He had three armies
under his command — the Twelfth Army of
General Gorbatowski with headquarters at
Venden, the Fifth Army based on Rzezytsa,
and the First Army of General Litvinoff in the

* See Vol. VIII.. p. 204.

district of Disna. German writers put their
aggregate strength at 35 to 41 divisions of
infantry, and 13 J divisions of cavalry.

The centre facing Vilna remained under the
command of General Evert, who by the mag-
nificent skill displayed in the retreat from the
Niemen and Vilia, had enhanced the high
reputation which he had earned in the Russo-
Japanese War. His group included the Second
Army under General Smirnoff round Dokshitse,
the Tenth Army of General Radkievitch with
headquarters at Minsk, the Fourth Army of
General Rogoza on the Upper Niemen, and the
Third Army of General Lesh on the northern
outskirts of the Pripet Marshes. German
estimates of the strength of the Russian centre

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THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

varied from 42A to 50| infantry and 8i cavalry
divisions.

One may safely assume that these figures were
more or less exaggerated. It was the regular
policy of German writers to enhance the figures
of the forces opposed to them (not of those
opposed to the Austrians !) and to discount the
strength of enemy reserves, so as to magnify
the greatness of their own " achievements "
and to prove the hopelessness of the enemy's
cause.

Ever since the distinction between northern
and southern theatres of war had arisen on the
Russian front, the armies south of the Pripet
Marshes had remained under the command of
General Ivanoff. In the first days of April,
that fine old soldier having been called to
Imperial Headquarters to act as military
adviser to the Tsar, his place at the front was
taken by General Brusiloff, who had hitherto
led the Eighth Army. At the beginning of the
summer offensive his command included four
armies (towards the end of June, when Volhynia
had become the main battle-ground of Europe,
the army of General Lesh also was transferred
to this theatre of war). The four original
armies of General Brusiloff were — his own old
army with headquarters at Rovno, now under
the oommand of General Kaledin ; the Eleventh
Army under General Sakharoff on the borders
of Volhynia and Podolia ; the Seventh Army
under General Shcherbatieff in Eastern Galicia ;
and lastly, the Ninth Army of General Lechit-
sky on the Dniester and the frontier between
the Bukovina and Bessarabia. German esti-
mates put the strength of the Southern Armies
in May, 1916, at 41 divisions of infantry and
14 divisions of cavalry — which is much nearer
the mark than the estimate of the northern
groups.

It was in the southern area, and especially
in the spheres of operation of the Eighth and
Ninth Russian Armies, that the decisive battles
were to be fought during the opening stages of
the new Russian offensive. The victories of
June, 1916, added new lustre to the reputation
of General Brusiloff, and made known through-
out the world the hitherto unfamiliar names of
Generals Kaledin and Lechitsky.

4Jexey Alexeyevitch Brusiloff belonged to
an old Russian noble family. Of medium
height and spare build, with finely moulded
features, steady, sharp grey eyes, and elegant
easy movement, General Brusiloff had pre-
served to the full his bodily vigour. A famous

GENERAL EVERT,
Commanded the Russian Armies in the centre.

horseman — a distinction which it is by no
means easy to earn in Russia — he had all
through life kept in training. Although the
requirements of his professional work, as its
sphere was widening, led him away from
the interests of his younger years, be pre-
served the appearance of the typical cavalry
officer. It was in the cavalry that he started
his career. His work for the development and
training of that arm, which had always taken
a prominent part in the Russian forces, left
a permanent mark on its organization. In
1906, at the age of 53, Brusiloff was appointed
to the command of the Second Cavalry Division
of the Guard. Being known as an able adminis-
trator, he was subsequently attached for some,
tune as military assistant to the Governor-
General of Warsaw, General Skalon. In 1911
General Brusiloff was entrusted with the
command of the army corps stationed at
Vinnitsa (Russian Podolia) and of its military
district, which, bordering on East Galicia, was
the most important military area within the
Kieff command.

Thus General Brusiloff had spent the years
following on the Japanese War, during which
the Russian Army was reorganized, in the
frontier-districts to the north and east of

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

Galicia. The outbreak of the war found him
in command of the forces concentrated in
Russian Podolia. It was then but natural that
he should be chosen to lead the army which
invaded Galicia from the east. Previous
chapters of this history have told the story of
his rapid advance on Nizhnioff and Halitch,
of the grand battles which the Eighth Army
fought under Iris leadership in the Carpathian
Mountains, of its raids into Hungary, and finally
of the retirement which followed on the catas-
trophe of the adjoining Third Army on the
Dunayets. Even in the course of that retire-
ment Brusiloff's army still managed to capture
vast numbers of prisoners, and it concluded its
retreat in the first days of September, 1915, by
a brilliant counter-offensive in Yolhynia, which
gave it for a time command of Lutsk, and per-
manently secured Rovno. It therefore sur-
prised no one when General Brusiloft' was chosen
successor to General Ivanoff.

In the command of his own army he was
succeeded by General Kaledin. Before the
opening of the great Russian offensive Kaledin's
name was little known, even in Russia, except
in military circles. At the beginning of the
war he led a cavalry division in General
Brusiloff's army. He distinguished himself in
every one of the many actions in which he was

engaged, and was soon entrusted with the
command of an army corps, and finally was
picked out by General Brusiloff to succeed him
at the head of the entire Eighth Russian Army.
He was a short, thick-set man. His quiet,
sober eyes inspired confidence in anyone who
had dealings with him. The conduct of the
Volhynian battle in June, 1916, proved that
at any rate in the military art he was a past
master — a fact which not even enemy writers
dared to question.

One other of General Brusiloff's army-com-
manders rivalled in June, 1916, the fame of
(ieneral Kaledin. It was General Lechitsky,
the leader of the Russian offensive against the
Bukovina. His career reads like a romance.
He was born in 1856, the son of a Greek-
Orthodox priest in a small provincial town. He
himself was intended by his parents for the
Church and consequently attended the theo-
logical school at Vilna. He felt, however, that
his real vocation was that of a soldier. Too
poor to enter a military school, he joined the
army as a volunteer in a reserve battalion, and
by this roundabout way reached the cadets'
corps. He then spent some 16 years as a
company officer in Siberia. For many years he
struggled in obscurity with hardly a chance of
ever rising above the level of so many patient,

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THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

GENERAL LECHITSKY.

The leader of the Russian offensive against the
Bukovina.

quiet regimental officers whose work makes the
life of the Russian Army and whose names pass
into the oblivion of the crowd. The Boxer
Revolt in China gave him his first chance of
showing his true mettle ; he was soon promoted
to the rank of a colonel. He subsequently did
excellent work in the Russo-Japanese War, and
was a short time afterwards made a general.
In 1906 he was entrusted with the command
of the First Division of the Guard, and in 1911
he was put at the head of the army district of
Chabarovsk in Eastern Siberia. During the
Great War it was not until June, 1916, that he
appeared in a big offensive action as com-
mander of an Army — with the result that in the
south, between the Dniester and Pruth, the
Russians advanced within a month about 50
miles, and that the name of General Lechitsky
became one of the best known in Europe.

On the side of the enemy the Pripet Marshes
marked approximately the division between
the spheres of the two Germanic Allies. Al-
though one Austro-Hungarian -army :Corps
remained in the northern region, and a few
German divisions and two German commanders
operated in the southern district, it is still cor-
rect for the period of relative suspense (Sep-
tember, 1915--June, 1916) to call the line
between the Pripet Marshes and the Rumanian
border the Austro-Hungarian front. Having
done most of the work in 1915, the Austrians
wished to be able to call some quarter their
own ; soon after the fall of Brest-Litovsk a
segregation of troops was carried out, and

Field-Marshal Archduke Frederick (and also
General Conrad von Hotzendorf, the Chief of
the Austrian General Staff) came again to their
oven. The Archduke now conunanded the
armies south of the Marshes, whilst Field-
Marshal von Hindenburg and the shadowy
Prince Leopold of Bavaria directed the forces
between the Baltic Sea and the Pripet.

Hindenburg's command embraced four armies
whilst one army and an army detachment looked
for guidance to the military genius from the
House of Wittelsbach. A group consisting of
7 1 infantry divisions and one cavalry division
held the line from the Baltic Sea till about
Friedrichstadt. Xext to it stood the Eighth
German Army under General von Scholtz ;
it consisted of nine infantry and three cavalry
divisions, and its sphere of operation extended
till about Vidzy. The adjoining Tenth Army
under General von Eichhorn had the biggest
effectives at its disposal, but had the shortest
front to defend. It included 11£ infantry
and two cavalry divisions (besides another two
cavalry divisions in reserve), and occupied the
district between Vidzy and the Upper Vilia ; it
was thus primarily upon this Army that de-
volved the task of protecting Vilna, its head-
quarters. From north of Smorgon down to the

GENERAL KALEDIN,

Commanded the Russian Army at Rovno.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE W.W.

Xiemen extended the positions of the Twelfth
Army under General von Fabeck (eight divisions
v ith one brigade in reserve).

South of the Xiemen extended the realm of
I'rince Leopold of Bavaria, monarch of one of
the manj' kingdoms of Poland which were
vainly planned during the war, and chief of
a group of armies which never existed.* The
line between the Xiemen and the Oginski Canal
was held by his one and only companion.
General von Woyrseh, commanding the Ninth
German Army (in a " birthday article " which
the Vienna Neue Freie Presse devoted to
Prince Leopold in November, 1915, he himself
had been described as its commander). The
Ninth Army included eight German infantry
divisions and the 12th Austro-Hungarian army
corps. This detachment, consisting mainly of
Transylvanian troops, was the remainder of
the Kovess Group, which had become engulfed
in Woyrsch's Army in July, 1915, when
General Dankl, with part of the, in any case,
slender First Austro-Hungarian Army, had
been transferred to the Italian front. Subse-
quently, on the commencement of the new
campaign against Serbia, in the autumn of 1915,
the leader of the remainder of the First Austro-
Hungarian Army in the north, General Kovess
von Kovesshaza, was removed with part of his
troops to Serbia, whilst the 12th army corps
was left in the midst of its German comrades.
However well the Germans conducted publicity
campaigns for themselves and for any German
commander or division which might happen to
find itself within the Austrian lines, the pre-
sence of their " weaker brethren " within their
own half of the line was regularly passed over
in silence until it came to bear the brunt of a
Russian attack. Then, on June 16, 1916, the
Yi?nna Neue Freie Presse devoted a whole
article to that newly discovered Austrian
detachment, stating that " the news of their
presence in Lithuania " may surprise its
readers, "as it was not hitherto generally
known that a detachment of Imperial and
Royal troops stood so far north in the midst of
German armies." In fact, the only writer who
had previously mentioned it was the Military
Correspondent of The Times in his remarkable
article on the German Armies in Russia, pub-
lished on April 23, 1916.

* Attention has been previously called to the peculiar
military career of Prince Leopold, who had risen to the
rank of commander of a group of armies for the occasion
of his entry into Warsaw ; cj. Chapter XCI., pp. 328
and 358, and Chapter CX-, p. 114.

Besides the Ninth Army there was only a
small detachment in the thick of the Pripet
swamps (made separate probably in order to
mark the difference of standing between mere
army commanders and the Royal Prince of
Bavaria). That detachment consisted of three
infantry and two cavalry divisions.

Thus the German forces north of the Pripet
Marshes seem to have included 48 divisions of
infantry and 10 divisions of cavalry, repre-
senting an aggregate strength of probably
1 ,200,000 men. The most striking feature was the
almost complete absence of strategic reserves ;
these had been drained for the Verdun front.

It was the kindly, grandfatherly spirit of
Archduke Frederick which presided over the
fates of Miitel-Europa in the country south of
the Marshes during the spring of ] 9 1 6. The
days of the grim Mackensen had gone, and the
Prussian Von Linsingen and the Bavarian
Count Bothmer were as yet merely subordi-
nates of the old gentleman whom fate and the
Habsburg family had chosen for a general.
Born in 1856, he celebrated his 60th birthday
on June 4 — indeed a day which history will
remember, though for reasons very different
from those on which the courtiers of Vienna
expatiated.

It is a family tradition of the Habsburgs to
produce military geniuses. Archduke Frede-
rick, a grandson of Archduke Charles, the hero
of Aspern, and a nephew of Archduke Albrecht
of Custozza fame, was chosen to be a real
soldier. He entered the army at the age of 15.
At the age of 24 he was already a colonel, two
years later a general. As a man of 30 he was
put in command of a division, and three years
later of a whole army-corps. Having shown
such extraordinary abilities in his youth, he
became in 1906 Commander-in-Chief of the
Austrian Landwehr, and on July 12, 1914, the
Emperor Francis Joseph appointed him to the
highest command of the common Austro-
Hungarian Army. At the time that the
Germans thought Russia to have been " finished
off for good " they handed over to him the
southern portion of the Eastern front.

Two separate regions may be distinguished
within that area : the Russian district of
Volhynia and the Austrian territories in East
Galicia and the Bukovina. The differences in
the development of means of communication
and in their directions preserve the importance
of this frontier line, which otherwise (accord-
ing to the principles of the text-books) should

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

A SACRED SYMBOL OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY.
A portrait of Nicholas II. under guard during an advance.

have ceased to exist with the outbreak of
war.

The Volhynian district was held by two
Austrian armies : the Third Austro-Hungarian
Army under Genera] Puhallo von Brlog,
between the Marshes and Tchartoryi.sk, and
the Fourth Army under Archduke Joseph
Ferdinand within the Volhynian Triangle of
Fortresses (the Austrians held Lutsk and
Dubno, and were facing Rovno). Into these
two armies seems to have been merged, at a
date which was never announced, and in a
way which was never described, the army of
General von Linsingen— and he himself re-

mained in Volhynia in a character which was
never denned until the middle of June, 1916.
Then, after the first Austrian defeats, the
German official cotnmuniques (not those of
Vienna !) suddenly began to speak of a new
" group of armies " under Von Linsingen. The
Prussian had now openly taken out of the weak
Habsburg hands the command in the Volhy-
nian battle area.

It will be remembered that in the winter of
1914-15, when the battles were raging in th<j
Carpathians, a German " Army of the South "
was holding the mountain-chain from the Uzsok
Pass to the upper courses of the Bystrzytsas.

105- 3

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

ARCHDUKE FREDERICK.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Austro-Hungarian

Army, with his grandchildren — the children of

Princess Hohenlohe.

TL.S chief commander was Von Linsingen, and
its elite, the Prussian army corps containing
the Third Division of the Guard, was led by
Count Bothmer. Even then more than half
of the effectives of the " German Army of the
South " consisted of Austro -Hungarian troops.
During the advance in the summer of 1915 it
was split up, Linsingen proceeding to Volhynia,
whilst Botlimer advanced against the Tarnopol-
Trembovla front. Each of these halves served
as framework for a new army filled out with
fresh Austrian troops. Meantime no increase
was made in their German leaven — on the
contrary, much of it was removed. The last
withdrawal was the Prussian Guard of Both-
mer's Army, which had to go to replenish the
German effectives before Verdun. Towards the
end of May, 1916, there were left hardly more
than three German divisions in the midst of the
Austrian forces. Two of these stood in Vol-
hynia, whilst the 48th German Reserve Di-
vision was the only one remaining with the
army of General Count Bothmer.

Of Austro-Hungarian troops the two Volhy-
nian armies included 12J infantry and seven
cavalry divisions, besides the Polish legions

composed of all arms and amounting to some-
thing more than a division.

The front of the adjoining Second Austro-
Hungarian Army under General von Boehm-
Ermolli also extended mainly over Russian soil.
Its line stretched front south of Dqbno to a
point north of the Tarnopol-Krasne-Lvoff
railway-line. Still, up to the time when it was
dragged into the maelstrom of the Volhynian
battle, this army, with its headquarters and
bases on Austrian soil, belonged to the Galician
rather than to the Volhynian group. It
included about eight infantry divisions — all of
them Austrian or Hungarian. The rest of the
Austrian front was held by the two Armies of
Count Bothmer and General von Pflanzer-
Baltin, the point of junction between them
lying in the district of Butchatch. In March,
1916, their aggregate strength amounted to
about 20 Austro-Hungarian and two German
infantry divisions and four divisions of Austro-
Hungarian cavalry. It was especially within
that sector that changes were effected in the
course of the spring. Besides the Third
Division of the Prussian Guard, whose with-
drawal to Verdun was mentioned above,
these armies lost a few infantry divisions to
the ItaUan front. Yet the largest withdrawals
for the Trentino offensive did not come from
the armies at the front, but from the bases in
the rear. The Italian campaign had an effect
on the position of the Austro-Hungarian armies
in the east analogous to that which the Verdun
offensive exercised on Hindenburg's line. It
left them bare of strategic reserves.

The best authorities estimated the strength
of the enemy's infantry in the south at the time
when our Allies opened their great offensive at
about 38 Austro-Hungarian and three German
infantry divisions. Their strength in infantry
seems, therefore, to have been about equal to
that of General Brusiloff's armies, though the
Russians undoubtedly possessed a marked
superiority in cavalry.

The fact haw been frequently commented upon
that at the time wrhen the Russians opened their
offensive of 1916 the Austro-Hungarian armies
at the eastern front included hardly any
Czech, Yugo-Slav or Pvuthenian regiments —
i.e., few elements friendly at heart to the Slav
cause. Those troops had been sent mainly to
the Italian front, whilst Germans, Magyars,
Italians and Poles were sent to Russia and
Galicia. Indeed, all along the line could be
found Magyar regiments or whole army corps,

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

as, e.g.. the group of General von Szurmay in
the north, the detachment of General von
Goglia near Podkamien (south of Brody), and
very considerable numbers of Hungarian
regiments within Pflauzer-Baltin's army. Simi-
larly, German-Austrians — Viennese regiments,
Alpine divisions, Germans from Bohemia and
Moravia — were posted along the entire front.
Still, Czech and Yugo-Slav soldiers were by
no means absent. They were scattered in
groups among the troops whose loyalty could
be relied upon by the Austro-Hungarian Army
Command ; these had to keep watch over them,
send them everywhere into the most exposed
positions, and where any suspicion of " treason "
arose, fire at them from behind. Yet even
so, it remains to be known whether these
bodies of men, devoted to the cause of Slav
freedom and hating the German-Magyar rule,
did not contribute in some measure to the
victories of our Russian Allies. Anyhow, the
Russians soon became aware of their presence,
and whilst the true enemies among the prisoners
were started off on their weary journey to
Siberia or Turkestan, the Slavs were placed
at once on farms behind the Russian front,
where labour was needed for the approaching
harvest. They were a real godsend to the
farmers, as was shown by numerous notices
on the subject which appeared in the Press of
Southern Russia.

Of all the handicaps under which the Austro-
Hungarian Army Command was suffering
the most dangerous was perhaps its almost
pathetic conceit. It was not merely the daily
twaddle of the Neue Freie Presse and inspired
statements for the consumption of neutrals
which proclaimed the impregnability of the
Austrian positions and the invincibility of
Austrian troops. Prominent army comman-
ders made statements to that effect even in
private, intimate conversations. Of their pub-
lic declarations it will suffice to quote a single
one. On the very eve of the new Russian
offensive Baron Conrad von Hotzendorf, Chief
of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, was
reported as saying to the Swedish journalist,
Herr Nils Lago Linquist : " We have held out
for two years, and those two years were the
worst. Now we can hold out in a cheerful and
confident frame of mind as long as it pleases
our enemies. To hold out, of that we are
certainly capable. We are not to be conquered
again."* The Pester Lloyd had the doubtful
taste to reprint that conversation in its issue
of June 8.

Even the production of food was a concern
of the Austro-Hungarian Army at the front.
Convinced of the impossibility of ever again
having to retreat, it devoted all its spare
energies to the tilling of the fields behind the
* " Una ringt man nicht mehr nieder."

A CAPTURED AUSTRIAN TRENCH.
Built on a river bank.

CL.

z .s

o =

as 2

D »

Z i

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-i

THE TIMES H1ST0BY OF THE WAR.

battle line. The peaceful pursuits of its
detachments in reserve quarters no less
eloquently proves the confidence then pre-
vailing in the Austrian Army than the luxuries
and amenities of the life of its officers, even
in what for their soldiers was the firing-line.

Towards the end of June, 1916, Mr. Stanley
Washburn, The Times Special Correspondent
with the Russian Forces, visited some districts
behind the Austrian front in Volhynia and
described the elaborate arrangements which had
been made in that region for the well-being and
pleasure of the troops :

At a safe distance from rifle fire behind the lines one
came on the officers' quarters, which seemed like a
veritable park in the heart of the forest. Here one
found a beer garden with buildings beautifully con-
structed from logs and decorated with rustic tracery,
while chairs and tables made of birch still stood in
lonely groups about the garden just where they were
left when the occupants of the place suddenly departed.
In a sylvan bower was erected a beautiful altar of birch
trimmed with rustic traceries, the whole being surrounded
by a fence through which one passed under an arch
neatly made of birch branches. The Austrians must
have had an extremely comfortable time here. Every-
thing is clean and neat, and, no matter how humble the
work, it is always replete with good taste. One of the
advancing corps captured a trench with a piano in it,
and if the stories of large quantities of miscellaneous
lingerie (not included in the official list of trophies) that
fell into Russian hands are to be believed, one feels
that the Austrians did not spend a desolate or lonely
winter on this front. . . .

Emerging from the belt of woods, we cross an open
bit of country, and everywhere find signs of the Aus-
trians' intention to make their stay as comfortable as
possible. In fact, the Russians can make no complaint
of the state in which the enemy has left the territory
which he has been occupying. Nothing has been
destroyed that belonged to the Russian peasantry, and,
indeed, very little of the works the Austrians themselves
created. Every village has been carefully cleaned up,
each house is neatly white-washed, with numbers painted
on the front. Ditches have been cut along the sides of
the streets and most of the houses have been tastefully
fenced in by the rustic birch -work which one sees every-
where here. In several villages parks have been con-
structed, with rustic bandstands.

Arrangements had also been made for the
local revictualling of the armies. Besides
bakeries and slaughter-houses the Austrian
Army had close behind the front its own sausage
factories ( Wurste.rzeugungsanlagen ), rooms fitted
for the pickling and smoking of meat, and,
finally, suitable places for the cold storage of
the provisions. The meat-packers of one
army corps alone of the army of General von
Pflanzer-Baltin produced every third day
about a ton of sausages and smoked meat.
(And the description of all these indescrib-
able delights was officially given out to
hungry Austria about a fortnight before the
commencement of the Russian offensive !) Yet
strict economy was exercised in the slaughter-

houses of the " Imperial and Royal Army." All
tallow was carefully collected, and whatever
remained after the soldiers had been pro-
vided with grease for their rifles and boots was
handed over to the soap factory — of course,
again one owned and worked by the Army
itself.

Every detachment had behind the front its
own vegetable gardens, which were tilled and
looked after by the soldiers resting in reserve
positions. The total surface of these gardens
amounted to thousands of acres. And in those
villages and camps behind the front the Army
fattened even its own pigs and cattle !

Work on an even greater scale was done in
conjunction with the local population. The
horses of the cavalry and artillery were used in
the fields, motor-ploughs and all kinds of
machines, strange and incomprehensible to the
local peasant, were worked by the army
mechanics and engineers. Thus, for example,
the army of Pflanzer-Baltin, behind whose
front lay the Bukovina, one of the most fertile
countries in the world, cooperated in the tilling
of many hundred thousand acres of land. Of
course, it never crossed their minds that it
might be not they who were to reap the harvest.
One more detail may be mentioned as illustrat-
ing the feeling of absolute security which pre-
vailed in Austrian and even German Govern-
ment circles. Vast quantities of grain bought
in Rumania were stored in the Bukovina,
comparatively close behind the front. When
the Russian offensive broke through the Aus-
trian lines, and all railways were blocked with
war material, transports, wounded soldiers,
refugees, etc., there was no time to remove to
safety all the accumulated stores. A consider-
able part of them was captured by the Russians
or perished in conflagrations. Thus near
Itskany no less than five big Austrian
granaries and 15 smaller ones belonging to the
German military authorities were consumed
by fire.

Yet one can hardly be surprised if the Austro-
Hungarian Army Command thought its front
impregnable. Every possible device had been
adopted to render it so. In most sectors there
were five distinct consecutive lines of trenches,
many of them even 15 or 20 feet deep. The
woodwork and fittings were most elaborate,
the dug outs of the same pattern which was
familiar on the Western front. A thorough and
efficient system of communication had been
established in the rear of the battle-line.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

PATROL OF RUSSIAN LANCERS.
About to set off to scour the surrounding woods and plains.

Everywhere were field railways, and one could
hardly find anywhere more beautifully laid
tracks than were those behind the Austrian
front. And this system of roads and railways
was always being further developed. When
the Russians broke through the Austrian lines
they came across many tracks which were only
just in process of construction.

More difficult than on the high plateau of
the south was the work of entrenching and of
constructing roads and railways in the marshy
regions of northern Volhynia. It was there in
many places impossible to dig trenches of the
usual kind. Recourse was had to a system of
parapets secured by breastwork such as was
generally used in the wars of the seventeenth
century. The roads were made of logs, not of
stone ; they were artificial causeways rather
than roads. In some districts they presented
one long stretch of wide bridges, at points even
of considerable height, so as to secure them
against the spring floods. In the country
between the lower courses of the Styr and the
Stochod some of these bridges attained even
the length of two miles and more.

In short, as far as the mere work of preparing
their positions was concerned and of organizing
their communications and supplies behind the
front, the Austrians can hardly be reproached
with carelessness or inefficiency. They had
practically the same technical means for
resisting the enemy's offensive as the Germans

north of the Marshes or in France, and if their
resistance was not equal to that of their allies,
it was due to the fact that their Headquarters
were caught napping, that the general standard
of the average Austro -Hungarian soldier had
been lowered during the preceding two years of
war, and that many of the troops had not their
heart in the fight. It is possible that an
excessive amount of artillery had been with-
drawn for the Italian front, and it is certain
that no sufficient strategic reserves had been
left for the Eastern front. Yet, above all, the
fact remains that the Russian soldier had
established a marked individual superiority
over his opponent from the Habsburg
Monarchy ; and he who would not acknow-
ledge that fact would search in vain for the
causes of the catastrophical character which
from the very first day the Russian offensive
assumed for the Austro-Hungarian Army.

" Everything in war is very simple," said
Von Moltke, " but the simple things are very
difficult." This is certainly true of the Russian
summer offensive of 1916. Its strategic
scheme was extremely simple, but its execution
was one of the most colossal undertakings
which any army ever had to face. The
offensive extended all along the line — i.e., in
all the most important districts some sectors
were singled out for attack. The timing of
these attacks to a single day made it impossible

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

for the enemy to throw his forces to and fro
behind the front, and compelled him to fight
each of the series of initial battles with the
support of merely local reserves.

The results of the first two or three days
determined the further development of the
Russian scheme. " You can plan a cam-
paign," was another of Moltke's sayings, " only
up to the beginning of the first battle." The
Russian offensive was successful beyond all
expectation in the districts of Lutsk, Butchatch,
and between the Dniester and the Pruth. It
failed to break through the enemy front on the
line extending from the border of Volhynia
and Galicia (round Zalostse) to about Vis-
niovtchyk on the Strypa. Similarly, in the
north, hardly any progress was made on the
Styr below Kolki. The question therefore
arose, how far a strategic advance was possible
through the breaches effected in the enemy
front. Two of the opposing armies — those of
Archduke Joseph Ferdinand and of General
von Pflanzer-Baltin — had met with complete
disaster ; but the army of General von Puhallo
on the Lower Styr, of General von Boehm-
Ermolli south of Dubno, and of Count Bothmor

on the "Upper and Middle Strypa, though by
no means intact, still represented a very serious
fighting force, and reinforcements were certain
soon to make their appearance. Would it
have been safe for the Russians to have poured
troops tlirough the gaps in the Austrian front,
or was it wiser to abstain from an experiment
which, if unsuccessful, might have changed
one of the greatest victories yet won in this1
war into a drawn battle ?

The answer to this question depended mainly
on the chance which the Russians had of reach-
ing vital points or lines behind the enemy's
front without dispersing their own forces and
without placing them into positions fraught
with difficulties or dangers in view of the
imminent German counter-offensive.

There were behind the Austrian front three
centres of vital importance : Kovel, .Lvoff
(Lemberg), and Stanislavoff (with the Dniester
crossings at Nizhnioff, Jezupol. and Halitch).
On the Russian side the main centres were
Rovno and Tarnopol, and to a minor extent
Tchortkoff. The Russian force which broke
through the Austrian front near Butchatch
could not have made its pressure felt in the

AUSTRIAN TRENCHES AND DUG-OUTS

Captured by the Russians.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR

Rossosz

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■- To Prz£my5f

REFERENCE. ' } l^e^s/W ^^^Zbar^^^fef ^"

-Russian Front in Sprmq 1916. ife""^^ Jez,er^a^?0,./ f

Scale of Miles 1^^^toz^£^e3^*£a'^^s=4=*' „ »<^

/o 20 30 40 so XaTarnopol^-^^^^^^/0^:,.

azalya

THE VOLHYNIAN THEATRE OF WAR.

direction of Lvoff until it had reached and
conquered the Dniester crossings. But this
was tinder any circumstances a formidable
task, and was rendered still more so by the
fact that it would have had to guard against
Bothmer's army on its right. Outflanking
cuts both ways : a Russian force advancing
past the unbroken Austro-Oerman front on the
Middle Strypa might have outflanked the enemy
or might itself have suffered that fate. But
whereas a successful Russian movement to the
west would have still left Bothmer the possi-
bility of falling back on to the Halitch-Pod-
haytse-Denysoff line, a failure of our Allies
would have thrown them back on to the " belt

of the Dniester," a region devoid of practicable
lines of communication. Hence an advance
on the northern bank of the Dniester west of
Butchatch would have been an extremely risky
enterprise as long as Count Bothmer continued
to hold his part of the front, and in any case
could not have affected within reasonable time
the position in north-eastern Galicia and
Volhynia.

A Russian army advancing through the
Volhynian gap could therefore have relied only
on its own forces. But what were the main
lines of advance in front of it ? The two rail-
ways from Rovno to the west (the Rovno-
Rozhishche-Kovel and the Rovno-Brody-Lvoff

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE.

lines) open out into an angle of about tiu°. An
advance to the west would, therefore, have had
to follow divergent lines and would have spread
out like a fan. Such a movement, risky under
any circumstances, was rendered dangerous to
an extreme degree by the fact that in the
course of the war Kovel had been linked up
with Lvoff by the railway which, between
Vladimir-Volynsk and Sokal, connected the
older Kovel -Vladimir and Lvoff-Sokal lines. In
other words, at the base of the triangle formed
by Rovno, Lvoff, and Kovel the enemy pos-
sessed a lateral line of communication (rein-
forced, moreover, by the LvofT-Kamionka-
Stoyanoff railway), whereas our Allies, advanc-
ing from the east, would have had no such assist-
ance for quick manoeuvring.

The topographical conditions analysed
above determined the main outlines of tl.e
Russian strategy during the first phase of their
summer offensive in 1916.

In the Volhynian area our Allies advanced
as far to the west as was compatible with
safety " and then met the German counter-
offensive on a line on which they suffered from
no disadvantage in matters of communications.
In the district of Butchatch the initial success
was not pressed any further than was necessary
with regard to the progress made south of the
Dniester.

It was in the country between the Dniester
and the Carpathians that the advance was
pressed most vigorously during the first month
of the Russian offensive. Kere it was possible
to exploit to the full the initial advantage with-

AUSTRIAN MITRAILLEUSE GUN

Captured by the Russians. It was used as an
anti-aircraft gun.

AT RUSSIAN HEADQUARTERS.

At work on a tape machine.

out any danger of sudden reverses. The belt
of the Dniester, with its canons and forests,
covered the right flank of the advancing
Russian Army. By a rapid movement to the
south and south-west our Allies reached the
foot-hills of the Carpathians and soon even their
mountain passes. To the west the advance was
carried on to the very neighbourhood of Stanis-
lavoff, where the German counter-offensive was
met. To the superficial observer the progress
south of the Dniester may appear to have been
an advsnce into a blind alley, or at least into
a district of secondary strategic importance.
This was not, however, the case. Quite apart
from its great and obvious political and econo-
mic meaning; the Russian advance south of the
Dniester was also of first-rate strategic signifi-
cance. It cut a possible line of retreat of the
Austro-German centre, which clung tenaciously
to the line between Brody and Visniovtchyk.
Had the district south of the Dniester remained
in Austrian hands, the armies on the Tamopol
front would have been far less sensitive to
pressure from the northern flank ; their retreat
would not have been confined to a westerly
direction.

The first onslaught, together with the period
during which the initial successes were deve-
loped and consolidated — the advance of our
Allies west of Rovno and the resistance which
they subsequently offered to the German

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

counter-offensive, and their advance south of
the Dniester, culminating in the capture of
Czernovitz — constitute the first phase of the
great Russian offensive. It coincides roughly
with the first month of active operations. The
first days of July, in which General Lechitsky
carried forward his advance to the west beyond
Kolomea, and General Lesh opened his offensive
north of Kolki, on the right flank of General
Kaledin's Lutsk salient, can be regarded as the
beginning of the second phase of the Russian
advance in the summer of 1!)1(>.

On June 1 and 2 the Germans attacked the
Russian positions north-east and also south of
Krevo ; they continued their onslaught during
the night of June 2-3. The fear of approaching
events in the southern theatre of war was the
explanation of this sudden belated burst of
German activity north of the Marshes. On
June 4 the Austrian official communique
reported a violent Russian bombardment of
different parts of the Austrian front, especially
of the line held by the army of Archduke
Joseph Ferdinand, and closed with the following
significant statement : " Everywhere there are
indications that infantry attacks are imminent."
The German diversion came much too late to
influence in any way the Russian offensive
which was now commencing in the southern
area.

For months our Allies had been studying
the enemy positions and working out the
details of the coming advance. Everything
for the big attack had been arranged before-
hand, and on June 4 the Russian guns began
slowly and methodically to place their shells
on previously selected points of the enemy
line. It does not appear that any attempt
was made to wipe out the enemy trenches
themselves ; the object was rather to cut
avenues in the wire entanglements through
which the Russian infantry could proceed to
attack the enemy positions. The artillery pre-
paration in the different sectors lasted 12 to 30
hours. Then followed the Russian bayonet
attacks. As soon as the Russians entered the
Austrian front trenches the Russian artillery
developed a curtain fire which precluded all
communication with the rear. The Austrians
were trapped ; their fine deep trenches, covered
with solid oaken timbers, fastened with cement,
and surmounted by thick layers of earth, once
the Russians had reached them, were cages,
and death or surrender were the only alterna-
tives for their occupants. During the first

hours the enemy infantry, especially the
Hungarians, fought furiously. Thousands
were killed. Then their resistance began to
slacken, and they began to surrender. On
the first day alone the haul of Austrian prisoners
amounted to 13,000. On the third day (June
(i), by noon, the armies of General Brusiloff
had taken prisoners 900 officers and over
40,000 rank and file, and captured 77 guns and
1 34 machine-guns. Further, 49 trench-mortars
were captured, in addition to searchlights,
telephones, field kitchens, and a large quantity
of arms and material of war, with great reserves
of ammunition. A number of batteries were
taken intact with all their guns and limbers.
As ammunition magazines are usually stationed
about 10 miles behind the front trenches, the
enormous hauls of the first days by themselves
bear witness to the swiftness of the Russian
advance.

The shortness of the bombardment preceding
the attack and the simultaneous character of
the operations along a front of about 250 miles
were the novel features of the Russian offensive.
The results brilliantly justified these new
Russian tactics. "The, main element of our
success," said General Brusiloff to Mr. Wash-
burn, The Times correspondent, about a fort-
night after the commencement of the Russian
offensive, " was due to the absolute co-ordina-
tion of all the armies involved and the carefully
planned harmony with which the various
branches of the service supported each other.
On our entire front the attack began at the
same hour, and it was impossible for the enemy
to shift his troops from one quarter to another,
as our attacks were being pressed equally at
all points."

The most important fighting and the most
signal victory of those opening days occurred
within the triangle of Volhynian fortresses.
The original front in that district extended from
about Tsiunan on the Putilovka, across the
Rovno-Kovel railway, past Olyka — half-way
between Rovno and Lutsk — and then a few
miles east of Dubno across the Rovno -Brody
line towards Kremieniets. The country north
of the Rovno-Kovel railway is a sandy plain
covered with swamps and woods ; south of
Mlynoff the marshy course of the Ikva and the
huge oak-forests, from which Dubno derives
its name,* presented a serious barrier to an

* " Dub " means in Kussian " oak."

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

■2:!

THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE ON THE SOUTHERN FRONT.
Cattle for the Army.

advance of our Allies. The higher and more
open country in the centre offered, however,
tactical facilities for an offensive movement.
On June 3-4 the entire sector between the
Rivers Putilovka and Ikva was subjected to a
vigorous bombardment, the advance being
Dressed most vigorously due west from the
district of Olyka, along the Rovno-Lutsk road,
and from Mlynoff in a north-westerly direction.
Thus the attack against the fortress of Lutsk
itself was conducted along concentric lines.
The brunt of the Russian onset was borne by
the 10th (Hungarian) Division and the 2nd
Division, composed largely of Slav troops.
The attack on the very first day cut clean
through their lines and Russian cavalry poured
through the gaps. Large bodies of Austro-
Hungarian troops between Olyka and the Ikva
were cut off from all possibility of retreat,
before they even knew that their front had
been broken. On June 4, at headquarters at
Lutsk, celebrations were held in honour of
Archduke Frederick's birthday. The news of
the disaster came like a thunderclap on the
Austrian commanders. The 13th Division was
thrown into the gap to hold up the Russian
advance. It fared no better than its prede-

cessors. The speed with which our Allies
were moving beat all records. Almost to the
last moment the Austrian commanders at
Lutsk do not seem to have realized the full
extent of their disaster. By June 6, two days
after the advance had begun, the Russian forces
had advanced more than 20 miles from their
original positions. They were approaching
Lutsk from two sides. Lutsk itself, in a strong
natural position, covered on both wings by the
deep and tortuous valley of the River Styr,
had been changed in the course of the war into
a regular fortress. Defences of enormous
strength covered its approaches. Yet such
was the demoralisation of the beaten Austro-
Hungarian troops that they proved unable to
offer any serious resistance. Their lines were
broken through near Podgaytse a.nd near
Krupy, and on June 6, at 8.25 p.m., the first
Russian detachments entered Lutsk, which
the commander of the Fourth Austro-Hun-
garian Army, Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, had
left only in the afternoon. The ancient town
and the ruins of its magnificent old castle — in
which the Polish king, Wladyslaw Jagiello,
met in 1429 Vitold, Grand Duke of Lithuania,
and Sigismund of Luxembourg, Emperor of

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

Germany — suffered practically no damage, no
serious fighting having occurred within that
area. The panic among the enemy troops
round Lutsk was such that at one point they
left six 4 -in. guns without stopping to unload
them, and many cases of shell were still along-
side the weapons. In Lutsk itself considerable
military stores fell into the hands of our
Allies. Similarly the Austrians had not had
the time to clear out the hospitals, and
thus had to abandon thousands of their
wounded.

By June 8 the Russians had not merely
reached the line of the Styr and the Ikva, but
had even crossed it at many points. On the
same day German reinforcements began to
make their appearance. First to arrive was
a scratch division gathered from the region
of the Marshes, and including the 57th Land-
wehr and the 39th and 268th Landsturm
regiments. Subsequently the 18th, 81st, and
several other German divisions, also from the
northern area, were thrown into the Volhynian
battle ; they were drawn mainly from the
Dvina front- — e.g., the 22nd German Division —
and from the Ninth German Army. Field -
Marshal von Hindenburg could hardly dare to
weaken his forces in front of Vilna. With the
German reinforcements Genera] von Luden-
dorff, Chief of Hindenburg's Staff, was sent to
retrieve the Austrian fortunes. Von Linsingen
was put in command of the Volhynian front.
Yet it was not until full ten days after the
Russian offensive had begun that its advance
in Volhynia came to a halt, and then its arrest
was due as much to the requirements of the
Russian strategy as to the new armies which
the Germanic allies had drawn together from
all fronts.

On June 8-9 the severest fighting raged
round the two main crossings of the Rivers
Styr and Ikva — namely, in the districts of
Rozhyshche and Dubno, where the two chief
railway lines (Rovno-Kovel and Rovno-Brody)
pass over those rivers. Rozhyshche was,
moreover, an important base town containing
large military stores and a centre of com-
munications ; it was here that the light Austrian
field railways to Lutsk and to Kolki joined the
main line. The Austrians, vigorously supported
by fresh German reinforcements, offered a
desperate resistance to the Russians who
attacked Rozhyshche from the south-east.
Still, under cover of heavy artillery fire, the
Russian troops — recently formed units — crossed

the Styr and drove out the enemy, taking
numerous prisoners and booty.

At the southern end of the Volhynian salient
our Allies captured on the same day the fort
and town of Dubno. Here, however, the work
was not as easy as it had been at Lutsk, and the
picturesque old town suffered very severe
damage. Simultaneously with this advance
another Russian detachment captured the
Austrian point d'appui at Mlynoff (on the Ikva),
crossed the river, and occupied the region of the
village Demidovka. During the next few days
they completely cleared of the enemy the
forests which cover this region, thus securing the
Lutsk salient from a sudden counter-offensive
from the south. On June 13 they reached the
village of Kozin, 18 miles south-west of Dubno
and 9 miles west of the old battle front on the
Ikva.

Due west of Lutsk the Russian advance was,
meantime, progressing at considerable speed.
A screen of cavalry was thrown out, and
detachments of Cossacks were traversing the
country in every direction. On June 12 our
Allies reached Torchin, 18 miles west of Lutsk.
The next day fierce fighting occurred near
Zaturtsy, more than half-way from Lutsk to
Vladimir- Volynsk. By June 16 the sweep of the
Russian tide to the west in the Lutsk salient
had attained its high-water mark. Their
outposts occupied a wide semi-circle round
Olyka, with a radius of about 45 miles. It
stretched from about Kolki (on the Styr) in
the north, then followed the Stochod from near
Svidniki to the district of Kisielin, reached its
farthest extension to the west in the sector
Lokatchy-Sviniukhy-Gorokhoff, and then bent
back to the east towards Kozin.

It was on the two wings of that salient that
the last considerable gains were effected during
the first stage of the Russian offensive. The
Germans were certain to start soon a counter-
offensive. They were bringing up fresh troops
not merely from the northern area, but even
from France. They had to defend Kovel at any
price. Its loss would have meant the cutting
of the direct connexion between the northern
and southern armies. In view of this strong
gathering of the enemy a further advance in the
centre towards Vladimir-Volynsk was clearly
inadvisable. The enemy forces were being
concentrated not only round Vladimir, but also
on the wings. The flanks of the salient had
therefore been secured.

Tn the marshy district of Kolki, where so

THE TIMES HISTORY OE THE WAR.

many pitched battles had been fought, in the
autumn of 1915, the enemy was offering a
tough resistance. Nevertheless progress was
made by our Allies, and the village of Kolki
itself was captured on June 13. The Austro-
German troops were slowly retiring behind the
Stochod. On June 16, however, the enemy
attempted to counter the Russian advance
near Gadomytche, some 6 miles west of Kolki,
and also round Svidniki on the Stochod. A
violent battle developed in the narrow sector
where the courses of the Rivers Styr and
Stochod approach within some 6 to 8 miles of
one another. The German attacks were re-
pulsed, and in pursuit of the retreating army
a Siberian regiment, under Colonel Kisliy,
crossed the Stochod near Svidniki, capturing
an entire German battalion. In the same
battle the Hussars of White Russia, supported
by horse artillery, charged through three ex-
tended lines of the enemy and sabred two
Austrian companies. In the course of the
next few days the counter-attacks of the
enemy against Svidniki were repulsed, special
mention in the Russian official cotnmunique
being earned by a Cossack regiment under
Colonel Smirnoff.

Whilst the right wing of General Kaledin's
Army was thus securing the Russian front
round the Rovno-Kovel line, the extreme
left, with the help of the adjoining wing of
General Sakharoff's Army, was strengthening
its positions in the district south-west of
Dubno, on the Rovno-Brody railway. On
June 15 General Sakharoff's troops conquered
the Austrian positions on the River Plash-
chevka, between Kozin and Tarnavka (the
same region in which the famous Third Cau-
casian Army Corps, under General Irmanoff,
won its first victory over the Austrians in
August, 1914). One of the newly formed
Russian regiments under Colonel Tataroff,
after a fierce fight, forded the river, with the
water up to their chins. " One company was
engulfed, and died an heroic death," says the
Russian official communique of June 16, "but
the valour of their comrades and their officers
resulted in the disorderly flight of the enemy,
of whom 70 officers and 5,000 men were taken
prisoners." On June 16 our Allies entered
Radziviloff, the Russian frontier -station on
the Rovno-Brody-Lvoff railway, whilst to the
south-east they reached the line Potohaiefi-
Lopushno-Alexiniets.

RUSSIAN ADVANCE ON DUBNO.
An Austrian trench under a ruined house.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR'.

RUSSIAN TROOPS ENTRENCHED IN A FOREST.

Thus the 12 days of the Russian offensive
in Volhynia resulted in an advance of 30 miles
to the south-west of the recaptured fortress of
Dubno, and of a similar distance to the north-
west of Lutsk, the scene of their initial successes.
The entire Volhynian triangle of fortresses
was again in the hands of our Allies, whilst
their outposts approached within some 25 miles
of Kovel and reached the north-eastern border
of Galicia in front of Brody. In the course of
those 12 days the Army of General Kaledin
alone took prisoners 1,309 officers, 10 surgeons,
and 70,000 soldiers. It also captured 83 guns,
236 machine-guns, and an enormous quantity
ol war material.

About the middle of June the pressure of
the new German concentration was beginning
to make itself felt in Volhynia, and resulted
in about a fortnight of fierce but more or less
stationary fighting. Besides the divisions from
the northern area, previously mentioned, the
Germans were bringing up reinforcements even
from France, whilst the Austrians were with-
drawing all available reserves from the Tyrol,
the Italian front, and the Balkans, and from
their bases in the interior. Naturally parts of
these armies were detailed to the Tarnopol
front, others were sent to hold the Dniester
crossings, still others to guard the Carpathian
passes leading into Transylvania. Yet the
majoritv of these reinforcements were directed

to Volhynia, to ward off the danger which was
threatening Kovel and to prevent a further
Russian advance on Lvoff. The desperate
hurry in which these transfers were made is
best shown by the fact, which the Russians
learned from the note-book of a dead Austrian
officer, that a German army corps had been
moved from Verdun to Kovel in six days.
But the Germans seem to have come soon to the
end of their available reserves — and then our
Allies resumed their offensive in Volhynia.

" To illustrate the desperate shortage of the
German armies," said General Alexeieff on
July 22 to the Petrograd correspondent of
The Times, " I need only recall the well-estab-
lished fact that four divisions were hurried here
from France soon after June 4, when our
offensive began. These were the 19th and 20th.
forming the 10th Active Corps, and the 11th
Bavarian and 43rd Reserve Divisions. We
were expecting the 44th - Division, but it did
not appear. As usual, the Germans had under-
rated French powers of resistance. Although
17 divisions remain before Verdun, the enemy
found it impossible to move another man
hither, and as soon as the British armies
advanced all idea of transferring troops had to
be abandoned. The units confronting us
represent the maximum effort of Germany.
They are being moved about along the Russian
front, chiefly to the southward, in order to fill

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB.

■2'.)

up the tremendous gap caused by the over-
throw of the Austrians. Not a single fresh
unit has been produced by the enemy. Two
badly mauled divisions withdrawn from Verdun
constitute the strategical reserve of the German
Army. ' '

On June 16 the counter-offensive of the
enemy against the Lutsk salient began on the
entire front. The German operations which
had Kovel for their base were directed mainly
against the Stochod-Styr sector, whilst the
Austrians, supported by some German troops,
were fighting in front of Vladimir-Volynsk,
Sokal and Stoyanoff, attacking the Lokatehy-
Sviniukhy-Gorokhoff line. Before the persis-
tent, violent German onslaughts our Allies had
to withdraw their troops from the western
bank of the Stochod near Svidniki. Then a
furious battle ensued on the front extending
from Sokal by Gadomitche, Linievka, Voron-
chin to Kieselin. On June 19 the fighting
resulted in a marked success for our Allies,
who captured considerable numbers of prisoners.
The engagements continued unabated on the
following day. "The village of Gruziatyn
(two miles north of Gadomitche)," says the
Petrograd official communique of June 22,
" changed hands" several times. Yesterday
afternoon our troops raided the village, cap-
turing 11 officers, 400 men, and 6 machine-guns.
Nevertheless the heavy German fire once more
obliged us to evacuate the village." On the
same day, German attacks near Voronchin
and Raymiesto were completely defeated, and
the enemy ■ was compelled to withdraw in
haste. The battle was renewed during the
next few days, losing, however, gradually in
fierceness.

No less violent was the enemy's counter-
offensive against the apex of the Lutsk salient.
"In the region of the village of Rogovitchi,
south-east of the village of Lokatchy (four
miles south of the high road from Lutsk to
Vladimir - Volynsk)," says the Petrograd
official communique of June 19, " the Austrians
attacked our troops in massed formations, and,
breaking through one sector of the fighting
front, captured three guns of a battery which
bravely resisted until the last shell had been
fired. Reinforcements came up and routed
the advancing enemy, recapturing one gun,*
taking prisoners 300 soldiers and capturing
two macliine-guns."

* The recapture of the other two guns is mentioned in
the report of June 20.

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GENERAL KASHTALINSKI.

Similar and even more successful fighting was
reported under the same date from the Svini-
ukliy and the Gorokhoff fronts. In those
sectors the enemy was put to flight, losing
heavily in prisoners.

Further encounters were reported in the
course of the following few days. Having
inflicted some more or less sensible reverses
on the enemy, our Allies gradually withdrew
their line in the centre about five miles. The
western and south-western front of the salient
were slightly flattened out, being withdrawn
on to the Zaturtsy-Bludoff-Shklin-Lipa line.
Here, also, about June 24, the fighting began to
show signs of slackening.

In the last days of the month the Austro-
German armies resumed the counter-offensive
with redoubled fury. Desperate attempts
were made to drive wedges into the Russian
front on the Linievka-Kobchi line in the north,
near Zaturtsy in the centre, and round Ugrinoff

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

THE BUKOVINA AND SOUTH-EASTERN GAL1CIA.

in the south. " During these operations,"
wired Mr. Washburn from General Kaledin's
Headquarters under date of July 1 , " the conflict
has been ranging over the entire front of this
army without the enemy gaining a success
anywhere. It is stated that they have never
thrown forward such continuous masses of
troops heretofore in their efforts to break
through." A vast concentration of heavy
artillery, up to and including 8-in. calibre, with
quantities of ammunition which were stated
never to have been equalled in volume within

Russian experience, was used in those battles.
Yet the Russian line nowhere wavered, and
the enemy's counter-offensive ended in failure.
The meaning of that last desperate attempt
at driving in the Lutsk salient is obvious.
The Germans undoubtedly must have known
of the new Russian concentrations between
the big marshes and Kolki, where on July 4 the
army of General Lesh was to assume the
offensive, and of the near renewal of activities
by General Sakharoff, in front of Brody.
They also knew that a British offensive was

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

imminent in the West. They had, therefore,
to seek an immediate decision in Volhynia or
to give up their attempts at regaining the line
of the Styrand Ikva. The fateful day came
upon them both in the East and in the West,
before they had been able to achieve their
design in Volhynia.

The East-Galieian front, in .Time, 1916, fell
approximately into two divisions, which might
best be described as the Tarnopol and the
Butchatch sectors, the frontier between them
lying in the district of Burkanoff. North of
this boundary the ground is undulating,
wooded, the valleys marshy, and the, rivers
widen out at many points into ponds and
small lakes. Round Zalostse and Vorobiyovks.,
the course of the Sereth and of its tributaries
and the intervening hills offered excellent
opportunities for defence ; south of Kozloff,
the Strypa was in the main the front between
the opposing armies. Below Burkanoff the
aspect of the country changes completely. It
rises into a high plateau, cut by many deep
river canons, with steep banks ; marshes are

naturally very few, forests cover mainly the
sides of the canons, occasionally extending on
to the surrounding plain. These are the natural
lines of defence in Southern Podolia. In front
and south of Butchatch, the Austrians possessed,
moreover, quite exceptionally favourable con-
ditions for defence. On a stretch of about 12
miles the stream Olekhoviets runs parallel to
the River Strypa at a distance of only about a
mile to the east ; the country intervening
between these two river canons lies like a
rampart in front of the Strypa line, whilst the
wooded, rocky sides of the winding canons,
frequently bordered by stone quarries, offer
most excellent opportunities for fortifications,
ambuscades, gun emplacements, and enfilading
positions. The eastern approaches of the
Trybukhovtse-Yasloviets front (as the line of
the Olekhoviets was usually called from the
two chief localities on its banks) are open
fields ; there are but few depressions, and no
woods on 'the high plateau which intervenes
between it and the canon of the Dzhuryn. In
the extreme south, near the Dniester, south of
the Ustsietchko-Shutromintse-Yasloviets road

BURNING VILLAGES ON THE VOLHYNIA FRONT.
To envelope their retreat in smoke, the Austro-German forces set on fire villages and crops along)

their line.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

the ground presents serious difficulties for
military operations on a large scale.

On June 4, 1910, the main Russian attacks
were directed against the Tsebroff-Yorobiyovka
sector, the gate on the Tarnopol-Krasne-Lvoff
railway ; against the district of Burkanoff
and against the Trybukhovtse-Yasloviets line,
guarding the approaches to Butchatch and the
Butehatch-Nizhnioff-Stanislavoff railway. In
front of Tarnopol, in spite of most heroic
achievements on the part of the Russian troops,
supported in that quarter by a detachment of
Belgian armoured cars, under Major Semet, very
little ground was gained. The defensive posi-
tions of the Austrians were exceedingly strong,
and the immediate neighbourhood of the
Tarnopol -Lvoff railway, one of the best in
Eastern Europe (it was part of the Berlin-
Odessa line), offered them many advantages.
"Whether the leadership of the Bavarian general,
Count Bothmer, contributed in any way to the
success of the defence — as was hinted by Ger-
man writers — is a subject which may best be
left for discussion to Mittel-Europa itself. The
story, however, that it was due mainly to the
" heroism " of the German soldiers can be
dismissed, as there were very few of them on the
Upper Strypa, the majority of the troops en-
gaged having been West Galician regiments,
especially Polish mountaineers from the Tatra
and Beskid Mountains. In the Burkanoff-
Bobulintse sector, as a result of a series of battles
which proceeded throughout the first ten days of
the Russian offensive, our Allies drove the
enemy out of any positions which he held on the
eastern bank of the Strypa and even gained on
a considerable front the opposite side of the
river. The most signal success attended,
however, the operations of General Shcherba-
tieff's Army in the region of Butchatch. As the
result of an intense artillery preparation,
followed by infantry attacks, our Allies had
carried, by June 7, the entire line of the
Olekhoviets and reached the ridge between that
stream and the Strypa. After further bitter
fighting the Russians, at dawn on June 8,
entered Butchatch itself, and, developing their
success, captured the same day the villages of
Stsianka and Potok Zloty, a few miles to the
west of the Lower Strypa. In Potok Zloty our
Allies seized a large artillery park and consider-
able quantities of shells ; near Ossovitse (north
of Butchatch) a complete battery of 4/4 in.
howitzers ; they also took in the same neigh-
bourhood many prisoners, including the staff

of an Austrian battalion. After a week's
progress their advance in that region came,
however, to a halt, for reasons explained in our
general strategic survey of the first phase of the
Russian offensive. It was not resumed until
the first days of July, in conjunction with the
very considerable conquests of ground south of
the Dniester.

The problem with which General Lechitsky
was faced in his attack against the Bukovina
was by no means an easy one to solve. From
the north, where the Russian positions extended
about 40 miles farther west than in the Buko-
vina, that country is protected by the belt of
the Dniester. Of the three bridge-heads
across it, only the most westerly, that of
I'stsietchko,* was in the hands of our Allies ;
it was the least important, as the topographical
configuration of its surroundings hardly admits
movements of any considerable forces across
the river at that point. It could serve as gate
for cavalry or minor detachments, not as an
opening for an invasion by a whole army.
The most important bridgehead of Zaleshchyki,
where both a road and a railway cross the
Dniester, was entirely in the possession of the
Austrian army ; the enemy held also the
strong defensive positions which on the northern
bank cover the approaches to the river. There
remained the bridgehead of Ustsie Biskupie,
where the river separated the opposing armies.
At this point, however, the Russians had a
decisive advantage : the southern bank (held
by the Austrians) is low, and can be dominated
and taken under cross-fire by artillery posted
on the high northern bank of the Dniester
loop.')" This sector was indeed to play a most
important part in General Lechitsky's offensive
against the Bukovina.

Towards the east between the Rivers Dniester
and Pruth the northern corner of the Buko-
vina borders for about 20 miles on Bessarabia ;
south of the Pruth Rumanian territory pro-
tected the flank of General von Pflanzer-
Battin's Army. Most of what appears on the
map like a gap between the two rivers js in
reality blocked by a range of liills, called the
Berdo Horodyshche, and rising 300-800 feet

* At Ustsietchko both banks of the Dniester are
Galician ground. There has been some confusion among
British writers concerning the western frontier of the
Bukovina, and it may therefore be worth emphasising
that the towns of Horodenka, Sniatyn, and Kuty are
all three in Galicia, and that Kolomea lies no less than
35 miles west of the Bukovina border.

t A description of the Okna-Onut depression was given
in Chapter LXXXV.. p. 14i.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

THE RE-OCCUPATION

New recruits passing through

above the valley of the Pruth.* Only in the
northern corner, between Dobronovtse and
Okna, in the valley of the Onut, does the range
drop into a small plain. This plain, which
was to become the opening for the Russian
offensive, is almost isolated on the southern
and south-eastern sides, where, on Russian
ground, the wooded hills extend to the very
canon of the Dniester. Not even a secondary
road approached Okna or Dobronovtse from
that direction. An advance from Bessarabia
seemed, therefore, to be fraught with almost
insuperable difficulties. Yet. having found
during their operations on the Toporovtse-
Rarantche front in January, 1916, that the
defences of the Berdo Horodyshche could
not be forced to any appreciable extent
by a frontal attack, our Allies decided to
attempt the seemingly impossible, and to open
their offensive by a concentric attack against
the north-eastern corner of the Bukovina.
It must be accounted one of the most extra-
ordinary achievements of the Russian troops
in that district that they were able, to carry
out their vast preparations in that diffi-
cult region without being noticed by the
enemy. From the west the access to (hat
sector is extremely easy, and even if the
depression of Okna could not have been held,

* Of. the description of that, sector given in Chapte
CX.. pp. 114-HB.

OF RUSSIAN TERRITORY,
a town to join the Russian Army.

with reasonable foresight the Austrians ought
to have been able to offer effective resistance
on the Toutry-Yurkovtse-Dobronovtse line.
But they seem to have been caught by surprise.
On June 2 the Russians began to bombard
the Austrian positions at Okna ; in the after-
noon of the following day the fire increased
considerably in violence, and on June 4 the
first infantry attacks were launched across the
river. The Austrian troops withdrew about
3 miles south of the Okna position on to Hills
233 and 238. About the same time our Allies
opened their attacks against Dobronovtse. As
soon as the plan of the Russian offensive had
been disclosed, it became clear that an abso-
lutely decisive battle was being fought in that
secluded north-eastern corner of the Bukovina.
Some of the best Hungarian troops were sent
against the Russians ; some of the best Magyar
blood was shed in this desperate contest on the
ramparts before the gates opening into Transyl-
vania.* After four days of fighting the

* Among the casualties of the battle of Okna was
Count Julius Esterhazy, the third member of that
family to be killed in the war. He was a man of 47, yet
had volunteered for the army as a, private. Whatever
one may think about Magyar policy and the heavy
burden of guilt which it bore in this war, their patriotism
deserves the fullest praise. Whilst the Viennese
aristocracy from the very beginning left, the hard work
of fighting to evidently less precious members of society,
and whilst the Prussian Junkers for the most part dis-
creetly withdrewfrom the front and busied themselves, for
instance, with guarding the Dutch border, the Magyar
aristocracy continued to fight and bleed for their country.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

defence of the enemy began to weaken. By
June 9 liis position was practically hopeless.
" In spite of a desperate resistance on the part
of the enemy." says the Petrograd official
communique of June 11, " a violent flanking
fire, and even curtain fire, and the explosions
of whole sets of mines, General Lechitsky's
troops captured the enemy's position south of
Dobronovtse, 14 miles north-east of Czerno-
vitz. In that region alone we captured
18,000 soldiers, one general, 347 officers, and
10 guns, and at the time this report was sent
off prisoners were still streaming in in large
parties."

On the same day the Austrians blew up the
railway station at Yurkovtse. A wedge had been
driven into the enemy front between the Rivers
Dniester and Pruth, the positions of the Berdo
Horodyshche were turned, the bridgehead of
Zaleshchyki. one of the proudest re-conquests
of the Austrian armies in that region — dearly
paid for in blood — had suddenly lost all strategic
value : the Russians were now in possession of
the ground both north and south of Zaleshchyki.
By June 12 our Allies held the bridgehead itself,
and even the village of Horodenka, the junction
of six first-class high roads (including one
leading by Ustsietchko to Tchortkoff). All

gates into Northern Bukovina were now wide
open and safe against any counter-attack by
the enemy. The greater part of the defeated
army of General von Pflanzer-Baltin had to
seek safety beyond the Pruth ; his front now
extended east and west, thus leaving only
weaker detachments north of the Pruth, on the
road towards Kolomea. Our Allies made the
fullest use of their opportunities. They were
advancing rapidly. The following is the account
of those clays given in a Polish paper by a land-
owner from the neighbourhood of Sniatyn :
"During the night of June 12-13, terrific
artillery fire was heard in the town. Somewhere
near a battle was raging. For the third or
fourth time since the beginning of the war we
were passing through that experience. I went
to the army-command to ask advice. A staff-
captain had just arrived with news from the
front. The Austrian troops were resisting.
Still, after the front between the Dniester and
Pruth had once been broken there was no other
natural line for resistance. According to the
accounts of the Austrian officers, the Russian
artillery was, with magnificent bravery, driving
up to new positions, thus preventing our men
from entrenching and preparing a new line.
" ' How long can we hold out ? ' was my

THE ADVANCE IN THE BUKOVINA.
A Russian patrol reporting at Headquarters after a raid.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

A RUSSIAN TROPHY.
A gun captured from a regiment of Prussian Grenadiers.

question. The old general looked at me and
answered : ' Only our rearguards are now
engaged ; our forces are gathering a few miles
from here. If our flank near Horodenka holds
out overnight we shall not evacuate the town.'

" I returned to Sniatyn. . . . Small groups
of inhabitants were standing about the streets,
commenting on the news. Artillery and ammu-
nition were at full speed passing through the
town for the front. A few regiments of infantry
marched through at night. , . . The horizon
was red with the glow of fires. For the third
time our poor villages were burning. Whatever
had survived previous battles was now given up
to the flames. Homeless refugees, evacuated
from the threatened villages, were passing with
their poor, worn-out horses and their cows — all
their remaining wealth. In perfect silence ; no
one complained ; it had to be. . . . Mysterious
cavalry patrols and despatch-riders were riding
through the streets. No one slept that night. . . .

" In the morning the first military transports
passed through the town. The retreat had
begun. Questions were asked. The Magyar
soldiers quietly smoked their pipes ; there was
no way for us of understanding one another.
Only one of them, who knew a few German
words, explained ' Russen, stark, stark, Masse '

(' Russians, strong, strong, a great mass ')....
The approaching violent fire of heavy guns was
even more enlightening. Our trained ears
could distinguish their voices. Like a con-
tinuous thunder was the roar of the Japanese
(Russian) guns ; at intervals they were
answered nervously by the Austrian artillery.

" Suddenly the gun-fire stopped and the
expert ear could catch the rattling of machine
guns. The decisive attack had begun. All
a-strain, we were awaiting news. Some soldiers
appeared round the corner of the road, slightly
wounded. . . . Then a panic began. Someone
had come from a neighbouring village reporting
that he had seen Cossacks. Soon refugees front
the villages outside were streaming through the
town. General confusion. Children were crying,
women sobbing. A mass flight began. Again
cavalry and despatch-riders. Then a drum was
heard in the square. It was officially given out
that the situation was extremely grave and
that whoever wished to leave the town had
better do so immediately.

"We had to go. As I was mounting the
carriage I perceived in the distance, near the
wood on the hill, a few horsemen with long
lances — Cossacks from Kuban. They were
slowly emerging from the forest and approach-

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

<
>
<
u

D
as

fa
O

B
J

ing the town. ' Drive ahead ! ' I shouted to the
coachman."

On June 13 the Russians entered Sniatyn for
the third time in the course of the war.

The Austrians soon came to see that, at least
in this part of the country, the game was up.
Near Niezviska, north-west of Horodenka, on
the Kolomea-Butchatch road, in the biggest of
the Dniester loops, they had been constructing
a new bridge across the river. It was meant
to become one of the most important bridge-
heads, safely covered against attacks from the
north by the two narrow necks of the river
loop. Once the Dniester line had been turned
from the south the position at Niezviska lost
all value, just as had that of Zaleshchyki. The
bridge, a structure some 40 feet high, was
now destroyed by its builders. Farther back
to the west, at Tlumatch, Ottynia, and Kolomea
measures were taken for the evacuation of the
civilian population. The Austrian officials were
leaving the towns, and all men of military age
were compelled to join in the flight ; in many
cases their families followed them, and a new
wave of refugees was rolling towards the
west. To many of them, with characteristic
egotism and heartlessness, Hungary closed its
doors.

No less hopeless, in the long run, was the
position of the Austrians south of the Pruth.
The strong line of the river made it possible
for them to hold up the Russian advance for a
few days. Yet no illusion could be entertained
concerning the ultimate issue of the struggle
for Czernovitz. On Sunday, June 11, at 6 a.m.,
an official proclamation, signed by Herr von
Tarangul, Chief of the Czernovitz police, was
posted on the walls announcing that on the same
day the town was expected to come under the
fire of the Russian guns. What a sudden change !
After a break of a year and a half, the University
of Czernovitz, the farthest outpost of German
Kultur in the East, had just resumed its
work.* Its Pan-German Professors, who in the
summer of 1915 had been celebrating noisy
festivities of " brotherhood in arms " (Waffeu-
bruderschafl) with German officers, had now
shown their sure military instinct by appoint-
ing Archdukes Frederick, Eugene and Joseph

* German was the language at the University cf
Czernovitz, although 40 per cent, of the population of
the Bukovina are Little Russians, 35 per cent. Rou-
manians, 13 per cent. Jews, 3 per cent. Poles (mainly of
Armenian extraction), and only about 9 per cent.
Germans. These Germans are concentrated mainly in
the town and direct neighbourhood of Czernovitz.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

RUSSIAN TROOPS PASSING THROUGH LUTSK.

The principal street, through which the troops are passing, called Emperor Nicholas Street, was renamed
by the Austrians Emperor Franz Josef Street.

Ferdinand, and also General Conrad von
Hoetzendorf , ' ' honorary doctors ' ' of the
University. Even the fatal day of June 4
was still meant to be at Czernovitz a day of
festivities. The town was beflagged as " an
Imperial Eagle in Iron " (em Reichsaar in
Eisen) was unveiled at the Ratfiaus " in memory
of the time of Russian occupation " (zur
Erinnerung an die Eussenzeit). The wide town-
square was filled with people, and General von
Pflanzer-Baltin himself was expected. But
then in the afternoon, whilst the artillery fire
in the north, in the direction of Okna and
Dobronovtse, was getting louder and louder, a
despatch-rider arrived with the following mes-
sage, which was read out to the expectant
crowds in the square : " His Excellency General
von Pflanzer-Baltin is prevented from taking
part in the festivities of to-day, and gives
notice of his absence."

Six days later crowds were again filling the
town-square — no longer to " commemorate "
the Russian occupation of Czernovitz. " On
Saturday, June 10, at 6 p.m.," wrote a cor-
respondent of the Polish daily Gazeta Wieczorna

(Lvoff), who spent in Czernovitz the fatal
ten days in June, " military transports began
to traverse the main streets of the town,
moving from the direction of the bridgehead of
Zhuchka towards Starozhyniets. It was an
interminable chain of all kinds of vehicles,
from huge, heavy motor lorries down to light
gigs driven by army officers. The waves of
war were rolling through the city.

" As if at a given sign the town-square filled
with people. Frightened, searching eyes were
asking for an explanation. Terrifying news
began to circulate, the excited imagination of
the crowd was at work. Mysterious informa-
tion was passed from mouth to mouth, yet no
one knew anything definite. A fever got hold
of the town. . . . With bags, boxes and
baskets people were hurrying to the railway
station. ' Is an " evacuation -train " leaving,
and when ? ' they were asking with the persis-
tence of desperation. The hours were moving
slowly, and the night came over the city, full
of despondency and gloom.

' ' And still the endless military transports
were traversing the streets. But no longer was

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

any notice taken of them. . . . The guns were
playing, the excitement was growing. At
7 p.m. the civilian authorities received the
order of evacuation. Everything was to be
ready for the train at 6 a.m. which, besides
Government property, was to carry off the
railway employees and their families.

" The coffee-houses were filling with people.
. . . All Government officials put on their
uniforms, all Government authorities, even the
police, granted leave to their employees,
demanding no more than a show of the per-
formance of official duties. The town cor-
poration paid out to its officers two months'
salaries and sent them off to Sutchava, where
all the evacuated Government authorities were
going. No official was, however, to leave the
Bukovina wit'hout permission. (The fact which
naturally is not mentioned in this account is
that, before leaving the town, the Austrian
authorities arrested a number of prominent
citizens of Russian or Rumanian nationality
— among them the Greek-Orthodox Archbishop
Dr. Repta — and carried them away to Dorna
Vatra, and subsequently farther on to the
interior. )

" The command of the army corps from
Sadagora (4 miles north of Czernovitz, on tie
opposite side of the Pruth) took up quarters at
the ' Black Eagle ' Hotel.

" Suddenly — no one knows how — the news
spread that the army-group of General Papp
had evacuated its positions and was retreating.
Even the hour of the event was known. The
information was correct. . . . The greatest
optimists now gave up all hope. . . . The
safety of the Bukovina was closely connected
with the name of General Papp. . . .

" The grey dawn found the city in full
flight. . . . The streets were filled with crowds,
the tramcars were carrying wounded soldiers, as
at the order of the army-command the evacua-
tion of the military hospitals had been started.
The square before the railway station was
closely packed with people, but the police were
admitting only railway officials. The women
were begging, crying, lifting up their children.
They had to wait — that train was not meant
for them.

" At 8 a.m. the first evacuation train left the
city. The next was due at noon, or at 3 p.m.
Many people preferred to fly by foot, as the
prices of cabs and cars had risen to an incredible
height. The artillery fire was drawing closer
and closer, and above the heads of the crowd

appeared a Russian aviator. Their hearts were
shaking with fear. . . .

" The prices of goods in the town were falling
rapidly. Tobacco and cigarettes, which pre-
viously were hardly to be had anywhere, were
offered at half-price without any restrictions.
Women from the suburbs who, not knowing
what had happened, had brought their vege-
tables to the market, were selling them for a
third of the usual price, only to be able to return
to their homes and children. For the merchants
in Czernovitz the evacuation was a catastrophe.
As they had been supplying the army with
goods, they had gathered stores valued at
millions of crowns. None of them could be
carried away ; only Government property was
being removed.

' ' The news that the town would soon come
under fire led to a sheer panic. The crowd in
front of the station was seized with frenzy.
Against the resistance of the officials it forced
its way into the station and invaded a half-
empty military train. The same happened in
the case of the next train, and to all the
following ones. In the course of Sunday
6 to 8,000 people left Czernovitz. . . ."

By June 13 our Allies had reached the Pruth
on the entire front from Nepokoloutz to Boyan.
The Austrians had evacuated Sadagora, and,
withdrawing across the river, had blown up the
bridge at Mahalla. They effected their retreat,
not without very heavy losses both in men and
material. At Sadagora the Russians seized a
large store of engineering material and an
aerial railway. Reviewing the entire captures
made by the army of General Lechitsky since
the beginning of the operations, the Russian
official communique of June 13 stated that his
troops alone had taken prisoners 3 com-
manders of regiments, 754 other officers,
37,832 soldiers, and had captured 120 machine
guns, 49 guns, 21 trench mortars, and 11 mine-
throwers.

For three days the Austrian forces were
holding up the Russian advance across the
Pruth. They were considerably favoured by
topographical conditions. On the southern bank
a range of hills rises above the flat Pruth
valley ; they command all the passages across
it. Hence the forcing of the river was by no
means an easy task : it was achieved by our
Allies on June 16. The same night the Austrians
began the first military evacuation of Czerno-
vitz, and on June 17, at 4 p.m., Russian troops
entered the town, and were received with j o y by

1(1

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

their own compatriots and the Rumanians (in
so far as they had not been " evacuated " by the
Austrian authorities). As a matter of fact, the
town had suffered very little ; although it had
been for almost a week within the range of the
Russian guns, it had not " come under their
fire." Only the main railway station had been
shelled and destroyed (to the " Volksgarten "
station the Austrians themselves had set fire
after the last " evacuation train " had left it on
June 17, at 2.30 a.m.), and some streets near the
Pruth had been slightly damaged during the
battle for the river crossings. TheVicar-General
of Czernovitz, Herr Sclrmid himself, in an
interview with the Vienna Reichspost, denied
the stories about the destruction of Czernovitz
circulated by certain German and Austrian
journalists. " The tales about the residence of
the Greek-Orthodox Archbishop and the centre
of the town having been shelled and destroyed
are inventions. Altogether six civilians have
been wounded during the bombardment." One
sincerely wishes a similar account could have
been given of Reims or Ypres.

On the occupation of Czernovitz, Colonel
Bromoff was appointed commander of the
city, whilst Dr. George Sandru, the Greek-
Orthodox vicar of the Paraskieva Church — a
native of Czernovitz of Rumanian nationality
— was entrusted with its civilian administration
until the return of Dr. Bocancea. (The latter,
a local Rumanian barrister, had been mayor
of Czernovitz during the second Russian occupa-
tion, November 27, 1914-February 22, 1915,
and had then withdrawn with the Russian
troops.)

The piercing of the Dniester-Pruth front had
knocked out the keystone of the Austrian defen-
sive system in the south. It had practically cut
off the army of General von Pflanzer-Baltin from
that of General Count Bothmer. Then the
forcing of the Pruth line tlrrew back the troops
of Pflanzer-Baltin on to the Carpathian passes ;
the forces gathered in front of Kolomea,

Stanislavoff, and the Dniester crossings passed
henceforth under Bothmer's command.

The line of the River Sereth (not to be con-
fused with another river in Galicia bearing the
same name) was the only one south of the
Pruth on which the Austro-Hungarian troops
might have held up the advance of our Allies,
had they been given time to organize their
defences. But the Russians allowed them no
respite. On June 18 they had already reached
Starozhyniets, south of which the so-called
" Transylvanian road " crosses the Sereth. On
the same day our Allies captured also the town
of Kutclmrmare. On June 19 they crossed
the Sereth, and on the 21st they entered
Radautz, 30 miles south of Czernovitz. At the
same time other Russian detachments were
advancing to the west, up the valley of the
Tcheremosh (a confluent of the Pruth) past
Vizlmits, towards Kuty. Retiring in haste
before them, the Austrians set fire to the new
big bridge over the river. On June 22 our
Allies entered Kuty, and during the next few
days hacked their way through past Kossoff
to Pistyn. From three sides, from the north-
east, the east, and the south-east, they were
now closing in on Kolomea.

In the Bukovina itself the Russian advance
was, meantime, continuing with amazing
speed. Within 24 hours of the capture of
Pvadautz, our Allies entered Gora Humora,
some 20 miles farther to the south. By the
evening of June 23 they had taken, after a
fierce struggle, the town of Kimpolung, cap-
turing about GO officers and 2,000 men, and
7 machine-guns. Thus practically the whole of
the Bukovina had passed again into the hands
of the Russians. As the result of a three weeks'
campaign, they had conquered a province
more than half as large as Wales, a province
dearly loved by the Austrian-Germans as a
reputed outpost of Deutschtum in the East,
highly valued by the Magyars as a rampart
covering Transylvania.

CHAPTER CXXXVIII.

THE BATTLE OF VERDUN (III.).

Position at End of April, 1916 — The Fourth Month of the Battle — Political Situation in
France — A Secret Session of the Chamber — M. Briand's Position Strengthened — Fighting
on the Left Bank of the Meuse — Avocourt Wood, Hill 304, and the Mort Homme — French
Attack on Dotjaumont — Changes in Command — General Nivelle — General Mangin —
Destruction of German Observation Balloons — Heavy Fighting Described — The Mort
Homme Again — German Progress at the End of May — Enormous Loss of Life — The Fall
of Vaux — Major Raynal's Heroic Defence — Fresh German Assaults — Situation at Fleury
— Co-ordination of Allied Strategy — Preparation of the Franco -British Offensive on
the Somme — Effect on the Verdun Battle.

THE issue at Verdun, once the first
German plan of overwhelming the
Meuse fortress by weight and by
surprise had been abandoned as
being impossible of attainment, was mainly a
question of time.

The Germans sought feverishly to rain blow
after blow upon the French ; to attract to the
Meuse front the French general reserves, and
so to pound the French Army as to render it
incapable of giving any really solid assistance
to the British offensive on the Somme which in
June, to the knowledge even of the man in the
street, was inevitably imminent. The months
of May and June, 1916, were in this respect
decisive. The French by the valour of their
infantry, by the skill of their leadership, by
the growing strength of their heavy artillery,
were able during this period, not only to defend
Verdun and gain time for their British Allies
to bring the weight of their mobilized resources
to bear upon the northern front, but also to
avoid the extensive loss, the utter crippling,
which their enemy sought to inflict upon them.
Not only was Verdun, or what remained of it,
still in French hands when the British began
their great offensive on the Somme, but in that
offensive the French triumphantly showed
that their reserves of men and of material were
Vol. IX.— Part 106. 41

still capable of supporting the double action of
defence on the Meuse and offence on the
Somme. This result was not achieved without
great labour, without stern heroism.

The fourth month of the battle for Verdun
was ushered in by some of the fiercest fighting
of the war. Worn-out troops — or rather men
who, according to all the tests of human
resistance, should have been worn out — were
called upon to furnish an effort of resistance
greater than any up till then demanded of an
army. There was more than that. The
enemy at the outset of the war had clearly
shown by the nature of his propaganda, by
the tone of his Press comment, that he still
possessed a notion of French psychology
dating from the terrible year of 1870. He
still imagined, as was shown in a hundred ways,
that the French were incapable of bearing
defeat. This idea he extended both to the
army and to the civilian population. Especially
was it a firmly-fixed idea of the Germans
that when every other ally played them false
they would be able to count upon the pas-
sionate blindness of the French politician.

There can be no mistake about the Verdun
battle. It cost the French very dear. There
was hardly a village throughout the country
which had not contributed to the glory of its

4'2

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

THE COMMANDER OF
General Joffre visits General Nivelle (on right),

defence. In spite of a censorship which at
times and in certain ways took too timorous
a view of the character of the French civilian,
the country as a whole knew only too well
what was the price of glory on the Meuse.
It may be easy for a demagogue to declare
from the comparative safety of a public plat-
form that a country prefers death to slavery,
but when the icy fingers of death seem to be
feeling at the heart of everyone in a country,
only true courage, only the purest patriotism,
can support the strain. The strain placed
upon the French by the continuance of the
Verdun fighting was manifold. There were
moments when all seemed lost. It became
a commonplace both in France and in Great
Britain to say that the peoples of the
two countries had shown themselves infinitely
superior to their Governments. Great though
were the services of the French Parlia-
ment to the common cause, it is equally
true to say that the French Parliament in its

THE VERDUN ARMY.

who in May, 1916, succeeded General Petain.

main manifestations did not adequately repre-
sent the courage and steadfastness of the con-
stituencies. There were occasions when Par-
liament, which knowing little feared much,
seemed likely to leap the barriers of common-
sense and embark upon political and mili-
tary adventures of an extremely hazardous
nature. That temptation became increas-
ingly strong during the months of May and
June, when the nature and conditions of the
early part of the Verdun battle became generally
known.

The whole of France knew more or less
directly that mistakes had been committed. It
was but natural that there should be a clamour
for enquiry and for remedy. It is to the honour
of French Parliamentarism that this demand
never went outside the limits of common-sense.
The French Deputy showed the enemy clearly
that all his calculations founded upon political
internal disruption were based upon false
premises.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

There was another and more subtle strain.
British propaganda — a propaganda destined to
inform France of the real nature of British effort
and achievement — had been singularly in-
effective. It seemed as though the British
Government was unable or unwilling to
attempt to set on foot any adequate machinery
for supplying the friendly French Press with a
proper service of British news which would give
to the bulk of the country a real notion of the
extent of the wholehearted cooperation of
Great Britain in the war as well as of the value
of the services already rendered by the British
Fleet.

The ordinary Frenchman of 1916 was able to
converse with complete fluency and with some
intelligence about a number of Continental
problems which had never tired the brains of
his British colleague. But when it came to an
understanding of British conditions, of British
character, and of the unvarying nature of British
foreign policy, there was as much ignorance in
France as was displayed in those circles in
England — fortunately limited — which before the
war feared the recrudescence of a jingo France.
The French had been told of the efforts made
to recruit the British Army. They had followed
with sympathy, but, be it said, without compre-

hension, the dying compromises of the Volun-
tary system. They admired our voluntary
effort without in the least understanding its
magnitude. There was no one to point out
authoritatively to them that Great Britain,
perhaps alone of the three great Powers of the
Entente, had furnished the means of defence
promised at the very outbreak of the war.
There was none to draw French attention
to the fact that in the preparation of the
defensive league of the Entente it was never
contemplated that Great Britain should fur-
nish an army on the Continental scale. We
were to represent the sea and finance force
of a defensive combination, the soldiers of
which were France and Russia. None
had ' shown them that our first duty to
ourselves and to our Allies had been to see to
the Fleet ; that therefore the first call upon our
industrial resources was naval. There was
none to remind the French peasant of the actual
mathematical problems of war equipment. It
was, therefore, but natural that while the
French were bearing alone the great blood drain
of Verdun there should have been a hopeful
field for German propaganda directed towards
creating bad blood between the Allies. Now
and again indeed, in moments of depression, a

A FRENCH GUN.
In an improvised emplacement for indirect fire.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

few Frenchmen exclaimed, " What are the
English doing ? " And yet it was proved
ultimately that a few frank words from British
Ministers declaring that the British Army had
placed itself completely at the disposal of
General Joffre from the very start of the Verdun
operations almost sufficed to remove this
feeling.

The effect of Verdun upon the internal political
situation in France was more marked, and
indeed at one time seemed likely to be consider-
able. Throughout the war the role of the French
Chamber of Deputies and of the Upper House,

WAR'S ALARM BELL.

A bell removed from a ruined village church and

fixed up in a trench to warn French troops against

the German asphyxiating gas attacks.

the Senate, had been one of great delicacy
and difficulty. At the outbreak of the struggle
Parliament in a fine expression of the country's
feeling decided at once to bury the political
hatchet and to leave the Government unfettered
by criticism to grapple with the many problems
of national defence. In the first months of
the war there was in France a series of
problems to be settled similar to those
which arose in England. The French had
their shell shortage to meet. They had
many gaps in their heavy artillery to make
good, and towards the end of the first
six months of war it became apparent that in

some respects at least the Government had not
displayed the requisite energy in dealing with
these matters nor the necessary foresight in
arranging for heavy gun construction. Par-
liament, therefore, felt it to be its duty to resume
the functions of control conferred upon it by
the Constitution. The exercise of that control
brought about no small amount of friction
between Government and Chambers. The
Ministers attacked defended themselves with
tenacious vigour, and already in 1914 there
were Parliamentarians who wondered whether
in the machinery of secret sittings of the
Chamber the Government might not be forced
to reveal all and to deliver peccant Ministers
to Parliamentary judgment.

When the first accounts of the early clays at
Verdun became known, the clamour for a
secret sitting at which the House could be
informed of all the documents bearing upon
the conditions of the defence of Verdun
increased. The agitation had the support of
M. Clemenceau in the Senate, and in the
Chamber of Deputies a large body of opinion
favoured the demand, which, after much
Parliamentary fencing and skirmishing, was
finally accepted by M. Briand, the Prime
Minister, and the first secret sitting of the
Chamber of Deputies was held on June 16.
The main purpose of secrecy was to enable
private members to inform themselves fully
as to the steps taken by the Higher Command
to place Verdun in a proper condition of
defence before the beginning of the German
offensive on February 21. A subject of this
nature was quite evidently not proper matter
for public comment. A Parliamentary debale
upon the Higher Command during the very
height of battle was evidently full of danger.
M. Briand determined that a debate restricted
to this military subject would be more dan-
gerous than a general discussion of the whole
of the Government's war policy. The pro-
ceedings were marked by one or two inci-
dents, notably by a speech by M. Delcasse
on foreign policy, which failed to obtain the
approval of the House. The final result of
the secret sittings in the Chamber, as well
as of those held later in the Senate was to
strengthen the Government's hands and to
increase the prestige of its leader. No other
result was, indeed, possible ' at a time when
the whole future of Europe was still under
public and violent debate in the fighting on
the Meuse. ■

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

A CORDUROY ROAD ON THE FRENCH FRONT.
Trees destroyed by the enemy bombardment.

Meanwhile, the French nation as a whole
admirably resisted all the pressure placed upon
them by events, and the attitude of the popu-
lation, civil and military, was a model for
futurity. They passed through weeks of
strained anxiety. It was a time of severe test

for the General Staff, for people, and for
Parliament. The French war spirit emerged
triumphant from these tests, and the enemy
failed to reap any permanent moral or political
advantage from the blood poured out upon the
Meuse slopes in the continuance of the great

106—2

THE TIMES HISTORY- OF THE WAR.

FRENCH TROOPS

Leaving their billets to take their place in the

fighting-line.

effort begun against Verdun at the end of
February.

The growing activity of the Germans on
the British front, the aerial activity over the
British Isles, the attempted Irish rising, and
signs of fresh naval activity in the North Sea led
many persons to imagine at the end of the
month of April that the German had learned
his lesson, was about to accept defeat at
Verdun, and was getting ready to turn his
attention to the once "contemptible" army in
the north. There were, indeed, not a few
General Officers in France who were inclined
to share this view, which, indeed, found
expression in a semi-official statement issued
in Paris. At the ■ General Staff, however,
there were no illusions, and when after a pro-
longed pause the battle flamed up again
there was no weakening in the French armour.
The next great outburst of activity began in
the first week of May.

The course of the fighting was extremely
simple. On the left bank all German progress
had been stayed by the resistance of the
Mort Homme, and the fighting here consisted
throughout May and the greater part of June
in a series of tremendous thrusts, some aimed
directly at the Mort Homme positions of the
French, while others bore upon the flanking
bastions of that great natural fortress.

On the right bank of the river the enemy
proceeded to bring all his effort to bear upon
one point after another, his attacks being
centred mainly upon Thiaumont work and
the region of Douaumont and Vaux.

During the first week of May, under cover
of heavy preliminary bombardment, the enemy
completed his new concentration of troops.
The battle began again upon the left bank,
where, at the close of April, the French had
begun to make local progress in the neigh-
bourhood of the Mort Homme.

A characteristic feature of the strategic course
of the Battle of Verdun was the tendency of the
German attack to displace itself ever farther
westwards and away from the main objective.
They had begun in February with the vain
attempt to batter straight through the northern
front. They were stopped by the Douaumont
defence and tried to find a vulnerable spot in
Pepper Ridge. Here, also, they were foiled,
and were forced to carry the battle over to the
left bank of the Meuse, trying to get through
Crows' Wood, Cumieres Wood, and Goose
Ridge. This also proved impossible, so long
as the French held the Mort Homme, which,
in its turn, became the centre of attack. Frontal

FRENCH TROOPS
On their way to the trenches.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

TO STEM A COUNTER-ATTACK.
French advanced party waiting for the Germans.

assault upon the Mort Homme had proved
altogether too costly a plan to be followed,
and at the beginning of May the front spread
farther west again to Hill 304 and Avocourt
Wood.

The Mort Homme was the culminating point
of a long, undulating plateau, running almost
due north and south from Forges Stream to the
Bois Bourrus. East of it lay the broad valley
of the Meuse. On the west the plateau sloped
more gradually down to the little stream of
Esnes, which divided the Mort Homme from
Hill 304. The ground here rose rapidly
through a fringe of thin woods to a bare,
C-shaped plateau, about two and a half miles
long and a few hundred yards wide. For
three days and three nights the whole of this
ridge was swept by artillery fire. The French
were driven out of their first-line trenches,
and the enemy got a footing on the ridge.
Using fresh troops with great prodigality, the
enemy made almost superhuman efforts to
develop this small success, but on May 10 he
was forced once again to withdraw his shattered
divisions, and, following the logic of the battle,
to prepare for a further effort, and to seek for
some means of turning Hill 304. Thus the
enemy had attacked the Mort Homme in order
to turn the Bois des Corbeaux (Crows' Wood),
he had attacked Hill 304 in order to turn the

Mort Homme, and he next attacked Avocourt
Wood in order to turn Hill 304.

The French artillery posted in Avocourt
Wood had proved itself extremely irksome to
German progress on Hill 304, as it was able
to pour an enfilading fire upon the German
troops which debouched from Haucourt.
Operations here began with an assault upon
Avocourt Wood at 6 p.m. on May 17. Very
great preparations had been made in order
to ensure success. French airmen flying
behind the German lines had reported growing
activity along the roads and at the rail centres
behind the German lines ; fresh troops and
fresh guns were being brought in from the east
and from other portions of the line in France.
The action begun at Avocourt spread east-
wards until it embraced the whole of the
western half of the Verdun battle -front from
Avocourt to Cumieres. The most desperate
fighting was in the immediate neighbourhood
of the Mort Homme. On May 18 the volume
of normal artillery fire rose to the fortissimo
of battle, and reached its culminating point
at about one o'clock on the afternoon of
May 20. Over sixty German batteries con-
centrated their accelerated fire upon the
French positions along the north-western
and north-eastern slopes of the Mort Homme,
and almost immediately afterwards the in

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

Malancourt

^^3r1 /

THE MORT HOMME AREA.

fan try moved out to the attack. The tactieal
idea of the German plan was to cut in behind
the hill-top of the Mort Homme from the
north-east and north-west. The troops of a
fresh division were told off to push through
the attack from the north-east, to carry
Crows' Wood, and Les Caurettes, and to join
up with the thrust made from the north-
west. '

The eastern attack met with but slight
success. The first-line trenches of the French
had, as was inevitable, crumbled away under
the preliminary bombardment, but with their
splendid tenacity the men of the French
machine gun sections did not lightly abandon
their positions. The Germans were received
by a vigorous fire, but pressing forward in ever-
growing numbers, they swept on across the first
trench line, and advanced in strength upon the
second line of defence. Here they were met by
concentrated and combined machine gun and
artillery fire. Their losses were extremely
heavy. They fought with great vigour and
determination, and at one time succeeded in
getting right into the second line of trenches.
Here progress was stopped. In vain did the
Germans fling a neighbouring division into
the battle in the hope of consolidating the
first positions captured, and of driving through
to the rear of the Mort Homme ; they were
quite unable to make any headway.

On the western slopes the enemy fared a little
better. At the cost of heavy losses he gained
possession of the French trenches on the south
and south-west slopes of the ridge. The result
achieved by the operations was small in geo-
graphy, but large in promise. The Mort Homme

was no longer a French position. Its summit
was swept by the fire of the guns on both sides.
The French had been driven down into the
slight depression separating the top of the Mort
Homme from the next eminence to the south.

The exact price paid for this progress will
never be known, but there was enough in the
evidence of the battlefield and of prisoners to
justify the belief that about three-quarters of
the total number of troops engaged on the drive
from the north-east were killed or wounded.
The attacks were not, however, carried out in
the most deadly formation, bvit were entrusted
to seven and in some cases eight successive
waves of infantry, separated one from the other
by between fifty and a hundred yards. ' The
whole of the Bavarian brigade engaged, which
took part in the fighting at this point, was
caught in the curtain fire of the French machine
guns, and ceased to exist as a useful unit. The
desperate nature of the fighting can well be
imagined from the account given of it by an
officer who was engaged. He had seen Ypres,
Souchez, and Carency, and declared that even
after Ypres and Carency, even after the first
onslaught in the Verdun sector, he could not
have believed that a battle could reach such
a pitch of fury.

" Nothing that the manuals say, nothing
that the technicians have foreseen, is true to-
day. Even under a hail of shells troops can
fight on, and beneath the most terrific bombard-
ment it is still the spirit of the combatants which
counts. The German bombardments outdid all
previsions.

" When my battalion was called up as rein-
forcements on May 20, the dug-outs and trenches

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

of the first French line were already completely
destroyed. The curtain fire of the Gennans,
which had succeeded their bombardment of the
front lines, fell on the road more than two
kilometres behind these. Now and then the
heavy long-distance guns of the Germans
lengthened their fire in an attempt to reach our
batteries and their communications. At eight
o'clock in the evening, when we arrived in auto-
'buses behind the second or third lines, several
shells reached our wagons, and killed men.
The excellent spirit of the battalion suffered not
at all, and this is the more to be noted, since it
is far easier to keep one's dash and spirit in the
heat of actual battle than when one is just
approaching it. I have read a good many
stories of battle, and some of their embroideries
appear to me rather exaggerated ; the truth is
quite good enough by itself. Although they
were bombarded beforehand, my men went very
firmly into action. The cannonade worked on
the ears and the nerves, getting louder with
every step nearer the front, till the very earth
shook, and our hearts jumped in our breasts.

" Where we were there were hardly any
trenches nor communication trenches left.
Every half -hour the appearance of the earth was

COMMUNICATION TRENCHES.

A stairway leading from one French trench to

another.

IN THE TRENCHES.
A deep and well-constructed trench.

changed by the unflagging shell fire. It was a
perfect cataract of fire. We went forward by
fits and starts, taking cover in shell-holes, and
sametimes we saw a shell drop in the very hole
we had chosen for our next leap forwards. A
hundred men of the battalion were half buried,
and we had scarcely the time to stop and help
them to get themselves out. Suddenly we
arrived at what remained of our first-line
trenches, just as the Boches arrived at our
barbed wire entanglements — or, rather, at the
caterpillar-like remains of our barbed wire.

" At this moment the German curtain fire
lengthened, and most of our men buried in
shell-holes were able to get out and rejoin us.
The Germans attacked in massed formation, by
big columns of five or six hundred men, preceded
by two waves of sharpshooters. We had only
our rifles and our machine-guns, because the
75's could not get to work.

" Fortunately the flank batteries succeeded
in catching the Boches on the right. It is abso-
lutely impossible to convey what losses the
Germans must suffer in these attacks Nothing
can give an idea of it. Whole ranks are mowed
down, and those that follow them suffer the same
fate. Under the storm of machine-gun, rifle

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THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

and 75 fire, the German columns were ploughed
into furrows of death. Imagine if you can
what it would he like to rake water. Those
gaps filled up again at once. That is enough
to show with what disdain of human life the
German attacks are planned and carried out.

" In these circumstances German advances
are sure. They startle the public, but at the
front nobody attaches any importance to them.
As a matter of fact, our trenches are so near-
those of the Germans that once the barbed wire
is destroyed the distance between them can be
covered in a few minutes. Thus, if one is
willing to suffer a loss of life corresponding to
the number of men necessary to cover the space
between the lines, the other trench can always
be reached. By sacrificing thousands of men,
after a formidable bombardment, an enemy
trench can always be taken.

" There are slopes on Hill 304 where the level
of the ground is raised several metres by
mounds of German corpses. Sometimes it
happens that the third German wave uses the
dead of the second wave as ramparts and
shelters. It was behind ramparts of the dead
left by the first five attacks, on May 24, that we
saw the Bodies take shelter while they organized
their next rush.

" We make prisoners among these dead
during our counter-attacks. They are men
who have received no hurt, but have been
knocked down by the falling of the human wall
of their killed and wounded neighbours. They
say very little. They are for the most part
dazed with fear and alcohol, and it is several
days before they recover."

The flame on the left bank spread the next
day (May 22) to the whole Verdun front, and
the French in a brilliant dash upon the Fort
of Douatimont opened one of the most glorious
chapters of the defence upon the right bank.

Douaumont had long been one of the white-
heat points in the furnace. When the Ger-
mans announced throughout the world on
February 26 that their " doughty Branden-
burgers " had captured the position they doubt-
less piously believed that they had in fact won
command of the key of the whole Meuse posi-
tion. As has been explained in previous
chapters, the course of modern warfare had
completely altered the kind of services which
the ring of old-style forts around Verdun was
called upon to play. While the positions which
had been crowned by forts naturally retained

GENERAL JOFFRE AT VERDUN.

Congratulating the General in command at

Hill 304.

their former importance in relation to the
terrain, they became from a fortification point
of view nothing but extremely strong links in
the wide scheme of field works. Douaumont
Fort, therefore, while completely changed by
the development of war, while it had lost its
old meaning, nevertheless kept its old import-
ance as an observation point and as a position
from which the approaches to Vaux and Bras
Fort could be swept by fire.

Moreover, the Germans who first entered the
fort on February 26 were few in number, and for
many a long day the chief preoccupation of the
enemy at this point of the line was to hang on
like grim death to the slender hold he had
acquired without a thought of any advance
towards Paris. Having with difficulty consoli-
dated his position, the enemy then sought to
improve it. After much hard fighting he pressed
the French down the southern slope of Douau-
mont, but he was never able to make his posi-
tion there entirely sure.

The French, on their side, had here as at

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

LOADING A F

other points along the line the fixed principle of
profiting from every opportunity to hinder the
enemy's progress and upset his calculations
with vigorous local counter-attacks. It was
the settled policy of steady defensive with
occasional flashes of aggression. When Douau-
mont Fort fell, its work devolved upon Vaux
Fort, and with this point of resistance as a sort
of base behind them the French in March and
April worked steadily if slowly back towards
Douaumont.

While the Germans were getting more and
more heavily engaged upon the left bank of the
river in their effort against the Mort Homme,
the French pushed up east and west of Douau-
mont towards Thiaumont Farm and Caillette
Wood as a preliminary to a direct attack upon
the Douaumont position itself.

The Germans devoted their picked troops to
the capture of Douaumont in February, for only
solid troops could be expected successfully to
carry a position of its strength. The French,
in their turn, entrusted the execution of the
operations to the Fifth Division under General
Mangin, one of the most dashing of our Ally's
leaders.

The preparation of the French attack was
carried out with a secrecy which had been notice-
ably absent from the planning of other opera-
tions of this importance. Directly responsible
for the plans was General Nivello, who from the
beginning of May had been placed in direct
command of the Verdun army in succession to

RENCH MORTAR.

General Petain. General Petain had taken the
place of General Langle de Gary, who at the
beginning of the Verdun offensive was in com-
mand of the Central Group of the French
Armies and included in his front the Verdun
area. General Langle de Gary was appointed
to an Inspectorship in the rear in the early
stages of the Verdun fighting.

Petain's successor had a long record of pre-
war service in the Colonies. He was an old
Polytechnique man, and had specialized in the
use of artillery. His career was in many
respects similar to that of Petain. The war
found him in command of the Fifth Infantry
Regiment. In October, 1914, he commanded
a Brigade. In February, 1915, he was acting
Commander of the Sixth Division and then as
General of Division took over the Third Army
Corps.

Invention had placed in General Nivelle's
hands a very useful means of ensuring tactical
secrecy, so difficult to obtain with the develop-
ment of the Air Services and the swarms of kite
sausages which floated above the Meuse Hills.
A new type of bomb for destroying these
balloons, which was used with such effect
later in the opening stages of the Somme
offensive, was introduced in the preparation of
the French attack upon Douaumont, and before
General Mangin's men were set in motion the
enemy was partially blinded by the destruction
by aircraft of six of his observation balloons.

The great interest of the Douaumont battles

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

.33

is that the study of no other portion of the
operations gives so clear an idea of the real cause
of German failure to break through. The great
factor which the Germans had completely under-
estimated was the fighting spirit of the French
soldier. And at Verdun the French showed
that however great might have become the
importance of artillery the infantry were still,
and perhaps more than ever, the Queen of
Battle.

The troops allotted to the recapture of Douau-
mont were no strangers to Verdun. Fpon the
Fifth Division had fallen the brunt of the enemy
onslaughts in the Vaux-Douaumont region at
the beginning of April. They suffered heavily,
b\it before they left to refit in the rear General
Mang'n, addressing his men, said : " You are
going to reform your depleted ranks. Many
among you will return to your homes and will
bear with you to your families the warlike
ardour and the thirst for vengeance which
inspires you. ' There is no rest for any French-
man so long as the barbarous enemy treads the
hallowed ground of our country ; there can be
no peace for the world so long as the monster
of Prussian militarism has not been laid low.
You will therefore prepare yourselves for further
battles, in which you will have the absolute
certainty of your superiority over an enemy
whom you have seen so often flee or raise his
hands before your bayonets and grenades.
You are certain of that now. Any German who

gets into a trench of the Fifth Division is dead
or captured. Any position methodically at-
tacked by the Fifth Division is a captured
position. You march under the wings of
Victory." A month later they were back,
burning to justify the confidence of their chief.
The " methodical " preparation of the assault
was thoroughly well carried out. For two days
the French- poured high explosive upon the
already battered ruins of the Fort. An officer
who took part in the attack thus described the
operations : " On the horizon the top of
Douaumont was crowned with sombre smoke.
It looked like a volcano in full eruption, and
under the formidable fire of the French artillery
our infantry was getting on with its preparation
for attack, was digging its attacking trenches
and making all its last dispositions. Shortly
before eight o'clock on May 22 one of our air-
squadrons flew up and went over the enemy
lines. A few minutes afterwards six of the
sausage balloons of the enemy on the right bank
of the Meuse exploded. Our pilots had carried
out their task, they had deprived the German
artillery of its best means of observation, and
had considerably interfered with its efficiency
for a part, at any rate, of the day. One of our
soidiers, who was struck by the fact that the
enemy shell was falling far from the zone
normally swept by their guns, said to his
colonel : ' We've put a bandage round the
Boche's eyes.' "

GETTING READY TO FIRE.

106—3

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

Nevertheless, the Germans, feeling the
imminence of the attack and the approach of
danger, flooded our first lines with a storm
of shrapnel, while our artillery increased its
speed, and was vomiting shells with all its
strength. As an officer said, there was a per-
petual moan such as had never been heard
before. The hour of attack drew near. All
our men knew the price of it. They knew the
fighting at Neuville St. Vaast, the offensive
in the Champagne, the hand-to-hand struggles
in the Bois des Caillettes ; they knew the work
of German artillery and of the enemy in front
of them. Their respective duties were care-
fully laid down. The centre had the big
job allotted to it, to carry the ruins of the fort ;
the right and the left were to take the enemy
trenches east and west, and endeavour to
surround the position. Each one of them knew
his duty, and appreciated the value of the
effort demanded of him.

Soldiers such as these would not be denied.
At 10 minutes to 12 they all dashed
forward. There was no singing, and they did
not form a battle picture. They bounded
from shell hole to shell hole, from obstacle to
obstacle, lying down, disappearing, rushing
forward again, some falling never to get up
again. A splendid flame burned through them.
At noon the staff aeroplane reported that a
Bengal fire was burning on Douaumont fort.
The 129th Regiment had taken 11 minutes
to carry three lines of enemy trench, and to
reach its objective.

On the left, all the German trenches on the
west of the fort as far as the road from Douau-
mont to Fleury had fallen into French hands :
the 36th Regimont had carried out its part
of the task. At the same time detachments
of infantry and sappers got inside the fort,
and covered the operations of those entrusted
with the destruction of flanking positions,
and with the blocking of exits from the fort.
Bengal fires going up one after the other
showed what progress was being made. It
was reported to the staff of the Tenth Brigade
that the surrounding movement was being
effected in excellent conditions. The north-
western and the northern angle were reached,
and mitrailleuses were put in place.

Meanwhile, east of the fort, the progress
of the 74th Regiment had met with great
opposition. The. left had pushed forward
rapidly, but the right had been under heavy
fire from the enemy's communication trenches

which commanded their flank. In spite of
all efforts this break slowed down progress.
The north-eastern angle of the fort was still in
German hands. We held over two-thirds of the
whole position, and sent back many prisoners
to the rear. Half an hour after the staff
aeroplane signal had been received — that is
to say, less than 50 minutes after the begin-
ning of the assault — two German officers,
some non-commissioned officers, and about 100
men arrived as prisoners at the command
post of the Tenth Brigade. Our men were
wildly enthusiastic, and had but one thought,
to push on to their success. Before the troops
started out on these operations orders had
been issued in which it was said : " The
Germans will make every effort to prevent us
from getting into Douaumont Fort. Con-
sequently, if we do get in, don't think that
you're going to have a second of rest."

It was certain that the reaction of the
enemy would make itself felt ; it was of almost
unheard-of violence. That night masses of
infantry collected east of Haudromont Wood,
and towards ten o'clock at night a violent
bombardment was begun upon the French
positions west of the fort. It was followed by a
very vigorous infantry attack, which forced us
to yield a little of the line we had won in the
morning. In the fort, throughout the night,
the struggle turned to our advantage. We
kept all we had got, and even slightly increased
our gains. At dawn the next day, the 23rd,
our positions in the fort were subjected to
an appalling bombardment. Although the
trench organiz ition which had been successively
tumbled and turned by French and German
artillery seemed absolutely untenable, the
129th Regiment, in spite of the losses which
had weakened its ranks, hung on to the ground
gained with a tenacity that was perfectly
extraordinary. It was in vain that the
enemy multiplied his infantry attacks and
resumed and reinforced his bombardment.
He met with an indomitable resistance.
Nowhere was there, any faltering, nowhere
did the German manage to get his teeth in ;
and when, during the night of the 23rd and
the morning of the 24th, the 10th Infantry
Brigade was relieved, it had not lost an inch
of the ground it had captured

Heroic episodes in this desperate fight were
legion. All ought to be quoted, they all
resemble each other ; and yet how many will
remain unknown ! There are the Grenadiers,

LEAVING A BALLOON BY PARACHUTE,

The balloon had broken loose and was drifting towards the enemy's trenches during a storm. The

French airman landed safely behind the French lines.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

who pushed forward into perilous positions,
right into the German lines, and did great
killing before they rejoined their comrades.
They even went the whole round of the fort,
throwing their grenades, and yet managed to
get back to their regiment. It was good to hear
the officers talking of their men. " I've been
in twenty-five campaigns," said a colonel
who commanded a brigade ; " I've never seen
anything finer than this assault. My men
have really moved me into a surprised admira-
tion. There is nothing finer than our French
soldiers. They are better than they were a
year ago, better to-day than they were yester-
day. They are always surprising. I watched
them coming back from the lines, both young
and old were the same. There was one
carrying a German helmet, another moved
slowly but gloriously along upon a long stick ;

SCENES IN THE TOWN OF VERDUN.

Buildings reduced to a heap of ruins by German

artillery fire.

they were all laden with splendid booty, they
were real warriors, and I adore them."

The fighting at Douaiunont was not only a
fine episode and a glorious episode in the
history of the French army ; it contained a
lesson for the enemy. The lesson for the
Germans was that the spirit and dash of the
French infantryman was still as great as ever.
The enemy, even in operations in which their
best troops were engaged, had been obliged
frequently to resort to close formation in attack.
The French infantry streamed out of its trenches
in open order and advanced faultlessly upon the
plateau. There was no faltering of any sort
and the men stood the strain of advance in open
order with complete success. Once they had
got inside the fort their troubles were in some
respects only beginning. The garrison made
the most determined stand and hung on to its
positions in the north and north-east of the fort
with grim tenacity, waiting for the counter-
attack to come to their relief. They had not
long to wait, and the rest of the day and the
following night were filled with the roar of
battle as fresh counter-attacks followed one
after the other at short intervals. Fighting was
carried out right along the Douaumont front,
and the fort itself was attacked time after time
by strong bodies of infantry who were launched
against it from west, east and north. The
efforts of the two fresh Bavarian divisions were
finally triumphant, and on May 24 the ruins of
Douaumont were once again in enemy hands.

The whole Verdun front was now ablaze, and
from Avocourt to Vaux the Germans hurled

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

regiment after regiment of new troops upon the
French lines in a supreme endeavour to break
through. They re-entered Douaumont, as we
have seen, on May 24, and the same day they
made progress of greater significance on the left
bank sector of the field of battle. On May 23
the situation on the left bank was extremely
critical — the whole battle of Verdun was
an unending series of critical days. Here,
as upon the right bank, the Germans had some,
what antedated their victories. They had
announced the capture of the Mort Homme, and
they had followed this example by declaring that
Hill 304 was in their hands, at a time when from
a military point of view they were still far from
undisputed mastery of these positions. With
regard to Hill 304, it is clear that on this day,
May 23, the French still held the military crest
and the western slopes. It is perhaps necessary
to explain that, owing to the development of
modern artillery, hill-crests in the geographical
sense of the term possessed no military value
whatever. The tops of the hills and ridges of the
Meuse were so pounded with high explosive as to
be untenable by either side. What happened in

most cases was that the defending party held
on to the military crest as long as possible. This
military crest consisted of trench positions,
situated a few hundred feet below the sky-line,
and screened from direct artillery fire by the
geographical crest of the hill. In many cases
there existed a complicated system of tunnels
which led right through from behind the peak
to the slope exposed to the observation of the
enemy. Here on this exposed surface artillery
observation posts were established, protected
and strengthened by a few machine-guns. The
top of the hill itself ceased therefore to possess
any value. This use of what the French call
the contre-pente had first been introduced into
general practice by the Germans in the course
of the Champagne offensive in the autumn of
1915. It was indeed mainly these positions
with their large fields of barbed wire, which lay
hidden from direct artillery destruction, which
held up the French in their onslaught upon the
last German lines in the neighbourhood of
Tahure.

The situation at the Mort Homme at the
beginning of May may be described roughly as

ANOTHER VIEW OF THE TOWN
After the German bombardment.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

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follows : The enemy had crept a short way up
the northern face of the ridge, and had formed
a salient in the French positions established
upon the eastern and the western slopes of the
hill, the summit of which had been converted
into a shell-swept No Man's Land, upon which
occasionally ventured an absolutely essential
artillery observation officer. On the contre-
pente French infantry were as solidly entrenched
as was possible, and in the horse-shoe round the
base of the hill the French held hastily-con-
structed trench defences. The opening of the
horse-shoe was represented by the German
salient on the northern side.

On the neighbouring position of Hill 304 the
state of affairs was not exactly similar. There
the Germans had pushed through the stubble
of shell-shattered woods which lined the base of
the ridge, and had occupied positions which
were almost exactly the opposite of the relative
situations of the two armies upon the Mort
Homme. Here it was the German Army which
had placed a horse -shoe at the base of the hill,
and it was the French from the western slopes
who formed a salient.

The general plan of the enemy on May 23
was to turn the whole Mort Homme plateau by
cutting through the trench organizations which
linked it up in the west with Hill 304. The
enemy had pushed the French down to the base
of the Mort Homme, and endeavoured to swing
themselves up to the crest of Hill 287, the next
eminence on the road to Verdun. At the same
time the Germans endeavoured to cut through
to the east of the Mort Homme plateau, and
into the combined operations, which were
launched after a bombardment of great fury,
the enemy launched at least two army corps.
Fortunately the French had in this sector of
the front troops of well-tried valour ; the new
systems of liaison and fire control were becoming
perfected ; the infantry had but to press a
button, so to speak, to have an almost instan-
taneous curtain fire from the artillery in the
rear.

It was one of the curious things of the war
that for long the unquestioned changes wrought
in tactics, and in the use of artillery, had failed
to affect the general organization of the French
armies. The divisions employed could have, at
this stage of the war, no general or individual
strategic mission, which is another way of saying
that for the divisional general the tactics had
almost entirely vanished, or were applied upon a
minute scale involving the capture of a cellar,

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

-j

BEHIND THE FRENCH LINES AT VEKDUN.
Reinforcements leaving motor wagons to relieve their comrades in the trenches.

or the flanking of a ditch, and strategy had
completely disappeared. For the army corps
this was even more the case, yet, until an
advanced period of the battle for Verdun, the
old almost watertight army organization had
remained intact. The general commanding a
division still had under his direct control the
same amount of artillery as at the opening of
the war. Heavy artillery was almost entirely
the special property of the army corps com-
manders, to whom requests for barrage fire had
to be addressed through time-wasting and
circuitous routes. General Petain was the first
French army commander to introduce a system
which was already employed in both the British
and German armies. He abolished, partly at
any rate, the iron-bound system of divisions of
army corps, massed large numbers of divisions
together, and gave to each of them their pro-
portionate quota of heavy artillery. The
importance of this change is quite evident when
it is realized that in all the later stages of the
Verdun battle the curtain fire was, in the
majority of cases, carried out by heavy artiller5%
Curtain fire, to be effective, had to be instan-
taneous. Immediately the forward artillery
observation officer saw the enemy's bombard-
ment slacken, and the " war-grey " forms of
the enemy appear above the trench-line, he had
to telephone at once, or, as was frequently the
case when telephones had ceased to work, to
signal with rockets, for an immediate curtain
fire. The shell of the 75's had proved itself
quite unable to stop the massed rushes of the
enemy, and unless what at the beginning of
Verdun was the Corps Artillery, that is to say
the heavy guns, could pour its thousands of
pounds of melinite upon the advancing waves,
the attack was almost certain to succeed.

It was through a curtain fire of this tremen-
dous density that the German infantry advanced
on the left bank front on May 23. The scene
was described by one of the band of American
airmen who did such excellent work in. the
Verdun sector, in words which conjure up, as
do all the aerial photographs, and particularly
those of the assault upon Douaumont, a battle
picture painted in completely novel perspective.
This airman had been sent out as artillery
observation officer at the beginning of the
German assaults in the Mort Homme region.
His mission, he declared, was absolutely fruit-
less. Although he flew at an extremely low
altitude, only some few hundred feet above the
earth, nothing whatever could be seen, except
a tremendous pillar of smoke ; the ground itself
was completely hidden from his eyes. There
was not even a flash. A column of smoke
600 feet high covered the whole position. In
this smoky inferno wave after wave of Ger-
mans fell blasted to pieces by high explosives,
or were dropped in their rush by the savage
chattering machine guns. On the east of the
Mort Homme the enemy was unable to get
through the horrible zone thus formed, and his
dead lay in patches in the shell area, and in long
swathes where the machine guns had mown
them down.

Between Hill 304 and thb Mort Homme,
however, greater progress was made. For a
time here too the enemy spent himself in un-
availing dashes at the curtain of bursting shell ;
but, as there were ever more and more men
pressing forward to take the places of those who
fell, towards the close of the day the Germans
managed to sweep through the danger zone,
and to install themselves close enough to the
first trench lines to render the use of French

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

FRENCH TROOPS CHARGING ENEMY'S TRENCHES
With fixed bayonets, and led by a bomb-thrower.

high explosive impossible, without there being
a certainty of killing as many French as
Germans. Here for a time the enemy hung on,
and meanwhile the special detachment cf
flame-fighters who had just arrived in this
region were sent forward. There is no mask
against fire, and with their diabolical flame-
throwers the Germans succeeded in burning the
French out of their first lines. Before nightfall
the French came back at them again — it was
one of the constantly hopeful features of the
Verdun fighting that at no period did the French
infantry fail to react — and after half an hour's
fighting the Germans had been driven out of
the ground they had purchased at so high a cost,

and were filtering in isolated disorder back to
the trenches from which they had begun the
attack.

Dastardly and despicable though German
methods of fighting were, it would be foolish
to deny that in the whole effort they made
against Verdun their men displayed the
most formidable doggedness. Time after time
they stormed to the assault of the most for-
bidding positions, over the corpses of hundreds
who had failed before them ; time after time
regiments which had reeled and melted beneath
the deadly sputtering of mitrailleuses formed
up again, and again returned to obvious de-
struction. The French were not long left in

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

ENTRANCE TO

French troops in a vi

possession of their recaptured line, but had,
before night fell, to withstand again the counter-
attacks of the enemy. This night effort was
most pronounced to the west of the Mort
Homme, a section of the front which had seen
some of the most desperate fighting in the
whole history of the battle. The Caurettes
"Wood and Cumieres Wood, which formed the
first cover of Cumieres village, had, as lias
been related in earlier chapters, been the scene
of desperate and bloody fighting. They had
been captured and recaptured several times, and
when this climax was reached, the French were
stiJl hanging on by the skin of their teeth to a
portion of these woods. The day attacks had

A DUG-OUT.

llage near Verdun.

failed to get home ; at night the sluice-gates of
Germany were open, and horde after horde of
infantry rolled down in the effort to force a
passage to the east of the Mort Homme — down
the valley of the Meuse itself.

In spite of the explanations furnished by the
German General Staff there can be. no question
whatever that this great drive was intended to
bring the Germans into position from which
they could begin the direct attack upon the
main defences of Verdun on the left bank.
It is to be noted that in this area of the front
the Germans were still battling with the advance
work defending the Meuse capital. They had
not here even reached the same point on May 22

THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAB.

as they had attained on February 20 on the
right bank by the capture of Douaumont.
The French still had to protect their whole
Verdun salient, the formidable line of wooded
hill and dale constituted by the fort of Bras,
Bourrus Wood, and the Esnes position. It was
to the piercing of this second line of defence
that the great attacks of May 23 were devoted.
An was frequently the case in the long
battle, the enemy very nearly succeeded. He
felt the cup between his lips, but could not
drink. During the night of May 23-24, profiting
by his gains on Hill 304 and the Mort Homme,
which, although slight in measurement, were
capable of great strategic profit, he pushed
forward upon the second line of Verdun
defences. Once again troops which had hitherto
been spared the horrors of Verdun were
gathered in strength upon the restricted front

TRENCH IN THE MEUSE
SECTOR.
Showing the method of construction, and the
white lines of the communication trenches in the
distance. Smaller picture : Poste de Comman-
dant at a French Brigade Headquarters near
Douaumont.

of the Mort Homme and the country west of
it as far as the Meuse. The village of Cumi-res
was the immediate objective of this resumed
attempt. It had long before been ruined, laying
as it did in the valley at the extreme western
point of the great loop formed by the Meuse
between Samogneux and Bras, its strategic
value was doubtful. The whole place was
covered with shells, and reduced by the most
elementary and, be it added, effective methods
of warfare. After every few hours of bombard-
ment waves of infantry were sent up to it.
When they returned, broken and depleted
under the fire of undestroyed machine gims,
the big guns again took up the story. By this
alternate battery and assault the Germans on
May 24 smashed the line, drove the French
right out of the village of Cumteres, and,
profiting by their disorder and disarray, pushed
their infantry right down to the neighbourhood
of Chattancourt railway station.

Once again the French automatic counter-
attack, at any rate partly, re-established a
balance. The infantry went at the advancing
Gennans with all their old dash and bite, and
drove them back into Cumieres village, where,
throughout the night of the 24th, they held out
in trenches on the southern outskirts of the
ruins. This hold enabled them to start
methodical operations for the recapture of
the rubble heap. Getting into the bushes and
tree trunks east of the village, bombing parties
made good progress during the next few days,
while the enemy was having an all too brief
breathing space. While the infantry were
at work in the east, the artilleryman was

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

pounding the German positions in the village
and to the north-west of it. On May 27 the
progress made by these two arms was deemed
sufficient and the two assaulting columns,
which had been brought \ip east and west of
the village, were launched at sundown. On
both flanks progress was made. The great
landmark of Cumieres, the mill, was carried
by the eastern column, and at dusk the French
were engaged in the especially desperate
business of cellar fighting, in the attempt to
strengthen their hold upon the village.

The western column made sufficient progress
to cause the Germans to fear that the whole
village would be surrounded, and vigorous
counter-attacks to the strength of a brigade
and a half were launched upon this one point.
It is interesting to note, at this stage in the
battle, what tremendous effort in effectives
had been demanded from the Germans. It is
also interesting to note the first definite instance
of large co-ordination between the western
Allies, which is to be found in the relief of the
French Tenth Army by British forces.

The Germans at this stage of the battle
began a great artillery demonstration in Alsace
and elsewhere along the front, with a view to
preventing the free handling by the French of
their reserves. The Paris Correspondent of The
Times, commenting upon this on May 28, said :

The French, it would be puerile to deny, have paid,
and are paying, the price which their heroic resistance
at Verdun demands. Their losses during the last week's
fighting have probably been proportionately greater
than at any other time throughout the Verdun fighting.
It would, nevertheless, be folly to imagine that the bulk
of the French general reserves has been flung into battle.
The relief given by the British in taking over the front
of the French 10th Army, liberating it for service else-
where, is an indication of the method by which the
Allied effectives in > the West are constantly growing
and the heavy losses at Verdun constantly being made
good.

The fact that the enemy, for the continuance of his
tremendous drive upon the Verdun bulwarks, has been
forced to scratch together fresh divisions from Russia,
from the Balkans, and from the northern front, is the

A FRENCH TRENCH IN A STREET IN CUMIERES.
Smaller picture : A trench and barricade.

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THE TIMES HISTORY OP THE WAR.

best evidence of die price which the Trench are exacting
for every yard of advance made by the Germans towards
the eastern gate. Some indication of that price is con -
tained in the Echo de Paris in a telegram from the
Verdun front. The writer of this dispatch says :

" It is proved that from May 20 to May 25 seven
different divisions were flung into the battle on both
sides of the Meuse. Four of these were brought from
other points of the Western front — two from Flande'rs,
two from the Somme.

" On the left bank alone four divisions were employed
in the last week-end fighting. Without a thought of
the enormous losses caused by our curtain fire and
machine guns, the German Command threw them one
after the other into the boiling pot east and west of Mort
Homme. On May 22 alone, before the capture of
Cumieres village, which has now been retaken, the enemy
made no fewer than 16 attacks upon the front from the
Avocourt Wood to the Meuse. Over 50,000 men sought
that day to climb the slopes of Mort Homme and the
plateau of Hill 304. The great charnel heap had 15,000
fresh corpses flung upon it without the French lines
having yielded."

All estimates of losses must naturally, at the present
moment, remain estimates, but, according to all the
information available, it seems to be established beyond
question that there is a great disproportion between the
losses of the French and Germans. The battle of Verdun
throughout its development seems, indeed, to have
shown that the French have reached a watershed of
victory. In other words, that their artillery equipment
and shell consumption have almost, if not entirely,
reached a point of equality with that of the Germans.
Under the conditions of modern warfare it is inevitable,
with such equality of armament, and with, at the very
least, equality of moral between opposing men, that
the attackers should suffer more heavily in the casualty
lists.

There is good ground for the belief that in the first
six weeks of the Verdun battle the Germans were losing
very nearly three to one.

Losses seemed, however, to be of no import-
ance whatever to the enemy in the pursuit of
his aim. The hundredth day of the battle of
Verdun was marked by a tremendous upward
swoop of the curve of bloodshed, by another
and even more vehement blow, delivered no
doubt with a full and considered apprecia-
tion of military requirements, but aimed also
at affecting the course of internal affairs in
France. The agitation, briefly summarized
at the beginning of this chapter, for a full and
free discussion of the conditions of defence at
Verdun, was taking a more and more alarming
shape.

This great blow at the military might and
civilian moral of France was begun on May 28.
The Sunday was passed in what in Verdun
constituted quiet — that is to say, the whole
countryside shook and trembled under the fire
of thousands of guns. In the evening the
German infantry moved out of Crows' Wood
and delivered an assault upon the French
trenches betweerf the Mort Homme and
Cumieres. This effort was shattered beneath
French curtain fire, and it was not until mid-

BEFORE VERDUN.

The German Crown Prince with his

Chief of Staff.

night that the enemy again got going. But
this second attempt met with no greater success.
The casualties sustained in this fighting had
clearly shown the Germans that, intense though
their bombardment had been, it had not been
heavy enough to obliterate the French defence.
The artillery once more took up the story, and
for some 12 hours over 60 heavy batteries of
enemy artillery poured shell upon the Avocourt-
Mort Homme-Cumieres line. At three in the
afternoon the next assault was launched. In
these attacks no less than five fresh divisions
took part. Two had been drawn from the
front of the Sixth Army, while the main reserve
of the German Army in the West at Cambrai had
been called upon to furnish the other two. To
give these fresh troops backing and aid in the
tremendous task which lay before them, the
greatest concentration of artillery seen up till
then on the Western front was carried out with
speed and secrecy. Each hour of battle saw the
establishment of a fresh record in shell eon-
sumption. There had been nothing like it in
the world's history, and nothing which even the
most imaginative writers of war fiction had said
in forecasting the conditions of modern war in
any way approached the storm of horror un-
loosed in this stage of the great struggle for
Verdun. The German attacks, broken and

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

shattered as they were by constant curtain fire,
were repeated with tremendous rapidity along
the front. It was, as one officer put it, as
though the whole German Army had been con-
verted into a machine-gun, and was delivering
a series rf blows in which each bullet of the
machine-gun was represented by a regiment.

The enemy's losses were gigantic, and at one
time it seemed as though success might have
been within his grasp, but the toll taken of the
Germans as they advanced in wave after wave
upon the French positions was too great for any
army to withstand the drain. The objective of
all this fighting was the reduction of the salient
formed by the French lines in the Mort Homme-
Cumieres section of the front ; the results
obtained were scanty. The big blow of their
guns was delivered upon the French centre, and
right along this portion of the battlefield the
French first-line trenches were obliterated. But
what the artillery had shattered the German
infantry was unable to seize. The enemy found
himself much in the position of a man, anxious
to increase his bag, who has brought down his
bird, but whose retriever is quite unable to
bring it back. At the end of this stage of the
fighting the French positions on the Mort
Homme had been greatly weakened, but they
still were holding out in trenches to the east,
south and west. The village of Cumieres had
been captured, but there also none of the
expected fruit of the German victory had been
gathered. The attempt to storm through and
begin the direct attack upon the great second
line of the left bank defences of Verdun had
failed, and in spite of the strenuous and constant
striving ot the enemy to accomplish his object
in the month of June, he was still occupjang the
positions on the Mort Homme, was still fighting
for Hill 304, was still far from the Bourrus-
Esnes line of positions when the joint Anglo-
French offensive in the Somme burst with its
fury on July 1.

It cannot be definitely stated whether the
next move of the enemy was due to the recog-
nition of his failure on the left bank, or whether
it was due to an almost incredible exaggeration
of the effects of the small success achieved.
The main cause of the left bank operations was
that operations on the right bank in the neigh-
bourhood of Douaumont had been impeded by
the enfilading fire of the French batteries posted
farther north upon the left bank. The Mort
Homme position had proved to be particularly

disturbing. It may be that with the practical
reduction of this bastion the Germans felt that
they could afford to concentrate once more upon
the northern front of Verdun, and once again
attempt to pierce straight through to the city.
The Paris Correspondent of The Times, tele-
graphing on June 1, was able to report that " so
far the German blows have only dented the
French defence, and there seems no reason to
suppose that the enemy will ever succeed in
driving right through it." Telegraphing earlier
in the day the same correspondent said : " On
the right bank the bombardment, which has
become almost chronic, was continued yesterday
along the whole front from the Meuse to Vaux.
. . . During the night the bombardment both
east and west of Fort Douaumont attained an
intensity which can only precede great infantry
operations on one side or the other."

Such indeed was the case. The French first
and second lines during 26 hours had been
subjected to a constant bombardment, of a
violence seldom seen even in the course of this
battle. All the heavy quick-firing batteries at
the disposal of the enemy had been drawn up,
and had made it impossible for the French
supply and ammunition columns to furnish
their front lines. The storm was a prelude
to a long and desperate struggle for the Fort of
Vaux, the capture of which had been announced
by the' Germans three months previously, when
they had succeeded in getting a footing on the
northern slopes of the ridge. The two great
efforts of the enemy against this position in
March and in April had been very costly, and
in no way successful. Throughout those two
months they had been constantly pushing in
small local attacks, which were equally un-
availing. The June fighting, which lasted for
a week, gave them the position, but to take it
they poured out men in a profusion unequalled
in any attack of so small a front.

After the fall of Douaumont, Vaux had taken
up the duties of that position, and had become
the advanced bastion of the big Souville fort to
the south-west. Its fire swept the ravine
through which the ground rose from the Woevre
plain to Souville. The line of attack, as in the
case of the Mort Homme, was from the north-
east and north-west, through the Fumin Wood
and Caillettes Wood. On June 1 the enemy,
advancing from the north-west, captured the
Caillettes spur, and advanced through Vaux
village, and on the following day began the
direct assault upon the fort.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

RUINS OF VAUX FORT.

After seven days' desperate fighting against assaulting troops the enemy occupied the work, which

had been completely ruined by furious bombardment.

An official account of the figfcting round Vaux
said : " It is impossible to retrace in detail
the movements of such fighting. A modern
battle is too fragmentary and too complicated

for even approximate reconstitution to be
possible. Nevertheless among the episodes
there are some which give a good idea of the
nature of the whole fighting. Among these is

(is

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

the defence of Trench R.I. by the 101st Infantry
Regiment. R.I. was a small trench north-west
of Yaux fort, about halfway between the fort
and the village. In front of it, about 40
yards away, the Germans were entrenched, and
they also occupied positions to the right and
left. It was a difficult spot, but it had to be
held, as it interfered with the plan of encircling
the fort, which the enemy had been trying to
carry through for many weeks. In this part of
the country, where 280 mm. shells were flung
in packets of 10, everything was topsyturvy,
all trenches were level, and there was not a
shelter or dugout which offered security against
the artillery, which was firing with such
intensity as to prevent all work of repair.

On June 1 at eight o'clock in the morning,
after a short struggle, the Germans managed to
carr3' a small length of French trench, -which
jutted out west of R.I. They were then seen
advancing in single file along the lake, trying to
filter through towards the slopes of Fumin
Wood. Two French machine guns at once
stopped their progress. R.I. was not attacked ;
there was nothing but an exchange of shots and
grenades v/ith the trench opposite. The
bombardment continued throughout the night.
Food and drink could not get up to the trench,
where the men were beginning to suffer from
thirst. No one complained about it. Each
man had an ample provision of grenades by his
side, and packing cases full of them were dotted
about close up to the trench. At 5.30 in the
evening the rain of 105 and 130 shells was
tropical. At eight o'clock the enemy left their
trench and advanced on R.I. They were met
with a hail of grenades, and streamed back to
their trench in disorder. The order was given
to send up a rocket asking our artillery to throw

out a curtain fire in front of R.I. By bad luck,
before the rocket was got off, it burst and set
fire to all the stock of rockets. Fire and smoke
tilled the trench, and red and green flames rose
above it. Those at a distance could not under-
stand what had happened, and wondered whether
the enemy was attacking with liquid fire, or had
turned the French position. In the trencli
everyone was calm, officers and men joining in
the work of placing the stock of grenades out of
danger. At 10 o'clock the fire was mastered,
emd at the same time, a reward arrived ; 1 (i
pints of water were brought through from Fumin
Wood, and divided immediately — one mouthful
to each man.

There was a pause until half -past two on the
morning of June 3, when the enemy again
attacked. "This time," said the captain who
commanded the trench, " we must be more
patient. Last time we were too quick." The
enemy were allowed to come within about
15 paces, before they were struck down by
grenades and rifle fire. One German, who had
got up to within three yards of the trench,
received a grenade right in his face, and fell
on the parapet. The officers were throwing
bombs with as much zest as their men. By a
last effort the Germans were beaten back, and
at half -past three all was over.

The trench, however, was still isolated by the
enemy's curtain fire, and the men suffered more
from thirst than from the enemy. Luckily it
began to rain. Canvas was spread out, and
in other receptacles water was gathered.
Throughout the day the bombardment con-
tinued, and the Germans, who had succeeded in
advancing in the trenches on the right and on
the slopes of the fort, got a machine gun into
position, and opened enfilading fire upon R.I.

FRENCH GUNS IN THE ENVIRONS OF VERDUN.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

WAITING TILL THE SHELLS HAVE CLEARED THE WAY.

French troops in a trench getting ready to advance.

Another machine gun in Fumin Wood swept the
left of the trench. After a further burst of
bombardment, between 1.30 and 7.30, German
waves again rolled up to the French line, and
were again thrown back. The night was passed
under intense bombardment, and at three
o'clock in the morning the. enemy again came
on ; but the French had acquired complete

confidence in their grenades during the three
days' fighting, and gave them a warm reception.
By dawn the Germans had once more been
repulsed. The first light of day lit up an extra-
ordinary picture in the French trend). Every
stone was splashed with blood ; the ground was
littered with all kinds of debris, shell splinters,
and more ghastly evidences of battle. For 24

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

JPM"

I ^^1

I^H^^B^^H^Bsti igg ^^^^a

A FRENCH CANNON
Gun of 155 mm. (6 in.) calibre which did

more hours the bombardment continued, but
the enemy was mastered, and at nine o'clock
on June 5 the gallant garrison of the trench
was relieved. The Colonel of the 101st, in
reporting to the General commanding the 124th
Division, during the thick of the fight, had said :
" \Vre are fighting to the end. Both men and
officers, who have shown the most splendid
devotion and self-sacrifice beyond praise, are
determined to fall to a man in the defence of
their trench."

While both east and west of the fort fighting
of this nature was going on all along the line,
the attack upon the fort itself was developing.
The Germans knew that it was beyond their
strength to carry the fort by direct assault.
They had got a footing on the slopes in March,
and although they had done their utmost

DATING FROM 1881.
excellent duty in the defence of Verdun.

they had been unable to progress. In the
weeks which followed they endeavoured to
invest the position. Their infantry held the
north and pushed down east and west, but
their constant efforts to close the circle in the
south had failed. Their artillery accomplished
what their infantry had been unable to effect.
The whole southern slope of Vaux was covered
with a curtain fire of heavy shell, which formed
a wall of steel and high explosive and com-
pleted the encircling of the fort.

It was estimated that since March the
Germans had flung no less than 8,000 heavy
shells a day on to this position. During the
latter days of the defence of Vaux this figure
had greatly grown. The fort itself was torn
and twisted by explosion. The usual entrance
was completely blocked up, and for long the

THE TIMER HISTORY OF THE WAR.

IN A VILLAGE NORTH-WEST OF VERDUN.
German shell exploding and destroying a small station in the line of fire.

only way into the fort was through a wicket
in the north-western corner. It was through
this gate that, in spite of tremendous difficulties,
communications had been maintained and
supplies kept up.

Mr. Warner Allen, the special representative
of the British Press, in an account based upon
official information, wrote :

The fort itself was completely demolished by the
explosion. In this hell-hole a little garrison under
Major Raynal continued to resist.

Around the fort all work was impossible. Trenches
were demolished while they were being dug. A man
had to wait for hours and choose his moment if he was
to have the slightest chance of passing. On June 1 the
enemy began a terrific attack. Under the violence of
their fire certain elements of the French advanced line
retired. A few men, slightly wounded, seeking for some
shelter against the rain of shell, made their way into the
ruins of the fort, and were an embarrassment to the
garrison rather than a reinforcement.

The next day the German advance made it impossible

to use the north-western postern. Henceforth the fort
was deprived of the only communication with the French
lines. Since it was impossible for dispatch bearers to
get through an attempt was made to communicate by
signals. Signallers were posted at a window to com-
municate with other signallers just over a mile away.
But the scheme did not work satisfactorily — Vaux could
not see the signals distinctly. A volunteer came forward
to carry the news through the zone of death. He
managed to escape the German fire, though not a
movement passed undetected by the Germans. The
signaller's position was changed, and he returned to
his post in the fort, his object accomplished. A young
officer named Bessett succeeded in leaving the fort with
a report, and then went back to encourage his comrades,
whom he refused to desert.

A private in the 124th Division, Stretcher-bearer
Vanier, worked untiringly with the wounded, hiding
them among the ruins, and bandaging their wounds.
When he had no wounded to tend he went out to fetch
water, for water was the most serious problem of all.

Throughout the battle of Verdun thirst has been one
of the most terrible trials to which the soldiers have
been submitted. Letters captured on German prisoners
continually refer to it. Troops were entirely isolated

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

by curtains of shell fire on a narrow front, making all
movement impossible. Darkness was the only pro-
tection ; but in June the nights are short, and star-
shells were continually blazing.

Isolated men succeeded in passing, but at terrible
risk, with a tiny supply of water. But the task of
providing 150 men with water, to say nothing of 400
more who had taken refuge in the fort, was beyond
human power. From outside attempts were made to
send water into the fort, but not one was successful.
Yet the fort was held, and held for four days more.

The enemy advanced on the higher ground, but the
French organized the ruins of the buildings inside the
fort. At every window, at every opening, behind the
dibris of a wall machine-guns were placed, picked shots
took refuge, and every German who reached the court-
yard of the fort was shot down. Barricades were raised
at every corner, and piles of German corpses lay before
them.

The Germans tried the experiment of letting down
at the end of a cord baskets full of grenades, and, when
these baskets were on a level with the windows held by
the French, they dropped into them a grenade with a
time-fuse and swung them in through the opening to
explode inside. But still the garrison fought on.

There is, however, a limit to human endurance. The
last message sent by Major Raynal ran as follows :

We are near the end. Officers and soldiers have
done their whole duty. Vive la France !
June 6 was the final day. In the morning Vanier,
with a few wounded who were determined not to be
taken alive, escaped through a grating. They crawled
towards the French lines, but several of them were
killed. Those who won through were full of joy.
When his colonel congratulated him, Vanier, who
already holds the Military Medal and the War Cross
with two palms, replied, " Mon Colonel, I would rather
be killed than be taken by the Boches." This is the
last definite news received concerning the Fort of
Vaux. The same day our aeroplanes observed thick
columns of smoke and explosions in what was once the
fort.

The defence of Vaux was one of the finest
examples of French doggedness, and the
French Government, departing from a rule
which up till then had always been observed,
for the first time mentioned an officer by name
in a communique, and held up to the admira-
tion of the world Major Raynal, the commander
of the fort. Before the fort fell it was announced
that he had been promoted to the rank of com-
mander in the Legion of Honour. He was one
of those French officers who had won their way
up from the ranks in a life of steady hard work.
He was severely wounded on September 14,
1914, and mentioned in dispatches as follows :
" Commanding the advance guard of his
regiment, and having come into close contact
with strongly entrenched enemy forces, imme-
diately placed his battalion on supporting
points, and maintained it there under the fire
of infantry, machine guns, and heavy artillery.
Severely wounded in the afternoon, he retained
the command of his battalion, staying in the first
line, in order the better to control the fighting
in difficult and covered country, until he was
obliged by loss of blood to go to the rear."

Before his wounds were healed he was
clamouring to get back to the fighting, and
as the medical board refused to pass him for
service in the field, he asked for a fortress
command, and was given Vaux.

The gallantry of Major Raynal 's defence
moved the enemy to admiration, and he was
permitted by the German Crown Prince to
retain his sword, on his removal to Mainz. It
was from the Germans that he learned of the
honour bestowed upon him by the French
Republic, and in special recognition of his
gallantry, the insignia of his new rank in the
Legion of Honour were conferred upon his wife
at a special review at the Invalides.

The effect of the fall of Vaux in its moral
aspect was merely to strengthen French
determination, and the effect upon the enemy
of the resistance put up there was shown in the
German Press. The special correspondent of
the Berliner Tageblatt, after paying a tribute
to the heroism and tenacity of the Vaux garrison,
thus related a conversation he had had with
a French soldier captured in Caillettes Wood :
" I said, 'We've got Vaux Fort.' The French-
man calmly said, ' Well ? ' and then, with a
smile full of irony, added, ' Perhaps you've got
Souville also ? ' This extraordinary optimism
of the French makes one really despair."

The value of Vaux in the general reduction
of Verdun proved to be small, but its fall was
the necessary preface to the beginning of a
direct operation against Souville. The front
formed after the fall of Vaux, going from west to
east, ran through Hill 321, north of Froide Terre
Ridge, Thiaumont work, Fleury village, and
the woods of Chapitr.?, Fumin, Chenois, and
La Laufee, which formed the approaches to
Souville and Tavannes. The only road open
to the Germans lay down the valley which
separated Froide Terre Ridge from the table-
land upon which were the forts of Souville
and Tavannes. The entrance to this valley
was blocked by Fleury village, but before the
enemy could hope to carry this they had to
obtain possession of Thiaumont work.

After a prolonged pause, following the fall
of Vaux Fort, the systematic attack upon this
line was begun. From June 19 to June 22
this attack bore down in three main directions,
upon Ridge 321, Th'aumont work, and Fleury.
The main assault was delivered on June 23,
when nearly a hundred thousand men were
flung upon a front which measured barely
three miles. In the first sector in the west

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

Phiaumont work was the main objective.
Between ridges 321 and 320 — that is to say,
on a front of just over a mile, no less than three
divisions were engaged. The attack began
at eight o'clock in the morning, and it was not
till the afternoon, when - fresh troops had
been brought up to strengthen the shattered
divisions, that the first small breach was made
in the French line. The point of this break
was just east of Thiaumont Work, and at two
in the afternoon the Germans flung a tre-
mendous concentration of men upon the spot,
burst right through the line, and poured right
over the Tliiaumont position.

Upon Fleury their action was not so rapidly
successful. At one moment in the day they
managed indeed to reach the village, but were
flung out of it again with very heavy losses.
By June 25, after further murderous assaults,
the enemy had succeeded in driving a wedge
between the two main positions of the French,
and had gained possession of Fleury village.
For a moment matters had looked very black
indeed, and it had seemed as though the
German General Staff had been able to profit
by the critical moment which follows retreat
to push forward and complete the disorganiza-
tion of the defence. The French counter-
attacks at Fleury, however, upset their cal-
culations, and the Germans were destined for
long to remain unable to exploit their pos-
session of Fleury village.

While Fleury was still the scene of hotly con-
tjsted grenade fighting, already in the north, on

the British front, a prolonged bombardment
foreshadowed coming events. The time was at
hand when the patient, if belated, efforts of
the Allies to ensure co-ordination, to have — as
M. Briand, the originator of the Allied con-
ferences, put the matter — unity of action
upon unity of front, were to come to fruition.
Away on the Eastern front the Russians were
striding from victory to victory. On the
Southern front the Italians had stemmed the
threatened Austrian invasion, and were pre-
paring a vigorous reaction. On the Western
front also, the initiative was about to be wrested
from the enemy's hands.

The Alhes, in dealing with this question of
co-ordination, were at a disadvantage, as com-
pared with their enemies. The Entento
alliance was one of free and great peoples,
proud of their independence, and jealous of
their heritage in history. It was impossible
for one of them to impose his will, his policy,
and Ins leading upon all the others, as Germany
did upon Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and
Turkey. Nevertheless, much had been accom-
plished in the series of conferences held
in France and in England, and the most
complete unity of view had been obtained.
The rumours which were spread about by men
of little faith in France, as to the unwillingness of
Britain to take up her full share of the burden
pressing on the French, spread very naturally
owing to the anxiety of the moment throughout
the country and across the Channel. As day
after day the Germans slowly pressed in upon

GERMAN PROGRESS IN THE BATTLE OF VERDUN.
The first week and the first four months.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

7 a

'ILS NE PASSERONT PAS."
The spirit of France at Fleury.

the Meuse capital, the waiting for relief from
the British placed a great strain upon the
judgment and the faith of all. A good cor-
rective to this anxiety was delivered by Mr.
Bonar Law on his arrival for the Economic
Conference in Paris, when he said that on two
occasions the British Army had been placed at
the disposal of General Joffre, and was ready,
and had long been ready, to carry out all that
might be asked of it. The whole world
waited on the tip-toe of expectation for the
striking of that hour.

It was everywhere realized that the French
at Verdun had been fighting for time. As

Sir Edward Grey pointed out, they were fighting
not for France alone, but for the whole alliance.
If the French had failed there the whole arch
of allied cooperation would have tumbled to
the ground, the' machinery of victory would
have been flung out of gear, and many a long
month added to the duration of the war. The
enemy failed, and the extent of his failure can
only be appreciated by a rapid survey of
events since the beginning of his offensive on
February 21.

The original aim of the offensive had been
the capture of Verdun. The first few days of
the battle brought the Germans to Douaumont,

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THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

THE FORT DES PAROCHES.

and within sight of Douaumont they were
still fighting when the joint offensive on the
Somme began on July 1. When, after the
first two months of the battle, it became clear
that Verdun was not to be captured, except
at appalling cost, the objective was changed.
The Germans were told that the offensive was
purely defensive in character, that it aimed at
destroying the military power of France, at
preventing any possibility of co-ordinated
action on the Western front. The magnificent
dash made by the French south of the Somme
in the first days of July proved how complete
had been German defeat in this direction.
General Joffre declared on the occasion of the
second anniversary of the war :

The great sacrifices which France has supported at
Verdun have given our Allies time to build up their
resources, have enabled us to mature our plans and
carry them out with perfect appreciation of the neces-
sities of all fronts. We are now able to employ all our
resources simultaneously in a thoroughgoing way. I
desire to pay homage to the manner wherein all the
Allies are fulfilling their part.

Drawing on her inexhaustible resources Russia has
been afforded time to bring forward men in ever-increas-
ing numbers, and is now deploying her huge armies with
telling effect in Galieia, Volhynia, and Armenia. Great
Britain, too, has had time in the past two years to show
the world the extent of her varied resources. Her
troops are proving their splendid valour on the Somme,
showing what a determined nation can do in such times
as these. No doubt Italy has a difficult and limited part
to play in a more restricted sphere of action, but her
troops are fulfilling their role splendidly. The Serbian
Army is beginning at this moment to enter the firing-
line anew.

After this brief review of the position of the
Allied armies General Joffre outlined the Ger-
man situation in a few crisp sentences :

We know positively that our enemies, although
fighting as desperately as ever, are drawing on their
last reserves. Up to now they have followed the policy
of transferring their reserves from one place to another,
but in face of the Allies' united effort they now find it
impossible, and will find it increasingly impossible in
future, to pursue such methods. All our sources of
information confirm that.

It is not for me to say how long this struggle is going
to last, but the question matters little. We know that
the rupture is coming. ^ou, no doubt, feel as well as
we do, that we have reached the turning point. The
five months' resistance of the French troops at Verdun,
has shattered the plans of the German Staff* and brought
us round the corner, heading for victory. Don't, how-
ever, imagine that there is yet a marked weakening of
the German effort on the western front. Two-thirds of
their finest troops are still opposed to us on this side.
The English and French face 122 of their best divisions.
On the Russian front the Germans have 50 divisions
to which must, of course, be added the Austrian Armies.

I won't go into details on the condition and temper
of the French Army. You cannot do better than avail
yourself of the facilities to see our troops in the field with
your own eyes. You will see the Army as it is after two
years of the hardest fighting. You will see an Army
of which the spirit and energy have been vastly increased
by this bitter struggle. To that I can add that the
number of our troops at the front is greater now than at
the beginning of the war. I can think of no more
eloquent fact than that as illustrating France's capacity
for waging a just war. The country is determined to
see the war to a victorious conclusion. The Allies are
fighting not merely for the respective interests of their
countries, but for the liberty of the world, and will not
stop till the world's liberty is definitely assured.

The magnificent spectacle of French heroism
at Verdun had robbed the Germans of that

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

moral victory which, to judga from their
campaign of lies, they held most dear. The
doggsdness of the poilu aroused the admiration
of the world. Everywhere, even in Germany,
Verdun was regarded as symbolizing the whole
fighting spirit of France — the spirit which found
itself admirably translated in Orders of the Day
issued by General Joffre and General Nivelle.

On June 12 the Generalissimo, in informing
the troops of the Russian successes in Galicia,
wrote : " The plan elaborated by the councils
of the coalition is now in full course of execution.
Soldiers of Verdun, this is due to your heroic
resistance, which has been the indispensable
condition for success. All our future victories
are based upon it. It is your resistance wdiich
has created throughout the whole theatre of the
European War a situation from which will be
born to-morrow the final triumph of our
cause."

On June 23 General Nivelle in Army Orders
said : " The hour is decisive. The Germans,
feeling themselves hunted down on every hand,
are launching furious and desperate attacks
upon our front, in the hope of reaching the gates
of Verdun before themselves being attacked by
the united forces of the Allied Armies. You will

not let them pass, my comrades. The country
demands this further supreme effort. The
Army of Verdun will not allow itself to be intimi-
dated by shells, and by German infantry, whose
efforts it has destroyed during the past four
months. The Army of Verdun will keep its
glory intact."

At a later date General Nivelle, in acquainting
his men with the address of praise sent to them
by the French Academy, added : " It is one of
the greatest sources of pride for the Verdun
Army to have earned the testimony of the great
assembly which incarnates and immortalizes
the genius of the French tongue and the French
race. The Army of Verdun has had the good
fortune to answer to the appeal addressed to it
by the country. Thanks to its heroic tenacity
the offensive of the Allies has already made
brilliant progress . . . and the Germans are
not at Verdun. But their task is not yet
finished. No Frenchman will have earned his
rest so long as there remains a single enemy upon
the soil of France, of Alsace, or Lorraine. In
order to enable the allied offensive to develop in
freedom, and later on to lead us to final victory,
we shall continue to resist the assaults of our
implacable enemies, who, in spite of the sacrifice

BEFORE DOUAUMONT.

French Officers watching effect of Artillery fire.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

BEFORE VERDUN : TAKING SOUP TO THE FIRING-LINE.

of the half -million men which Verdun has
already cost them, have not given up their vain
hopes. And, soldiers of the Eleventh Army, you
will not be content with resistance ; you will go
on biting in order to keep in front of you by a
constant threat the largest possible number of
enemy forces, until the approaching hour of the
general offensive has struck. The past is a
guarantee of the future ; you will not fail in
your sacred mission, and you will thus acquire
further claims upon the gratitude of your
country, and of the allied nations."

The effect upon Germany may be clearly
indicated in a few quotations from the German
Press, which towards the middle of June, with
the Bussian victories in process of development,
looked at the great gamble of Verdun with
somewhat melancholy eyes. The Kolnische
Volkszeitung, for instance, the chief organ of the
Roman Catholic Centre party, which had
distinguished itself from even the rest of the
German Press by the virulence of its hatred of
France, published towards the end of June an
article headed " The Goal Not Yet Reached,"

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB.

THE ENTRANCE TO FORT ST. MICHEL.

in which, after expressing its astonishment at
the colossal Russian attacks in Galicia and
Volhynia, it said : " On their side, the French,
in spite of the considerable sacrifices they are
making at Verdun, are continuing a resistance
which will take its place among the great
military feats of all ages. They are proving
that they will shrink from nothing in order to
deprive us of the benefits of our past victories.
No one knows when or how this war will finish,
nor whether certain past hopes will be realized.
It is better not to speak about it."

The Hamburger Fremdenblatt, in the same
strain of censored melancholy, said : "It does
not matter much if Verdun fall or not. Posses-
sion of this or of that fortress is of little value.
What we must know is if the war is going to be
of profit to one of the belligerent Powers, and if
that profit is worth the price it will cost."

Neutral opinion summed up the situation
created by the splendid defence of Verdun in
the words of a Spanish paper : " In no sector
of the vast front which they defend will the
Germans be able to make a finer effort than that
of Verdun, and, if they are not victorious in
front of the great Lorraine fortress, the Empire

is lost, for it will not have the necessary
elements for defence against simultaneous
attack."

Perhaps the most striking testimony to the
value of the stand at Verdun is to be found in a
study of the disposition of the Allied troops in
France. Apart from the relief of the French
trench army by the British the German offensive
had led to no considerable change. The Ger-
mans had every advantage to gain by forcing on
an attack by the British, by obliging Britain to
carry out big operations before the training of
her new Armies and the provision of her new
artillery rendered such operations advisable.
They failed in this, as they had failed in driving
home every one of their partial successes in the
field.

The fighting at Verdun was by no means over.
It was destined to remain for long an open sore.
Both Germans and French saw in it a means of
relieving pressure on the Somme, but as will be
seen, the whole aspect of the struggle before
Verdun was changed when the French and
British leapt from their trenches on both sides
of the Somme, in the great offensive that began
on July 1.

CHAPTER CXXXIX.

AUSTRIAN OFFENSIVE OF MAY,

1916, IN THE TRENTINO:

ITALIAN POLITICS.

The Winter of 1915 — Situation in the Speing — The Col di Lana — Capture of the Adamello
Glacier — Austrian Concentration in the Trentino — Analysis of the May Offensive —
Inadequate Italian Preparations — Description of the Austrian Gains — Threat to the
Venetian Plain — General Cadorna's Plans — The New Fifth Army' — The Turn of the
Tide — Austrian Retirement — Results of the Campaign — The Political Situation —
Decline and Fall of the Salandra Government — Italy and Germany' — National Demand
for More Vigorous Prosecution of the Was — A National Government under Boselli.

THE first months of 1916 saw an
inevitable lull on the Italian front.
Our Allies had carried on offensive
operations right up to the turn of
the year, well beyond the limit which had
seemed to be set by weather conditions,
but winter could no longer be defied. Deep
snow covered the mountains and all the upper
valleys, and mist began to lie thick on the lower
ground, especially on the Isonzo, preventing
accurate artillery preparation and support.
By Christmas men were coming South on leave,
and they continued to be sent home in relay?
throughout the winter and early spring.

There was a lull during these months, as far
as heavy fighting went, but all winter through
the opposing armies were feeling for each other,
worrying each other, testing each other's lines
for weak points, harassing communications by
long-range artillery fire, and, above all, working
to make ready against the coming of spring.
Only to keep the line on the mountain front
meant bitter and ceaseless toil, for the snow
and the Alpine storms imposed an effort and a
strain greater than in any other theatre of war.
To get food and fuel and clothing up to the
front lines, at anything from 5,000 to 10,000 feet
Vol. IX.— Part 107.

above the sea, implied a struggle that can have
no parallel in warfare. The Austrians were no
longer the chief enemy. Frostbite threatened
continually, and the rigours of a winter at
extreme altitudes found out any weakness in
physique. On the whole the health of the
troops was wonderful. The dangers of frostbite
were minimized by the provision of special foot-
gear and by insistence upon proper precautions,
while the well-equipped encampments that were
huddled among the snows gave ■ adequate
shelter against the terrible driving tempests that
sweep the Alps in winter. The task of furnish-
ing supplies was made difficult and dangerous
by frequent avalanches. A number of supply
trains were buried on their way to the front
lines, and a loss of this kind was a double
disaster. Not only was the convoy destroyed,
but men at the front had sometimes to go
hungry and cold for lack of food and fuel, for
it took time to re-open communications. The
problem was eventually solved, or nearly solved,
by the construction of teleferiche or filovie (they
went by both names at the front) — aerial cable
railways that carried a load of nearly half a
ton. In this way supplies and munitions were
rapidly conveyed to the highest points, and

THE TIMER HISTORY OF THE WAR

AN ITALIAN SIEGE GUN.

where this method of transit was possible
the danger from avalanches was largely
avoided.

All along the front the work of fortification
and preparation went on. The hard -won
positions on the Carso were made much less
" unhealthy " by the construction of main and
communication trenches cut deep in the rock,
and by the excavation of dug-outs which were
really " blasted-outs." The task of the Italians
in this sector had been made much more arduous
owing to the difficulty of constructing and
adapting trenches as they advanced, and by
the lack of cover for supporting troops. Their
lines were greatly strengthened during the
winter, and while this ensured smaller losses
in the event of an Austrian attack, they also
provided a much better " take-off " for a
forward movement.

Military and political conferences at Paris in
March, 1916, following upon M. Briand's visit
to Rome, showed that the idea of united and
simultaneous action had finally been accepted
by each member of the Quadruple Entente, and
in Italy, as elsewhere, the day when all the
Allies should strike together was eagerly ex-
pected. At the end of March, when the
tremendous pressure brought against the French
lines round Verdun seemed almost to go beyond

human resistance, there was a considerable
movement in Italy in favour of sending direct
assistance to France. Senator Humbert's ap-
peals in the French Press were backed by
various Italian newspapers and found special
support among the " Interventionists of the
Left," who looked with favour on any step
which should associate Italy more closely and
clearly with her Allies. As the military
authorities, and those who were aufait with the
general situation, realized, and as events were
later to prove, such a step would have done no
service to the common cause. But the desire
for united action was growing ever stronger, and
when the Italian guns began to thunder on the
Isonzo, at the end of March, there was a general
feeling of satisfaction throughout the country.
The heavy bombardment which took place, and
the infantry actions which followed, were in
fact only a " bluff," though considerable losses
were incurred on both sides. No general attack
was intended ; the increase of activity was duo
to the news that Austrian guns were being sent
to France, and it was essential to prevent any
such movement.

During April two actions of special interest,
if not of first-class importance, took place on the
mountain front. It has been explained in

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

Chapter CIX.* how after the taking of Col di
Lana on November 9, it was found impossible
to hold the summit so gallantly won by Colonel
" Peppino " Garibaldi. The Italians held the
greater part of the mountain, but the Austrians
still clung to the far slope of the main psak. It
was decided to tunnel through the peak during
the winter months and blow the Austrian gar-
rison off its last foothold on tire mountain
which had seen so much hard fighting. The
operation, which took three months to complete,
was entirely successful. A fortnight before the
work was finished the Austrians realized their
danger and drove counter -mines into the moun-
tain. One of these was exploded, but its direc-
tion was wrong, and on the night of April 17
the vast Italian mine was touched off, and the
fragments of the Austrian position were rushed
by an infantry attack. The mine crater was
1 50 feet wide and nearly 50 feet deep. For some
days the Austrian artillery fire from the west
made things very uncomfortable for the
Italians, but the new lines were soon firmly
established, and a further advance was made
along the ridges of Monte Sief and the Settsass.
* Vol. VII., p. 76.

About the time that the Col di Lana mine
wa? nearing completion, the commander of a
" group " of Alpini, Colonel Giordana, was pre-
paring an attack that stands alone in the history
of mountain warfare. On the western frontier
of the Trentino, the Adamello range, with its
vast glacier, seemed to oppose an impassable
barrier between the Italians and the valleys that
run down from it towards the Adige. In the
summer of 1915 small raiding parties had
fought on the glacier, and on the dreary rocks
that rise above it, but Colonel Giordana be-
lieved that by this seemingly impossible route
the Austrian lines might be seriously invaded.
His plans were compromised by the necessity
of detaching the greater part of his command
to another sector of the front, but he deter-
mined to carry out the first portion of his scheme,
the seizure of the Austrian positions on the far
side of the glacier, with the lessened forces that
remained to him.

The huge Adamello glacier is cut by three
rock ridges running roughly parallel, north and
south. The eastern and western ridges are
almost on the edge of the glacier, and these were
lightly held by Austrian and Italian posts. But

ACROSS A MOUNTAIN TORRENT.
An Italian surprise-attack across a river.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

eavly in April the Austrians sent forward out-
posts to the central ridge, which runs from
Lobbia Bassa by Lobbia Alta and Dosson di
Genova to Mont3 Fumo. They were not long
left in peace. On the night of April 11, 300
Alpini, clothed in their white winter uniform,
left the Rifugio Garibaldi on skis and reached
the glacier by way of the Brizio Pass. Here, at
10,000 feet above the sea, they entered a region
that is polar in its aspect — and in its severity,
for here they met with a wild Arctic storm. They
lost their way in the turmoil of wind and snow,
but kept going all night to escape the death that
would have gripped them if they stopped. The
morning found them scattered over the glacier.
All hope of surprise was gone, and the Austrians
had machine guns on the central ridge. They

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divided into two columns, and in spite of their
weariness and heavy losses, succeeded in storm-
ing the Austrian positions on Lobbia Alta and
Dosson di Genova. The Austrians were nearly
all killed or captured. But this was only the
first step. Seventeen days later, on the evening
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Rifugio Garibaldi. It was a very clear, starry
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selves under the eastern ridge. The central
column had the easiest work. The Austrians
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ated, and the Austrians made no attempt to
attack, retiring eastwards along the ridge that
runs to the Crozzon del Diavolo. The northern
column had a stiff fight before it could gain
possession of the Topeti Pass and the peak to
the north of it, the Crozzon di Fargorida, but
here, too, the Austrians were driven back. The
southern column had a harder task. The
approaching march, by way of "the English-
men's Pass," between the highest peak of the
Adamcllo and Corno Bianco, had been longer
and more difficult, and the ridge that faced the
advancing troops seemed to make a frontal
attack impossible. The men were very weary ;
one or two actually died of exhaustion and
cold as they moved to the advance. A small
flanking party was sent out under a volunteer
officer, and while the main body advanced .
slowly and drew the Austrian fire, this handful
of men scaled a rock pinnacle north of the Passo
di Cavento and turned the enemy's position.
When the flanking party, after a two hours'
climb, reached their goal, the main body
attacked furiously, and after a struggle that
lasted many hours the position was won. Most
of the Austrians were killed or taken prisoners ;
only a few succeeded in making their escapo
across the Lares glacier. A fortnight later
the Italians completed their occupation of the
eastern ridge and also occupied the Crozzon del
Diavolo, the highest point of the ridge that
divides the Fargorida and Lares glaciers. The
accounts of the undertaking emphasize the
support given by the Italian artillery, which
had been hoisted into impossible places.
Even a battery of six-inch guns had been
brought up to the western edge of the Adamello
glacier.

These are only the barest facts. It is im-
possible to convey in a few words a just idea of
the skill and toil and hardship involved in the
conduct of the operations. A volunteer subal-
tern who was with the southern column found
the right word : "epic." Imagination must do
the rest, and even imagination can only serve
those who know the glaciers of the high Alps,
not in the tourist season, but when the year is
changing from winter to summer.

As a result of the operations the Italians
dominated the heads of the valleys which run
down to the Val Giudicaria, and particularly the
Val di Genova. The occupation of the new
positions enabled the Italians to threaten from
the flank the Austrian lines opposing the Italian
advance in the Val Giudicaria, and it was hoped

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

LOWERING A WOUNDED SOLDIER FROM THE MOUNTAIN HEIGHTS.

An Italian method of lowering the stretchers in a sling along a guiding-rope. On the lower level Red
Gross orderlies, at a hospital tent, control the descent.

107-2

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

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THE AREA OE THE AUSTRIAN OFEENSIVE.

that the operations might be fruitful of result
as the season became more favourable.*

It has been said that Colonel Giordana had
to see the withdrawal of the greater part of his
command at the very moment when he was
preparing his arduous enterprise. This with-
drawal was due to the expectation of an Aus-
trian offensive on an important scale to the
east of the Adige valley. The Italian Intelli-
gence Department was aware of a very large
concentration of men and material in the
neighbourhood of Trento, and it was evident
that the Austrians were preparing for operations
on a scale quite different from anything that
had been hitherto seen on that part of the
front. In view of the terrain, the greatest
possible number of Alpine troops were dis-
patched to the scene of the expected fighting,
and Colonel Giordana's men were sent to the
Eastern Trentino.

* Colonel Giordana was promoted Hajor-General, and
transferred to the Eastern Trentino, where he was
shortly afterwards killed.

The Austrian concentration had been carried
out very gradually. The Trentino front had
been reinforced at the end of November, 1915.
and all through the winter troops and guns were
being quietly conveyed from the Russian front,
or from the depots and munition factories within
the Empire. It was certainly the belief of the
Austrian Command that the Russians would bo
incapable of any important offensive action in
the early summer, and they had every hope
that they would be able to carry out what the
heir to the Habsburg throne, in an address to
his troops, termed a " Straf -expedition," before
any danger could threaten from the East. The
Italian Command, of course, knew what the
enemy did not know, the real condition of the
Russian armies, and they doubtless assumed
that the enemy Intelligence Department was
better informed than it actually was. Doubt-
less, also, they were misled by the gradualness
and secrecy with which the Austrians carried
out their preparations. In any event, they
miscalculated the extent of the coming Austrian

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

effort. They believed in a hard push, and took
measures to meet it, though on certain parts of
the line the local commanders had not realized
the absolute necessity of unlimited spadework,
in the literal sense. But the Italian Command
was not prepared for the hammer-stroke that
came in the middle of May.

On May 14 the Austrians began a very heavy
bombardment along the whole front from the
Val Giudicaria to the sea, but it was quickly
evident, even if it had not already been fore-
seen, that the enemy's offensive was to be
concentrated upon the comparatively short
front between the Val Lagarina and the Val
Sugana, and particularly upon the sector be-
tween the Val Lagarina and the Upper Astico.
On May 1 5 the Austrians followed up the initial
bombardment by massed infantry attacks all
along this sector.

Here it will be well to recapitulate the infor-
mation given in Chapter CIX. regarding the
positions which the Italians held in the Eastern
Trentino, and to add a further description of
the terrain which was to be the scene of a long
and desperate struggle.

When the Austrian attack began, the Italian
line east of the Val Lagarina ran from just
south of Rovereto up the Val Terragnolo north

of Col Santo (6,830 feet), which is the northern
ridge of the great Pasubio massif (highest point
7,335 feet), as far as Monte Maronia (5,540 feet) ;
thence in front of the Folgaria group of fortifica-
tions to Soglio d'Aspio (4,375 feet). From Soglio
dAspio it bent back eastward. The Italians
had made no impression on the fortified lines
of the Lavarone plateau and their positions
followed a line not far west of the old frontier
as far as Cima Manderiolo (6,665 feet) ; whence
they ran northward across the Valle Maggio
and the Val Sugana to Monte Collo, a point
north-west of Borgo ; thence north-eastward
to the Val Calamento. There were other
advanced posts outside this main line, but they
were of little importance, and indeed it is mis-
leading to term this the main line, though it
was all effectively occupied by Italian troops.
There were certain positions, the occupation
of which formed part of an offensive scheme,
which were obviously untenable in the face of
an Austrian attack in force. Zugna Torta and
the slopes leading down to Rovereto formed a
dangerously exposed salient, commanded from
the west by the Austrian positions on Biaena,
on the north by Monte Ghello, and on the north-
east by the fortified lines of Finonchio. The
lines in the Val Terragnolo were very much
exposed, and Soglio d'Aspio, flanked by the

ITALIAN TROOPS IN THEIR HIRST-LINE TRENCHES.

.VS

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB.

great Lavarone-Luserna plateau on the north,
was practically in the air. The real Italian
defensive line ran from Serravalle in the Val
Lagarina by Malga Zugna across the Vallarsa
to Pasuhio ; from Pasubio by the Borcola Pass
to Monte Maggio (5,730 feet), and thence,
leaving the exposed frontier, by Monte Toraro
(6,175 feet), and Monte Campomolon (6,030 feet )
to Spitz Tonezza (5,512 feet) ; thence along the
highest part of the Sette Comuni plateau to
Cima Portule (7,510 feet), and thence across the
Val Sugana to the slopes east of the Maso
stream.

But this lino was not satisfactory, especially
the sector between the Val Posina and the Upper
Astico. Experience had shown that massed
infantry attacks, if preceded by a sufficiently
shattering artillery fire, can generally win a
footing in the first-line system of defences. In
level or nearly level country the various lines of
defence may follow one another at very short
intervals, and the breaking of a section of the
front line need not very greatly affect the
position as a whole. In hilly country the lines
of defence are conditioned by the nature of the
ground. A second line may have to be a
considerable distance from the first, in order to
give its defenders a fair chance of resistance,
and the occupation of one dominating point in
a line has a greater effect than it has in level
country. Good positions in a mountainous
country make the best line a defender can hope
for. A bad mountain position leaves him much
worse off than in the plains.

Between the Val Posina and the Upper
Astico the Italian position was bad. It has
already been explained how the main defences
of the Arsiero plateau had to run along the line
Monte Ma.ggio, Monte Toraro, Monte Cam-
pomolon, Spitz Tonezza. But this defensive
line had nothing to back it. The ground falls
away south-eastwards in a long glacis that
drops steeply at last to the Posina valley on
the south and the Astico on the east. The
position was bad by nature, and only the most
careful and complete preparation could have
made it a really stout bulwark against a deter-
mined attack. And that preparation was
lacking.

In the first place, the Italians were short of
guns. This shortage had handicapped them
in their attacks on the Isonzo line, and it had
not yet been made up, though great progress
had been effected in the output of war material,
and France had supplied some heavy howit-

GENERAL PECORI-GIRALDI.

Commanded the First Army.

zers of a new type. In the second place, the
dispositions taken by the general commanding
the First Army, and by some of the local com-
manders, were not only insufficient, but, as
far as they went, unskilful.

In Chapter CIX. it was said that in their
gallant offensive actions on the Isonzo in 1915
the Italians had suffered from a lack of techni-
que in trench warfare. But the armies on the
Isonzo, officers and men, had been gradually
hammered by the stress of hard fighting into
splendidly efficient weapons, well able to deal
with the new conditions of war. In the Tren-
tino it was otherwise. There had been a good
deal of desultory fighting and a great deal of
artillery work throughout the year that had
elapsed since the beginning of the war. But
no serious offensive had been undertaken by
the Italians, and the enemy had never even
tested the Italian lines. It seems certain that
General Roberto Brusati, the General in com-
mand of the First Army, had failed to realize
the nature of a modern offensive on the grand
scale, and that some of his officers were equally
lacking in insight. It is understood that
General Brusati fully believed in the imminence
of the Austrian offensive, unlike some of his
subordinates, who declared it to be practically
impossible. If this be true, there is the less

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

excuse for the condition of unpreparedncss in
which a part of the front under Ms command
was found to be

It has been said that the Italian Command
miscalculated the extent of the coming offen-
sive. General Cadorna was correctly informed
of the number of enemy troops concentrated
in the Trent ino, and he had detailed sufficient
reinforcements to cope with the attack which
he expected. He did not expect, however,
the immense weight of artillery which was
massed upon the front between the Yal Laga-
rina and the Yal Sugana. It would appear, too,
that he did not exactly anticipate the direction
of the Austrian attack. The Austrian concen-
tration at Trento, and the excellent system of
roads which branches south and south-east-
wards through the Eastern Trentino, permitted
an attacking force to be tlirown at any point
on the Italian line. The Italian lateral com-
munications in the uplands were not favourable.
A great deal had been done in the way of making
roads, but the lie of the country complicated
the problem. General Cadorna's strategic
reserves had to be concentrated in the plain,
and from the course of the fighting which fol-
lowed it seems that he had rather expected the
main Austrian efforts to be directed against
the wings of the Italian forces in the Eastern
Trentino, along the parallel highways of the
Val Lagarina and the Vallarsa on the west,
and the Yal Sugana on the east. He had good
grounds for such a calculation. There is a
railway both in the Yal Lagarina and in the
Val Sugana, and the terrain in the centre is
very difficult for heavy artillery. An envelop-
ing movement seemed on the whole more likely
than a drive at the centre.

Towards the end of April General Cadorna
transferred his quarters to the First Army. It
may be deduced that he was not satisfied with
the dispositions taken, for within a few days
General Brusati was deprived of his command,*
and General Pecori-Giraldi was appointed to
the First Army. General Pecori-Giraldi had
been under a cloud when the war began. He
had been sent home in disgrace from Tripoli
at the end of 1911, on grounds which it was
difficult to recognize as adequate, and there is
too much reason to believe that political con-
siderations led to his recall. General Cadorna

* General Brusati was placed a dispositions on May 13.
On May 25 his case was deliberated by the Cabinet, and
he was retired from the Army by a special Government
decree.

had always held a very high opinion of General
Pecori-Giraldi, and when the war broke out
he was given a division in reserve. He was
soon transferred to the front line, where his
work earned him promotion to the command
of an army corps. He was now to be tested
very severely. He took over the First Army
too late to be able to repair the deficiencies in
the preparations made by his predecessor,
and before he had time to grip his command
the enemy blow fell.

The bombardment which opened the Austrian
offensive came as a very unwelcome sin-prise
to the defending army. It was at once evident
that the amount of heavy and mediiun-calibre
artillery at the enemy's disposal was very large
in proportion to his numbers, and the storm of
high explosive which was directed against the
Italian lines soon found out the weak spots.
The concentration of Austrian artillery was
certainly formidable. Well over. 2,000 guns
(one detailed account which should be correct
put the number in the Trentino at 2,400)
were collected on a front of less than 30 miles.
Of these nearly 800 were of medium or large
calibre. There were not less than 40 12-inch
Skoda howitzers on the narrow front, and in
addition there were three, or possibly four,
German 420's, and a couple of 15-inch naval
guns. At least eighteen Austrian divisions
were concentrated in the Trentino, and the
attacking force which was thrown against the
front between the Val Lagarina and the Val
Sugana consisted of 15 divisions, all of them
picked first-line troops. In all some 350,000
men were launched upon the StraJ "-expedition.

It was soon clear that the main drive was to
be in the centre. No fewer than 30 of the
305's were massed on the Folgaria and Lavarone
plateaux. In this sector, too, were the 420's,
and the big naval guns. One of the latter
was placed at Cost' Alta, near the road that
runs from Monte Rovere to Vezzena under the
old fort of Busa di Verle. From this point
15-in. shells were flung into Asiago, 11 miles
away. A torrent of high-explosive was poured
unceasingly on the main Italian positions,
and the roads leading up to them on the
Asiago and Arsiero plateaux were subjected
to a very severe tir de barrage.

As the Austrian infantry attack developed
the Italians withdrew from their advanced
positions, taking heavy toll of the enemy
before they went. The first forward move-
ments took place on the wings, against Zugna

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

INFANTRY ADVANCING UNDER HEAVY SHRAPNEL FIRE.

A concealed Italian machine gun assisting an advance. The advancing infantry, on all fours, are

carrying bags filled with sand on their backs to protect them from the flying bullets.

Torta and the Armentera ridge (south of
the Brenta, between Levico and Roncegno).
The Italians lost a good many prisoners in
the outlying positions near Rovereto, where
they counter-attacked several times, but the
enemy paid dearly for the ground won. On

May 17 five separate infantry attacks on Zugna
Torta were repulsed with heavy loss, but
the following day Zugna Torta was evacuated,
the Italians retiring upon their prepared
positions at Malga Zugna. The Armentera
ridge was evacuated two days later. Mean-

!>2

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

COUNT OF TURIN (on right)
In Command of Italian Cavalry.

while the Austrian advance in the centre was
developing under cover of a ceaseless fire from
guns of every calibre. On May 18 the line
running northward from Monte Maggio to
Soglio d'Aspio was abandoned, in accordance
with expectation, but the following day a
very serious loss befell the Italians, who were
driven off the Monte Toraro — Monte Campo-
lon-Spitz Tonezza line. This was the sector of
the Trentino front where preparation had
been specially necessary and where it had
been notably lacking. The troops, without
adequate cover against the storm of heavy
shells, had little chance, and they were further
handicapped by a shortage of field and mountain
artillery. The position seems to have been
arranged as though the Italians were on the
offensive. The big guns were well forward,
and there were not enough field and mountain
guns to hold back the advancing masses of the
enemy. One brigade broke under the tre-
mendous strain : the Austrians gained a footing
on the main Italian line before reinforcements
<;ould arrive, and took a very considerable
number of prisoners. The Italian centre was
now practically gone, and the Austrians were
pressing hard on the left. The Italians had
fallen back from Col Santo upon Pasubio,
and both here and against C'oni Zugna a very
strong attack was developing. Between the

Astico and the Val Sugana the fighting was now
equally furious. The Italians were holding
their own, and had succeeded in winning back
various points that they had lost in the first
onslaught. But the whole position was pre-
judiced by the loss of the only line that could
defend the Arsiero plateau, and our Allies
were outgunned in the Sette Comuni as well
as farther south. On May 20 the Austrians
pushed farther forward through the hole in
the centre, occupying the Cimon dei Laghi
and the Cima di Mesole. They also occupied
the Borcola Pass. The Alpini on the Coston
dei Laghi, between the Borcola and Monte
Maggio, repulsed a determined infantry attack,
but their position was quite untenable, and
they were withdrawn.

On May 20, after the break in the centre,
< leneral Cadorna, who had assumed supreme
control of the operations, decided to withdraw
his whole centre line. His plan involved a
considerable sacrifice of territory, but he had
little alternative. A counter-attack upon the
Campomolon-Spitz Tonezza positions, delivered
by reserves who had been hurried to the spot,
had failed, and it was essential to find favourable
positions for further resistance. It has been
explained that the plateau falls right away
from the Campomolon line until it drops into

THE DUKE D'AOSTA

With his son, Prince Amadio, at the front.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

ENTRANCE TO AN ITALIAN GENERAL'S UNDERGROUND QUARTERS.

the Posina and Astico valleys. It was to the
south of the Posina and east of the Astico that
General Cadorna traced his new line. But this
retreat implied a corresponding withdrawal
in the Sette Comuni, and the line chosen ran
from Cima Portule, east cf the Val d'Assa, and
east and south of Asiago.

On May 21 the withdrawal began, and it was
conducted without much interference from
the enemy, who had suffered very heavily,
and were engaged in consolidating the positions
they had won. By May 24 the Italians were,
for the most part, south of the Posina and east
■ if the Astico and the Assa, leaving only skeleton
rearguards to contain the enemy's advance as
long as possible. But the situation was still
far from satisfactory. There was no time
to dig in deeply on the new positions ; the
Austrians had a great preponderance in artillery,
and it wa< clear that in a few days at most
the second phase of the attack would begin,
with the Austrians coming downhill. Moreover,
everything hung upon the wings holding firm,
and the Austrians were attacking Pasubio and
the Coni Zugna ridge with very large forces
and many guns. Pasubio was now a salient,
for the Austrians had pushed up the. Vallarsa

towards the old frontier between Pasubio and
Monte di Mezzo. They were hurling infantry
attacks tip the eastern slopes of the Coni
Zugna-Cima Mezzana ridge, and it was clear
that even more determined efforts were still
to come both here and at Pasubio, which was
under a very heavy bombardment. The troops
that had withdrawn to the south of the Posina
depended absolutely upon Pasubio standing
fast, and if any serious progress were to be
made by the enemy in the Vallarsa, Pasubio
was gone.

The position was critical, and General
Cadorna had to contemplate the possibility of
the Auitrians reaching the Venetian plain. On
the morning of May 2 1 he gave the order to draw
up plans for the formation of a new Army, to be
concentrated in the Vicenza district, and by
midday on May 22 the plans were finished and
approved and the necessary orders given. The
formation of this new Army will be described
later on ; for the moment it is enough to say
that it was in place, and ready, by June 2.

But meanwhile things were going badly on the
Italian right, or rather on the right of the centre,
in the highlands of the Sette Comuni. On the
extreme right, in the Val Sugana and among

107-3

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

the hills to the north, the Italians had retired
slowly and methodically to the positions chosen
on the hills east of the little river Maso, which
falls into the Brent a near Strigno. They had
dealt the enemy some shrewd blows as they
retired. But by May 24 the Austrians were
pressing hard vipon the Italian positions to the
east of the Yal d'Assa. On the following day
they succeeded in advancing to the north of the
valley, breaking the Portule line and occupying
the height of Corno di Campo Verde (6,815 ft.).
Owing to a misunderstanding the Alpini evacu-
ated the practically impregnable positions of
Cima Undici (7,140 ft.) and Cima Dodici
(7,610 ft.) before the Austrians attacked ; but
the mistake was of little consequence, for on
May 26 the Austrians, attacking to the east of
the Val d'Assa, succeeded in driving the Italians
back from the whole range running down from
Corno di Campo Verde to Monte Meatta,
between the Val d'Assa and the Valle di Gal-
marara. Owing to this success of the enemy
Cima Undici and Cima Dodici would have had
to be abandoned in any case. The fighting on
May 26 was very stiff, and both sides lost heavily,
but the Italians were still completely outgunned.
They retired across the Galmarara, leaving
behind them a number of prisoners who were cut
off from retreat, and it was clear already that
they would have to go farther still. On May 27
the enemy crossed the lower waters of the Gal-
marara torrent and occupied part of Monte
Mosciagh (or Moschicce). A very fierce struggle
took place on this mountain on May 27 and 28.
The Italians fought very stubbornly, and before
they finally withdrew farther east a brilliant
counter-attack by the 141st Regiment (Catan-
zaro brigade) succeeded in bringing away two
batteries which had been isolated.

But the word was still : " Go back." General
Cadorna required time for the assembling of his
new army, and General Pecori-Uiraldi had to
gain it for his chief. He had to hold the Aus-
trians for a fixed time, but he had always to be
able to extricate his troops. He had to keep
his lines intact in order to permit the formation
of the new lines behind him. When too hard
pressed he had to fall back as long as there were
positions left for him to fall back upon ; the
time had not yet come for his men to die where
they stood on the uplands of the Sette Comuni.

On the left, and on the left of the centre, that
time had already come. On May 24, after a
very heavy bombardment, the Austrians
attacked all along the line from Coni Zugna to

Pasubio. They came forward in masses, in the
early morning, against both sides of Coni Zugna,
against the Pass that divides Coni Zugna from
Cima di Mezzana — the Passo di Buole — and
against Pasubio ; but they were everywhere
repulsed with heavy loss. Before midday they
renewed the attack against Passo di Buole, but
were again flung back, and the Italians, counter-
attacking, occupied the position of Parmesan,
south-east of the Pass, on the northern slope of
Cima di Mezzana. The artillery thundered all
day, and on the following morning the enemy
camo again to the assault, in compact masses.
A brigade which was sent against the Passo di
Buole was literally exterminated. None went
back. For six days the fighting continued,
practically without ceasing. The enemy showed
the utmost bravery, but nothing could shake
the resistance of the 37th Division (Sicilia and
Taro brigades — 61st, 62nd, 207th, 208th regi-
ments) who occupied the Zugna ridge. It was
old-fashioned fighting, except for the guns, for
the trenches were makeshift affairs, where they
existed at all, and when the enemy approached
the Italians leapt at them with the bayonet.
On May 30 the Austrians made their last attack
in mass on the Passo di Buole. Again and
again they came up the slopes, but the 62nd and
207th regiments, who held the Pass, never moved
a yard, except when they dashed forward to
finish their work with the bayonet. On this day
alone it is calculated that 7,000 Austrians were
killed, and during the six days' fighting they lost
some 40 per cent, of their infantry effectives in
this sector. After their failure on June 30 their
efforts slackened and their methods changed.
They came forward in lines instead of in masses,
and it almost seemed as though their attacks
were rather directed to keeping the Italians
occupied than inspired by any real hope of
success. Stubborn fighting still went on, but
the fury and intensity of the enemy's onslaxight
were dulled.

The resistance at the Passo di Buole was more
than a splendid feat of arms. It saved Pasubio,
and on the fate of Pasubio depended the fate of
the Italian line south of the Posina. All the
weight they could bring to bear was flung by the
Austrians against this bulwark. For weeks the
heavy guns thundered against the Italian posi-
tions, and wave after wave of massed infantry
was dashed to pieces against those granite lines.
The Austrians advanced from Col Santo along the
great ridge ; they came up from the Val Terrag-
nolo by the Borcola Pass, from Anghebeni and

ITALY'S MOUNTAINEERS.
Alpioi scaling the rugged mountain sides on the Austrian front.

THE TIMES HISTORY 'OF THE WAR.

ASPHYXIATING GAS CYLINDERS
GRENADES
Captured by the Italians.

AND

Ohiesa in the Vallarsa. For three weeks they
outnumbered the Italians by four to one in this
sector, and their artillery superiority was
immense, as all a,long the front. But neither
massed men nor massed guns, nor both together,
could break a way througn. The conditions
were terrible for both sides, for in May and June
snow still lay deep on the high ridges. Italians
and Austrians struggled in the snow, but the
Italians had also to sleep in the snow, and there
were often 200 cases of frostbite in a day. The
defenders knew the immense importance of their
task. They knew that if the Pasubio angle were
smashed in the Austrians would almost inevit-
ably roll up the Italian line south of the Posina,
and find two good open roads to the plain by
way of Valli di Signori, while the Lower Astico
would also be freed for the enemy's advance.
They knew what depended upon their standing
fast, and they stood — stood like the everlasting
hills upon which so many earned a glorious
grave. When the details of the fighting in the
Trentino are forgotten by all save those who
make a study of military history, Italians will
remember, and Italy's Allies should remember,
how the troops on Zugna and Pasubio blocked
the advance of the Austrian right and so held
up the tide of invasion.

It lias already been said that on May 2-t
the Italians had practicallj' completed their
withdrawal from the region between the

Posina and the Astico and were concentrating
south and east, respectively, of these two
streams. On the same day the Austrian
artillery opened fire from the positions on the
Monte Maggio-Campomolon line, from which
the Italians had been driven five days before,
and the infantry were already pouring down
the slopes of the tilted plateau. On May 25
the enemy entered the hamlet of Bettale on
the Upper Posina, and occupied the south-
eastern limb of the Tonezza plateau, that
rises sheer-sided, like an immense battleship,
between the Rio Freddo and the Astico, and
ends in the peak of Monte Cimone (4,031 ft.),
completely dominating the Arsiero basin.
The next day they were down in the Astico
valley and close upon Arsiero. On May 28
the Austrians crossed the Posina in force, and
on the following day battle was joined all along
the slopes to the south of the stream. Par-
ticularly heavy fighting took place beneath
Sogli di Campiglia and Pria Fora (5,415 ft.),
and the Italians fell back on the mountain line,
which they had orders to hold at all costs.
This line ran from Forni Alti (the extreme
eastern section of the Pasubio massif) by the
Colle di Xomo (3,438 ft.), Monte Spin (4,630 ft.),
and Malga Vaccarezze (4,730 ft.) to Pria Fora ;
it was practically the last line of defence in

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IN THE TRENCHES.
Firing a big Italian gun.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

the mountains. Behind Malga Xomo and
Monte Spin lay the Val Leogra. Behind Malga
Vaccarezze and Pria Fora the line Monte
Cogolo (5,390 ft.), Monte Novegna (5,046 ft.),
and Monte Brazome (4,028 ft.) formed the
very last bulwark. Beneath lay Sehio and
the Venetian plain.

The Italians withdrew from the valley on
the evening of May 29, and the troops that
were ordered to occupy Pria Fora lost their
way in the dark. Instead of reaching the main
height they struck too far to the south and
halted on Monte Ciove, the ridge that runs
towards Novegna and Brazome. When dawn
came Pria Fora frowned on them from the
north, and the Austrians were in possession.
Pria Fora is only about 200 ft. higher than the
southern ridge, but the drop is almost pre-
cipitous, except for a narrow approach, and the
enemy 'was already in force, having come up
the easy northern slopes. A desperate attack
failed to win the main height and the Italians
were thrown back on Monte Ciove.

The position looked bad. Monte Ciove
lay bare to the Austrian fire from Pria Fora as
well as to the heavy artillery across the Posina,
and it seemed almost untenable. But rein-
forcements were sent up and the order was
given by the general commanding the sector

AN ITALIAN PATROL,
With machine gun, in the Trentino.

ITALIAN TRANSPORT
In a Mountain Pass.

that there must be no going back. June 1
seemed a happy date for the Austrians. Pria
Fora not only commanded the Italian positions
to the south ; it looked down upon the Lower
Astico from the west, and Monte Cengio on the
other side of the valley was already threatened
by the troops coming down the Upper Astico.
Punta Corbin had been evacuated by the
Italians two days before, and the enemy were
spreading over the south-western corner of
the Asiago plateau, north-east of Arsiero.
On June 1 the Austrian Command issued an
Army Order to the troops in the Posina sector,
saymg that only one mountain remained
between them and the plain.

The Italian line ran across the Lower Astico,
just below Arsiero from Monte Brazome by
Quaro, Velo dAstico, Seghe, and Schiri to the
slopes of Monte Cengio, and here, too, the fight
was soon raging, only four miles from where
the valley gives on to the Vincentine plain.
On June 1 a furious storm of shells was hurled
against the whole Italian line from Colle di
Xomo to Rocchette, at the entrance to the
plain, and determined infantry attacks were
delivered against Monte Spin and the Seghe -
Schiri line. They were thrown back with
heavy loss. The Italian artillery, particularly

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE.

the field artillery, had been strongly reinforced,
and shrapnel fire wrought havoc among the
dense columns of the enemy. But Cengio was
being hard pressed from the north, where the
Austrians occupied Monte Barco.

In the Sette Comuni the Italians were still
falling back. Asiago had been evacuated on
May 28. and the retirement across the Gal-
marara was followed by a further retreat across
the parallel valleys of Xos and Campomulo,
the Austrians occupying Monte Baldo (5,450 ft.)
and Monte Fiara (5,815 ft.) on May 30, though
the Alpini still retained a footing on the latter
mountain. Farther north, on June 1, the enemy
advanced eastwards from Monte Mandrielle
(5,100 ft.) on to Austrian territory. The move
sounds peculiar, but it is explained by the
fact that here they entered one of the strategical
wedges secured by the frontier of 1866 — a
wedge thrust forward down the Brenta. The
enemy were now less than four miles from the
Val Sugana. at a point well behind the Italian
main line of defence in that valley. But com-
munications were bad in this region, and they
were to make little more progress here. Nor
was the Graz Army Corps, which had pushed
back the Italians across the Val Campomulo,
to gain many further laurels.

More to the south, however, the position
still seemed critical for the Italians. Des-
perate fighting was going on below Asiago.
A brigade of Sardinian Grenadiers was clinging
to Monte Cengio, attacked from north and
west, and on the plateau to the north-east, a
little west of the steam-tramway iine that
runs to Asiago from the plain, the hill of Bel-
monte was taken and retaken several times.
It seemed as though the Italians must be
driven eastward across the Val Canaglia, as,
indeed, they were on Juno 3, but on that very-
day General Cadorna announced that the
Austrian offensive had been stopped all along
the line. His new Army was ready, and he
had taken the measure of the enemy. A
fortnight's heavy fighting had shown him that
his troops and their leaders could do what he
asked them, and he expressed his confidence
in them by the communique which he issued to
the world. There were many days' bitter
defensive fighting in front of the Italians.
They were still to fall back a little way in the
Sette Comuni, but no position of first-class
importance was to be lost. Where they with-
drew there was ample room for retreat, and it
was now General Cadorna's game to draw

and hold the enemy well inside the salient
that their great drive had made.

The southern ha'f of the final line, from
which there was to be no withdrawal, has
already been indicated. It ran from Zugna to
Pasubio, thence eastwards to the Val d'Astico,
crossing the valley near Velo d'Astico ; thence
bending backwards to east of the Val Cana-
glia. Here it ascended the rim of the Asiago
plateau and ran by Monte Pan (4,515 ft.) and
Magnaboschi (4,420 ft.), south of the Asiago
basin, to the Val Frenzela ; thence north-east-
wards to Monte Lisser (5,310 ft.). From here
the line turned north-westward, along the
edge of the high, bleak tableland that drops
to the Val Sugana, to beneath the line that the
enemy had established along the frontier peaks.
In tracing this line General Cadorna had issued
the following Army Order : " Remember that
here we defend the soil of our country and the
honour of the Army. These positions are to
be defended to the death." His troops did
not fail him. and while they stood and died he
prepared his counter-stroke.

The Fifth Army was assembled on the plain,
complete in all its details, by J\me 2, exactly
ten days after the order for its formation was
given. Great reserves had been concentrated
in the war zone ; between the Tagliamento
and the Isonzo in readiness for the offensive
that was being prepared against Gorizia and
the Carso ; east of the Tagliamento, on central
positions that allowed a quick move to any part
of the front ; and in the permanent depots of
the north. By the night of May 22 the whole
of the Venetian plain was amove with troops
and their transport — the immense transport
required by modern war. In 10 days more
than half a million men, with guns, ammunition,
and provisions, with countless motor camions
and endless trains of mule-transport, were
ready in the plain to meet the enemy. It was
a magnificent feat of organization and energy.

But by June 2 General Cadorna knew that
the enemy would never reach the plain, if,
indeed, that was their real objective. In
addition to forming the Fifth Army he had
been able to draw on other reserves to reinforce
the lengthening line in the uplands, and fill the
gaps. For days the wonderful motor transport
of the Italians was moving men and machine-
guns and ammunition up to the mountains,
while behind them, more slowly, came artil-
lery, and more artillery. The most amazing

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

Fact, or at least the most spectacular, was the
transference of an entire division by motor, in
a single night, from the Carnic Alps to the
Pasubio district. These reinforcements were
enough to hold the enemy, and the duty of the
Fifth Army became offensive, not defensive.

On June 2 the Fifth Army was ready in the
plain, but to prepare the forward move took
10 days more. The difficulties of transport
were enormous. The Asiago plateau in par-
ticular is very scantily supplied with water.
The troops already there had suffered much
from thirst, and it was essential to assure an
adequate water supply for the greatly-mcreast <
forces which were soon to be thrown against
the Austrian*. And new roads had to be made
for transport, or old tracks widened, for the
existing roads would not serve General Cadoma's
purpose. This purpose was to take the enemy
on both flanks — to come up to the Asiago
plateau on the right, and drive at Col Santo
on the left. The plan required minute and
careful preparation, and during the interval
between plan and action the Austrians ham-
mered unceasingly at the Pasubio, Posina,
Astico and Asiago lines.

For fifteen days the fighting in the Posina
sector was heavy and continuous. Every
morning the Austrian guns opened fire at 6.30
precisely, and the bombardment never ceased
as long as daylight lasted. On June 2, 3 and
4, the enemy delivered massed infantry attacks

ITALIAN CAVALRY PATROL IN THE MOUNTAINS.
Top picture: An officer studying the surrounding country.

100

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

101

■on various parts of the front, from Colle di
Xomo to Sohiri in the Astico valley, but they
were unsuccessful everywhere. On the night
of June 4-5, while a violent storm was raging,
a furious attack was thrown against Monte
Ciove and Monte Brazome, supported by a
hail of shells. The Italians never moved,
though they were very highly tried, and a
similar attack on the night of June 5 had a
similar result. The next three days were
quieter, and on June 9 the Italians were able
to push forward a little and improve their
positions in the Monte Novegna sector of the
line. June 10 and 11 were comparatively
qviiet days, but a terri6c bombardment began
on June 12, and the Austrians attacked all
along the line. Their efforts were especially
directed against Monte Ciove, and at one time it
seemed as though the position could not be
held. It was swept and torn by shell, the
enemy were advancing in mass, and the
brigadier in command sent back word that the
pressure was likely to be too strong. The
reply of the general commanding the sector was
stern and peremptory, and it had the necessary
effect. But they were anxious hours. All
telephonic communications had been destroyed
by the storm of shells. Nearly all the divisional
staff were killed or wounded by an unlucky
direct hit. Orders had to be given entirely
by megaphone or bugle. Battalions and
regiments had all but passed out of the general's
direction, and he could only trust to officers
and men fulfilling his orders to stand fast. His
orders were obeyed, and at nightfall the Aus-
trians retreated.

Next morning, under cover of the usual bom-
bardment all along the line, the Austrians
made one more attempt upon Monte Ciove.
About 11 o'clock, after a furious preliminary
shelling, they lifted their fire to the rear of the
Italian positions and launched a powerful
infantry attack. Nearly all the Italian officers
were put out of action, and it was almost im-
possible to get supporting troops through the
curtain fire. The general could not see how
the defence was going, so a colonel of the staff
climbed to a point of vantage and called through
a megaphone to his waiting chief. His voice
came through a lull in the storm of fire : " They
are holding marvellously." They did not
cease to hold, and at 3 o'clock the Austrians
fell back. That evening the Cag'.iari brigade
(63rd and 64th regiments), which had held
Monte Ciove so gallantly was relieved by rein-

forcements which had arrived the previous
night. The brigade came out of action with
only 30 per cent, of its original strength. It
had lost 4,000 men on Monte Ciove.

Further attacks were made on Monte Brazome
early in the morning of June 14, and again on
the evening of the same day. They were easily
repulsed, and it was now clear that the Austrian
bolt was shot. Even the daily bombardment
was soon to slacken, and on the evening of
June 23 the 12-inch shell in the direction of
divisional headquarters, which had always
closed the day's work, came over for the last
time.

Meanwhile a desperate struggle had been
going on in the Sette Comuni, particularly on
that part of the plateau which lies to the south
of the Asiago basin. On the night of June 3
the Austrians, attacking in greatly superior
force, drove the Sardinian Grenadiers off Monte
Angio, but not until the brigade had lost far
more than half its effectives. They retreated
across the Val Canaglia, but the Italians still
held the south-western slopes of Cengio, above
Schiri, and on the following day they gained
some ground in this direction. An attempt to
retake the mountain failed, however, and the
Austrian pressure grew very heavy, both here
and to the north. There were two danger-
points : the uplands between the lower Astico
and the Asiago basin, and the head of the Val
Frenzela, where the Austrians were little more
than three miles from Valstagua, low down in
tho Brenta valley.

From June 4 to June 8 a long and stubborn
battle took place on the line running east of
the Valle di Campomulo to the head of the Val
Frenzela. The Austrian losses were enormous,
and they were driven back repeatedly, but on
the evening of June 8 the Italians retired a
short distance to the eastward, leaving the
summit of Castelgonberto (5,928 feet) in the
hands of the enemy. At this point the Aus-
trians now came under direct fire from Monte
Lisser, and the limit of their advance was reached.
Masses of artillery were now being placed in the
Monte Lisser sector, reinforcements were
arriving daily, and the preparations for the
Italian counter-offensive were well under way.
Persistent artillery duels followed, but the
enemy made no further infantry attacks.

South of Asiago the Austrian effort was more
prolonged and more violent. On the evening
of June 6 a furious attack was delivered on
the Italian positions. The battle raged all

102

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

ITALIAN INFANTRYMEN
Carrying anti-aircraft guns.

night, and the enemy were driven back, but on
the following afternoon they came again, only
to be repulsed once more. They had, however,
gamed a footing on Monte Lemerle, and two
days later the Italians were driven off their
positions on the summit of the mountain. But
the Forli brigade (43rd and 44th regiments),
which remained on the south-eastern slopes of
Lemerle, jdelded no more ground. They were
attacked by greatly superior forces on June 10,
but they did not move until the moment came
for a bayonet charge, when they counter-
attacked and scattered the Austrians, pursuing
them for some distance before returning to
their positions. From June f) to June 15 they
were subjected to repeated attacks and un-
ceasing artillery fire, but, magnificently sup-
ported by the new field guns which had now
been put in position, they defeated every at-
tempt to overcome their resistance. On June
15 they were reinforced by the 149th regiment,
and at 5.30 p.m. their brigadier sent them for-
ward in an irresistible rush which captured the
summit of Lemerle. A counter-attack came

at once, but was repulsed. Next day the
enemy attacked again and again. Late in the
evening they swarmed down over the summit
upon the Italian positions, which had been
withdrawn 100 yards for the sake of cover.
The defenders feinted a retreat, but returned
at the moment when the Austrians were trium-
phantly establishing themselves on the aban-
doned line. Nono of the enemy escaped. On
June 17 the attacks continued, being directed
especially on the line between Lemerle and Mag-
naboschi. The Forli brigade lost many officers
and fell back, but they were reinforced by the
33rd regiment, and their positions were re-
gained. A further desperate onslaught was
made on June 18, but it ended in failure. The
Austrian situation had become critical. The
enemy had realized the development of the
Italian counter-offensive, and they staked
everything in an attempt to drive a wedge
between the Lemerle-Magnaboschi line and the
positions east of the Val Canaglia. On a narrow
front, well under two miles, they sent in an
attacking force of over 20 battalions (the 43rd
division, the 24th and 41st infantry, tho 20th
and 22nd Landwehr). On June 15 the Austrian
command had issued an army order to the
troops saying that Lemerle would fall in two
days, and that afterwards only three mountains
lay between them and Milan. But in the four
days' fighting they did not gain another yard,
and the attack on June 18 was their last effort
These four days tried the Italians very highly.
No further reinforcements were available for
the moment, and the Forli brigade suffered
terrible losses. Only their indomitable courage
and the splendid work of the field artillery
saved the position.

Farther west, on the Val Canaglia line, the
struggle was no less grim, and here the Liguria
brigade won for itself a glorious name. This
brigade, one of the new formations created
during the year of preparation, was territorially
recruited and consisted almost entirely of
Genoese. They' were stationed at an angle
where the Italian line bent north-eastward frcm
the Val Canaglia to Magnaboschi and Lemerle.
The summit of Monte Pau lay behind them to
the south, and to the west and north the
Austrian positions faced them in a curved line,
running from the eastern slope of Monte Angio,
by Monte Barco, Panoccio and Belmonte to
Cesuna, with the height of Busibollo thrust
forward as a bastion on the near side of the
road, and the steam-tramway line running up

THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR.

103

the Val Canalgia. The point they held.
Zovetta, is not marked save on the largest-scale
staff maps, but it is a shoulder of the Monte
Pau-Magnaboschi range.

When the Liguria brigade took up its position
bad news was coming in both from north and
south. The Grenadiers had been driven off
Cengio ; the Austrians soon gained a footing on
Lemerle, and farther to the north Castelgom-
berto was evacuated. The Genoese of the
Liguria brigade were first attacked in force on
the evening of June 6, simultaneously with the
attack on Lemerle. They were heavily engaged
in the battle of June 10, when they sviffered
severely from artillery fire. The Austrians had
nearly 200 guns on the curved line described
above, and the greater part of their fire was
directed against the Monte Pau positions. The
Italians had not yet placed all their fresh artil-
lery, and the main support of the Genoese was
two batteries of mountain guns on Monte Pau.
Their heaviest trial, like that of their com-
rades of the Forli brigade, was to begin on
June 15. On that day and the two following
the Austrian infantry attacked in force. They
were able to concentrate in dead ground, pro-
tected from artillery fire, in the valley beneath

Zovetta, and their attacks were persistent. By
this time the Genoese had fallen back some
150 yards from the edge of the hill, to a road
that crossed the shoulder from the north, and
here they waited and mowed down the enemy
as they came over the brow of the slope. The
defenders suffered very severely. After one
onslaught had been repulsed no news came to
brigade headquarters from an outlying company
on the right. When a supporting party was
sent out the message came back that the entire
company was dead or disabled. On the evening
of June 17 the remnants of the Liguria brigade*
were replaced by fresh troops, but no further
attack was to come from the enemy.

The next few days saw an intense artillery
bombardment from both sides, and all along
the line from the Adige to the Brcnta the
Italians were beginning to test the ground for
an advance. The Austrian offensive was over.
Three out of the four reserve divisions concen-
trated at Trento had either been brought already

* The various units mentioned by name in this brief
account are far from exhausting the list of those who
greatly distinguished themselves. They have been
selected by the writer because the fighting in which they
earned renown was specially important in the story of
the Trentino operations.

ON THE LOOK-OUT.
An anti-aircraft gun sentry in winter garb.

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a o
X a
H .5

Z S

■» I

z J

<! .

J |

<! ui

as -a

Z c

104

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

105

into the front line or sent in haste to Galicia ;
the fourth division was formed of second-line
troops, of doubtful value, and there was no
more reinforcement possible. The smashing
blows dealt by the Russians on the eastern front
showed that the Trentino attack had been based
on a very grave miscalculation, and instead of
being able to bring more troops against Italy the
Austrian command had now to study the pro-
blem of removing a part of those which were
already engaged.

On June 16 the Italian right wing had made
useful progress. The Alpini astonished the
enemy by climbing the steep cliffs of Castelloni
di San Marco (6,033 ft.), on the frontier above
the Val Sugana, and by this move they prepared
tli3 way for the occupation of Monte Magari
and Malga Fossetta, positions which were very
strongly held by two infantry regiments (70th
and 76th) and eight battalions of Bosnian
Feldjdger. On the following day the Alpini
pushed westward and captured the Cima dTsi-
doro (6,270 ft.). The whole right wing was now
moving forward, and the left wing was also
under way, in the Vallarsa and at the head of
the Posina valley. Guns and men were massed
on the Italian centre. The time had nearly
come for the Austrians to go.

For a week the Austrians opposed a firm re-
sistance to the Italian pressure, but on June 25
the retreat of the invaders began. Their posi-
tion was becoming untenable. The Alpini
were recapturing the high peaks on the right, and
on the left Col Santo was being seriously threa-
tened. Attacking on June 25 the Italians
rapidly occupied the Austrian positions imme-
diately confronting them. They met only a
rearguard resistance, the main body of the in-
vaders being in full retreat. Within three days
the Italians were attacking the mountains east
of the upper waters of the Galmarara, and they
had already occupied Monte Interrotto' and
Monte Mosciagh, to the north of Asiago. Far-
ther south they were on the line of the Assa, as
far as its junction with the Astico, and to the
west they had crossed the Posina and were
attacking Monte Majo. In the Vallarsa and
Pasubio sector they were making progress
against Col Santo. They were picking up a
good many prisoners and machine-guns, and
finding a good many unburied dead, but the
Austrian retreat had been planned and was
being conducted with great skill. Above all,
the guns were being got away. General
Cadorna's counter-offensive was to have only

partial results, for the enemy realized it in time.
On the other hand, it never fully developed ;
the retreat of the enemy from the salient they
had made changed the circumstances, and
consequently the plan.

The line that the Austrians intended to hold
was clearly indicated, for as they approached it
their resistance stiffened. It ran from Rovereto
by Col Santo to Monte Maggio via the Borcola
Pass ; thence along the rim of the Arsiero
plateau, north of the Posina and east of the
Upper Astico ; thence across the Upper Astico
north of the Assa to where the valley turns nort h -
ward, and thence, crossing the river, by Monte
Meatta and the Portule line to the frontier. This
was an immensely strong defensive line, backed
as it was by the heavy guns of the Folgaria and
Lavarone plateaux, and everywhere looking
down on the Italian positions. General Ca-
dorna had no intention of letting things be in the
Trentino. It was his business to keep as many
Austrians as possible pinned on the line, and he
worried the enemy by continual strong pushes
on various parts of the Trentino front. But he
had equally no intention of knocking his head
against the stone wall of the enemy's lines, and
wasting men who might be better employed
elsewhere. At three points only he hastened to
press the attack home — east of tlie Galmarara,
Monte Cimone (immediately north of Arsiero)
and in the Pasubio sector. In each case the
attacking troops were successful. The east side
of the Galmarara valley was solidly occupied,
Monte Zebio being brilliantly carried by the
Sassari Brigade (151st and 152nd regiments)
and the Bersaglieri. the Italian lines on the
Pasubio massif were pushed forward so as to
give more breathing-space at this all -important
position, and Monte Cimone was taken. The
capture of this peak deserves a special word . Its
position and formation have already been de-
scribed, and it will be clear that it was an ideal
spot to defend. Several times the Italians
endeavoured to climb its steep sides, both from
the Rio Freddo and the Astico valley, but
machine-gun fire mowed them down, and it
seemed impossible to reach the plateau. • As
the steep sides were apparently impracticable,
it was resolved to give the Alpini another chance
of showing their special qualities. They were
sent against the southern end of Cimone, a wall
of rock rising 350 feet above Monte Caviojo, a
spur already occupied by the Italians. Before
dawn on July 23 they scaled the rock face by the
aid of ropes and after a long and bloody struggle

IOC

THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR.

HAULING A FIELD PIECE
Under a roof to hide the

bombed the Austrians off the summit. The
bombs had. to be passed up from below by a
chain of men, roped on the cliff. By the
evening they had extended their occupation suf-
ficiently to cover the advance of the infantry
from the Rio Freddo and the Val d'Astico, who
came up the steep paths and established them-
selves solidly on the plateau north of the sum-
mit. This victory took from the Austrians a
very tiseful observatory, and gave the Italians a
firm footing on the Tonezza plateau. Farther
west they were firmly entrenched on the hills
north of the Posina. They had occupied
Monte Majo and were, threatening Como
del Coston and the Borcola Pass. And
near the border of the Trentino and Tirol
a new movement had been started from
the Val Cistron and the Val Pellegrino,
which threatened the Val d'Avisio and the
great highway that runs down by Cavalise
to the Adige

The Italians were carrying out their task
very successfully, and despite all their efforts
the Austrians had not been able to detach
more than three divisions, or possibly four, to
the help of their routed armies in Galicia.
The Trentino adventure had come to a disas-

TO THE FIRING-POINT—
gun from enemy airmen.

trous end. The invaders had inflicted heavy
losses on the Italians, both in men and guns,
and had made a rapid and brilliant advance
on to Italian soil. But they had not the neces-
sary staying-power, and their effort died out.
They lost at least 150,000 in two months'
fighting, and though they were better placed
strategically than before their offensive, the
price they had paid was far too high for what
they gained. It might perhaps have been
worth paying if it could have paralysed the
Italian preparations for a big movement on
the Isonzo, and many critics consider that this
was the real purpose. But while the echoes
of the heavy guns in the Trentino were still
resounding, General Cadorna smashed through
the iron fortresses of Sabotino, Podgora and
San Michele, occupied the entire western seg-
ment of the Carso, and drove the Austrians
headlong from Gorizia.

The Italian Army won immortal honour by
its resistance in the Trentino, and, like his
troops, their leader gained laurels that will not
fade. Yet a greater title to renown will be
that he could dare to hold back the invaders
with his left arm and keep his right ready for
a blow elsewhere

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

107

When the Austrian offensive in the Trentino
began the Italian Parliament was not sitting.
It was not until June ti that the Chamber of
Deputies reopened, and by that time the
advancing tide of invasion had been stemmed.
Three days before, General Cadorna's com-
munique had stated that the Austrian forward
movement had been definitely arrested along
the whole front. The Government, therefore,
was assured of a more favourable reception
than it would have had a fortnight earner,
when the issue of the fighting still seemed un-
certain, and many people feared that the
enemy might win their way to the Venetian
plain. But it was generally felt that the
Cabinet could hardly hope to escape a storm,
for the conviction was widespread that the
Austrian successes in the Trentino were due,
in part at least, to lack of foresight and pre-
paration on the Italian side.

The temper of the Chamber was critical
and everything depended on the way in which
the deputies were handled. In point of fact,
the Salandra Government, and particularly the
Premier himself, had for a considerable time
been losing in popularity. So far back as the
autumn of 1915 it had been said, with some

justice, that Signor Salandra not only took no
trouble to keep in touch with the leaders of
opinion in Parliament and in the country, but
seemed actually averse from contact with any-
one outside his own immediate political circle.
This attitude of extreme reserve was under-
stood and appreciated during the difficult
period of Italian neutrality, and at the moment
of Italy's entry into the war. Signor Salan-
dra's position in the country was very strong.
Perhaps he reached the highest point of his
popularity after his speech at the Capitol on
Juno 2, 1915, when he answered the attack
made upon Italy in the Reichstag by the
German Chancellor. At that moment Signor
Salandra held a place in the political life of
his country that no Italian statesman had
occupied since Cavour. It lay with him
whether he could keep that place. His task
was not easy. Italian public opinion is difficult
to hold, difficult to manage, and it cannot be
ignored. And in Parliament his position
was not satisfactory. His Government was
formed upon a narrow and not too stable
foundation. The party to which he belonged,
the Liberals of the Right, counted compara-
tively few votes in the Chamber, and the great

AN ITALIAN TRENCH IN THE MOUNTAINS.
2,000 metres high.

108

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

majority of the deputies wero political oppo-
nents. The Giolittians had voted for Italy's
intervention because intervention had been
clearly demanded by the country. The " In-
terventionists of the Left " — Radicals, Repub-
licans and Reformist Socialists — who had
worked unceasingly for war, were antagonistic
to Signor Salandra and his party on every
question save that of the part that Italy should
play in the European struggle.

The situation, therefore, required specially
skilful handling. To assure the position of his
Government it was necessary that Signor
Salandra should keep in close touch with
feeling in the country, and that he should take
steps to assure the support of those who were
not his natural political allies in Parliament.
The first task was one which is the duty of every
politician who aspires to power in a democratic
country ; the way was cleared for the second
by the special circumstances of the time.
The, name of Salandra stood for Italy's entry
into the European war, and the adherents of
the war policy were ready to forget all domestic
differences and lend their loyal support to the
man who had led Italy in the great choice.
The sympathy of the Interventionist Left was
increased by the appointment of Signor Bar-
zilai as Minister without portfolio. All Italy
approved the inclusion in the Cabinet of the
recognized leader of the Irredentist movement,
himself a native of Trieste, as a symbol of the
national aspirations which should be fulfilled
by the war ; but to the Left the appointment
was especially welcome. Signor Barzilai had
fought many parliamentary battles under the
Republican flag, and though he had ceased to
be identified with a party which seemed now
to have little raison d'etre in Italian politics
he continued to be one of the leaders of " the
democracy " in the Chamber. His inclusion
in the Cabinet stood as a pledge for the com-
pletion of national unity, but it was also taken
as a recognition of the part played by the
Interventionist Left in arousing Italian opinion
to the necessity of war.

This strengthened Signor Salandra's parlia-
mentary position, but, even allowing for the
assurance of added support to the Government,
the Giolittians formed a maj ority in the Chamber.
A number of the party, including their leader,
were practically vowed to enmity against the
Government. They had gone altogether too far
in their endeavours to preserve Italian neu-
trality, and, incidentally, to regain political

power for themselves. They might vote for
the Government, but not out of friendliness, and
they could as little have dealings with the man
who had defeated their schemes as he could
have dealings with them. On the other hand,
there were many members of Signor Giolitti's
majority who were in a quite different position.
They had played no part in the backstairs
negotiations of May, 1915, and most of them,
probably, gave a sincere if not enthusiastic
acquiescence to Signor Salandra's war policy.
They felt that as Italians their one duty was
to collaborate in the work of pursuing the war
with the utmost vigour and bringing it to a
successful conclusion. Here, too, there was a
chance for the G o vernment to win solid support,
without any sacrifice of principle or dignity.

The tasks that confronted Signor Salandra,
when Italy's decision was finally taken, required
abilities of a special kind. Above all they
required tact and the gift of handling men.
Unfortunately Signor Salandra was not able to
display the qualities demanded by the situation.
With Baron Sonnino at his right hand he had
guided Italy through a long and fateful crisis.
He had faced and overcome, with firmness and
skill, the most exceptional difficulties, and he
had won a remarkable place in the esteem of
his countrymen. He was to fail in a task that
seemed much less intrinsically difficult, but
called for gifts which he could not bring to it.
He was to lose a great personal opportunity
and see the gradual dwindling of the popularity
which he had most justly earned.

In Italy as in most democratic countries, but
perhaps more in Italy than in others, the
quality of souplesse is practically essential to
permanent political success. It was for lack
of this quality that Baron Sonnino had. for so
long failed to wield the influence in Italian
political life to which his abilities and character
had entitled him. He had shown himself
lacking in the necessary parliamentary gifts.
He had won power but failed to hold it, and
until his hour came, the hour so fateful for
Italy's future, it had seemed that he would
never have the chance of giving to his country
what he could give. The chance came under the
leadership of the man who had been his close
friend and political ally fol 30 years, and
had served as his lieutenant in two Govern-
ments. It was the moment that gave to Baron
Sonnino the opportunity of proving himself,
but if he had been Premier himself, he could
never have carried his programme through.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

109

MOUNTAIN WARFARE.

Alpini hauling a gun up a mountain.

And he could hardly have done his work under
another leader, just as Signor Salandra could
hardly have led Italy to war if anyone but his
old chief had been at the Consulta.

During the period of Italy's neutrality, after
the death of the Marquis di San Giuliano, the
Salandra-Sonnino combination had shown itself
specially suited to the circumstances. Above

all, both men were trusted. They were known
to be beyond the suspicion of intrigue, and
everyone was willing to admit the necessity of
reserve. With the declaration of war the
situation changed. It remained to be seen
whether the Government could adapt itself to
the new circumstances.

The duty of adaptation lay with Signor

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

ITALIAN TROOPS

Throwing hand-grenades into an enemy trench.

Salandra. No one expected Baron Sonnino to
change his spots, to be outspoken with the
supporters of the Government, old and new, or
to keep in touch with the Press, which counts
for so much in Italy. It was hoped that this
essential part of the Government's duties would
be performed by Signor Salandra, but after a
few months it began to be said that he was
" worse than Sonnino." Before Parliament
met on December 1, 1915, there was a good deal
of discontent, which was no doubt accentuated
by the fact that things seemed to be going
badly for the Allies. It would not have been
so hard to be patient and go without informa-
tion if the progress of the war had been satis-
factory, but the debacle in the Balkans made a
profound impression in Italy, and men's minds
were uneasy. The general uneasiness was
accentuated by a doubt as to Italy's exact
position in the Entente. When Italy declared
war against Austria, the Government and the
country expected a declaration of hostilities on
the part of Germany within a few days. Signor
Salandra's speech at the Capitol was thought to
make war finally inevitable, but still Germany
did not move. Before relations were broken
off with Turkey, on August 21, Naby Bey, the
Turkish Ambassador in Kome, warned Baron
Sonnino that war with Turkey meant war with

Germany, that Germany had pledged herself
to declare war on Italy if Italy declared war on
Turkey. Italy's answer to this warning was
an immediate declaration of hostilities, but the
pledge to Turkey had no more value than any
other German promise.

When Serbia was invaded by Germany,
Austria and Bulgaria, and Italy declared war
on Bulgaria, but not on Germany, Italian
opinion, and the opinion of Italy's allies, were
further puzzled. The grounds of the declara-
tion published by the official Stefani Agency on
October 19, 1915, seemed rather to increase
the anomalous nature of the situation. The
official statement ran as follows :

" Bulgaria having opened hostilities against
Serbia, and having allied herself with Italy's
enemies to fight against the Allies, the Italian
Government, by order of the King, has declared
a state of war to exist between Italy and
Bulgaria."

It was at this period that the talk began to
go round of a secret agreement between Italy
and Germany, signed shortly before the rupture
of diplomatic relations and the declaration of
war against Austria, wmch preserved a bridge
between the two countries, and provided that
they should not come to open aostilities.
There was no truth whatever in this suggestion,
though it was freely made by some who ought
to have known better than to lend their autho-
rity to the rumour. The facts were available
to those who chose to apply for them, and the
story is an interesting comment on the way
in which an imposing, if shadowy, edifice can
be built up on a slender foundation, or rather
on no foundation at all. A special agree-
ment between Italy and Germany was signed
before diplomatic relations were broken off,
but it was not of the nature insinuated. When
Italy's intervention was certain and imminent,
the Italian Government proposed both to
Germany and to Austria-Hungary that in the
event of war eacn country should (1) respect
and protect all private property belonging to
the other's subjects within its own borders
and (2) should permit the repatriation of the
other's subjects. The property clause was to
the advantage of Austria-Hungary and Germany,
both of whom had large interests in Italy.
The clause providing for the departure of enemy
subjects was to protect the very large number
of Italians, principally of the working classes,
who were resident in Germany or Austria-
Hungary. The Germans and Austrians domi-

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

Ill

ciled in Italy, who, generally speaking, be-
longed to the well-to-do classes, had for the
most part left Italy before the rupture of
diplomatic relations became imminent.

Austria-Hungary refused the Italian pro-
posal ; Germany accepted it, and on May 21,
1915, an agreement to the effect indicated was
signed by the German Foreign Secretary, Herr
von Jagow, and the Italian Ambassador in
Berlin, Signor Bollati. It will be seen that
the agreement gives no grounds whatever for
the most unjust and mischievous suggestion
that Italy was endeavouring to keep a foot in
the enemy's camp. The agreement was in
fact little more than an attempt to re -affirm
principles which had seemed to be well estab-
lished before Germany began to break most of the
rules of war to which she had put her signature.
The two important points about it, in view of
the gossip to which its existence gave rise, are :

1. The terms it contained were offered to
Austria-Hungary, upon whom Italy was about
to declare war.

2. It deliberately provided for a state of
war between Italy and Germany.

The story of a secret agreement was entirely
unfounded, and it was at length definitely
contradicted by Signor Barzilai, in an inter-

view given in February, 1916, but the fact
that it was started, and repeated, and half
believed even by many Italians, shows how
Italy's position was compromised by the
absence of a formal declaration of war from or
against Germany.

It has already been said that the omission
to ta,ke the opportunity of the attack upon
Serbia increased the confusion both of
Italian and Allied opinion. Some months
later, when the question was again arousing
lively discussion in Italy, Signor Bissolati
stated in the course of a conversation that
the Government had missed an excellent
chance of regularizing the position, but comment
was silenced for a little, in Italy at least, by the
announcement that Italy had adhered to the
Pact of London,* which pledged its signatories
not to conclude a separate peace. This an-
nouncement was made by Baron Sonnino, in
the Chamber of Deputies, on December 1,
1915, the opening day of the short winter
session, and it was then stated that Italy's
signature had been affixed to the Pact the day
before. It is understood, however, that Italy

* The original declaration was signed in London in
September, 1914, by Great Britain, France and Russia,
ana Japan adhered to the agreement a year later.

A WELL-CONSTRUCTED SHELTER: ITALIAN "DUG-OUT."

112

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

had given formal assurances of her adhesion
some time previously, and Signor Orlando,
Minister of Justice, had prepared public
opinion for Baron Sonnino's statement in an
important speech delivered at Palermo on
November 20. In the course of that speech
Signor Orlando had emphasized the impossi-
bility of an " isolated peace," and had already
dashed the hopes of those few Italians who
thought that Italy ought to confine herself to
what had been called contemptuously " a
narrow-gauge war."

It was not long before the Government began
to come in for fresh criticism. By this time
it was well understood that Signor Salandra
was not likely to modify his attitude of reserve.
And a number of charges were accumulating
against the Government, most of which, no
doubt, admitted of an excellent answer, but
to which no adequate answer was given.
Italy, like other countries, was slow to realize
the extent of her munition requirements. It
began to be known that it was largely owing
to lack of sufficient artillery preparation and
support that the Italian attacks on the Isonzo
had not succeeded in Ijreaking the Austrian
lines. Critics were quite well prepared to
excuse a shortage of guns and shells, if they
felt that every effort had been made to furnish
an adequate supplj'. It was on this point
that there was a sense of uncertainty. Those
who had to provide the shells showed an undue
complacence regarding the output which per-
haps they did not feel, but the effect was
imfortunate. At the front, at least, there
were no illusions. When a representative of
the Munitions Department gave the assurance
that there was an " abundance " of shells, he
received the true and only answer to his easy
optimism: "There is never abundance."
Here was the point. Italy had certainly done
marvels in the way of military preparation.
The danger was lest it should be thought
enough to have done marvels.

Over the question of munitions the Govern-
ment began to be accused of lack of forethought,
and similar accusations began to be made in
regard to other deficiencies which were making
themselves felt. The question of the supply
of coal and grain was becoming acute, owing
to the shortage of shipping and the ever-
increasing price of freight. It was asserted
that the Government had shown a lack of
foresight in regard to these problems, and of
energy in dealing with them. Not all the

criticisms were justified, but some were fair
enough, and the situation was made worse by
the isolation of the Government from the
leaders of public opinion, which forbade dis-
cussion and explanation.

The short winter session (the Chamber sat
from December 1 to December 13, and the
debates in the Senate lasted only three days,
from December 15 to December 17) had not
given much chance to those who desired fuller
information on the various points that had
begun to trouble public opinion. The Chamber
was not to reopen till March 1, so that during a
period of more than 11 months, except for
the historic single-day sitting on May 20, 1915,
the elected representatives of the nation had
only a fortnight for parliamentary discussion of
the situation and its problems. This would
not have mattered — many people w:ere against
parliamentary discussion altogether — if the
Ministry had in the interval maintained a
reasonable contact with its supporters. No such
contact was maintained, and public opinion
soon began to be restless again. The Inter-
ventionists of the Left were particularly dis-
satisfied. They thought with some justice that
the part they had played before the war entitled
them to consideration, and they were specially
concerned over the question of munitions.
Moreover, they were still uneasy in regard to
Germany. The adhesion to the Pact of London
had satisfied them for the moment, but on
reflection it did not seem sufficient. Almost
from the first they had regarded Germany as the
principal enemy, and they realized clearly that
the absence of a declaration of war put Italy in a
false position. By a. Government decree dated
November 3, 1915, Italy had requisitioned all
German ships in Italian ports, deferring pay-
ment " till after the war," and at the beginning
of February a further decree was published for-
bidding all trade between Germany and Italy,
direct or indirect. But these measures did not
satisfy those who felt that the situation must be
cleared of every kind of apparent ambiguity.

Early in February Signor Salandra went to
Turin, where he delivered several speeches. In
one of these he made what must be considered
a serious error in tact, by claiming for the party
to which he belonged the credit of having led
Italy to war in defence of her rights. This
claim was resented by the Interventionists of
the Left, and matters were made worse by the
suggestion of a Turin deputy (the Parliamen-
tary correspondent of the Gazzella del Popolo)

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113

114

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

that their resentment was due to their wish for
Signer Bissolati's inclusion in the Cabinet.
Tins was an unfair criticism. The object of the
malcontents was not power, though they did
desire to see Signor Bissolati, and others of their
number, replace certain Ministers who they con-
sidered had not proved equal to their duties.
They wished to be assured that the war would
be conducted with every possible energy, and
they believed that the best guarantee for their
aims was the infusion of fresh blood into the
Cabinet. An interview granted by Signor
Salandra to the Deputy mentioned above,
Signor Bevione, did not mend matters. Signor
Salandra declared that political crises must
always be resolved in Parliament, but that
neither newspapers, nor political groups, nor
even a Parliamentary majority, could compel
the Premier to discard some of his colleagues
and appoint new Ministers. This seemed a
direct challenge to those who hoped for a recon-
struction of the Ministry, and on February 9
a memorial was sent to Signor Salandra by the
representatives of the Interventionists of the
Left and the Nationalists. The memorial stated
that the Interventionist groups had given the
fullest support to the Government, but that
they felt it their special duty, as advocates of
the war, to draw attention to what they con-
sidered the shortcomings of those who were
directing the policy and actions of Italy. These
alleged shortcomings have already been indi-
cated, and need not be repeated here. Signor
Salandra replied the following day, in 20 words,
promising that the memorial would have
all his attention, but no further answer was
received. Further discussion was delayed by
M. Briand's visit to Rome, which was a. symbol
of the increased solidarity between the Allies,
but the reopening of Parliament was awaited
with special interest.

The spring session began well with a speech
by Signor Bissolati proposing that a message
should be sent to the French Chamber expressing
complete unity between Italy and France. He
insisted on the unanimity of the Allies, and
declared that as on the western front France
and England were righting against Austria-
Hungary, so on the Isonzo Italy was fighting
against Germany. The speech was received
with the greatest enthusiasm, all the Deputies,
except the official Socialists, rising to acclaim
his words and signify their agreement with the
proposed message. But stoims were soon to
come. Within a week Signor Salandra offended

a large section of the Chamber by the manner in
which he refused to accept a proposal to divide
the House on an unimportant motion brought
forward by the official Socialists. The Ex-
treme Left were certainly displaying an attitude
unworthy of the times and had given much
provocation, but unruly behaviour on the part
of the Socialists is a long tradition in Italian
politics, and no Premier can afford to lose
patience with the Chamber. Signor Salandra
did lose patience, and astonished the House by
tlireatening an appeal to the Crown if Deputies
continued to press for votes on all occasions.
The Premier's words were taken by all the Left
as indicating a lack of proper respect for the
rights of the Chamber, and the Interventionists
who had hitherto supported him seemed to re-
sent what they termed his " reactionary atti-
tude " as much as did the official Socialists.
It was from this date that the movement for a
National Government, which had hitherto re-
ceived little support, began to gain weight.
Several stormy sittings followed, but the criti-
cisms which had been expected from the Inter-
ventionist Left were not well defined. An
interview between the Premier and Signor Bisso-
lati led to an alteration in the attitude of those
who were working with the latter, and it seems
clear that the Reformist leader received some
assurance as to the position of Italy in regard to
Germany. The keynote of the Interventionists'
argument had hitherto been that the diplomatic
situation must be cleared up. Now their chief
contention was that the Government must be
reinforced, so as to represent all the elements
favourable to the war. The debate on the
Government's economic policy brought no very
satisfactory statements from the Ministers
attacked, and before the division an event of
first-class political importance took place. The
Interventionist groups of the Left, who had
been acting together since before the war,
formally joined forces under the leadership of
Signor Bissolati, and constituted themselves
into a bloc under the name of the Democratic
Alliance. Speaking on the eve of the division
in the name of the 140 members who constituted
the new party, Signor Bissolati declared that he
and his friends were not satisfied with the
answers given to the critics of the Government.
He said, however, that they were convinced
that the Cabinet saw the necessity for complete
solidarity between the Allies, and for that
reason they had resolved to do nothing that
might weaken the Government on the eve of

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

115

AT AN ADVANCED POST.
A lonely Austrian sentry on guard in the Dolomites.

the Paris Conference. In the course of his
.speech in defence of the policy of the Govern-
ment Signor Salandra had resented the sugges-
tion that Italy had not put her whole heart
in the war, declaring that Italy " now holds her
place in the front line of the great war, on equal
terms with those Powers with whom in full and
loyal solidarity of action she is fighting for the
defence of human civilization and the law of
nations." This seemed a fairly satisfactory
statement, and no doubt did something to
placate the malcontents. There had been a
long discussion between the leaders of the new
bloc as to whether they should continue to sup-
port the Government, and Signor Bissolati had
some difficulty in winning his followers to his
way of thinking. Indeed, when the division
came, the Reformist Socialists, Signori Rai-
mondo and Cabrini, broke away from their
friends and voted against the Government, as
did the small Nationalist group. The Govern-
ment majority, however, was sufficiently impo-
sing : 394 votes to 61. Signor Salandra was
safe for the moment, but it was realized that
the Democratic Alliance, from that time
onwards, practically held the Government in
their hands. The closing passage of Signor
Bissolati's speech, every phrase of which had

been considered by the leaders of the new party,

outlined the policy for which they stood. It

ran as follows :

The programme, not of this Government only, but of
any Government which would not betray Italy, is one
only — Victory. A victory which, fortunately for
civilization, cannot be the victory of Italy, of France, of
Russia, or of England, but is the victory which, being
affirmed in the resurrection of Belgium and Serbia, in
the liberation of France, in the attainment of Italy's
national claims, and in the reconstitution of Poland,
will lay the granite foundations of a Europe free and
truly civilized, assured against the manoeuvres of a
military caste, and dedicated to the fruitful works of
peace.

The visits of Signor Salandra, Baron Son-
nino and General Cadorna to Paris, the reso-
lutions passed at the Paris Conference, and the
visit of Mr. Asquith to Rome, combined
together to strengthen the position of the
Government, which had been badly shaken.
There was comparatively little criticism of
Baron Somiino's definite and emphatic refusal,
in his speech on the Foreign Estimates, to
consider the suggestion that Parliament should
be more closely associated with the conduct
of Italy's foreign policy. He pointed out that
the abandonment of "secret diplomacy"
would simply play into the hands of the enemy,
and both the Chamber and public opinion saw
the force of his argument. The Foreign Esti-

lit;

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAN.

mates wen: passed by 352 votes to 36, and there
seemed no speeial reason to anticipate a crisis
when Parliament reassembled. Signor Salan-
dra was, in fact, ready to include Signor
Bissolati in his Cabinet, but the Reformist
leader was unwilling to accept office. He felt
that it would be difficult to reconcile his ideas
with the Premier's methods, and preferred to
retain his independence of action, but it was
generally hoped and believed that Signer
Salandra would learn from the experience of
the March sittings that he must modify his
attitude towards the Chamber and the country.
The storm blew up very quickly at the end.
The Chamber reopened on June 0, and the

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MR. ASQUITH AT ROME.

(On the right Signor Salandra.)

first two days of the session were occupied in
quiet discussion of the Budget. On June 8,
however, a motion was presented by Signer
Eugenio Cliiesa, a prominent member of the
Democratic Alliance, calling upon the Govern-
ment to make a declaration regarding the
military situation. He suggested the holding
of a secret session if the Government was un-
willing to make a public statement, but he
urged that the country was growing restive at
the absence of any Government declaration,
and resented the discussion of the Budget at. a
time when all eyes were turned upon the
Trentino. Signor Bissolati deprecated the
pressing of the motion, but suggested that the
Government might find a way of taking the

leaders of the various groups into its con
fidence. Signor Salandra's reply did not
satisfy the Chamber. He appealed for patience,
assuring the House that they would have
ample opportunity of discussing the general
policy of the Government when the time came
for the Vote on Account. The Vote was to be
taken in four days' time, and meanwhile he
asked the Chamber to continue its ordinary
work. In obedience to the appeal of Signor
Bissolati, Signor Chiesa withdrew his motion,
but the Chamber quickly altered the situation
to the disadvantage of the Government. When
the Debate on the Estimates of the Ministry of
the Interior was resumed only one Deputy spoke,
and the Estimates went through without
further discussion. The Estimates of the
Ministries of Finance and the Treasury were
disposed of without a word, the Colonial
Estimates were passed after the briefest dis-
cussion, and the sitting closed early. No fewer
than 110 Deputies who were inscribed to speak
on the various Estimates withdrew their
names, and it was clear that the Chamber
meant to answer silence by silence.

The next day's sitting was short, the voting
being taken on the Estimates which had been
discussed, or rather, not discussed, on the
previous day. The Government was far from
obtaining its usual war majority ; the Estimates
of the Ministry of the Interior, for example,
being passed by a majority of only 71 — 191
votes to 120. The small number of Deputies
voting was significant.

By the evening of June 9 the situation was
fairly clear. Signor Salandra was tired of the
Chamber, and the Chamber was tired of Signor
Salandra. The Premier had perforce advanced
the discussion on the Vote on Account two
days, and had indicated that he meant to ask
for an unconditional vote of confidence. The
Interventionist Left, who held Iris fate in their
hands, were still uncertain. Conciliation would
have probably saved the Ministry, but Signor
Salandra was in anything but a conciliatory
mood. It is believed that he was weary of
office. He had lived through two years
of exceptional strain, and the sittings of
the spring and the summer had seemed to
indicate that his nerves were feeling the long
trial.

In any event, he had showed himself un-
yielding to suggestion, and when the moment
of crisis came he showed himself equally
unyielding to the pressure of circumstances.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

117

BOMBARDMENT ON LAKE GARDA.
Shelling the Austrian trenches to assist the Italian Army in the Trentino.

The speech he made in requesting a vote of
confidence was not happily phrased, and he
gave the impression of being altogether out of
touch with the Chamber. One passage in
particular was unfavourably received. He
said that better prepared defences on the
Trentino front would at least have arrested the
enemy at a greater distance from the Venetian
plain. This was, of course, perfectly true,
and it was typical of the feeling that had grown

up against the Premier that the Chamber
strongly resented his bringing the question of
the military command into his speech. In
answer to criticism, Signor Salandra rose to
explain that he was not criticizing the Comando
Supremo, but merely expressing their con-
sidered opinion. The explanation might well
have been sufficient, but it was not so considered,
and it must be admitted that Signor Salandra
ought to have said either more or nothing.

lis

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

SIGNOR BOSELLI.
Italian Prime Minister.

After his speech it was generally felt that 'the
Premier had already fallen, and the result of
the voting — 197 to 158 against the Govern-
ment.— caused no surprise.

The majority which defeated the Salandra
Government represented almost all shades of
opinion. It was composed as follows : Official
Socialists, 37; Reformists, 20; Radicals, 35;
Giolittians. 50 ; Right, including the National-
ist Group, 25 ; Republicans, 10 ; Democratic
Constitutionalists, 20. The important point
was that more than half of the malcontents
came from those groups which from the 6rst
were most strongly m favour of Italy's partici-
pation in the war, the groups which had recently
been pressing for a declaration of war on Ger-
many and the reconstruction of the Cabinet
on a wide basis. The balance was turned by
the Democratic Alliance, and it was clear at
once that their ideas would count for much
in the formation of the new Cabinet.

Signor Salandra was defeated on June 10, and
resigned on June 12. The King, who arrived
in Rome from the war zone on the morning of
June 12, did not at once accept Signor Salandra's
resignation, reserving liis decision until he had
consulted various political leaders. Two

currents of opinion made themselves felt
immediately — one in favour of a reconstruction
of the outgoing Ministry, still under the leader-
ship of the two men who had led Italy to war ;
the other supporting a " National Ministry "
under the presidency of the veteran Signor
Boselli, Father of the Italian Chamber of
Deputies. It was soon realized that the " re-
incarnation " of Signor Salandra would probably
lead to a repetition of the difficulties which had
caused his fall, and opinion quickly concen-
trated upon Signor Boselli, who was the first
choice of King Victor Emmanuel. Signor
Boselli was indicated to the King by Signor
Salandra, and also, by the Presidents of the
Chamber and Senate, and it was felt that he,
better than anyone else, might be able to unite
a sufficient number of elements in the Chamber
to form a Cabinet on a really broad basis. He
quickly secured the adhesion of Signor Orlando,
Minister of Justice in Signor Salandra's Cabinet,
who represented the Liberals of the Left and
had recently been spoken of as a possible Prime
Minister, and of Signor Bissolati, who brought
with him the support of the Democratic Alliance.
Signor Boselli's chief difficulty lay in filling the
position of Minister of Foreign Affairs. He was
anxious to secure the cooperation of Baron
Sonnino at his old post, and in this desire he
was backed by the great body of opinion in the
country. Two obstacles arose. Tn the first
place, Baron Sonnino was not anxious to remain
at the Consulta. He was unwilling to sever his
political fate from that of Signor Salandra,
and he was determined to make it .a condition
of his remaining in office that adequate reserve
should be maintained regarding foreign policy.
In the second place, there was a strong move-
ment in Parliament and in the Press in favour
of Signor Tittoni. the Italian Ambassador in
Paris. Signor Tittoni, however, was not ac-
ceptable to the Democratic Alliance, who con-
sidered that his career had been too much the
creation of Signor Giolitti to allow him to preside
at the Consulta at such -a period. Baron
Sonnino's personal scruples were overcome and
his conditions were readily met by Signor
Boselli. The opposition to his remaining at the
Consulta never took serious form, and on
June 15 it was announced that he had consented
to retain his portfolio. The construction of
the Cabinet progressed quickly after Signor
Boselli had assured himself of the support of
the three leaders mentioned, and late on the
evening of June 18, a list of Ministers was

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAS.

1 JO

AN EXPLOIT OF THE ALPINI AT MONTE TOFANA.
Scaling the precipitous peaks of Monte Tofana, where the Italian troops drove the enemy out of the

trenches.

120

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

published which was practically complete. A
day later the last names were added, and the
new Cabinet received the approval of the
King.

The Ministry was composed as follows :

Signor Boselli, Prime Minister, without portfolio.

Baron Sonnino, Foreign Affairs.

Signor Orlando, Interior.

Signor Bissolati, without portfolio.

Signor Carcano, Treasury.

Signor Meda, Finance.

Signor Rufnni, Education.

General Morrone, War.

Admiral Corsi, Marine. *

Signor Arlotta, Transport.

Signor Sacchi, Justice.

Signor Bonomi, Public Works.

Signor Fera, Post Office.

Signor Colosirno, Colonies.

Signor Raineri, Agriculture.

Signor Do Nava, Industry and Commerce.

Signor Comandini, without portfolio.

Signor Scialoja, without portfolio.

Signor Leonardo Bianchi, without portfolio.

The Cabinet now consisted of 19 members,
instead of 13. There wore five Ministers with-
out portfolios instead of one, and two new
portfolios were created by the establishment
of a Ministry of Transport and the severance
of the departments of Industry and Commerce
from the Ministry of Agriculture.

The new Ministry came very close to the ideal
of a National Government. There were six
Liberal Conservatives or Right Centre members,
Signor Boselli, Baron Sonnino, Signor De Nava,
Signor Arlotta, Signor Ruffini and Signor
Scialoja. There was one Catholic, Signor
Meda. There were five Liberals of the Left,
Signori Orlando, Carcano, Raineri, Colosirno
and Leonardo Bianchi ; two Radicals, Signori
Sacchi and Fera ; two Reformist Socialists,
Signori Bissolati and Bonomi ; and one Re-
publican, Signor Comandini.

The announcement of the new Ministry met
with as great a measure of acceptance as could
be hoped. Naturally there were some dis-
appointments. There was not room, even in a
greatly enlarged Cabinet, for all those who had
strong claims to office. And some of those
whose claims were strong per se were not likely
to work well with those whose choice was in-
evitable. The greatest danger attending a
Government which included so many different
colours lay in the possibility of internal dis-
sension, and it was necessary to avoid

appointments which would clearly lead to
friction.

The fall of Signor Salandra was greatly re-
gretted in Italy even by many who had felt
bound to criticize his attitude. His name will
always be associated with the most important
action taken by Italy since her existence as a
united country, and if he could have accommo-
dated himself to the requirements of the situa-
tion, satisfaction would have been general.
Another cause for regret was the retirement of
Signor Ferdinando Martini, Minister of the
Colonies. Signor Martini was closely associated
with Signor Salandra and Baron Sonnino in the
policy which guided Italy to intervention. But
he, too, was suffering from the long strain. He
was approaching his 75th birthday when the
crisis took place, and he had earned the right
to rest.

The new Government was certainly stronger
than the old, as far as personnel was concerned,
and it commanded a very different measure of
support in the Chamber. The moderate
Giolittians, who had come to see the absolute
necessity of Italy's intervention, could much
more readily give their adhesion to a Government
of which Signor Salandra was not the head.
They were directly represented in the Cabinet
by Signor Colosirno, and there were old ties,
which they could renew, with Signor Orlando
and others. Far the most striking figure among
the new Ministers was Signor Bissolati. A
Socialist who had parted company with his
comrades on the question of the Tripoli expedi-
tion, he had from the first stood openly for
Italy's intervention against Germany and
Austria. From the first, moreover, he had seen
that Germany was the prime enemy. He had a
great following in the country and was specially
popular in the army, which remembered that
for many months he had fought as a sergeant
of Alpini, and had been wounded in the early
days of the campaign.

Signor Boselli was 78 years old, but he
brought to his task a fresh and vigorous mind,
as well as long Parliamentary experience. And
all his colleagues were united in their determina-
tion to prosecute the war with the utmost
vigour, and to consolidate the alliance with
England, France and Russia

CHAPTER CXL.

THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND BANK.

Looking Forward to a Fight — German Naval Policy — First News of the Battle : a Mis-
leading Communique' — Official Excuses — German Versions — The Ships Engaged on Both
Sides — The Battle-Cruisers Come into Action — Sir David Beatty Draws the Germans
Northward — Arrival of Sir John Jellicoe with the Battle Fleet — Retreat of the Enemy
— Work of the Light Cruisers and Destroyers — British and German Losses — Tales of
Gallantry.

IN the afternoon and evening of May 31,
1916, an action was fought in the North
Sea between the Grand Fleet under
Admiral Sir John Jellicoe and the German
High Sea Fleet under Admiral Reinhold
Scheer. The genesis of the encounter will be
discussed later, but its successive stages, with
one important difference, followed the normal
lines of similar affairs which had taken place
during the war. First, the advanced vedettes,
the light cruisers and destroyers, got into
touch, and then the reconnaissance squadrons,
the battle-cruisers, became engaged, just as
happened in the Heligoland Bight on August
28, 1914, and at the Dogger Bank on January
24, 1915. Presently, the unusual happened,
and the German battle fleet arrived, to support
its cruisers, and a little later the British battle
squadrons came into the fray. Then the
aspect of the conflict underwent an entire
change.

For twenty-two months the British public
had looked forward almost daily to such an
encounter — a pitched battle at sea, as it was
called. There was no anxiety as to the result,
for although the dire consequences of a naval
defeat were well recognized, the nation had
entire trust in its seamen, and confidently
expected that if a suitable opportunity offered
they would win a decisive victory. It had
been asserted that the command of the sea
Vol. IX.— Part 108.

could not be obtained until a fleet action had
been fought. The reasoning by which this
theory was supported was against the teaching
of history, and, moreover, it derived no con-
firmation from known conceptions of German
strategy and naval needs. The conditions in
which the two navies faced one another were
not such as to give promise of a speedy conflict
on a large scale. The enemy's flag had dis-
appeared from the ocean. The oversea traffic
of the Allies continued practically unmolested,
save by submarines. British naval policy was
in the main directed to the destruction of the
enemy's commerce and trade and to the
enforcement of what in all but name was a
blockade. His warships were shut up in port,
watched by the British seamen, whose only
desire was to draw them out and drub them.
So long as the enemy made no attempt to take
to the sea in force, it was not easy to see how
a decisive engagement could be brought about.
Nevertheless, it was hoped that, as the blockade
became more stringent, this and other circum-
stances might operate to force the Germans to
risk a battle. The British seamen only waited
an opportunity to translate their desires into
deeds.

When, however, the battle occurred, neither
the manner in which it was made known to the
country, the circumstances in which it was
fought, nor its results, were exactly what the

121

122

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

nation had expected or the seamen hoped for.
By a trick of fortune they were baulked
of complete satisfaction. The disappointment
was not lasting, for with later news came an
assurance of triumph, and in any case the faith
of the people in the Navy never weakened or
abated. The message of congratulation which
King George sent to the Commander-in-Chief
after paying a visit to the Grand Fleet ex-
pressed in fehcitous terms their trust and
satisfaction. " Assure all ranks and ratings,"
said the King, " that the name of the British
Navy never stood higher in the eyes of their
fellow-countrymen, whose pride and confidence
in their achievements are unabated."

The significance and import of the battle,
however, were not immediately realized, and
until all the conditions were known attempts
to appraise its strategical value would have
been premature. The purpose of the " enter-
prise directed northward," in which the Ger-
mans announced on June 1 that their Fleet had
been engaged, remained obscure. The extent
of the enemy's success or failure could not be
calculated until the precise military object
which they were seeking to attain was known.
Manifestly, it was not to the advantage of
either of the participants to reveal details of
the engagement which might be of value to
the other side. Reticence %vas essential so

long as hostilities continued. Even were the
war ended, the features of an encounter which
illustrated so much that was novel in sea
fighting ; the relations which certain move-
ments bore to the intelligence of the enemy's
position and strength ; the manoeuvres by
which the German admiral saved his ships
from destruction ; the vise of various classes
and typos of vessels ; the efficie icy of methods
of protection and equipment — these and many
other technical problems were likely for a long
time to afford subjects for professional dis-
cussion. Similar questions concerning earlier
naval actions of the era of steam and steel —
Lissa, Santiago, and Tsushima — were still de-
bated, and after a hundred years the tactics
of Trafalgar were under examination by an
official committee of experts.

For nearly two years the Grand Fleet had
occupied a position in the North Sea facing
the principal bases of the enemy. Behind this
guard, the Allies were able to conduct the
passage of their trade and troops practically
unmolested. Campaigns for the possession of
the enemy's colonies, and oversea expeditions,
were undertaken ; and assistance was rendered
to the land forces in three continents without
let or hindrance. Furthermore, the Fleet pro-
vided a safeguard to these islands from inva-
sion, and enforced what was to all intents and

BRITISH LIGHT CRAFT
Watching for the German Fleet.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB.

123

ADMIRAL SIR JOHN JELLICOE, G.C.B., G.C.V.O.,
Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet. In the uniform of a Vice-Admiral.

purposes a strangulation of trade with Germany,
the stringency of which was only limited by
the diplomatic requirements of the Govern-
ment. All these operations could not have
been performed without exertions which im-
posed a severe test upon those qualities of
endurance, resource, patience and skill for
which British seamen are renowned. The
strain was ceaseless. It necessitated arduous
work in all the weathers to be experienced in
the higher latitudes. The peril from the mine

and the submarine mena.ce were always present,
and the call upon the vigilance of the flotillas
and fleets on patrol service unremitting. But
every demand was fully met. While, however,
the predominant position at sea was thus
maintained, there was in being, within a short
distance of our shores, the second strongest
fleet in the world, manned by courageous and
competent officers and men, and controlled by
the same wily, unscrupulous, and determined
authorities in Berlin whose barbarous methods

124

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

THE SCENE OF THE BATTLE,
May 31-June 1, 1916.

of waging war had received shocking demonstra-
tion alike on land and sea. Forced by the
rigours of the blockade, by the economic pres-
sure which told upon the production of material
for the land warfare, and by the restriction of
their sources of wealth and prosperity resulting
from the loss of sea-borne commerce — this fleet
might at any time be flung into the arena to
pick up the gage of battle, opportunity for
which was always offered and ardently desired
by the British seamen. When the opportunity
did occur, and the hopes which inspired the
latter seemed likely to be fulfilled, their
opponents fought indeed with courage and

skill, but they evaded decisive action, and
retired to their fortified bases. The Grand
Fleet still retained an undisputed mastery of
the sea communications ; its grip was not
weakened, much less broken ; while, tried in
the test of battle, the prestige of the British
Navy, as well as its efficiency, stood on a higher
plane than ever.

There was, as always, a moral as well as a
material aspect to the battle. Although the
Germans were able, owing to the proximity
of their harbours, to promulgate their version
of the action first, the impression created by
their false and misleading announcements was

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

125

dissipated when the fuller British accounts
were published. The conflict afforded an
opportunity to the British seamen for a display
of those qualities of courage, endurance, and
skill which were confidently expected of them.
It is not in mortals to command success, but
in this battle there was displayed in the Grand
Fleet convincing evidence of readiness to take
the initiative, of consummate ability in execu-
tion, and of capacity, boldness, and daring
which thoroughly deserved to succeed. Great
Britain and Germany were the two most
formidable of naval Powers, and, despite the
material superiority of the former, their navies
were in other respects apparently well matched.
The Germans were assured that their methods
of training, their guns and mechanical equip-
ment, with the armament and armour supplied
by Krupp, were better than those of their
opponents. Given that they could choose their
own time and place for action, they believed
that these advantages would more than com-
pensate for a deficiency in numbers. Yet
when tried in the stern ordeal of battle, the
higher standard of technique was on the other
side. Neither in nerve nor in moral were the
staying powers of the Germans equal to those
of their opponents, nor did they prove the
better in tactical efficiency, scientific gunnery,
or the handling of ships and machinery.

In character and organization the fleet
which Grand Admiral von Tirpitz created was
designed to serve two purposes. It was to be
both a political influence and an instrument of
war. In the event of European complications,
it was intended that the possession of a fleet
of such strength by Germany should force Great

Britain to remain neutral. Not even the
mightiest Naval Power would, it was said, dare
to incur the risk involved in fighting it. Thus
the much-dreaded blockade would be pre-
vented. The other and much older purpose
was the use of the Fleet — its inferiority being
recognised — for making sudden onslaughts,
bolts from the blue, hussar-like strokes, which
at little cost to the assailant would inflict
damage of a serious character principally on
the hostile naval force, but with avoidance of
a contested or prolonged action. The first
purpose failed when Mr. Churchill and Admiral
Prince Louis of Battenberg sent the Grand
Fleet into the North Sea to its fighting stations,
and this country decided on war. Great
Britain, thanks largely to Mr. McKenna and
Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher, had built
up a fleet which was in a position to take the
risk of engaging even the High Sea Fleet if
required to do so. But. in the early months of
the war a naval battle on the grand scale was
not in Germany's programme. The strategic
line imposed upon her by the appearance of
that supreme British Fleet in the North Sea was
a modification of the two ideas above mentioned.
In the outer seas an attempt was made to
interfere with British trade, which was to some
extent successful, but it came to an untimely
end, with no inconsiderable loss of useful
cruisers, as a result of the British victory off
the Falklands. Nearer home, sallying tactics
were tried, with the assistance of the mine and
the submarine, in the belief that such damage
as resulted might gradually whittle away the
supremacy of the superior fleet and provide
an opportunity for larger operations. In the

THE GERMAN DREADNOUGHT BATTLESHIP "KAISER,"
which took part in the battle.

10S— 2

126

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

VICE-ADMIRAL SGHEEK,

Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet.

face of the energy, resource, and ingenuity of
the British seamen, this plan also was of little
avail.

The new naval policy was thus one of
strategic reticence, varied by cruiser raids and
submarine adventures. In its defended ports
the High Sea Fleet was beyond the reach of
our naval forces, while at the same time,
by reason of the Kiel Canal, it served to secure
the flanks and rear of the armies which
on interior lines were operating on two
fronts. Nevertheless, it could not protect
Germany's foreign possessions or her sea-
borne commerce. It could not prevent that
naval compression, the strangling effects of
which were severely felt, even when minimized
to some extent by economic organization, by
the help of neutrals, and by the development
of internal communications. The new plan
offered a striking contrast to Germany's bold
campaign on land, but the Grand Admiral
quoted with approval Nelson's saying : " Do
not imagine I am one of those hot-brained
people who fight at a disadvantage without an
adequate object." Attempts could still be
made against the floating trade of the Allies,
and von Tirpitz threw himself with character-
istic energy into the enforcement of a " sub-
marine blockade " — a secret, sneaking war.
directed alike against neutral and belligerent,
merchantman and fishing boat. The " selected

moment," the time to strike with advantage,
had not yet come, and before it was thought
to have done so von Tirpitz went into retire-
ment.

During the time that the Grand Admiral was
at the Ministry of Marine the policy of ruthless
submarine activity prevailed, and the cruiser
raids which preceded the Dogger Bank action
were made against the East Coast. It was
said, however, that in regard to the use of the
battle fleet Tirpitz counselled prudence and
caution, and that he was even opposed to
risking the Dreadnoughts in the Baltic. If,
therefore, he had a deciding voice in naval
strategy, it was assumed there would be
no fleet action. Up to September, 1915,
when the first rumours of the removal of
von Tirpitz appeared, there had only been
one mention of a movement on the part
of the High Sea Fleet. This was in April,
1915, when the Fleet was said to have advanced
into English waters. What exactly was meant
by this official announcement was never made
clear, but it followed upon the appointment oi
Admiral Hugo von Pohl as Commander-in-
Chief in the place of Admiral Ingenohl, who
was supposed to have been relieved in conse-
quence of the failure at the Dogger Bank. It
seems likely that von Tirpitz had more to do

VICE-ADMIRAL HIPPER,
Commanded the German reconnoitring fleet.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

127

THE "WARSPITE,"

ONE OF THE "QUEEN ELIZABETH" SQUADRON,

Engaging the German Battleships,

with the policy of ship construction than with
the control of the Fleet. There appears to be
some reason for the belief that instead of
pressing on the building of heavier vessels he
concentrated the resources of the arsenals and
shipyards — on the former of which the land
requirements must have been making a very
heavy call — upon submarine output and
perhaps some novel devices. The rumours of
changes in the armament of ships, and of the
appearance of new and strange craft — " the
novel dangers requiring novel expedients," as
Mr. Churchill said — were founded to some extent
on a phrase in a letter to von Tirpitz from the
Kaiser, who thanked him for what he had
accomplished during the war " by preparing
new means of fighting in all departments of
warfare." The composition of the German
Fleet in the action of May 31 afforded no
support, however, to this theory.

The direction of the operations of the Fleet
appears to have been more particularly in the
nands of the Naval General Staff, and the
appointment in the autumn of 1915 of von
Holtzendorff (who had commanded the Fleet
himself from September, 1909, to January,
1913) as Chief of that Staff, in succession to
Admiral Bachmann, apparently coincided
■with changes in policy. At all events, on

December 19, 1915, the Admiralty Staff at
Berlin announced that a portion of the High
Sea Fleet in the previous week had searched
the North Sea for the enemy, and then cruised
on the 17th and 18th in the Skager Rak,
searching shipping. Fifty-two steamers were
examined, it was stated, and one steamer
loaded with contraband was seized. " During
this entire period," the announcement con-
cluded, " the English fighting forces were
nowhere to be seen." It must have been
about this time that von Pohl found himself
too unwell to continue the active work of his
command, and he was temporarily succeeded
by Vice - Admiral Scheer, a division com-
mander. In February, 1910, von Pohl
died, and Scheer was confirmed in the
appointment, but even before this hap-
pened there began to be rumours of increased
liveliness, and reports from fishermen and
other sources that the High Sea Fleet, or
portions of it, were making short cruises.
In March, 25 ships were seen off Vlieland,
on the Dutch coast, and a little later
other squadrons moving in the same locality.
Then in April the Yarmouth raid occurred,
and both from Holland and Denmark move-
ments at Kiel and Heligoland, as well as
unusual activity in the dockyards, were re-

128

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

VICE-ADMIRAL SIR DAVID BEATTY,
K.C.B.. M.V.O.. D.S.O.,

Commanded the Battle-cruiser Fleet.
In the uniform of a Vice-Admiral.

ported. It was widely believed by neutrals
that the enemy would attempt some stroke,
and that the gun practice continually being
carried out behind the mine-fields, with the
airships which in fine weather were always
patrolling the North Sea, were symptoms of
this impending movement. Most certainly
there were reflections in various directions of
a more energetic hand at the wheel. Simul-
taneously, all that portion of the Press which
derived its inspiration from the Admiralty —
Count P^eventlow and the naval officers writing
for the German papers — appeared to be under
instructions to prepare the. German people for
some development of the war at sea. More-
over, the increasing effect of the blockade,
internal discontent and unrest, with the new
co-ordinated efforts of the Allies in the land
theatres, could not but exercise an influence
in this direction.

Although, therefore, the situation was not
without indication of the possibility of a
coming conflict — and it may be assumed that
the signs had been noted and acted upon by
the naval authorities — yet the public experi-

[RusssU.

REAR-ADMIRAL O. DE B. BROCK,
Commanded the First Battle-cruiser Squadron.

enced a great shock when the first news of the
battle was announced on the evening of Friday,
June 2. The nation was disappointed, and the
world deceived.

There had been rumours in London ot a
naval engagement on Wednesday night, but
such rumours were of almost daily occurrence,
and as no confirmation was forthcoming the
story was dismissed as others had been before.
On Thursday, the tidings became more circum-
stantial, and received support from news which
leaked out in the dockyard towns and naval
bases. As, however, the House of Commons
adjourned shortly after nine p.m., in accordance
with a resolution moved by the Prime Minister,
without any announcement on the subject of
a naval battle having been made, there were
still doubts as to whether it had taken place.
It was afterwards explained by Mr. Balfour,
at a luncheon in the week following the battle,
at the British Imperial Council of Commerce,
that he got his first intimation from the
Commander-in-Chief that an engagement be-
tween the hostile fleets was imminent on
Wednesday afternoon, and from that time,
until a telegram was received from Sir John
Jellicoe on Friday afternoon, the Admiralty

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

129

[Lafayette.

REAR-ADMIRAL W. C. PAKENHAM,
Commanded the Second Battle-cruiser Squadron.

had no news from him as to the course of the
engagement. Such information as they had
was mainly obtained from intercepted wireless
messages, which included, no doubt, the report
by the German Admiralty to Washington on
June 1, describing the action and the losses
which the British were said to have suffered.
It was not until seven p.m. on Friday, June 2,
that the following communique was issued by
the Admiralty through the Press Bureau : —

On the afternoon of Wednesday, May 31, a naval
engagement took place off the coast of Jutland. The
British ships on which the brunt of the fighting fell were
the Battle-Cruiser Fleet and some cruisers and light
cruisers, supported by four fast battleships. Among
those the losses were heavy. The German Battle Fleet,
aided by low visibility, avoided prolonged action with
our main forces, and soon after these appeared on the
scene the enemy returned to port, though not before
receiving severe damage from our battleships.

The battle-cruisers Queen Mary, Indefatigable,
Invincible, and the cruisers Defence and Black Prince
were sunk. The Warrior was disabled, and, after being
towed for some time, had to be abandoned by her crew.
It is also known that the destroyers Tipperary, Turbulent,
Fortune, Sparrowhawk and Ardent were lost, and six
others are not yet accounted for. No British battleships
or light cruisers were sunk. The enemy's losses were
serious. At least one battle-cruiser was destroyed, and
one severely damaged ; one battleship reported sunk by
our destroyers during a night attack ; two light cruiser*
were disabled and probably sunk. The exact number of
enemy destroyers disposed of during the action cannot be
ascertained with any certainty, but it must have been large.

[Lafayette.

REAR-ADMIRAL THE HON. HORACE
L. A. HOOD, C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O.,

Commanded the Third Battle-cruiser Squadron.
In the uniform of a Captain, R.N.

The wording of this communique, with its
admissions of British losses apparently much
heavier than those inflicted upon the enemy,
gave the impression that it was the preliminary
and guarded announcement of a naval reverse.
The evening papers published the news in their
later editions, and generally it was taken to
indicate that the Germans, in great strength
had surprised a portion of the British Fleet
and inflicted heavy loss upon it before help
could arrive. The very frankness with which
heavy casualties were admitted, coupled with
the statement that soon after our main forces
" appeared on the scene the enemy returned
to port," was sufficient to justify such appre-
hensions as were created by the news. The
early editions of the morning papers, and most
of those published in the provinces, contained
the same communique, with comments founded
on it. At one o'clock on Saturday morning
a further announcement was made which put
a slightly better complexion on the affair. This
second statement was as follows : —

Since the foregoing communiqud was issued, a further
report has been received from the Commander-in-Chief,
Grand Fleet, stating that it is now ascertained that our

130

THE TIMES' HISTORY OF THE WAR.

131

total losses in destroyers amount to eight boats in all.
The Commander-in-Chief also reports that it is now
possible to form a closer estimate of the losses and
damage sustained by the enemy fleet. One Dread-
nought battleship of the Kaiser class was blown up in an'
attack by British destroyers, and another Dreadnought
battleship of the Kaiser class is believed to have been
sunk by gun-fire. Of three German battle-cruisers, two
of which, it is believed, were the Derfflinger and the
Liitzow, one was blown up, another was heavily engaged
by our Battle Fleet and was seen to be disabled and
stopping, and a third was observed to be seriously
damaged. One German light cruiser and six German
destroyers were surds, and at least two more German light
cruisers were seen to be disabled. Further, repeated
hits were observed on three other German battleships
that were engaged. Finally, a German submarine was
rammed and sunk.

This was published by the newspapers in
their later editions, and the alterations made
in the editorial comments showed that it had
a reassuring effect. Many people, however
will long retain unpleasant recollections of
that first Friday night in June, 1916, when
they might have been sharing in the satis-
faction of a British naval triumph, had the
Admiralty acted more judiciously in circulating
the news. On Saturday and Sunday, June 3
and 4, a third official communique and two
semi-official announcements were issued from
the Admiralty through the Press Bureau. The
first-named was, in effect, an epitome of the
dispatches from the Commander-in-Chief pub-
lished a month later, and showed the action
in its true light. It finally disposed of the idea
that the Germans had won a victory, but even
so its encouraging effect was to some extent
minimized by the semi-official statements
which appeared at the same time. The first of
these was an analysis of the British and German
losses by Mr. Winston Churchill. After com-
paring the units of the Fleets alleged to have
been sunk on either side, and pointing out
that so far from ours having been the greater
the balance was the other way about, Mr.
Churchill went on to say : —

Our margin of superiority is in no way impaired. The
despatch of troops to the Continent should continue with
the utmost freedom, the battered condition of the
German Fleet being an additional security to us. The
hazy weather, the fall of night, and the retreat of the
enemy alone frustrated the persevering efforts of our
brilliant commanders, Sir John Jellicoe and Sir David
Beatty, to force a final decision. Although it was not
possible to compel the German main fleet to accept battle,
the conclusions reached are of extreme importance. All
classes of vessels on both sides have now met, and we
know that there are no surprises or unforeseen features.
An accurate measure can be taken of the strength of the
enemy, and his definite inferiority is freed from any
element of uncertainty.

This calling in of Mr. Churchill by the First

Lord to give what the former termed " a

reassuring interview " was regarded as a weak-

step on the part of the Admiralty, and aroused
much criticism. Both Mr. Balfour and Mr.
Churchill felt constrained to explain why the
latter was asked to intervene, but neither in
this matter nor in the attempt to throw the
blame for the misleading impression created
by the first communique on to the Press were
the excuses regarded as entirely satisfactory.
The other semi-official statement came from
" a naval officer of high rank," who had had
access, like Mr. Churcliill, to special sources of
information. It was in the shape of an inter-
view with a representative of the Associated
Press of America on June 3, but was issued
by the Press Bureau on the following day. The
various stages of the battle were described,
with additional details and comments on the
official reports. To the interviewer, this officer
further remarked :

We can only say that we were looking for a fight when
our Fleet went out. Stories that it was decoyed by the
Germans are the sheerest nonsense. . . . The battle hod
four phases, the first opening at 3.15 p.m., when our
battle-cruisers, at a range of six miles, joined action with
the German battle-cruisers. Shortly after, the second
phase began, with the arrival on both sides of battle-
ships. The Germans arrived first, but before their
arrival our three battle-cruisers had been blown up,
supposedlyas the result of gun-fire, but there is a possi-
bility that they met their fate by torpedoes.

Such close-range fightinc by battle-cruisers might be
criticised as bad tactics, but our Fleet, following the
traditions of the Navy, went out to engage the enemy.
On account of the weather conditions however, it could
only do so at short range.

The third phase was the engagement of battleships,
which was never more than partial. This phase included
a running fight, as the German Dreadnoughts fled
towards their bases. All the big ship fighting was over
by 9.15. Then came one of the most weird features of
the battle, as the German destroyers made attack after
attack, like infantry following an artillery preparation
on our big ships ; but these onslaughts were singularly
futile, not a single torpedo launched by them getting
home. With the morning these attacks ended, and the
battleground was scoured by Admiral Jellieoe's Fleet,
which reported not a single enemy ship in sight.

After a summary of the losses believed to have
been inflicted upon- the -enemy attention was
directed to the circumstance that the weather
conditions were the hardest bit of luck the
Fleet encountered, as shown by the following
paragraph in the official report : " Regret
misty weather saved enemy from far more
severe punishment." This account of the
engagement was published in a great number
of the British and foreign papers. It foimed
the basis of much of the comment and criticism
that was made by naval officers and others in
the United States, where it was doubtless
intended to counteract the erroneous impres-
sions created by the announcements which the

132

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR

[Russell.

CAPTAIN E. M. PHILLPOTTS,
Commanded lhe Battleship "Warspite."

German Admiralty were issuing. The Ameri-
cans got their first notion from a Berlin message
which, being sent by wireless to Sayville,
escaped the censorship over the cable lines.
This was supplemented by the German Ad-
miralty report dated June 1, the text of which
was as follows :

During an enterprise directed towards the north, our
High Sea Fleet on Wednesday (May 31) encountered the
main part of the British fighting fleet, which was con-
siderably superior to our forces. During the afternoon,
between the Skagger Rak and Horn Reef, a heavy
ongagement developed, which was successful for us, and
which continued during the whole night. In this
engagement, so far as is known to us at present, we
destroyed the great battleship Warspite, the battle-
cruisers Queen Mary and Indefatigable, two armoured
cruisers, apparently of the Achilles type, one small
cruiser, the new destroyer leaders Turbulent, Nestor and
Alcaster (Acasta), a large number of destroyers, and one
submarine.

By observations which are unchallengeable, it is
known that a larce number of British battleships
suffered damage from our ships and torpedo craft during
the day and night actions. Among others, the great
battleship Marlborough was hit by a torpedo, as has been
confirmed by prisoners. Several of our ships rescued
portions of the crews' of the sunk British ships, among
whom were the only two survivors of the Indefatigable.

On our side, the small cruiser Wiesbaden was sunk by
the enemy's guns in the course of the day action, and
the Pommern during the night by a torpedo. The fate
of the Frauenlob, which is missing, and of some torpedo
boats which have not yet returned, is unknown. The
High Sea Fleet returned to-day (Thursday) to our ports.

A second official message was issued by the

Chief of the German Naval Staff on June 3, in

which the loss of the Elbing was admitted, and

another on June 7, in which was admitted the

loss of the vessels Liitzow and Rostock —

[Russell.

CAPTAIN F. C. DREYER, C.B.,
Flag-Captain and Gunnery Director of the Fleet.

information hitherto withheld, it was announced,
for military reasons.

The view generally taken by the American
Press, from the early British and German
reports, even by those papers which sympa-
thized with the cause of the Allies, was that the
British had suffered a defeat. As an example,
the Philadelphia Inquirer, an old-established
journal of well-balanced judgment, said in its
leading article of June 3 :

In the first great naval engagement of the war, in a
conflict for which the British have been a-weatying, and
in which they counted with confidence on success, they
have been decisively defeated, and have sustained losses
which not the most optimistically inclined can regard as
negligible. ... So far as can be gathered from the
information at hand, only a comparatively small section
of the British Fleet was engaged, and it is hardly
necessary to point out that Great Britain's naval
superiority has not been materially affected by the losses
it has sustained.

The early reports gave rise to erroneous con-
clusions by others than civilians. The Army
and Navy Journal, of New York, in its issue of
June 10, stated that in the opinion of officers
at the Navy Department, the British battle-
cruisers got into a place in the engagement for
which they were entirely unsuited.

In some quarters there has been a tendency to criticize
the commander of the Battle-Cruiser Fleet, and par-
ticularly the commanders of the light armoured cruisers,
for impetuously rushing into a struggle where thoy were
at such a disadvantage, but this is explained in part by
the suggestion that in all probability the British naval
officeis had been held in leash so long that when they got
an opportunity to get into action they showed more
courage than prudence.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

133

[Russell.

CAPTAIN ARTHUR L. CAY,
Flag-Captain of the "Invincible."

Rear-Admiral Caspar F. Goodrich, after quoting
from the statement of " the naval officer of high
rank," said :

It would seem from what we are told that over-con-
fidence in the hattle-cruisers led to their taking an undue
share of hard knocks, and that it would have been more
prudent to let them draw the German battleships to
within range of the British battleships fast coming to
their relief.

Other naval officers expressed similar views.
Even Admiral Dewey spoke of the unfitness of
the battle-cruiser to play a leading role in naval
dramas, and Captain W. S. Sims was evidently
of the opinion that the Battle-Cruiser Fleet had
attacked the main body of the German Fleet on
sight. It was not until the dispatch of Sir John
Jellicoe and report of Sir David Beatty were
published that these mistaken inferences were
corrected, and it was made abundantly clear that
such conclusions found no warrant in the facts.

On Tuesday, May 30, the ships of the Grand
Fleet left their anchorages by instructions from
the Commander-in-Cliief to carry out one of
those periodical sweeps of the Xorth Sea of
which the first to be announced was mentioned
in an official communique as far back as Sep-
tember 10, 1914, and many of which had been
carried out at intervals since the beginning of
the war. Sir John Jellicoe made it clear in his
dispatch that every part of the Grand Fleet
was under his command, and was operating in
accordance with his orders. From the state-
ments of visitors to the Fleet, it was known to

[Maull & Fox.

CAPTAIN CHARLES J. WINTOUR,

Commanded the Destroyer " Tipperary.'

have been in three sections, and a few days
earlier the Battle-Cruiser Fleet was reported as
being in the Firth of Forth. It is essential to
note that the concerted movements of the Fleet
were made on Tuesday, because it thus becomes
clear that the enemy could have had no certain
knowledge that the Grand Fleet was at sea.
The location of the sections of the Fleet might
have been discovered by Zeppelins in the day-
time, but these could not have seen and re-
ported the movements of the ships after dark.
Similarly, the survivors of the Elbing when
landed in Holland stated that the High Sea
Fleet had put to sea at 4 a.m. on the morning
of Wednesday, May 31. This movement,
therefore, could not have been the cause of the
Grand Fleet's putting to sea on the previous
afternoon. An unusual briskness and stir had,
indeed, been reported at Wilhelmshaven and
Kiel. Both Fleets were no doubt fully prepared
for battle when they left port, but the actual
meeting appears to have happened by chance.
The object of the sweeps made by the Grand
Fleet was clear. The intention was to meet
the enemy, if he could be found, and to engage
him. The sole purpose in view was his annihi-
lation as an effective force. The sweeps, it may
be said, were made in conformity with the policy
adumbrated by Nelson, " The enemy are still
in port, but something must be done to provoke
cr lure them to a battle." It may be asked,
on the other hand, whether the Germans had

108—3

V.)i

"HE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

THE COURSE OF THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND BANK.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

135

any serious undertaking in view in coming out
as they did. Probably they had, first, because
nothing they had done had lacked purpose, and
secondly, they had certain advantages which
were denied to their opponents. The fleet
which keeps the sea cannot always be at its
maximum strength. As Admiral W. H. Hen-
derson pointed out* : —

Refits and repairs require constant attendance, and
although our Fleet is superior to that of the enemy it
is not possible to count upon all the ships of which it is
composed being perpetually on the spot. . . . The
Queen Elizabeth and the Australia appear to have been
absent from the battle, or over 13 per cent, of the
strength of our fast divisions. Can anyone doubt what
the addition of those two ships would have meant to the
hardly-pressed and splendidly-fought squadrons during
the time in which they were engaged with superior
force.

The Germans could select the moment to appear
when they were at their full strength, and of
this they evidently took advantage. It was
obviously their correct plan to look for an
opportunity to cut off and destroy any unit of
the opposed force inferior in strength, and
separated so far from its main body as to be
dealt with before support could be obtained.
By such tactics the material strength of the
fleets might be more equally balanced. The
semi-official statement from Berlin on June 5
that " the German High Sea forces pushed
forward in order to engage portions of the
British Fleet which were repeatedly reported
recently to be off the south coast of Norway "
may well have referred to the " enterprise
directed northward " of the first official com-
munique, issued on June 1. It was possible
that by means of Zeppelins the Germans
had discovered that the periodical sweeps were
not always carried out by the whole of the
Grand Fleet. When, therefore, the British
Battle-Cruiser Fleet was sighted by Hipper's
scouts on Wednesday afternoon, it would have
been a natural conclusion to draw that a
chance had presented itself to attack with their
full force a weaker British division, and thus
to gain a comparatively easy success. If this
was their endeavour, it was completely frus-
trated by the dogged tenacity of Sir David
Beatty, with the effective support supplied by
Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas, and the decisive
stroke of the Commander-in-Chief when he
arrived on the scene of action. In any case
there was no sign of an intention to seriously
contest the command of the sea, of a plan for
breaking the blockade, or of an adventure into
the Atlantic. Such projects could only be carried
* Contemporary Review, July, 1916.

[Russell.

COMMANDER SIR C. R. BLANE, BART.,
H.M.S. "Queen Mary" (killed).

out successfully after the British naval forces
had been depleted by attrition, and that this was
recognized by the Germans was shown by their
immediate retirement when it was seen that the
battle squadrons of Sir John Jellicoe were join-
ing in the battle. Both sides wanted a fight, but
the Germans only on their own terms.

A further advantage would be obtained by
the Germans, should an engagement occur,
if they could contrive to bring it about nearer
to their own ports than to those of the enemy.
Although not due directly to their own efforts,
it is nevertheless the fact that this happened.
The locality in which the battle began was in
the vicinity of the Little Fisher Bank, and
to the westward of the Jutland Bank, two shoal
patches at no great distance from the Danish
coast. The approximate position of the British
Battle-Cruiser Fleet on sighting the German
battle-cruisers was somewhere about 56deg.,
50min. North latitude, and 5deg. 30min. East
longitude. This position is nearly twice as far
from the British coast as it is from that of
Germany. When the battle came to an end
on the morning of June 1, while the retreating
German ships had approached much closer to
their own ports, the Grand Fleet was over 400

115(5

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

miles from its main base, and its other bases
were all considerably farther away than the
German ports. Between the two positions
which marked the beginning and the end of tie
encounter, the Horn Rett' projects from the
Danish coast about ten miles, its outlying point
marked by a light vessel, and the action was
certainly nearer to this reef than to the Skager
Rak. This explains why the encounter was
sometimes called in this country after the Horn
Reef, which was much more appropriate than
to call it after the Skager Rak, as the Germans
did. Apparently they wished to suggest that

Name.
Royal Sovereign

Queen Elizabeth (Fifth

Squadron)
Iron Duke (First Squadron)

Orion (Second Squadron) ...

Dreadnought (Fourth

Squadron)

Lion (First Squadron)

New Zealand (Second

Squadron)

Indomitable (Third

Squadron)

Defence (First Squadron) ...

Achilles (Second Squadron)

Black Prince (First

Squadron)

Galatea (First Squadron) ...

Southampton (Second

Squadron)

Falmouth (Third Squadron)

Calliope (Fourth Squadron)

Fearless (First Flotilla)

Tipperary

Pelican

Onslow
Nestor

Moresby

THE

GRAND FLEET.

TYPES OF

SHIPS.

Battleships.

Belt

Date.

Tons.

Speed.

Armament.

Armoi

1916

25,750

2 J

8 15-in.,
12 6-in.

13 -in.

1915

27,500

8 15-in.,
12 6-in.

13-in.

191 +

25,000

10 13-5-in.
12 6-in.

12-in.

1912

23,000

10 13-5-in.,
16 4-in.

12-in.

1900

17,900

10 12-in..
4-in. or 12-pr.

1 1 -in.

attlk-Cjv

:;isers.

1912

26,350

8 13-5-in.,
16 4-in.

9-in.

1912

18,800

8 12-in.,
16 4-in.

7-in.

1908

17,250

8 12-in.,
16 4-in.

7 in.

Armoured C

RUISERS.

1909

14,600

4 9-2-in.,
10 7-5-in.

6-in.

1907

13,550

225

6 9-2-in.
4 7-5-in.

6-in.

1906

13.550

o-> i

6 9-2-in.

6-in.

1915

1913

1911
1915

1913

1914

1916
1916
1915

1914

they had no advantage from the scene of the
battle being in the vicinity of their defended
harbours. This, however, was not the case.

Some uncertainty exists as to the identity of
all the ships which took part in the action. A
note appended to the dispatch of Sir John
Jellicoe says : " The list of ships and com-
manding officers which took part in the action
has been withheld from publication for the
present in accordance with practice." It was
believed that vessels from all the types in the
following table were present :

r. Sister. Ships.

Revenge, etc.

Warspite, Valiant, Barham,
Malaya.

Marlborough, Emperor of
India, Ben bow.

Conqueror, Monarch, Thun-
derer, King GJeorge V.,
Ajax, Audacious, Cen-
turion.

Bellerophon, Temeraire, Su-
perb, St. Vincent, Colling-
vvood, Vanguard, Neptune,
Colossus, Hercules.

Princess Royal, Queen Mary,

Tiger.
Indefatigable, Australia.

Inflexible, Invincible.

10 6-in.

Light Cruisers.

5,100

5,250
3,800

3,440

J. 850

251
25.V

2 6-in
8 4-in

8 or 9 6-in.

2 6-in

8 4-in

25.1

ESTR

• VERS

10 4-in

Particulars unknown,
['art iculars unknown.
Particulars unknown.

Particulars unknown.

Landrail

1913

965

Acasta (" Ii '

' type)

1912

935

Badger ("I"

type)...

19)1

780

Abdiel
Engadiue

—

Partici

Seapli

3 4-in
3 4-in

- 4-in.,
■2 12-pdrs.

Minotaur, Shannon.
Cochrane, Warrior.
Duke of Edinburgh.

Aurora, Inconstant, Royalist,
Penelope, Phaeton," Un-
daunted.

Chatham, Dublin, Birming-
ham, Lowestoft, Notting-
ham.

Dartmouth, Falmouth, Wey-
mouth, Yarmouth.

Caroline, Caryslort, Cham-
pion, Cleopatra, Comus,
Conquest, Cordelia.

Active, Blanche, Blonde,
Belloua, Boadieea.

Botha, Turbulent, Terma-
gant, and others.

Petard, etc.

Onslaught, Obdurate, etc.

Nomad, Nicator, Nar-
borough, Nerissa, etc.

Manly, Mansfield, Mastiff,
Matchless, Mentor. Meteor,
Milne, Minos Miranda,
Moorsom, Morris, Murray,
Myngs, etc.

Lydiard, Lalorey, Lookout,
Legion, etc.

Ardent, Fortune, Garland,
Ambuscade. Shark, Spar-
rowhawk, Spitfire, etc.

Defender, Attack, Hornet,
Phoenix, etc.

MlSCELLANEOL

THE TIMER HISTORY OF THE WAR.

137

GERMAN SUBMARINES ATTACHED TO THE HIGH SEA FLEET.

With regard to the Grand . Fleet, the com-
position of the battle squadrons was not dis-
closed, the' names of only a few of the vessels
being mentioned. Sir John Jellicoe refers to
the movements of three squadrons — the First,
Second, and Fourth, in the last-named of which
his flagship, the Iron Duke, was placed. The
Marlborough was the flagship' ot Sir Cecil
Burney in the First Squadron ; and the King
George V. of Sir Thomas Jerram in the Second
Squadron. According to the German account,
a squadron of three ships of the Royal Sovereign
type was also present. One of these was men-
tioned by the Commander-in-Chief, who stated
that when the Marlborough was partially dis-
abled by a torpedo Sir Cecil Burney transferred
his flag to the Revenge, of the Royal Sovereign
class. The Fifth Battle Squadron, which
supported the Battle-Cruiser Fleet, consisted
of four ships of the Queen Elizabeth type, but
the name-ship was absent refitting. Rear-
Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas flew his flag in the
Barham.

The nine battle-cruisers present on the British
side were organized in three squadrons, com-
manded respectively by Rear- Admirals O. de

B. Brock, W. C. Pakenham, and the Hon.
H. L. A. Hood. The Princess Royal flew the
flag of the first -named : the New Zealand that
of Admiral Pakenham ; and the Invincible
that of Admiral Hood. The flag of Vice-
Admiral Sir David Beatty, Commanding the
Battle-Cruiser Fleet, was flying in the Lion.
The five other battle-cruisers were the Queen
Mary, Tiger, Indefatigable, Indomitable, and
Inflexible. Admiral Beatty also had under his
command the First, Second, and Third Light
Cruiser Squadrons, and destroyers from the
First, Ninth, Tenth, and Thirteenth Flotillas
With the Commander-in-Chief and the battle
squadrons were the First and Second Cruiser
Squadrons, the Fourth Light Cruiser Squadron,
and destroyers from the Fourth, Eleventh, and
Twelfth Flotillas. There were also a number
of special and auxiliary types represented, in-
cluding the Engadine, seaplane-carrier.

There is more doubt about the composition
of the German High Sea Fleet, under the com-
mand of Vice-Admiral Scheer, which accord-
ing to the German account consisted of ?a
main battle fleet in three squadrons, and a
reconnoitring fleet of five battle-cruisers under

THE GERMAN BATTLE-CRUISER "SEYDLITZ," CAPTAIN VON EGIDY.
Reported to have been seriously damaged in the battle.

138

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

Vice-Admiral Hipper, with light cruisers and
destroyers attached to both divisions. The
heavier vessels were probably of the types in the
table below :

presence of which would nocessarily reduce
the speed and fighting capacity of the whole
force.

Admiral Hipper's five battle-cruisers are said,

THE HIGH SEA FLEET.

TYPES OF

SHIPS.

Battleships.

Belt

Name.

Date.

Tons.

Speed.

Armament.

Armour

Sister-Ships.

Wilhelm IT. (ex-Worth) ..

1916

29,000

8 15 -in.,
16 5-9- in.

— ,

" T."

"N " (ex-Salamis) ...

1910

19,200

8 14-in.,
12 6-in.

10-in.

Unknown.

Konig

1914

25.387

10 12-in..
14 5-9-in.

14-in.

Markgraf, Grosser Kurlurst,
Kronprinz.

Kaiser

1913

24,310

10 12-in.,
14 5-9-in.

14-in.

Kaiserin, Friedrich der
Crosse, Konig Albert,
Prinzregent Luitpold.

Helgoland

1911

22,500

20 J

12 12-in.,

12-in.

Ostfriesland, Thuringen,

14 5-9-in.

Oldenburg.

Nassau

1909

18,600

20|

12 11-in.,

12 5-9-in.
4 11-in.,

12-in.

Westl'alen, Rheinland, Posen.

Deutschland ...

1906

13,040

L8J

9 1 -in.

Hannover, Pommern, Schle-

14 6-7-in.

sien, Schlqswig-Holstein.

Braunschweig

1904

12,907

4 11-in.,
14 6-7-in.

9-in,

Elsass, Preussen, Lothrin-
gen, Hessen.

Battle-Cruisei s

Hindenburg ...

1910

28,000

8 15-in.,
14 5-9-in.

—

Unknown.

Liitzow

1915

28,000

8 12-in.,
12 5-9-in.

11-in.

Derfninger.

Seydlitz

1913

24,640

10 11-in.,
12 5-9-in.

11-in.

Moltke.

Von der Tann

1911

18,700

2.3

8 11-in.,
10 5-9-in.

6-in.

None.

Armoured Cruiser.
1905 9,£50 21 4 8-2 in.,

10 5-9-in.

4 -in .

Accepting the German statement, the First
Squadron of eight battleships would probably
be composed of the Konig and Kaiser types ;
the Second of the Helgoland and Nassau types ;
and the Third of pre-Dreadnought ships, the
Deutschlands and Braunschweigs. There is
reason to believe, however, that two new battle-
ships, which were known when building as the
Ersatz-Worth and " T," were present. The
former is said to have been named the Wil-
he'm II. It was on board a new ship of this
name that Admirals Scheer and Hipper re-
ceived the freedom of Wilhelmshaven a few
weeks after the battle. It was also suggested
that the Pommern, a vessel of which name the
Germans admitted was sunk in the action, was
not the old pre-Dreadnought ship of this name —
which was understood to have been torpedoed
in the Baltic by a British submarine in July,
1915 — but the much more modern and power-
ful vessel known as " T." Another possibility
is that the vessel named the Salamis, which
was building in Germany for the Greeks when
the war broke out, took part in the battle under
some other name. At all events, it is difficult
to believe that the homogeneity of the German
squadrons -would have been broken by the
inclusion of some of the older ships, the

in the German official account, to have consisted
of the Derfflinger and Moltke classes, as well as
the Von der Tann. The Liitzow, in which
Admiral Hipper's flag was flying during part of
the action, was the sister-ship of the Derfflinger,
and the Seydlitz of the Moltke. Some British
observers were of opinion that a later battle-
cruiser, the Hindenburg, was present, and not
the Von der Tann, and this is the more likely, as
the inclusion of the latter would have tended to
reduce the speed of the squadron.

Thus at about two o'clock on the afternoon
of Wednesday, May 31, two large naval forces
were approaching one another in the North
Sea. Each of these forces consisted of a main
body comprising three squadrons of their latest
battleships. Each also had an advanced or
reconnoitring squadron of battle-cruisers thrown
out some distance before the main body. Each,
too, was accompanied by satellites, seme of
which w-ere still more advanced, for scouting
purposes, and as a protective screen against
submarines. It is characteristic of the sea
operations that two such bodies as these, each
containing all the latest scientific appliances
for sea fighting, although they might be cruising
in the same waters, might seldcm ccme into

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

139

A SCENE OF THE MIDNIGHT BATTLE.

Engagement of one of the British destroyers with German cruisers, as revealed by German star-shells,

and firelight caused by a huge shell which struck the British vessel. Caught between two fires and

fighting to the last, the officers and men of the destroyer gave a good account of themselves before

she sank. The German vessel was badly damaged by a torpedo.

contact, and that months might elapse without
an engagement. Even when they do meet, it
does not follow that there is continuity of

fighting, such as may be observed in the clash
of armies on land.

It was, as Sir David Beatty tells us, a. fine

140

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

afternoon, with a light wind from the south-
east, the sea calm, and the visibility — that is to
say, the range of vision — fairly good. At
about 2.30 the satellites of the two bodies
sighted one another. Some Dutch fishermen
who were present, described this first meeting
of the light cruisers which were thrown out
before the battle-cruiser squadrons.

Now it was that there occurred one of
those incidents which illustrate the change
in the conduct of sea fighting. Whether the

master G. S. Trewin, as observer, quickly recon-
noitred to the cast -north-east :

Owing to clouds it was necessary to fly very low, and
in order to identify four enemy light cruisers the sea-
plane had to fly at a height of 900 ft. within 3,000 yards
of thern, the light cruisers opening fire on her with
every gun that would bear

The information obtained in this way indicated
the value of such observations. It may be
remarked, however, that in clear weather, and
under favourable conditions, observations might
be made from Zeppelins for far greater dis-

VICE-ADMIRAL SIR CHARLES MADDEN,
K.C.B, C.V.O., Chief of Staff.

Germans were accompanied by Zeppelin scouts
remains uncertain. It was suggested that
they might have been present, because of
the reference in the official German version
of the battle to observations which were
indubitably reliable, and because the Danish
fishermen reported that they saw two airships
near the coast of Denmark. But the British
certainly made use of an air scout, for on a
report from the Galatea, Commodore E. S.
Alexander-Sinclair, who with the First Light
Cruiser Squadron was scouting to the east-
ward, Sir David Beatty ordered a seaplane
to be sent up from the Engadine, Lieut. -Com.
C. G. Robinson, and this machine, with Flight-
Lieut. F. J. Rutland as pilot, and Asst.-Pay-

W^BBSSBKHKBKK^BKKi

. Aim

^/Ffm

W ■ '

W j&*r^

.,vvK.'v<'^R8S; „ _*_i«I^*I^^S

v5!

\y%

if %

[Russell.
COMMODORE LIONEL HALSEY, C.M.G.,
"Iron Duke," Captain of the Fleet.

tances. It has been calculated that the radius
of vision of observers in these airships at
10,000 feet is about 90 miles. As the distance
by which the battle-cruiser squadrons on either
side were separated frcm their main bodies
could not have been more than 40 or 50 miles
at the most, a Zeppelin at the above-named
height should have been able, on a clear after-
noon, to have seen both the approaching battle
squadrons There was nothing, however, to
indicate that this knowledge was available to
either fleet.

The admirals commanding the battle-cruiser
squadrons became aware of the proximity and
of the strength of one another at about th6
same time. Their proceedings illustrated one

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

141

THE GERMAN LIGHT
Officially admitted to have

■of the functions such vessels are built to per-
form. The purpose of the battle-cruiser was
twofold. It was to be a commerce protector,
its speed and weight of armament enabling
it to catch and overwhelm sea wolves preying
on the trade, as was shown by Vice-Admiral
Sturdee's victory at the action off the Falkland
Islands. Its other purpose was to push home
a reconnaissance — to sweep away the protecting
-screen scouting for the enemy, and again by
its speed and power to get near enough to
find out the composition of the approaching
foe. In this instance, Vice-Admiral Hipper,
■discovering his force to be inferior to that of
his opponent, promptly turned to retire on .
liis main body. Sir David Beatty, not yet
aware whether there was any main body
behind Hipper, altered course and proceeded
-at full speed in a direction which would enable
him to make the discovery or to cut off the
•enemy cruisers from their base. There was,
therefore, no . question of undue risk. Sir

CRUISER "ROSTOCK."
been sunk in the battle.

David Beatty, with superior force, was carry-
ing out the primary purpose for which his
vessels had been created. It is true that
while he was steaming awaj' from his main
forces, Hipper was steaming towards his
friends ; but it should be noted that although
the distance in the latter case was decreasing
at the rate of the combined speeds of the
squadrons, the distance between Sir David
and the British battle fleet was only increasing
by the difference in the speeds of the two
bodies. The first stage of the battle, then,
took on a similar form to that of the action
off the Dogger Bank on January 24, 1915.
Hipper's five battle-cruisers were flying back
to the south-east, from which direction von
Scheer was advancing, while the six heavier
and more powerful British vessels were in
chase. The latter, moreover, were supported
by the four ships of the Fifth Battle Squadron
under Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, be-
tween five and six miles to the north-westward.

THE GERMAN PRE-DREADNOUGHT BATTLESHIP "POMMERN.
Officially admitted to have been sunk by a torpedo on the night of May 31.

142

THE TIMES HISTORY Ob THE WAR.

Summing up the position at this stage, Sir
David Beatty said : " The visibility at this
time was good, the sun behind us and the
wind south-east. Being between the enemy
and his base, our situation was both tactically
and strategically pood."

At 3.48 p.m. the opposed forces had closed
to a range of about 18,500 yards, and the action
began. Both sides opened fire practically
simultaneously, steaming on parallel lines. It
was a little later that there occurred one of
those catastrophic strokes of fortune which
have been made possible by the tremendous
power locked up in the modern engines of
battle. The ships on both sides were vigorously
engaged, when suddenly a heavy explosion
was caused in the last ship of the British line,
the Indefatigable. A black column of smoke
400 feet high shot upwards, said the German
account, hiding the ship, and when it cleared
away a little later the cruiser had disappeared.
Out of her ship's company of about 900 officers
and men, only two are believed to have sur-
vived. The fighting, we are told, was of a
very fierce and resolute character, and as the
good marksmanship of the British vessels
began to tell, the accuracy and rapidity of
that of the enemy depreciated. The Fifth
Battle Squadron, too, had come into action,
and opened fire at a range of 20,000 yards
upon the enemy's rear ships. At 4.18 the
third ship in the enemy's line was seen to be
on fire, but soon afterwards another tragic
misfortune befell the British squadron. The
magnificent battle-cruiser Queen Mary was
vitally hit, and with a terrific explosion,
which appeared to blow her hull asunder, also
disappeared. The loss of life in her case was
terrible also, for she had at least 1,000 people
in her, and only about a score were saved.
In modern warfare seamen have to face perils
unknown to their predecessors, for in the old
wars ships were more often captured than
sunk. Now the sacrifice is demanded with
awful suddenness, and in a moment the whole
of a ship's company may be added to the list
of those brave men who have died at their
post of duty.

It was in this run to the southward that the
German gunners displayed their best qualities.
The manner in which they concentrated the
fire of several ships and bunched their salvoes
on an object was remarkable. With regard
to the loss of Beatty's two cruisers, an officer
of one of the larger vessels gave in the Daily

Mail what appeared to be a possible explana-
tion. He said :

They were purely chance shots which brought about
their destruction. The armour would have withstood
any amount of shell -fire.

Under the deadly hail from the British ships,
however, the quality of the German gimnery
fell off, and their fire became far less effective,
whereas the result of that from Beatty's ships
became more marked every moment. For
an hour all but six minutes the engagement
continued to the southward, when the enemy's
battle fleet, in three divisions, was sighted by
the Southampton, Commodore W. E. Good-
enough, and reported to the Vice-Admiral.
Thereupon Sir David Beatty, having attained
one purpose, proceeded to carry out another.
He had driven in, by superior force, the enemy's
advance guard, and had discovered the compo-
sition and direction of their main force. At
the same time, he had prevented the enemy's
scouts from approaching his own main body
in order to obtain similar information. This
was not falling into a trap, but, if trap there
was, he now set it. Turning his squadron
round — the ships altering course in succession
to starboard — he proceeded northwards to lead
the enemy towards his own battle fleet. The
Fifth Battle Squadron, following in his wake,
but more to the southward, came into action
with the van of the enemy's battle fleet, which
Admiral Hipper, who had also turned, was
now leading on a parallel course to the British
squadron's. Possibly the Germans assumed
that Beatty and Thomas were unsupported,
and that the odds now in his favour offered
von Scheer the opportunity for which he had
been looking. If so, he was to be disillusioned.
Thus ended the first stage of the contest.

With the second stage there came about a
change in the conditions of light and visibility.
The British ships were silhouetted against a
clear horizon to the westward, with the setting
sun behind them, while the enemy, obscured in
an increasing veil of mist, presented very indis-
tinct outlines. It says a good deal for British
moral and marksmanship that, despite these
disadvantages, during the northward run " the
enemy received very severe punishment, and
one of their battle -cruisers quitted the line in a
considerably damaged condition." Other of the
ships also showed signs of increasing injury.
Beatty's battle-cruisers had been reduced to
four, and at an interval behind them were the
four fast battleships of the Queen Elizabeth

THE TIMES HISTOEY OF THE WAR.

143

THE END OF THE DESTROYER "SHARK."
After being engaged about ten minutes, the British destroyer
was struck by two torpedoes, which sank her almost at once.
But before she settled down the "Shark" fired her last
available torpedo. The portrait is of Loftus W. Jones,
Commander of the "Shark," who was killed in action.

144

THE TIMES HISTORY OE THE WAR.

type, the latter being engaged not only with

Hipper's force but with that of von Sehecr as

well. The range between the two lines was st ill

about 14,000 yards. An officer in Admiral

Evan-Thomas's squadron wrote :

Wo were at this time receiving a very heavy fire
indeed, our own battle-cruisers having become dis-
engaged for twenty minutes to half an hour, so that the
fire of tho whole German Fleet was concentrated on us.
Especially unpleasant was a period of half an hour,
during which we were unable to see the enemy, while
they could see us clearly. Thus we were unable to fire
a shot, and had to rest content, with steaming through
a tornado of shell-fire without loosing off a gun, which
was somewhat trying.

It should be borne in mind, however, that at
this time Beatty was getting into a position to
hustle the Germans over to the eastward, and
towards the Danish shore, while help was coming
to the sorely tried British force at the rate of
the combined speeds of the British battle fleet
and the contending forces moving to the
northward. That no serious loss occurred on the
British side during tliis, the most critical, phase
of the battle, testified alike to the splendid
handling of the ships and the excellence of the
material and workmanship put into their
construction.

The third stage of the engagement was intro-
duced by the arrival of the British battle fleet.
Its j^roximity had already been notified to Sir
David Beatty, the speed of whose ships had
enabled him to draw considerably ahead of the
German line, giving him the advantage of'
position, and he now turned to the north-
eastward, crossing, as it were, ahead of them,
and, as he says, crumpling up their leading
ships. He notes that only three of their battle-

cruisers were at this time in sight, closely
followed by battleships of the Konig class.
They were already turning to the eastward,
partly because of Beatty's action, but possibly
also because they had realized what they were
in for. It has been suggested that it was now
that von Scheer ordered tho pre-Dreadnought
ships to make the best of their way home.
Anyway, none of them appears to have taken
a part in the subsequent daylight fighting, as
should otherwise have been the case had they
retained their position as the rear division of
the German line.

When, at 5.56, the flagsliips of the British
battle squadrons were seen bearing north,
distant five miles, Beatty altered course to the
east, bringing the range down to 12,000 yards,
and proceeded at his utmost speed. The object
of this movement was to give room for Sir John
Jellicoe's force to deploy — that is, to open out
and extend his divisions from column into line
so as to come into action astern of the battle-
cruisers. The second purpose of Admiral
3eatty had been attained. As the Commander-
in-Chief, in a deservedly eulogistic passage in
his dispatch, said :

The junction of the Battle Fleet with the scouting
force after the enemy had been sighted was delayed
owing to the southerly course steered by our advanced
force during the first hour after commencing their
action with the enemy battle-cruisers. This was, of
course, unavoidable, as had our battle-cruisers not
followed the enemy to the southward the main fleets
would never have been in contact. The Battle-Cruiser
Fleet, gallantly led by Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty,
and admirably supported by the ships of the Fifth
Battle Squadron under Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-
Thomas, fought an action under, at times, disadvantageous
conditions, especially in regard to light, in a manner

GERMAN WAR VESSELS OUTSIDE KIEL HARBOUR.

THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR.

145

AFTER THE BATTLE.

Shell-holes in the side of a British warship. Th
shell-hole on the left is stopped up with bedding

that was in keeping with the beat traditions of t!
Service.

Before describing the way in which the

German High Sea Fleet was brought to action

by the British battle squadrons, it will make the

narrative more clear if the subsequent mo vet

ments of the force under Sir David Beatty are

first dealt with. Continuing his course to the

eastward, at 0.20 tho Third Battle-Cruiser

Squadron, commanded by Rear-Admiral the

Hon. H. L. A. Hood, which had been ordered to

reinforce him, appeared ahead, steaming south

towards the enemy's van. Sir David reports :

I ordered them to take station ahead, which was
carried out magnificently, Rear-Adrairal Hood bringing
his squadron into action in a most inspiring manner,
worthy of his great naval ancestors.

It was at this stage of the battle that, as the
Germans themselves admitted, the increasing
mist, particularly in the north and north-east,
made itself most unpleasantly felt. Hood,
advancing at great speed, to carry out the
operation described by Sir David Beatty, swung
across hi front of the battle-cruisers, and in the
mist ran on to within 8,000 yards of the German

line. What followed is thus described by a
spectator :

The Invincible, which had sunk a German light
cruiser at 5.45 p.m., after an action lasting five minutes
tackled a vessel of the Derfflinger class. The German
ship was hit by the first salvo, and was getting several
knocks to every one she got home on the Invincible,
when the shell camo that sank the Invincible. There
were only six survivors, and when they came op they
witnessed the extraordinary spectacle of both the bow
and stern of their ship standing vertically 50 ft. out of
the water.

146

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

As soon as Sir David Beatty realized what was
happening he altered course in support of the
Third Battle-Cruiser Squadron, and directed its
two remaining vessels to take station astern of
his squadron and to prolong the line. This was
the first occasion on which any of the battle-
cruisers engaged at less than 12,000 yards, and
Beatty was affording succour to his consorts of
Admiral Hood's division. The Invincible was
sunk, as the Indefatigable and Queen Mary had
been, in action with other battle-cruisers, and
there is no evidence in the dispatches that up
to this moment our battle-cruisers had been
in action with battleships. Any suggestions,
therefore, that undue risks were taken in regard
to range, or by the engagement of battleships
by battle-cruisers, are unsupported by the
facts. Nor does the action necessarily show
that battle-cruisers cannot fight battleships.
Later on, when the German battleships were
engaged by vessels of other types, they were
admittedly showing signs of demoraliza-
tion, which had all the disturbing effect of
defeat.

The visibility at 6.50 was not more than four
miles, and soon after the enemy's ships were
temporarily lost sight of. Sir David continued
his course to the eastward until 7 o'clock, when
he gradually altered course to the south and
west in order to regain touch with the enemy.
Twice more he was in action, and now with
battleships as well as battle-cruisers, at ranges
of 15,000 and 10,000 yards respectively. Both
times his gunners got home on these retreating
vessels. On the last occasion the leading ship,
after being repeatedly hit by the Lion, turned
away eight points, emitting high flames, and
with a heavy list to port. The Princess Royal
set fire to a three-funnelled battleship, and the
New Zealand and Indomitable reported that
the third ship hauled out of the line, heeling
over and on fire. Then the mist came down
again and enveloped them, and the battle-
cruisers' part in the engagement ceased. If any
vindication of the tactical ability of the Vice-
Admiral Commanding the Battle-Cruiser Fleet,
or the brilliant manner in which he carried out
the duties entrusted to him, was required, it
may surely be found in the appreciation and
approval of his work and talents by Admiral
Sir John Jellicoe :

Sir David Beatty once again showed his fine qualities
of gallant leadership, firm determination, and correct
strategic insight. He appreciated the situations at
once on sighting first the enemy's lighter forces, then
his battle-cruisers, and finally his battle fleet. I can

fully sympathize with his feelings when the evening
mist and fading light robbed the Fleet of that complete
victory for which he had manoeuvred, and for which
the vessels in company with him had striven so hard.
The services rendered by him, not only on this, but on
two previous occasions, have been of the very greatest
value.

There remains to describe the concluding
phase of the daylight engagement — that between
the battle squadrons. It was, however, a
very one-sided affair, because as soon as von
Scheer recognized what he was up against he
turned to the southward, and, under cover of
the declining daylight, the thickening mist,
and smoke-clouds from his small craft, with-
drew from the fight. Before he could get
away, however, the three squadrons of the
Battle Fleet formed in a single line were hurled
across his van, and under a paralysing fire
from the British 13"5-in. guns the German
formation was shattered and the ships them-
selves very severely mauled. It was the
supreme moment, leading to the climax of the
whole battle, when Sir John Jellicoe brought
his magnificent Dreadnoughts at their top
speed into the melee. The situation called
for the highest tactical skill, calm judgment,
aid instant and unerring decision on the part
of the Commander-in-Chief. His own account
of this important phase is singularly brief and
modest. " I formed the Battle Fleet in line
of battle on receipt of Sir David Beatty's
report, and during deployment the fleets
became engaged." Picture the circumstances.
Flashes of guns were visible through the haze,
but no ship could be clearly distinguished.
Even the position of the enemy's battleships
could not always be determined. So thick
was it, in fact, that great care was essential
to prevent the British ships being mistaken
for enemy vessels. The conditions were cer-
tainly unparalleled. Yet, without a moment's
hesitation, Sir John Jellicoe, with cool courage,
delivered a vigorous and decisive thrust which
threw the enemy into confusion and completed
their discomfiture. After this, all their tactics
were of a nature to avoid further action. How
they extricated themselves was not made clear.
The fighting between the big ships lasted inter-
mittently for two hours more. It developed
into a chase. " During the somewhat brii f
periods," says Sir John, " in which the ships
of the High Sea Fleet were visible through the
mist, the heavy and effective fire kept up by
the battleships and battle -cruisers of the Grand
Fleet caused me much satisfaction, and the
enemy's vessels were seen to be constantly hit,

REAR-ADMIR\L ARTHUR C. REAR-ADMIRAL ERNEST F. A.

LEVESON. C.B.. GAUNT. C.M.G.,

Second in-Comman J, Second Battle Squadron. gecond-in-Command. Fourth Battle

Squadron.

VICE-ADMIRAL SIR THOMAS

JERRAM. K.C.B..

Commanded the Second nettle Squadron.

REAR-ADMIRAL ALEXANDER L. DUFF. C.B.,
Second-in-Command. First Battle Squadron.

Photos by Russell, Elliott & Fry, Lafayette, VBstrange
147

REAR-ADMIRAL HUGH EVAN-THOMAS. M.V.O.,
Commanded the Fifth Battle-Squadron.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

some being obliged to haul out of the line, and
at least one to sink. The enemy's return fire
at this period was not effective, and the damage
caused to our ships was insignificant."

The story would not be complete without
some account of the operations of the light-
cruiser squadrons and destroyer flotillas. It
was here that the changes in the conduct of
sea fighting since the last time the British
Navy was engaged in a fleet action were most
clearly marked. In the old wars, over a
hundred years ago, ships of the line of battle,
unless incensed by some openly offensive act,
scorned to throw away ammunition on a frigate
or a sloop, and these vessels were left to fight
duels with others of their own class. This has
been entirely altered by the introduction of
the torpedo, and now the smallest boat thus
armed may become a formidable antagonist
to the biggest Dreadnought. The light craft,
therefore, which enter the field of a fleet action
must expect a hostile reception if they come
within range of any enemy ship. The lighter
craft, however, whether cruisers or destroyers,
cooperated with their heavier comrades of the
line, and engaged with intrepidity and daring.
The skilful way in which every type of vessel
was used to assist the others bears witness to
the development of fleet organization in
accordance with modern demands. Sir David
Beatty testified to the value of the light
cruisers. " They very effectively protected
the head of our line from torpedo attack by
light cruisers or destroyers, and were prompt
in helping to regain touch when the enemy's
line was temporarily lost sight of." No higher
praise could be given to the destroyer flotillas
than that of Sir John Jellicoe. " They sur-
passed the very highest expectations that I
had formed of them."

Although with grim determination and
resolute bravery the small craft threw them-
selves into the fight, no light cruiser was lost,
and only eight destroyers were sunk. It may
be described as a conflict between egg-shells
and sledge-hammers, but the egg-shells did not
often get the worst of it. Very many ships
were reported to have been seriously damaged
by our torpedo attacks. Three times the light
cruiser squadrons, carrying no heavier gun than
a 6-in., and relying for protection on their
own rapidity of fire and movement, attacked
armoured ships. The dispatches contain many
instances of individual heroism and devotion
to duty on the part of those in the destroyers,

and these are only typical of many brilliant'
feats which, under the conditions of the battle,
were unseen and unrecorded officially. Then
there is the tragic episode of the destruction
of Sir Robert Arbuthnot's squadron. At 6.1G
the Defence and Warrior of this squadron,
which had gone into action ahead of the British
Battle Fleet, were observed passing down
between the engaged lines under a very heavy
fire. The Defence, flying Rear-Admiral
Arbuthnot's flag, disappeared, and the Warrior
passed to the rear disabled. They had only
a short time before been observed in action
with an enemy light cruiser, which was sub-
sequently seen to sink.
Says Sir John Jellicoe :

It is probable that Sir Robert Arbuthnot, during his
engagement with the enemy's light cruisers and in his
desire to complete their destruction, was not aware of
the approach of the enemy's heavy ships, owing to the
mist, nntil he found himself in close proximity to the
main fleet, and before ho could withdraw his ships
they were caught under a heavy fire and disabled.

It is not known when the Black Prince, of
the same squadron, was sunk, but a wireless
signal was received from her between eight and
nine p.m. The ships' companies of both the
Defence and Black Prince were lost, but that
of the Warrior, as mentioned elsewhere, was.
saved by the Engadine.

The dispositions of the Commander-in-Chief
after nightfall recalled the methods of Togo
when he lost sight of the remnants of Rozh-
destvensky's fleet after Tsushima. Realizing
that Admiral Niebogatoff would make for
Vladivostok, Togo headed in the same direction,
and, as is known, found him the next morning
and accepted his surrender. Sir John Jellicoe-
manoeuvred to remain between the enemy and
his bases, placing his destroyers in a position
where they would afford protection to the
larger ships and also be favourably situated
for attacking those of the enemy. As it turned
out, while a heavy toll of the German vessels
was taken, not a single ship was touched in
the British line. The Fourth, Eleventh and
Twelfth Flotillas, under Commodore J. R. P..
Hawksley and Captains C. J. Wintour and
A. J. B. Stirling, are mentioned by Sir John
Jellicoe as having " delivered a series of very
gallant and successful attacks on the enemy,,
causing him heavy losses." The Twelfth
Flotilla attacked a squadron consisting of six
large vessels, including some of the Kaiser class,
which was entirely taken by surprise. " A
large number of torpedoes was fired, including.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

149

some at the second and third ships in the line ;
those fired at the third ship took effect, and she
was observed to blow up."

Jellicoe, however, was not to experience the
good fortune of Togo, for under cover of the
darkness of the night, and the thickness of
the weather, Vice-Admiral Scheer, with his
battered ships, was able to escape. It was not
until the following day, after the whole of the
large area covered by the fight had been
thoroughly searched, without a trace of the
enemy being seen, that the British Commander-
in-Chief returned to his'bases to refuel and refill
his magazines. As was officially stated, he
was ready again within a very few hours to
put to sea.

interviews with a large number of these officers.
Sir John Jellicoe compiled a list of the German
losses, to which reference will be made later.
With the British losses, of course, there was no
uncertainty whatever, for at the earliest
opportunity the Admiralty published them in
full, in contrast to the policy of the German
Navy Office, which aimed at concealment as
far as possible, only revealing the destruction
of those ships whose loss for various reasons
had already become known to a number of
people.

Of the three battle-cruisers and three ar-
moured cruisers sunk on the British side, the
Indefatigable, Captain C. F. Sowerby, was the
first to be destroyed, followed about twenty

REAR-ADMIRAL T. D. W. NAPIER,
M.V.O.,

Commanded the Third Light-Cruiser Squadron.

The circumstances of the weather which
obtained on the afternoon of May 31, and the
approach of night soon after the main battle
was joined, made it difficult to obtain exact
information as to the losses inflicted on the
enemy. As Sir John Jellicoe says, owing prin-
cipally to the mist, but partly to the smoke, it
was possible to see only a few ships at a time
in the enemy's battle line.

" The conditions of low visibility," he wrote in his
dispatch, " under which the day action took place and
the approach of darkness enhance the difficulty. of giving
»n accurate report of the damage inflicted or the names
»f the ships sunk by our forces."

After a most careful examination of the

evidence of all officers who testified to seeing

enemy vessels actually sink, and personal

[RusseLl.

REAR-ADMIRAL HERBERT L. HEATH,
M.V.O.,

Commanded the Second Cruiser Squadron.

minutes later by the Queen Mary, Captain
C. I. Prowse. It was s*t a later stage that the
third battle-cruiser, the Invincible, Captain
A. L. Cay, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral the
Hon. H. L. A. Hood, and the armoured cruisers
Defence, Captain S. V. Ellis, flying the flag ol
Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot, Black
Prince, Captain T. P. Bonham, and Warrior,
Captain V. B. Molteno, were sunk or disabled.
Sir John Jellicoe records at the end of his
dispatch how " the hardest fighting fell to the
lot of the Battle-Cruiser Fleet (the units of
which were less heavily armoured than their
opponents), the Fifth Battle Squadron, the
First Cruiser Squadron, Fourth Light Cruiser
Squadron, and the Flotillas." Of these forces

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150

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

151

the Battle-Cruiser Fleet under Sir David Beatty,
and First Cruiser Squadron under Rear-Admiral
Arbuthnot, each lost three units, as has been
shown, but the Fifth Battle Squadron, com-
manded by Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas,
and Fourth Light Cruiser Squadron (Commo-
dore C. E. Le Mesurier), escaped without loss,
no battleships or light cruisers being sunk at all
on the British side. The destroyers sunk were
eight in number — the Tipperary, Ardent,
Fortune, Shark, Sparrowhawk, Nestor, Nomad,
and Turbulent. In the first-named vessel,
Captain C. J. Wintour, commanding the Fourth
Flotilla, which, said Sir John Jellicoe, he had
brought to a high pitch of perfection, lost his
life.

The foregoing was the complete toll paid by
the British Fleet in driving back the Germans
into their ports. It was added to by the
enemy, sometimes liberally, with the intention
of supporting their claim to a " victory," but
the Admiralty on more than one occasion
definitely denied these new claims from Berlin.
One of the most persistent of the latter related
to the battleship Warspite, Captain E. M. Phill-
potts, which was declared to have been sunk.
In spite of the fact that the Admiralty issued a
notice on June 4 saying : " This is untrue, that
ship having returned to harbour," the allega-
tion was repeated in an official communique from
the German Fleet Command on the 6th, and
again in the long official account published on
June 8. On June 10, however, the Admiralty
granted permission to a representative of the
Associated Press of America to see Captain
Phillpotts, who was full of praise for the
conduct of his men in the battle and what he
termed the amazing powers of resistance of
his ship. He said :

1 am not surprised that there have been reports that
the Warspite was sunk, as from our position, between
our Fleet and the German battleships, our escape from
such a fate was simply miraculous. Several times
we disappeared from sight in the smoke and spray.

The Captain went on to explain that after
two hours of action, in much of which the Fifth
Battle Squadron, to which the Warspite
belonged, engaged the whole German Battle
Fleet in an effort to protect the British battle-
cruisers until Admiral Jellicoe came up, the
steering gear of the Warspite went wrong, and
she ran amuck among the enemy. Some six
German battleships concentrated their fire on
her, but under a worse pounding than the Lion
received in the Dogger Bank fight she remained
in action without a single vital injury. An

officer in another ship, describing the incident
in a letter published in the newspapers, said :

It was at this stage that, owing to some temporary
defect, the Warspite's helm jammed, and she went
straight at the enemy into a hell of fire. She looked a
most wonderful sight, every gun firing for all it was
worth in reply. Luckily, she got under control quickly,
and returned to the line, and it was this incident which
gave rise to the German legend that sho had been sunk,

Sir John Jellicoe commended the Warspite's
captain for his conduct at this trying moment.
" Clever handling," said the Commander-in-
Chief, " enabled Captain Edward M. Phillpotts
to extricate his ship from a somewhat awkward
situation." There was a rather amusing touch
at the conclusion of the incident, for the captain
told his interviewer that when the defect had
been quickly repaired the Warspite wanted to
return. But her previous movements had been
so erratic that Captain Phillpotts and his crew
found that they were not popular ! Sufficient
battleships were present by this time to fill the
line, and the possibility of the vessel's running
amuck among her own friends was not wel-
comed. So she steamed home.

Other ships in the British Fleet suffered the
same fate as the Warspite of being sunk on
paper. In the official German accounts the
battle-cruiser Princess P^oyal, the battleship
Marlborough, the light cruiser Birmingham,
and the destroyer Acasta were all consigned to
their destruction in this manner, obliging the
issue and repetition of a denial by the Admiralty.
The cruiser Euryalus was also said to have been
set on fire and completely burnt out, but, as
the Admiralty stated, she was not even present
in the battle. In the case of the Marlborough,
Captain G. P. Ross, which flew the flag of Vice-
Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, Commanding the
First Battle Squadron (Second-in-Command of
the Grand Fleet), there was some justification.
At 6.54 p.m., after having been engaged with a
battleship of the Kaiser class, and with a cruiser,
and later still another battlesliip, this vessel
was hit by a torpedo, and took up a considerable
list to starboard. In spite of this misfortune,
as the official dispatch states :

She reopened at 7.3 p.m. at a cruiser, and at 7.12 p.m.
fired fourteen rapid salvoes at a ship of the Konig class,
hitting her frequently until she turned out of the line.
The manner in which this effective fire was kept up in
spite of the disadvantages due to the injury caused by
the torpedo was most creditable to the ship, and a very
fine example to the squadron.

An eye-witness also said that the sight of the
gunlayers in the Marlborough calmly and coolly
serving their weapons while the vessel was

15-2

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

damaged and in possible danger of sinking
was a most inspiring one. It is significant that
the Marlborough continued to perform her
duties as flagship of the squadron until 2.30 a.m.
next morning. Then, as she had some diffi-
culty in keeping up the speed of the squadron,
Sir Cecil Burney transferred his flag to the
Revenge, and the Marlborough was detached
by the direction of Admiral Jellicoe to a base,
driving off a submarine en route.

Unlike the British losses in the battle, which
were known in full all over the world within
a few hours of the end of the engagement,
those of the German Fleet were only revealed
in easy stages. In the first German report,
circulated by wireless on June 1, they were
alleged to include onlv three shins and " some
torpedo boats." The communique said :

On our side the small cruiser Wiesbaden was sunk
by hostile artillery fire during the day engagements,
and the Pommern during the night by a torpedo. The
fate of the Frauenlob, which is missing, and of some
torpedo boats which have not }Tet returned, is unknown.

In the second German official message, issued
on June 3, the loss of the small cruiser Elbing
(Captain Madlung) was added to the list.
She was said to have been blown up by her own
crew after being heavily damaged by collision
with another German war vessel, which made
it impossible to take her back to port. The
crew were rescued by torpedo boats, with the
exception of the commander, two officers and
18 men, who remained on board in order to
blow up the vessel, and who were brought to
Ymuiden in a tug and landed there. Without
a doubt, it was the presence of these survivors
in Holland, reported in the Press, which induced
the German Admiralty Staff to admit the
destruction of the Elbing. According to some
accounts, it was the Warrior which put the
Elbing out of action.

In a semi-official statement issued on the
same day, the loss of the Frauenlob was
accepted as a certainty, and the ship was said
to have been sunk apparently during the
night of May 31 in an individual action. The
loss of five " large torpedo boats " was also
admitted. On Sunday, June 4, a Berlin
telegram, which attained added significance
in the light of later events, was dispatched.
" Contrary to the British Admiralty report,"
it said, "it is stated that no Gorman naval
units were lost other than those mentioned in
the official German communiqui." During
the next week, however, on Wednesday,
June 7, there was issued from the Marine-Amt

a long account of the battle, and in it occurred
the following passage :

The total losses of the German High Sea forces during
the battle of May 31 and Juno 1, and subsequently, are :

One battle-cruiser.

One ship of the line of older construction.

Four small cruisers.

Five torpedo boats.

Of these losses, the Pommern, launched in 1905, the
Wiesbaden, the Elbing, the Frauenlob, and five torpedo
boats have already been reported sunk in official state-
ments. For militarv reasons we refrained till now
from making public the loss of the vessels Liltzow and
Rostock. In view of the wrong interpretation of thia
measure, and moreover in order to frustrate English
legends about gigantio losses on our side, these reasons
must now be dropped. Both vessels were lost on their
way to harbour after attempts had failed to keep the
heavily-damaged vessels afloat. The crews of both
ships, including all severely wounded, are in safety.

This was as far as the Germans went in
regard to the admission of losses. In an
enclosure to his dispatch, Sir John Jellicoe
compiled a " list of enemy vessels put out of
action," in regard to which he expressed the
opinion that it gave the minimum in regard to
numbers, although it was possibly not entirely
accurate as regards the particular class of
vessel, especially those which were sunk during
the night attacks. In addition to the vessels
sunk, added Sir John, it was unquestionable
that many other ships were very seriously
damaged by gunfire and by torpedo attack.
In this connexion it has to be remembered
that as the Germans fought nearer home than
the British they had by far the greater chance
of getting their damaged ships safe into port.
They were only about 100 miles from the
shelter of the Heligoland forts, and probably
less from the minefields in the neighbourhood
of the Bight, when the battle finished, whereas
Sir John Jellicoe's bases were 400 miles away.
The Warrior, after being disabled during the
action, was towed by the Engadine for 75
miles from 8.40 p.m. on May 31, all through the
night, until 7.15 a.m. next morning, when she
foundered. Had the conditions in this respect
been equal, the British losses might have been
less, or the Germans much higher, according
to the position in which the battle was fought.
It is fitting to note here, in passing, the tribute
paid by Admiral Jellicoe to the artisan ratings
in his Fleet. They " carried out much valuable
work during and after the action," he said ;
" they could not have done better." Doubt-
less the hard and conscientious work of these
men contributed largely to the speed with
which the Fleet was made ready for sea again
within a few hours.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

153

Heath.

COMMODORE CHARLES E. LE MESURIER,
Commanded the Fourth Light-Cruiser Squadron.

There were several ships in the German
Fleet which were seen to have received severe
punishment, making the chance of their
getting back home a small one. As regards
the battle-cruiser squadron a Dutch report
stated that the Derfninger sank whilst being
towed to Wilhelmshaven, and there was like-
wise a doubt as to whether the Seydlitz, the
stern of which vessel was stated to have been
blown off, got into port. A large number
of relatives of her crew, residing in Schleswig,
were notified of casualties, although this was
not in itself conclusive evidence that she had
been destroyed. When the Liitzow was put
out of action Admiral Hipper transferred his

[Bacon

SIR ROBERT ARBUTHNOT, BT., M.V.O.,
Commanded the First Cruiser Squadron.

flag to the Moltke, which seems to have suffered

the least of the battle-cruisers. Of other

cruisers present on the German side, the Roon,

an armoured vessel of an earlier class than the

two sunk off the Falklands, was believed to

have been sunk. A midshipman in the

Marlborough wrote to his parents :

I believe we torpedoed a cruiser which has not yet
been claimed. We think it was the Roon, sister-ship
to the Yorck. We absolutely did for her with gun-fire
before we fired the torpedo. We could see right into
her hull. She was a mass of flames inside and had
lost a funnel.

In the same way, so many British ships
claimed to have disposed of light cruisers that
the four in the German list must have been

[Russell.

COMMODORE E. S. ALEXANDER-
SINCLAIR, M.V.O., A.D.C.,
Commanded the First Light-Cruiser Squadron

[Russell.

COMMODORE WILLIAM E. GOODENOUGH,
Commanded the Second Light-Cruiser Squadron.

154

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

ytundl.
COMMANDER E. B. S. BINGHAM.

Commanded the destroyer " Nestor."

an under-statement of losses in this class.
The municipality of Frankfort opened a fund
for the relief of relatives of the crew of the
light cruiser named after the city.

Then as regards their battle fleet, the Ger-
mans only admitted the loss of one unit, the
Pommern. Captain Btilcke, commanding this
vessel, was among those who went down in her.
The British official estimate, however, claimed
four battleships, three of which were seen to
sink. One of these may have been the, Ost-
friesland, which Dutch accounts stated had
been sunk. Her sister-ship, the Thiiringen,
may have suffered a like fate, and sailors' caps
bearing the name of tins vessel were found at
sea by an Ymuiden trawler. Byway, doubtless,
of contradicting the report of the loss of the
Thiiringen, an article appeared in the Kreuz
Zeilunrj at the end of June, purporting to be
written by an officer of the ship, in which it
was said that she was not touched. Tliree
weeks earlier, on June 10, the German Admir-
alty had allowed the publication of an account
of the battle alleged to have come from a mid-
shipman of the Ostfriesland, which was given a
rather suspicious prominence in the German
papers, and in which occurred the sentence :

" The Ostfriesland did not receive a single
hit."

In their revelation of the fine spirit shown by

the officers and men of the Royal Navy, the

details and incidents of the battle were most

inspiring. The confidence which the whole

Fleet had in its commanders, Sir John Jellicoe

and Sir David Beatty, had never been excelled

at any period in our naval history. Of the

Commander-in-Chief, the Archbishop of York

had written :

I left the Grand Fleet sharing to the full the admira-
tion, affection, and confidence which every officer
and man within it feels for its Commander-in-Chief,
Sir John Jellicoe. Here assuredly is the right man in
the right place at the right time. His officers givo him
the most absolute trust and loyalty. When I spoke of
him to his men I always felt that quick response which,
to a speaker, is the sure sign that he has reached and
touched the hearts of his hearers. The Commander-in-
Chief — quiet, modest, courteous, alert, resolute> holding
in firm control every part of his great fighting engine —
has under his command not only the ships, but the
heart of his Fleet.

As for the officers and their relations with
one another, the Archbishop said he never
heard one word of criticism, never felt the
slightest breath of jealousy. In manner, in
word, in spirit they justified the boast of one
of the Vice-Admirals : " We are all a great
band of brothers."

As for Sir David Beatty, every incident in
his career, and they had been both many and
glorious, had pointed him out as one of the men
to command the fleets of England if ever she
was engaged in a great naval war. The affair
in the Heligoland Bight, the action off the
Dogger Bank, and other episodes had inspired
feelings which were amply confirmed by the
great action off the Jutland coast. What his
men thought of him was well typified in the
answer of a sailor who was asked, just after
the battle, if the seamen had full confidence
in their leader. " Confidence in David ? " he
replied ; " why, we would all go to Hell for
David."

This implicit trust in the officers in command
was reciprocated to the full. Sir John Jellicoe
says in liis dispatch :

The conduct of officers and men throughout the day
and night actions was entirely beyond praise. No
words of mine could do them justice. On all sides it is
reported to me that the glorious traditions of the past
were most worthily upheld — whether in heavy ships,
cruisers, light cruisers, or destroyers — the same admirable
spirit prevailed. Officers and men were cool and
determined, with a cheeriness that would have carried
them through anything. The heroism of the wounded
was the admiration of all. I cannot adequately express
the pride with which the spirit of the Fleet filled me.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

155

THE DESTROYER "SPITFIRE"
(Lieutenant-Commander C. W. E. Trelawny) torpedoing a German warship.

Moreover the one thought in all ranks alter the enemy into the jaws of our Fleet. I have

the contest was that it might be renewed and no regrets, excopt for the gallant comrades, all

completed on a future occasion. Sir David pals, that have gone, who died gloriously. It

Beattv in a message to Admiral of the Fleot would have warmed your heart to see the gallant

the Hon. Sir Heclworth Meux, said : " We drew Hood bring his squadron into action. We are

156

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

TYPES OF GERMAN WARSHIPS

rea:ly for the next time. Please God it will
coma soon." The officers' tributes to the con-
duct of the men vie with those which the
seamen paid to the leading and example of
the officers. One officer, a lieutenant-com-
mander in a vessel which got into action a
little after 5 p.m. on the 31st, said in a letter :
" I am very glad the men have had their
baptism of fire. They were simply splendid.
Everything went just as if we had been at
target practice. Two young boys in an exposed
position were extremely good. I do not think
either of them is seventeen yet, but these boys
never turned a hair." Sub-Lieutenant G. A.
Nunneley, of the Warrior, testified, in a letter
quoted in the Yorkshire Post, to the coolness
of the men in that ship when she had been
disabled. They did not see how they could
possibly escape, as the Warrior was on fire
amidships and aft, but " the spirit of the men
and the heroism displayed were wonderful ;
everybody was cheerful and nobody lost his
head." This fine display of true discipline had
its reward when the whole of the crew, in most
difficult circumstances, were taken off by the
seaplane carrier Engadine. It was during the
transhipment, on the morning of June 1, that
Lieutenant F. J. Rutland performed the gallant
feat for which he received the Albert Medal of
the First Class from the King. A severely
wounded man from the Warrior, owing to the

violent motion of the two ships, was accidentally
dropped overboard from a stretcher and fell
between the vessels, which were working so
dangerously that the commanding officer of
the Warrior had to forbid two of his officers
from jumping overboard to the rescue of the
wounded man, as it was considered that this
would mean their almost certain death. Before
he could be observed, however, Lieutenant
Rutland went overboard from the forepart of
the Engadine with a bowline, and worked
himself aft. He succeeded in putting the bow-
line around the wounded man, and in getting
km hauled on board, but it was then found
that the man was dead, having been crushed
between the two ships. Lieutenant Rutland's
escape from a similar fate was miraculous.
" His bravery," as the official account of his
gallant deed stated, "is reported to have been
magnificent." He had already distinguished
himself at the beginning of the battle by his
work as pilot of the seaplane which, as indicated
elsewhere, was sent up from the Engadine for
scouting purposes. Lieutenant Rutland was one
of the few officers in the battle who had been
promoted from the lower deck. He was among
the first group of candidates selected in 1912, in
accordance with the new Admiralty scheme, to
qualify for commissions, by courses of training
at Greenwich and elsewhere, and by a period
of service afloat in the grade of "mate.' Le

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

157

■ G E R M AN

ATT.LE FLEET

DESTROYER
SCREEN

WHICH TOOK PART IN THE BATTLE.

eras appointed to torpedo boat No. 35 when
war began, but in December, 1914, transferred
to the Royal Naval Air Service as an acting
flight sub -lieutenant, afterwards being promoted
flight-lieutenant. The action of May 31 thus
produced, as it were, the first-fruits of the
decision, taken when Mr. Churchill was First
Lord, to open the commissioned ranks of the
Navy more widely to the petty officers and
seamsn.

In a striking speech when introducing the
Navy Estimates in the House of Commons on
February 15, 1915, Mr. Churchill, after review-
ing the salient features of the first six months
of naval war, and the lessons of the victories
off the Dogger Bank and the Falklands, said :
" It is my duty in this House to speak for the
Navy, and the truth is that it is sound as a
bell all through. I do not care where or how
it may be tested ; it will be found good and fit
and keen and honest." Demonstration of the
correctness of this estimate is to be found in
the performances of all ranks and ratings in the
Jutland Bank action, wherein the various
branches of the Service vied with one another
in efficiency. If two may specially be singled
out where all did so well, it is the engineering
and medical branches. The prelude to action,
said Sir John Jellicoe, is the work of the engine-
room department, and " during action the
offioers and men of that department perform

their most important duties without the in-
centive which a knowledge of the course of the
actions gives to those on deck. The qualities
of discipline and endurance are taxed to the
utmost under these conditions, and they were,
as always, most fully maintained throughout
the operations under review. Several ships
attained speeds that had never before been
reached, thus showing very clearly their high
state of steaming efficiency. Failures in material
were conspicuous by their absence, and several
instances are reported of magnificent work on
the part of the engine-room departments of
injured ships." Most praiseworthy also was
the devotion to duty of the surgeons. " The
work of the medical officers of the Fleet," Sir
John records, " carried out very largely under
the most difficult conditions, was entirely
admirable and invaluable. Lacking in many
cases all the essentials for performing critical
operations, and with their staff seriously de-
pleted by casualties, they worked untiringly
and with the greatest success. To them we
owe a deep debt of gratitude."

The confidence of the men in their officers
was indicated in many ways ; and there are
numerous letters and incidents which show how
real and deep it was. Reference is made by
Sir John Jellicoe to the fact that in the On-
slaught, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander
A. G. Onslow, D.S.C., Sub -Lieutenant H. W. A.

158

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

Keramis, assisted by Midshipman R. G. Arnot,
R.N.R. , who were the only executive officers
not disabled, brought the ship successfully out
of action and back to her home port. A stoker
petty officer, in an interview, described how the
Onslaught was swept pretty clean of everything,
and on her way back could not get into touch
by wireless, because both the operator and
signaller had been killed. The bridge had been

JOHN TRAVEKS GORNWELL,
Of the " Chester.'' The boy, who was under 16^
years old, although mortally wounded, remained
standing alone at a most exposed post, quietly
awaiting orders till the end of the action, with
the gun's crew dead and wounded around him.
The gallant lad died from his wounds.

carried away by a shell, and therefore the charts
were gone, and so was the compass. He added :
I would like to say something of Sub-Lieutenant
Kemmis, who took us home. We had a rare time of it,
because we had to pick our way as best we could, and
there was the sub-lieutenant sticking to the wheel for
over forty hours. He refused to be relieved. He kept
on saying that the men had quite enough to do to look
after themselves, and nobody was to bother about him.
We thought a lot of him, I can tell you.

Naturally, in the circumstances, the men in
the destroyers had, if anything, an extra share

of thrilling and trying experiences. The
stubborn and splendid episode of the Shark,
which went down righting to the very last, may
be cited. She formed one of a small division,
led by the Tipperary, which was caught and
overwhelmed. With about half of the crew
killed or disabled, the Shark continued to
maintain the action with only one remaining
gun. The captain, Commander L. W. Jones,
is said to have had one of his legs shot away,
but he continued the fight, and himself helped
to serve the gun to the last, when he was swept
into the sea as the vessel foitndered. Some
survivors from the Shark sprang on to a raft,
where they stayed for no less than five hours
watching the battle. They kept their blood
in circulation by jumping overboard and
swimming round the raft, all doing this in turn
and being hauled in afterwards by those on the
raft. A similar experience was shared by the
seamen from some of the larger ships. Com-
mander Dannreuther, one of the six survivors of
the Invincible, was shot into the sea when the
battle-cruiser exploded, and went down 20 feet
or 30 feet. Coming up, he found himself near
a raft, and clambered on to it. In a few minutes
he saw a broad, black, smiling face, covered
with grease and soot and oil, appear at the side
of the raft. " I'll bet that's Sandford," said
Commander Dannreuther to the visitor.
" An Irishman would be sure to smile after an
experience like this." " You're right," replied
Lieutenant C. S. Sandford, as he ,limbed on
to the raft. Both were picked up half an hour
later by a torpedo boat. It was of this handful
of Invincible survivors that a midshipman
related an incident which he said he should never
forget, as it was the pluckiest thing he had ever
seen. As the ship he was in steamed ahead
into action, he saw four men on a raft, and at
first thought they must be Germans. But as
the ship passed by, " the four got up on their
feet and cheered us like blazes. It was the
finest thing I had ever seen."

Three other destroyers of the same division
as the Shark were the Ardent, Fortune and
Sparrowhawk, and Sir John Jellicoe records
that when the waters from the latitude of the
Horn Reef to the scene of the action were
thoroughly searched next morning, some
survivors from each of these boats were picked
up, and also from their flotilla leader, the
Tipperary. The Sparrowhawk had been badly
injured in collision, and was no longer sea-
worthy, so she was sunk after her crew had been

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

159

"FOR YOUR SPLENDID
King George V. inspecting some of the seamen who
during his visit to the Battle Cruiser Fleet, June

taken off. A petty officer of Neath, who was
in the Fortune, related how 23 men of that
destroyer got on to a raft when she was sunk,
15 minutes after going into action, but only
seven of this number survived the terrors of
the night. All the officers were lost. One of
them clung to the rail until exhausted ; then
his hold slipped, and he went down. It was the
saddest sight of all, related this petty officer, to
see comrades slipping off when those who
remained alive were so numbed and cramped
that they could give them no help. Yet, in spite
of their sufferings, the men were amazingly

WORK I THANK YOU."

fought in the battle. The King taking the salute
, 1916. On the King's right is Admiral Beatty.

cheerful ; and it was related by another petty
officer how a seaman, who was the possessor of
a good bass voice, helped to keep up the spirits
of 26 other men from the Tipperary who were
stranded on a raft by singing to them, even
though he himself had been wounded in the leg
and had had two of his fingers shot away.
These men were afterwards rescued by the
disabled Sparrowhawk, and had not been long
in her when — insult added to injury ! — a
German submarine appeared on the starboard
quarter. But the two remaining gvms were
quickly brought to bear on her, and she dived

160

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

at once and made off. Besides the 27 men saved
from this particular raft, there was a sub-
lieutenant who was swimming alongside, with
one hand clutching the ropes hanging around.
He had been swimming thus for some hours,
having refused to board the raft, as it might
have capsized with his additional weight. In
the end, he was in better condition than several
of the men who were on board, many of whom
suffered from the cold and exposure. When on
board the Sparrowhawk, much amusement was
caused by one survivor who, dressed only in a
piece of serge round his loins, was anxiously
drying a number of £1 Treasury notes which
he had saved, explaining as he did so that he
was to be married on his next leave. To his
relief, the notes dried out all right, and then he
was able to take an interest in his own miracu-
lous escape.

There was one episode which, more than
any other, stirred the popular imagination
when the official dispatches were published,
and that was the deathless story of Boy
Corn well, who remained at his post of duty
to the end of the 6ght, faithful to the last,
and then died of his wounds. Sir David
Beatty says :

A report from the Commanding Officer of the Chester
gives a splendid instance of devotion to duty. Boy
(1st class) John Travers Cornwell, of the Chester, was
mortally wounded early in the action. He nevertheless
remained standing alone at a most exposed post, quietly
awaiting orders till the end of the action, with the
guii's crew dead and wounded all round him. His age
was under 161 years. I regret that he has since died,
but I recommend his case for special recognition in justice
to his memory, and as an acknowledgment of the high
example set by him.

The body of the brave lad was at first buried

in a common grave, but on July 29, having

been exhumed, it was reinterred with full

naval honours in a private grave in Manor

Park Cemetery, when the Bishop of Barking

and Dr. Macnamara, the latter of whom was

the bearer of a wreath from the Royal Navy,

delivered eloquent tributes to CornweU's

heroism. A movement for a national memorial

was set on foot, in which the Navy League and

Sir John Bethell, M.P., among others, were

interested, to endow a ward for disabled

sailors in the Star and Garter Home, to provide

cottage homes for disabled and invalided sailors

and their families, to institute naval scholar-
ships for deserving boys, and to erect a suitable
monument on the grave.

It is unnecessary to emphasize the fact that
the spirit which animated little Jack Cornwell
was displayed in numerous other deeds of
courage and valour on May 31, and it would be
true to say that what he did so splendidly
many others were ready to do if the need had
arisen. One case of the kind was that of a
commander, who, despite his wounds, con-
tinued to issue orders, and remained in charge
of the ship till she had finished fighting. When
he reached port, this gallant officer, before
allowing himself to be removed to hospital,
insisted on bein,r taken round his ship to
inspect the damage inflicted by the enemy's
fire. Rather a touching narrative was told
of the chaplain of another vessel, who, as he
lay dying from a shattered spine and leg, prayed
for victory for the British Fleet.

Another incident among the many glorious
and inspiring deeds on this memorable day is
that of a very heroic action which affords an
opportunity for giving to the gallant Corps of
Royal Marines the praise which is its due.
An officer of the corps is said, in his last moments
when mortally wounded, to have used his
remaining breath to issue instructions which
prevented a catastrophe and possibly the loss
of his ship. For obvious reasons, neither the
name of the officer nor of the vessel were publicly
disclosed, but at some later date the esteem and
honour in which his memory is now held by his
comrades and friends within the Service will
also be accorded him by all his fellow-country-
men.

On this note the relation of the Battle of
Jutland Bank may be concluded. The loss of
life was indeed serious, both to the Navy and
the country. Sir John Jellicoe, in his dispatch,
pays a tribute to the officers and men whose
death was mourned by their comrades in the
Grand Fleet. " They fell," he added, " doing
their duty nobly, a death which they would
have been the first to desire." The sorrow
which the Navy felt at the loss in action of so
many gallant seamen was fully shared by the
nation.

CHAPTER CXLI.

THE WESTERN FRONT IN MAY
AND JUNE, 1 916.

Desultory Warfare in May — Poison Gas and its Uses — The Anzacs in France — Analysis
of the Fighting — A Third Battle of Yr-RES — The German Attack — The Canadian Counter-
Attack between Hill 60 and Hooge — The Southern End of the British Line — A Series of
Raid.-' — Eve of the Great Franco-British Offensive on the Somme.

FROM the end of April until the begin-
ning of the Franco -British offensive
on July 1 the warfare on the Western
front partook of the same character
is that described in Chapter CXXXVI. ; that
is to say, the fighting was continuous, but
yielded no important results.

On May 2 the Germans delivered one of
those assaults in the Verdun region, west of
the Meuse, which had now become routine,
and, as usual, without any practical gain :
there were also encounters in the Argonne.
Thus affairs went on from day to day. until
the 8 th, when a bombardment of great violence
was directed against Avocourt Wood and the
region round about it. A German infantry
attack, which followed the fire, was brought to
a standstill by the French curtain fire and that
of their machine-guns.

On the 11th, in the Champagne region, the
French demolished a Geiman trench for a
length of 100 yards near Tahure, otherwise
there was comparative calm along the whole
front except north-east of Vermelles, where the
enemy seized about 500 yards of the British
front trenches. Part of the lost ground was,
however, quickly regained by a counter-attack.
It was the first endeavour that the Germans
had made on this part of the British line since
April 26-29.

A heavy bombardment during the night of
May 12-13, between the river Somme and
Vol. IX.— Part 109.

Maricourt, was followed by a German attack
in three columns, of which one only succeeded
in penetrating our line, and even this was at
once driven out again. In the neighbourhood
of Ploegsteert Wood the enemy attacked our
lines, and here also he succeeded in penetrating
at one point, but was rapidly expelled. At
another his troops were met on the parapet
by some of the Scots and forced to retire in
confusion.

This, from the German point of view, highly
irregular proceeding on the part of our men
came as a great surprise to the enemy, who
did not think that after the severe artillery
fire they would be equal to any such resistance.
< Jenerally along the line there was considerable
artillery activity, but very little else to note.
Mining operations were also carried on.

An ordinary day at the front was somewhat
as follows : What our men called the " morning
strafe" (one side might commence it or the
other) was followed by the ascent of observation
balloons and aeroplanes scouting to ascertain
what was going on behind the enemy's front
line, taking photographs of his works or disturb-
ing his movements. When the enemy's aero-
planes were noted in the air the anti-aircraft
guns got to work at them. In the middle of
the day there was sometimes a lull for dinners,
and later on the fire would begin again. In
the course of the night the enemy sometimes
attempted to raid our lines, and we did the

Hi I

lli'2

THE TIMES HISTORY OE THE WAR.

same with his. These incursions were made
either for the purpose of gaining information
or in order to keep the other side alarmed and
induee the belief that a larger attack was immi-
nent. There were always patrols to send out to
reconnoitre over " No-Man's Land," and some-
times covering parties were pushed on ahead of
our trenches to cover the working parties,
both dangerous duties.* Again, when it was
ascertained, or surmised, that there was a con-
siderable accumulation of German troops
opposite a British trench, a heavy artillery fire
would be brought to bear to make them keep
close under cover. Then the guns would
suddenly lift their fire, and a bombing party,
rushing over the intervening distance of " No-
Man's Land," would hurl death and destruction
among them. In addition to all this there was
the usual repair work to be executed, both on
the trenches and on the wire entanglements.

When a raid was determined on from either
side the artillery set to work to prepare the
way, that is to say, it smashed as much as
possible the enemy's entanglements which
protected the part selected for attack When
the destruction was deemed sufficient, and as
the points where raids were made were not far

'""No-Man's Land" was the name given to the
dividing space between the opposing trenches.

distant from the assaulting side's trenches,
the attacking infantry advanced to the assault.
The guns then turned their energies to making
a curtain fire behind the selected part to prevent
the enemy sending up supports to it. The
opponents meanwhile were engaged in much
the same manner, endeavouring to stop the
assault, or, if they could not do this, in throwing
a barrier of their shell-fire behind the attacking
party to prevent reinforcements reacliing it.

This procedure caused a considerable loss
of men to both sides, as the lists of casualties
issued from time to time showed. From our
point of view the results obtained were com-
mensurate. We wanted detail knowledge of
the enemy's works so as to make proper plans
for the grand advance which was to be made
at the right and proper time.

Tlvroughout the operations since the Second
Battle of Ypres the Germans had made use of
all their brutal auxiliary weapons — poison gas,
lachrymatory shells and flame jets. When
gas had been used at Ypres it came as a
surprise and. enabled the enemy to gain some
success, but it soon becams only a small factor
in warfare, and for all the good it did might
have been withdrawn. We were fully armed
against it. Every man carried a helmet which
filtered out the noxious gas and enabled him

EFFECT OF A GERMAN HOWITZER SHELL
Bursting behind the British lines.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAS.

163

BLOWING UP BARBED-WIRE ENTANGLE-
MENTS.
Circle picture : British troops stacking wire.

to breathe the air, which, passing through the
chemicals, was rendered fit for human respira-
tion.*

One of the latest developments was the
introduction of " stink " gas, so called from its
disagreeable odour, but not in itself danger-
ous. This was sometimes mixed with poison
gas. Until this little dodge of the gentle German
was understood many accidents occurred to our
men. They were apt to remove their protected
helmets on account of the smell which pene-
trated through them and then fell victims to
the poison. The lachrymatory shells, as their
name implies, produced a copious flow of tears.
To guard against this goggles were introduced

* Originally, chlorine was the gas the Germans made
use of, but others were subsequently employed. Chlorine
produced the long and agonising death that was so
common with our men when first they met it. Later it
had become possible to treat all but the very bad cases
and to nurse them back to health. Some of the later
kinds of gases employed were more subtle in their action,
and while not instantly incapacitating, had the property
of developing acute illness. The gases were kept under
pressure in steel cylinders, and let out when the wind
was favourable and blew towards the Allied trenches.

which in the latest pattern helmets form part
of them.*

It will be easily conceived that the combina-
tion of stink, poison, and tear -provoking gases
would be very deadly if proper means had not
been introduced to render nugatory their
deleterious effects. Occasionally it happened
that a change of direction of the wind blew

* The material, usually benzyl-bromide, was fired in
5-9 shells from howitzers. Each shell held about six
pints of it, and being opened out by a small bursting
charge on impact, scattered the liquid about, which slowly
vapovirised. It had a very irritating effect on the eyes,
making them smart severely and producing a flood
of tears.

Ilil

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

165

back the poison gas among the Germans, which
may be looked on as a providential arrangement.

Against the flame jets the only defence was
to avoid them, which was not always possible.
But fortunately they were very local in their
effects, and had also the disadvantage of
destroying the wooden revetments of trenches
(planks, brushwood, gabions, or hurdles), and
therefore making it difficult for the Germans to
occupy them. On the defensive, to stop an
attack of the Allies, they proved of some utility,
but always had the disadvantage of thoroughly
rousing the temper of the troops against whom
they were employed, with a resulting reluctance
to take prisoners when the German position was
gained.

On May 6 the Anzacs, who had arrived
at the front but a short time previously, had
their first encounter with the Germans. The
latter had sent a reconnoitring party to
penetrate our trenches, which gave them
the desired opportunity. Kor did they wait
on the pure defensive. On the contrary, when
they saw the Germans approaching, and
that they were within a short distance of their
trench, they rushed over the parapet bayonet
in hand to meet them. A fierce hand-to-hand
conflict took place, in which the Germans were
pressed back ; reinforcements were sent up to
help them, and the Australians were also
strengthened. Once more the two sides came to
handy -strokes, and again our men, plying bomb
and bayonet, drove back their opponents with
substantial losses in killed and wounded. It was
a pretty little fight, one in which the Anzacs
showed their mettle, and for which they deserved
good credit. Thus, within a fortnight of their
landing in France they had got their hearts'
desire, and had showed the Germans what they
could do with them. The change from the
trying conditions of Gallipoli or the great heat
of Egypt was an agreeable one, and they
thoroughly appreciated it.

The fighting went on continuously in the
Argonne and Champagne region, and at many
little points the French had straightened their
line. One of these incidents may here be
rlescribed. The Germans at the particular point
held a position of vantage which was a source of
considerable annoyance to the opposing French
( rench only some ten yards distant from it. As
a preliminary the French infantry were quietly
withdrawn unperceived by their opponents.
The retirement was necessary because otherwise
the French shells might have struck their own

men. Once it was accomplished, the French
proceeded to overwhelm the Germans with a
storm of 15 cm. (6 in.) shells. These heavy
projectiles pulverized the selected point while a
number of 75 cm. field guns cut off access to it
from either side by barrier fire. The operation
was completely successful, the French infantry
advanced and overpowered the defenders
without difficulty, and then set hard to work
to reconstruct the enemy's position and connect
it with their own front line. Curious to relate,
this was acquiesced in by the Germans without
any attempt to reconquer it.

On May 14 there was a renewal of activity
against the British during the evening and

AN IRISH V.C
Private Morrow, 1st Royal Fusiliers.

night between Loos and the Bethune-La
Bassee Canal. To the east of the former
place the enemy selected a small secticn
of our trenches for a particularly severe
bombardment, and a party of their infantry
succeeded in entering it, but was not able to
make good its footing. On our side, the German
trenches near the Hohenzollern redoubt were
severely bombarded, as were those north and
just south of the canal. The enemy sprang a
mine 25 yards from our trenches and seized the
crater, but after a short dose of shells from the
British trench mortars our infantry captured
it, driving back its garrison. This was about the
only infantry fighting. Both sides exploded

109—2

16fi

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

BRITISH HEAVY GUN READY FOR ACTION.

mines near Hulluch, and our artillery fired with
success on the enemy's posts opposite Fauquis-
sart, and silenced his trench mortars near
St. Eloi. While this was going on the German
artillery plastered their shells on the English
position with a stern disregard of the results of
their fire. Thus the ruined villages of Souchez,
Ablain, St. Nazaire and Neuville St. Vaast all
received a great deal of useless attention.

On the night of May 15, on the Vimy Ridge,
the Lancashire troops, including the Loyal North
Lancasliire and the Lancashire Fusiliers, with
whom were a company of Royal Engineers and
some Welsh Pioneers, who rendered most
valuable assistance in the assault, advanced
and seized the enemy's forward line over a
length of 250 yards, and inflicted considerable
loss on the Germans.* The Yimy Heights
were important to the Allies, as the\' domi-
nated the ground to the east of them over
which we should have to pass in any future
advance, f

This attack was the first serious offensive
movement against the Ridge since the portion
of the old French line at this part had been
taken over by the British. The enemy here
occupied a series of craters, six in number, in
two groups of three, separated from each other
by an interval of 40 yards. The craters formed

* This appears to be a moderate estimate ; some
observers rate the length at 360 yards.

f It will be remembered that at the Battle of Loos the
French made a great effort to secure this ground, but
failed io do so.

a curve convex to the trench held by our troops.
Frcm them a powerful fire could be brought to
bear on our line, which was dominated, while
they also facilitated the observation of our
trenches, and it was, therefore, desirable to
turn the Germans out of them.

For the two previous days the weather had
been wet and cloudy, so that the enemy could
see but little of our preparations. Among
these were two series of nines, one directed
against the left group of the German craters,
the other against the right. At the determined
moment our heavy artillery deluged the
Ceiman position with powerful shells to send
the Germans back into their dug-outs, and then
our two groups of mines were fired in suc-
cession, throwing dead and living up into the
air. The explosions blew up four out of the
six German craters, and knocked out a
maclmie-gun which had been very destructive
to us. On the German left there was, however,
still one crater untouched, and against this
went forward the Loyal North Lancashires.
The German energies had already been shat-
tered by the explosion so close to them, and
our men had little trouble in seizing the
position, and disposing of its garrison. At
once, aided by the working parties and the
Sappers, they set to work to occupy the crater
lip, and to dig back communication trenches
from it.

Simultaneously with the Loya! North Lanca-
shires the Lancasliire Fusiliers had advanced

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

167

to assault the right group of craters and the
interval of open ground between this and the
others, and they, too, were successful. Lights
went up from the German side, and then their
gunners began to overwhelm the position just
won with every species of projectile. But
the men of the Red Rose held firm to the
position they had gained, and reinforcements
of men and bombs were sent up to aid them.
By 9.30 p.m., one hour only after the attack
began, the whole five Geiman craters, or what
had been Geiman craters, were occupied by
our troops. The scene was one of cruel anguish,
for many of the troops, both British and Ger-
man, were half -buried beneath the mass of
earth which our guns and mines had thrown
iip. We offered to cease fire if the Germans
would do the same, so that the wounded might
be rescued, but the only reply was a volley of
bombs. The fighting and the working, there-
fore, went on, and our men managed to con-
solidate their position and hold it.

On May 16, in the Champagne, the Germans
tried to surprise a French post near Mesnil,
but were driven off by bombs. In the Argonne
there was a heavy artillery contest near the
Four-de-Paris, the Courtes Chaussees, and
Vauquois. Two raiding parties of Seaforth
Highlanders entered tho Geiman trenches
north of Roclincourt and succeeded in killing
many of the enemy and in bombing three

dug-outs, one of which was blown up. Our
own casualties were slight, and both parties
returned safely to the trenches.

Opposite Auchy a patrol raided the enemy's
trenches, which had been disturbed by a mine
explosion, and penetrated towards the second
line, exchanging some bombs with it.

On May 17-19 the usual artillery and trench-
mortar actions took place along the British
front. The Germans exploded a mine
south-east of Roclincourt, but we seized the
near edge of the crater ; on the other hand,
we fired a mine near Calonne, and effectively
bombarded the enemy's position there. In
the Western Argonne the Germans sprang
a mine and tried to seize a salient near St.
Hubert, but were stopped by curtain fire.

On Saturday, May 20, the enemy, after a
heavy bombardment, raided our line to the
south-west of Loos. For a time he managed
to seize our front trench, but was quickly
driven out again, and on the Vimy Ridge the
Loyal North Lancashire R,egiment recaptured a
crater which the enemy had taken on the 18th ;
we also blew up a mine near Hulluch and
occupied the crater.

In Lorraine the Geimms succeeded in pene-
trating one of the French trenches to the west
of Chazelles after a violent bombardment, but
tho artillery and machine-gun fire soon obliged
the Germans to evacuate the position.

READY FOR ACTION.

A British heavy howitzer on a railway mounting.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAN.

On May 21 the Germans determined to
recapture the position at the north end of the
Vimy Ridge. After a heavy bombardment,
which lasted well on into the afternoon, their
infantry came on and succeeded in penetrating
our front line of trenches on a front of 1,500
yards, and a deptli of 100 to 300 yards.
According to the Germans, several lines of the
British position over a length of a mile and a
quarter were captured, and during the night
counter-attacks were repulsed and 8 officers
and 220 men, with 4 macliine-guns and 3 trench-
mortars were taken. On the next day our
guns, in their turn, subjected the enemy to a
heavy bombardment, but nothing more was
done. We again sjjrang mines near Roclin-
eourt, the Hohenzollern Redoubt and the
Quarries, while vigorous mining was carried on
near Neuville St. Vaast and south of Fleur-
baix. There was also considerable artillery
tiring at Loos and east of Ypres.

May 24 being Empire Day, the following
telegram was sent to the King by General Sir
Douglas Haig :

" On Empire Day, on behalf of your Majesty's
Armies now in France, representative of every
part of your Majesty's Dominions, I respect-
fully submit the assurance of our loyal devotion
to your Majesty and to the principles of free-
dom and justice which are symbolized for us
by the Crown and flag of the British Empire."
His Majesty replied as follows :

" I warmly appreciate the assurances of
loyal devotion which you send me to-day in
the name of the Armies of the British Empire
serving under your command. Tell them
with what pride and interest I follow their
fortunes and of my confidence that success
will crown their efforts. May the comrade
ship of the battlefield knit still closer together
the peoples of the Dominions and Mother
Country in the age of peace which, please
God. will be the fruit of this long and arduous
war.

" George, R.I."
In his reply to an Empire Day message of
congratulation and goodwill from President
Poincare the King expressed his confidence in
the victory of the Allies, and declared the
solidarity of all his Empire with the noble
French nation.

During May 27 the British bombarded the
enemy's trenches to the south-east of Neuve
Chapelle, and destroyed some stores at Guille-
innnt. The enemy for their part directed a

heavy bombardment lasting 20 minutes west of
Fricourt, and then about Serre. The British
sprang five mines, three about Hulluch and two
south-east of Cuinchy. The enemy also ex-
ploded one near the Hohenzollern Redoubt and
another on the Vimy Ridge, of which our troops
occupied the crater. On the whole the Germans
displayed rather more activity than during the
previous few days and expended a large
amount of ammunition, and the enemy's mines
south-east of Neuville St. Vaast, south of Loos
and east of Souchez, did some damage to the
British trenches, but inflicted no casualties.

On May 28 there was considerable activity in
Alsace, when the Germans attempted to push
home an attack on Belschweiller (north-west of
Altkirch), but it was stopped by the French
fire, and in Champagne the French guns blew
up an ammunition depot in the region of Ville-
sur-Turbe.

On May 28 and 29 the German artillery
delivered a heavy but intermittent fire against
the British front between the La Bassee Canal
and Arras, against our trenches near Loos, and
as far north as Neuville St. Vaast. On our right
the re-entrant in our line about Mametz and
Fricourt also formed a target for German artil-
lery fire, and from Zillebeke to Hooge and near
Elverdinger the British position was also
shelled. By way of reply our artillery breached
the hostile parapet just north of Hooge and
destroyed a machine-gun emplacement, and
generally along the whole line our guns did
considerable damage to the enemy's works, as
well as to the hostile batteries. There was no
infantry activity.

On May 30 the enemy continued his general
bombardment. That about Neuve Chapelle
was particularly heavy. It lasted for 80
minutes, and was followed by an infantry attack
which penetrated our trenches, and took some
of our men prisoners. A counter movement
drove the Germans back. The Germans sprang
a mine north of Bethune, and our troops occu-
pied the near lip of the crater. There wa.s also
some mining activity near Loos.

On May 31 the artillery duel went on unin-
terruptedly. British and German guns of all
calibres were engaged near the Vimy Ridge, and
from time to time the fire became intense. The
activity of the guns extended also, in a lesser
degree, northwards in the direction of Loos
and near Ypres, and also near the Somme the
same occurred, but beyond this there was no

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

169

•#j£*

A MISSILE USED IN

The rifle-grenade about to

It will be remembered that round Ypres
there had already been two severe battles. The
first lasted from October 20 until November 11,
1914, the second April 22-May 13, 1915.
On June 2, 1916, a series of engagements com-
menced which may be fittingly described as
the third battle. The ground over which the
battle was fought was roughly confined between
the Ypres -Menin road and the Ypres-Comines
canal. It was in the main an open, rolling

TRENCH FIGHTING,
leave the rifle (on left).

country with no very pronounced feature ;
but the culminating portion of the ridge which
swept round Ypres had an average height of
about 120 feet, above that town and was of
sufficient elevation to make its possession of
importance to the British, for it overlooked the
ground in front of it. Equally was it desirable
to the Germans, because if our line were forced
back here it would be difficult to construct n
continuous barrier behind it, and Ypres would

170

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

,,,«, ^-u Polygon t
■gNopne / r<,"-
Bosche. T'£

Zandvoorde

rale of One Mile ^M§

Heights rnMetres

THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES.

have fallen into the enemy's hands. It must
not be forgotten that our trenches in " the
Ypres salient " had all the disadvantages
which that geometrical form possesses, in the
liability of the flanks to enfilade fire ; but still
the possession of Ypres was considered to
be of sufficient importance to justify hanging
on to it, because if it fell into German hands
it would have been necessary to draw back
our front line of trenches, both north and
south of it, for some considerable distance.
North of Hooge was Bellcwarde Farm, a mass
of ruins, while to the right of it might be seen
the German lines behind their wire entangle-
ments. Hooge and the trees round it existed
no more, but the Sanctuary Wood and the
copses along the main ridge running south
from Hooge to Zwartelen and Hill 60 still
afforded cover. From Hill 60 to the canal
the ground slopes gently downward. From the
hill, and running in a north-easterly direction
parallel with the railway, is a minor spur, at
first fairlv flat and then descending more
abruptly to Zillebeke and the lake to the west
of it, which is 110 feet below the main crest.
This spur afforded a secondary position for
the British, secured on its left flank by the
Jake, but sormwhat open to enfilade on the

right. Plainly, for the reasons given above,
the line frcm Bellcwarde to Hill 60 was of
great tactical importance for the British to
stop an advance on Ypres, for the Ceimins to
commmd the ground which led to that ruined
city. Tho German attack was delivered against
our front between Hooge and the neighbour-
hood of Hill 60, Zwartelen.

At 9.15 a.m. on June 2 the enemy's gun-
fire reached an intense development, which
was continued without intermission until
noon. It was directed not only against
the front line of trenches, but the ruined
village of Hooge was especially favoured,
also the ground behind, j'^rticularly towards
Zillobeke and Ypres, forming a barrage to
prevent reinforcements being sent to our men.
Although the British gunners replied to this
they were unable to subdue the fire of the
enemy, which seriously damaged our trenches
and the communications to the rear. The
Canadians, who garrisoned this part of the
position with British divisions to the north of
them, fought well and stood the pounding
without flinching, although their losses were
heavy. Their troops included the Canadian
Mounted Rifles, the Royal Canadian Regiment,
Princess Patricia's Light Infantry, and Canadian

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

171

infantry from all parts of the Dominions. 01
these the Patricia's, with some battalions of the
Royal Canadian Regiment, held the northern
end of the line south of Hooge and in the
Sanctuary Wood. More to the south were the
Canadian Mounted Rifles and various other
units.

Shortly before one o'clock the artillery fire
against our front line was lifted and used to
form a barrier to prevent reinforcements coming
up. Masses of hostile infantry, nine or ten batta-
lions, were now seen approachirg it on a front
of less than two miles, crossing the intervening
paces between the two lines, which was often
not more than 100 yards wide. By half-past two
the enemy had succeeded in penetrating the
front line at many points, as he greatly out-
numbered the defenders. A desperate hand-
to-hand struggle took place, which was parti-
cularly fierce in the neighbourhood of Sanctuary
Wood and on the rising ground a little to the
north of Hill CO, many of the Canadians refusing
to yield to superior numbers, and preferring
death to surrender. But the enemy gradu-
ally overpowered the brave defenders, and
during the afternoon our troops fell back to
a position about 1,000 yards in rear of the
original line.

In the wood, and in Maple Copse close to it,

it wn a fight to the death Twice were the
assailants driven back with heavy loss Rein-
f orcein mts were brought up but suffered
severely from the enemy's barrier fire. During
the night the action was not so intense, but
parties of the enemy penetrated to a depth of
some 700 yards in the direction of Zillebeke,
and here and there infantry encounters
took place, while the artillery on both sides
continued in action. That of the British
gradually increased in vigour during the early
morning.

The position the Germans had gained afforded
them very little defensive capability, for it had
been destroyed by the previous artillery fire
which they had directed against it, and which
our men had withstood for 24 hours before they
fell back. Our guns also executed barrier fire to
prevent further reinforcements from reaching
the enemy. At 7 o'clock in the morning
the Canadian counter-attack commenced. By
about 8.30 they had driven back the German
centre and penetrated the lost trench at several
important points. Thus near Hooge a long
stretch was carried at the first attempt, and
in a more southerly direction in the middle of
the disputed line and at two or three points
lower down the Canadians won a footing, and
then proceeded systematically to bomb their

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THE TIA1ES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

173

way right and left until the whole of the trench
had been recovered, including the high ground a
little to the north of Hill CO. The advance was
very difficult, especially on the right, as the
attackers were taken in reverse by machine-
gun fire and suffered from a murderous artillery
bombardment, and this prevented them holding
on to the ground they had regained. Still the
outcome of the counter-attack was that part of
the Germans, especially in the centre of the
ground they had captured, were pushed back
and the limit of their advance was reduced to
some 350 yards. Our troops proceeded to
throw up cover in the new position. This
was concave to the salient position we had
previously held, the left horn resting on the
old trench about 1,000 yards south of Hooge,
while the right was on a point 800 yards north-
east of HOI 60. The German attack was in
the nature of a surprise, and they managed to
capture Major-General Mercer and Brigadier-
General Williams of the 3rd Canadian Division,
who were inspecting the front trenches at the
time of the assault. According to German
accounts the former violently resisted capture
and struck a sergeant across the face with his
sword. He was then bayoneted and died of
his wound. The losses of the Canadians were
severe, especially during the commencing
defensive of the battle, but the Germans in their
alternative roles of assailant and defender also
suffered heavily.

On June 4 there was no material change in
the situation ; we maintained the recaptured
ground and the fighting was limited to the
artillery.

The next day the lull in the infantry opera-
tions continued, though the artillery was still
very active on both sides. On June 6 the Ger-
mans directed a heavy bombardment to the
north and south of Hooge and also towards
Ypres-Comines railway and canal. Between
3 and 4.30 p.m. the enemy sprang a series of
mines over a front of 2,000 yards to the north of
Hooge and he succeeded in capturing the front
trench of the British position where it passed
through the village. Attempts against other
portions of the line farther north were repulsed
by the British holding, There was also
another attack directed against our trenches
west of Hooge ; but thereafter the struggle
died down again into an intermittent artillery
fire only-

The fight now became of normal and
quieter character, chiefly artillery fire and

occasional small raids of no very great import-
ance ; but on the 10th the German bombard-
ment against our Ypres position became mucfl
more violent, our trenches north of the Ypres-
Comines railway, between the hours of 1 and
3 p.m., being severely punished, as was the
ground we held south of Hooge ; but there were
no infantry engagements. The next day,
Sunday, June 11, during the morning, there was
a further bombardment of Ypres and the ground
to the south of it, also of our trenches north of
the Menin road, while in the afternoon the
main attention of the enemy's guns was directed
against the Canadian position from Hill 60 to
the north for a distance of 1,500 vards. But

IN THE TRENCHES.

An Australian amusing himself with a toy

aeroplane.

again there were no infantry attacks of import-
ance.

Monday, June 12, was an uneventful day,
with only a heavy bombardment between
Hill 60 and Hooge by both sides ; but the 13th
saw a vigorous counter-attack delivered by the
Canadians to regain the ground lost on June 2-3.

Our artillery had been very active during the
previous days against the part of the enemy's
position selected for assault — viz., that portion
of the ground the enemy had won between
Hill 60 and Hooge, the ridge dominating from
the east the valley down to Zillebeke. From
12.45 p.m. on the 12th it was raised to the
highest possible intensity, and lasted to 1.30 a.m.
on the 13th. The night was very cold, wet and
dark, and indeed the weather for the past week
had been extremely unpropitious. But this had

109—3

174

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

in nowise affected the ardour of the men, who
burned to retake the position they had lost 1(1
days before. At half-past one our fire lifted and
the infantry dashed forward. The enemy poured
out a severe barrier fire to prevent the approach
of our men, but so great was their impetuosity
that they pushed tlirough it and quickly gained
their objective before the .sun rose. The resist-
ance of the Germans was but feeble ; they
seemed thoroughly cowed by the previous
artillery preparation, and groups of them
surrendered at sight, and seemed glad to do so.
Over 150 prisoners were taken. One German
officer who surrendeied with 132 men said:
" I knew how it would be. We had orders to
take this ground and took it, but we knew you
would come back again. You have done so.
So here I am.' * It was plain that our continued

* Daily Telegraph, Juno 16.

SNIPERS ON THE WESTERN FRONT.

Practising.

Circle picture : A Sniper at work.

shell-fire had prevented the enemy from
properly digging himself in and that he could
not hold the line effectually. At one point he
had even failed to discover certain stores and
ammunition hastily covered in by the Canadians
before their retreat.

Oiir men at once set about consolidating
their position and, although subjected to very
heavy artillery fire during the next 24 hours,
clung bravely to the position they had gained.
Once the enemy massed his infantry for attack,
but it was met by such a hail of fire from
our guns thai no attempt to advance was
made.

The advance of the main attack had been
much facilitated by two flank attacks or raids,
one on the left by British troops against the Ger-
man trenches north of Hooge, and another, on the
right, made by the Anzaes. These were covered
by gas to cause the enemy to believe they were
serious, and both were successful and with slight
loss. They served to prevent the concentration
of more German infantry and to safeguard the
Canadian assault from flank attack.

Particular interest attached to certain docu-
ments belonging to a German Grenadier Regi-
ment that were captured in the Ypres salient
by the Canadians during the course of their
successful counter-attack of June 13.

Stress is laid in these documents upon the
necessity to collect all the debris after a fight.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

175

It is urgently enjoined that search shall
invariably be made for the recovery of

" boots of all lands, all sorts of weapons and
parts of them, entrenching tools, steel
helmets, leather equipment, pouches, all kinds
of weapons for close fighting, belts, tents,
material of all kinds, haversacks, tunics,
trousers, and sandbags. These goods are of
most decisive importance to the final success
of our great cause."

This did not sound as if the Germans were
too well provided with equipment. This was
emphasized by the instruction " The enemy's
dead will be divested of articles of woollen
clothing and boots." Special instructions are
given to guard against the deterioration of
German fighting material :

" This must be brought back from the first
position and its communication trenches as
soon as possible. The exceeding disorder of
the second line must be at once thoroughly
cleaned up."

One sentence conveys what the Germans
really thought of the men opposite to them in
the Ypres salient more eloquently than even a
column of typical Teutonic abuse : " In view
of the enemy's characteristics, we have to
expect a strong attack at any time."

Six days after this opinion was written down
the attack came in good sooth, with the result
already described.

June 15 was marked by no special activity.
The artillery fire continued on both sides, but
there were no infantry actions. Nor were any
further serious attempts made to turn us out of
the position gained during the remainder of the
month. Artillery fire there was, and some small
minor operations, but no serious effort to dispute
our position.

Let us now return to the southern end of the
British line. The principal efforts during June 7
were made by the enemy against the sector
comprised between the Vimy Ridge and the
La Bassee Canal. The artillery fire was active
and several mines were exploded. Near the
Hohenzollern Redoubt we sprang a mine which
laid bare the hostile defences and enabled our
snipers to shoot down nine of the defenders. At
Souchez our artillery did good work, and just
south of the canal a successful raid drove out
the Germans from one of their trenches and
inflicted considerable loss on them. At this
southern end of our position, just as at Ypres,
after June 13 the fighting, while costing us

considerable losses, was not productive of any
great tactical results.

When, so to say, two hostile forces engage
one another at very short distances, often not
twice the length of a cricket pitch apart and
rarely over 100 yards, it is plain that
daily casualties must be incurred on no light
scale, and it speaks volumes for the troops on
either side that they stood this ever-present
danger without flinching. By this period,
however, we had attained a superiority in
artillery, and from time to time overwhelmed
the Germans at points where we wished to
press forward. Then it was usually found, as in
the case of the Canadian counter-attack from
Hooge to Hill 60, that the Germans were
shattered morally as well as physically. In
the ordinary routine of reciprocal shell and
trench-mortar fire, of sniping and patrolling,
they still maintained their reputation. But it
became clearer and more clear as the result of
our experience, both in raids and larger attacks,
that they did not relish the close-quarter
combat with bomb and bayonet.

To these methods of destruction were added
the constant danger from mines, which were
used by both sides to an extent hitherto
undreamt of in battle fighting.

On the early morning of June 22 the Germans
sprang a very large mine in the neighbourhood
of Givenchy, j ust north of the La Bassee Canal.
This they followed with a heavy barrage fire
behind the British line, under cover of which
they penetrated our front on a narrow space.
The Welsh Fusiliers were guarding this part
of the line, and were deceived by the calm into
thinking the Germans had no intention of dis-
turbing the quietude of the locality. Suddenly
there was a terrible roar, the earth opened,
and a huge mass of timber, soil and sandbags
was upheaved and fell back with a crash into
a vast crater, 120 feet across, and the trenches
in its neighbourhood, destroying the parapets
and replacing the well-ordered constructions
by a cleared space and a deep pit. Then
came the hostile artillery fire, pounding the
position and seeking by a veil of shells to cut
off all access to it. It was followed by three
distinct assaulting parties, who rushed forward
to occupy the mine-pit. But the Welshmen
were equal to the situation. Some had been
blown up, others dazed by the shock, yet
right and left of the riven ground there were
others eager for revenge. They closed on the
flanks of the raiding party and drove them

176

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

177

IMMELMANN.

The German airman, killed in June,

1916.

LIEUT. MCCUBBIN.
Who brought down Immelmann

back, fighting hard, into the crater, out of it,
and back to their own trenches. The Germans
had captured a machine gun and tried to take it
with them, but the men dragging it were all shot
down, and after lying in the open till Saturday
morning it was recovered by the Fusiliers.

A pleasant incident in this little fight was
the gallant conduct of a pioneer battalion
working in the vicinity. The men rushed
forward with their spades and dealt shrewd
blows with them on the astonished Germans.

During the night of June 24-25 there was
an attempted raid by the enemy on our trenches
north-east of Loos, which was easily driven
back. All day long on the 25th our artillery
were very active along the whole front, and at
places there were considerable replies by the
enemy, who also exploded four mines — two
opposite Hullueh, one south of the Bethune-
La Bassee line, and one north of Neuve Chapelle.
None of them caused any casualties ; nor did
one sprung on the 24th near the Hohenzollern
Redoubt. On the other hand, we destroyed
six kite balloons out of 15 which we at-
tacked.

On the night of the 25th-26th we executed
ten successful raids, which inflicted considerable
loss on the enemy, who also lost prisoners
while our casualties were slight. Our artillery,
too, fired with great effect, damaging the hostile
lines in many places, and causing four heavy
explosions among the rearward part of the
German position.

The preparatory bombardment of the enemy
to pave the way for the great advance of July

BOELCKE.

The German airman, who claimed

his nineteenth victory, June, 1916.

had begun. From Ypres to the Somme his
position was subjected to a hail of projectiles,
generally distributed, but also concentrated at
various points, so as to leave the enemy in
doubt as to where the attack, which he quite
appreciated was coming, would really be
delivered. The German reply, except for short
intervals and against a few places, was feeble
and ineffectual.

Our fire was one of pure devastation intended
to destroy the Germans, their batteries and
trench defences, blow up their ammunition
depots, and bombard far back their resting
places and lines of communication. This was
all effectively done. Nor was the infantry
idle. Raids were made on the enemy's
trenches, inflicting heavy losses on him, but
with few casualties to ourselves. Some of
these attacks were covered by gas, and at one
place where this had been employed the trenches
when entered by our men were full of German
dead. No less than a dozen successful raids were
made by our men on June 28-29, in which the
Liverpool Regiment, the Lancashire Fusiliers,
the Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry, the
Highland Light Infantry, and the Australians
all took part.

The prologue of the play was coming to an
end, and in a couple of days the grand drama
would commence. All this time the battle raged
round Verdun and in the Champagne. Further
away, in Alsace, there had been more or less
continuous fighting. The German was every-
where held ; the Allies were about to begin their
offensive.

O «
H 2

Z f,

J3
= If

H x

178

CHAPTER CXLII.

THE WORK OF THE Y.M.C.A.

Work fob Territorials and Volunteers in Peace Time — Beginnings of the War Work —
Origin of the Y.M.C.A. — Training Camps — Marquees and Huts — The Y.M.C.A. in France —
Hostels for Soldiers' Relatives — Railway Station Work — The Shakespeare Hut — Estab-
lishments in London — Work for the Navy — H.M.S. Crystal Palace — Munition Workers —
Troops from the Dominions — The Y.M.C.A. in India.

SIR GEORGE WILLIAMS, the Founder
of the Young Men's Christian Associa-
tion, took a keen interest during the
closing days of his life in the experiment
made by one of its auxiliaries at the time of the
South African War. This included the provision
of marquees for the use of the troops as reading,
writing and recreation centres, and also as
meeting places for religious services. It was
thus that the National Council of Y.M.C.A. 's
entered upon its first comiexion with the soldier
in actual warfare, and the modest beginning
proved a great success Before this period the
Association had established relations with the
Volunteers, and then later with the Territorials,
during their fortnight's training in camp, by
setting up its marquee equipment in the centres
marked out for summer training camps and
providing a place where the men could write
their letters — usually it was the official post
office — and purchase tea, coffee and light
refreshments.

When the war began these two experiences
decided the Y.M.C.A to prepare similar services
for the new Army. It had the machinery ready
and its work with the Volunteers and Terri-
torials inspired confidence as to the results.
Mr. A. K. Yapp, the General Secretary of the
National Council of Y.M.C.A.'s, suggested an
immediate appeal for £25,000. The appeal was
launched by a special War Work Committee,

of which Sir Thomas Sturmey Cave was chair-
man, Mr. A. K. Yapp secretary, and Mr. F. J.
Chamberlain assistant secretary. Somewhat
later Sir Henry E. Procter became acting
treasurer. In a few weeks' time the £25,000
appeared to be totally inadequate and another
£25,000 was required immediately. Before this
second amount was received it was seen that
even £50,000 would not meet the demands which
poured in from all parts of the United Kingdom.
Extensions often proceeded before the money
was in hand, owing to the urgent character of
the work, but in the first two years of war the
subscriptions amounted to £830,000 — a total
which included donations from the King and
Queen, Queen Alexandra, and other members of
the Royal Family, as well as gifts from rich and
poor alike. As the war advanced many gifts
were made in order to perpetuate the memory
of sons and brothers, and in France, at home,
and elsewhere there soon were many memorial
huts. Children in the elementary schools raised
over £16,000 by gifts from many thousands of
schools. Harrow in the second year of war gave
a complete building, and other public schools
rendered help in a most generous spirit. Livery
companies and railway, banking and commercial
undertakings added their share to the funds,
while humbler people brought their shillings.

To appreciate the significance of this assist-
ance, the beginnings of the Y.M.C.A. have to

179

180

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

A HUT FOR SOLDIERS AND SAILORS.

The Duchess of Argyll opening the Rest and Refreshment Hut at King's Cross.

Left to right : Duchess of Argyll, Major-General Sir Francis Lloyd, Mrs. Joy and Mr. Alexander Joy,

the donors of the Hut.

be remembered. The movement, as originally
started in England — from whence it spread
throughout the world — came from an evan-
gelical source. Its creed of membership con-
tained evangelical doctrine, and the Paris Con-
ference which determined its international
character set forth the following basis :

The Young Men's Christian Associations seek to
unite those young men who, regarding Jesus Christ as
their God and Saviour according to the Holy Scriptures,
desire to be His disciples in their doctrine and in their
life, and to associate their efforts for the extension of
His Kingdom among young men.

The founders were good men, for the greater
part trained in a somewhat narrow mould. At
the commencement, in 1844, the object was
described as " the improvement of the spiritual
condition of young men engaged in the drapery
and other trades by the introduction of
religious services among them." Membership
was confined to those possessing a definite
religious experience. One of the rules stipulated
" that no person shall be considered a member
of this Association unless he be a member of a
Christian Church, or there be sufficient evidence
of his being a converted character." In the
early 'sixties a severe rebuke was administered
to Archbishop Trench and Dr. Dale, the well-
known evangelical theologian of Birmingham,
because they had " trailed their Christian
priesthood in the dust to offer homage at the

shrine of a dead playwright " at the Shake-
speare tercentenary celebrations. There was
also a reference to " the oratorio of the ' Messiah '
wherein, as John Newton once said, roughly
but pointedly, " the Redeemer's agonies are
illustrated on catgut.' Masquerade and sermon,
pageant and oratorio ! — it is very mournful."
Nevertheless, and largely owing to the indomit-
able enthusiasm of the founder, Sir George
Williams, the branches increased at home, in
France, and other parts of the Continent, and
eventually in the United States and our Over-
seas Dominions. Its social features were
developed cautiously — if not jealously — because
its leaders feared that the religious side of the
work might be jeopardized. Smoking was
prohibited in Y.MG.A. buildings and the
members were advised to abstain from athletic
contests. Naturally such points were criticized
by the younger men who gradually came into
their own on the committees, and presently a
broader and more catholic policy found expres-
sion. According to current opinion, the Asso-
ciation created a particular type of young man
supposed to be addicted to personal introspec-
tion and lacking virility and commonsense. In
some quarters the Y.M.C.A. provoked satire
and derision, and in both Church of England and
Nonconformist circles there did not appear
that measure of cooperation that might

THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR.

181

have been expected. The general situation with
respect to the establishment and progress of the
Y.M.C.A. and its limitations up to the time of
the war need to be remembered in connexion
with what was afterwards accomplished.

Neither barracks nor temporary buildings
were sufficient at first to house the hundreds
of thousands of recruits who joined the new
armies. Away on lonely commons, under
canvas, in barns, halls and schools, billeted in
private houses, or in many cases occupying
empty ones — often without beds, blankets,
chairs, forms or tables — their accommodation
taxed all resources to the breaking point.
Moreover, coming straight from civilian life,
many from middle-class families, the men found
the social amenities in camp less than those
usually enjoyed by the soldier in barracks.
It was at this point that the Y.M.C.A. came
to the assistance of the New Army. The
methods adopted appeared exceedingly simple.
In the early days of the war marquees were
erected in every camp to which commanding
officers gave permission. Tea, coffee and re-
freshments were supplied during the soldier's
off-duty hours. He could obtain an early cup
of tea before going on duty at six o'clock on an

autumn morning, and when he returned after a
night march he usually found hot refreshments
before he turned in for the night. Cigarettes,
matches, boot-laces, buttons and other sundries
could be obtained at the Y.M.C.A. counter.
The Association never coveted the position of
haberdasher and tobacconist to the troops, but
when the camp was situated miles away from
a town the soldier appreciated this service.

Concerned with the social benefit of the
soldier the leaders did not disguise their defi
nitely religious objects when they undertook
this war work. They appreciated the fact,
however, that religion cannot be forced on men.
They did not therefore attempt either religious
button-holing or cross-examination. An un-
denominational service was arranged on Sun-
day evenings, but in the mornings the marquee
could be used by Church of England. Roman or
Free Church chaplains. This hospitality on
the part of a religious organization with deeply
embedded Protestant traditions received grate-
ful thanks in due course from Cardinal Bourne
and from the Rev. M. Adler, the chief Jewish
chaplain.

At the start the service of nearly every
available Y.M.C.A. official in the country was

INSIDE A HUT AT WIMBLEDON CAMP.
Soldiers writing to their friends.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

requisitioned. So great was the pressure
owing to the rapid extension of the agencies
that the leaders gladly availed themselves of
the help of teachers, undergraduates and
others who were free from their ordinary
duties during the holiday period that followed
the outbreak of the war. Some mistakes
occurred here and there, and men unfitted by
temperament and lack of knowledge for such
positions were found in places of trust, but on
the whole these instances were comparatively
few. The enthusiasm of the undertaking and
the splendid spirit of the new Army carried the
helpers along, and it was not unusual for them
to keep at their duties in the marquees during
16 or 18 hours of every day in the week.

From the first the work won the approval of
the Army authorities. They smoothed away
difficulties, provided facilities for transport,
and detailed orderlies for pitching the marquees
and other heavy work. The marquees were
usually within the camp boundaries, and be-
came a part of the life of the camp. This
recognition by the military authorities proved
a great asset.

The winter of 1914 settled the policy of the
Y.M.C.A. A brilliant autumn was followed by

an exceptionally wet winter. Even high and
exposed country like Salisbury Plain resembled
a morass, while the roads in the district were
covered with water four or five inches deep.
The autumnal gales wrecked scores of marquees,
and it became necessary, instead of the mar-
quees, which were comparatively cheap and
portable, to embark on the erection of huts,
costing on an average £600 to £700. Some of
the first to be erected accommodated the Cana-
dian troops just arrived in England. Many
improvements were subsequently made in the
interior arrangements of the huts. An audi-
torium was provided at Crowborough. for
example, to seat 2,000 men. Satisfactory
cooking arrangements were possible in the
hut, which enabled the helpers to prepare
more expeditiously the hot refreshments re-
quired by the men. In large camps a double
hut was built, which contained a special room
for concerts, lectures and services apart from
the common room used for games, correspon-
dence, and the serving of refreshments from the
counter.

In addition to marquees and huts, public
halls, mission rooms and other suitable build-
ings were hired in centres occupied by thousands

DINING HALL AND RECREATION ROOM FOR SHELL-MAKEKS AT WOOLWICH.

Munition workers going to dinner.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

jR3

FOR CIVILIANS AND SERVICE MEN.

Mr. Lloyd George visits the dining-room for mun
tion workers at Ponder's End, while Mrs. Llovd
George (smaller picture) distributes chocolates and
cigarettes to soldiers at the Temperance Hut at
Hampstead Heath.

of troops. One of the most notable enter-
prises was the transformation of a huge shell -
like building in the White City at Shepherd's
Bush, formerly occupied by Bostock's menagerie,
for the use of 10,000 Territorials in training
there during the winter of 1914. The usual
activities were here supplemented by the estab-
lishment of a lending library and the organization
of war lectures. Both agencies justified them-
selves, and as tho war progressed this depart-
ment received increasing attention not only at
home, but, as will be shown later, in the British
camps overseas.

Whether in hut, marquee or elsewhere the
effort was made to provide club facilities.
Apart from the officers' quarters the Y.M.C.A.
centre was the only place that boasted chairs
and tables for the men. The Bishop of London,
one of the few English Bishops who had
practical experience of the camps (having spent
a month under canvas at Crowborough), in
recording his impressions of camp life, stated
that marquees where the men could write
letters home were immensely appreciated, and
that was the reason why the Y.M.C.A. was so
popular with the men. From the commence-

ment notepaper and envelopes were supplied
free, and this distribution involved many million
sheets of paper and envelopes at a considerable
cost.

The soldier's love of music was recognized in
the provision for the Territorial camps. Every
marquee had its piano. A penny edition of
" Camp Songs " sold in hundreds of thousands.
This little book contained a selection of humor-
ous, sentimental and patriotic songs that are
always favourites with men, and proved of
considerable service in promoting the success
of the "sing-song." After a long and tedious
day the camp " sing-song " gave that happy
relief to a large body of men which cannot b">
found in any other way. The "sing-song '
closed a few minutes before the men had to be
in their quarters for the night, and almost

184

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

THE LATE SIR GEORGE WILLIAMS,
Founder of the Y.M.C.A.

invariably the majority remained for a hymn
and short prayer, followed by the National
Anthem. No one was forced to stay, and the
whole service lasted but a few minutes.

Neither at the period of the commencement
of the war nor in its later days were the soldiers,
speaking generally, subject to the conditions of
a religious revival, such as was claimed in
some quarters. They were, however, eager
listeners and interested in unconventional
religious services with plenty of singing.
Here they showed preferences of a striking
character. They loved to sing Dr. Monsell's
" Fight the good Fight," Charles Wesley's
" Sun of my Soul " and Cardinal New-
man's " Lead Kindly Light." The Sunday
evening service was addressed by a chaplain or
one of the Y.M.C.A. helpers, and frequently
when this closed the men continued another
hour singing further hymns. An attempt to
measure the religious influences would be mis-
leading, but thousands of signatures were
secured for the Y.M.C.A. War Roll.

Trained to a strict observance of the Sabbath,
the Y.M.C.A. leaders perforce modified their
opinions and opened the huts and marquees
during the whole of the seven days. The
majority of the centres were not closed, except
at night, from the time they were first
opened. Several huts kept open doors both
night and day. Sunday trading naturally
presented a difficult proposition. Some people
severely criticized the policy adopted, but the
large majority who know the conditions recog-
nized the necessity of the course that was
followed. The Association had to decide
whether the sale of hot refreshments should be
prohibited on Sundays and the men driven to
the wet canteen. Whilst replying in the nega-
tive, they limited Sunday labour as far as
possible and restricted amusements, but neces-
saries could be purchased at the counter as on
other days.

Soon after the war commenced the necessity
became evident of establishing in France
similar agencies for the troops to those that
had been provided at home. Lord French,
then in command of the British Expeditionary
Force, expressed complete sympathy with this
desire though unable owing to the nature of
the military operations to suggest an imme-
diate beginning. By November, 1914, however,
the Y.M.C.A. was permitted to start its work
in some of the base and rest camps as an
experiment, on the implied understanding that
if successful it would be allowed to make
extensions. This cautious policy was probably
wise in the absence of previous experience, for
the fact had to be determined to what extent
voluntary agencies could be associated with
the British Army in the war zone. Many
questions were involved, including the difficul-
ties of transport and the exact relation of a
civilian organization to military discipline
which was necessarily stricter than at home.
The tentative period proved the value of the
work. Writing on November 23, 1915, after a
full year's experience, Viscount French testified
to " the fine work done by the Y.M.C.A."
Continuing he said :

The problem of dealing with conditions, at such a
time, and under existing circumstances, at the rest
camps has always been a most difficult one ; but the
erection of huts by the Young Men's Christian Associa-
tion has made this far easier. The extra comfort
thereby afforded to the men, and the opportunities for
reading and writing, have been of incalculable service,
and I wish to tender to your Association and all those
who have assisted, my most grateful thanks.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

185

The history of European wars contains no
experience similar to that of this large and or-
ganized enterprise for assisting soldiers in the
field with social and religious agencies. Military
commanders naturally placed such efforts
outside their sphere of action, and neither
churches nor other bodies previously realized
the necessity and value of these undertakings.
The Salvation Army and the Church Army
followed the British soldier into France on more
or less similar lines, but the Y.M.C.A. deserves
the honour of the start as well as recognition
for the completeness of its organization.

From November, 1914, the agencies in
France were gradually extended, until by the
time the war had been two years in progress
1 80 centres had been established. The maj ority
of these were huts, built, so far as later editions
were concerned, in 5 ft. sections, so that they
could be easily moved. Various kinds of
buildings were also requisitioned, including
an old church, a convent, a cinema, a winter
garden and theatre, a mayor's parlour, and
farm buildings and structures of various
descriptions, upon all of which the sign of the
Red Triangle was affixed — an indication of a
warm and constant welcome to the British
troops. At the earnest wish of the Y.M.C.A.
leaders, the generals commanding divisions
at length permitted them to go up to villages
where the men in the trenches had their billets.
The Heath Harrison Hut, for instance, was
situated near cross roads 3J or 4 miles from
the German lines and exposed to shell fire.
From early morning until late at night a
continuous queue passed to and from the
refreshment counter, and indicated the benefit
of the place to these trench heroes. Again, the
Threapwood Hut was situated within a mile or

so of the enemy, and before it was destroyed by
the German fire, fifty evidences of the damage
by bursting shell or shrapnel were to be seen
in the building. The safety of the workers
had been ensured to some extent by the pro-
vision of a dug-out by the military authorities,
and when the Germans managed to drop a shell
upon it the leader and his helpers, warned of
the danger, were able to escape.

By permission of Her Majesty, the first
Y.M.C.A. building erected in France was named
the " Queen Mary Hut." This was situated a
short distance from the quay of one of the
French harbours, being largely used by the
men who came from the Port of London
Authority to unload the transports. Though
dressed in khaki, they ranked as non-com-
batants and did the work of ordinary dock
labourers. Hanging in the Queen Mary Hut
was a framed copy of the Queen's letter ex-
pressing warm sympathy with the Y.M.C.A.
work in France. Other members of the Royal
Family exhibited similar interest. Princess
Victoria of Schleswig-Holstein rendered great
service by accepting the post of President of
the Ladies' Auxiliary Committee for the
Y.M.C.A. base camps in France. The Princess
paid visits to France and inspected the whole
of the arrangements in order to effect improve-
ments and modifications. Her committee
collected parcels of comforts, footballs, cricket
sets, musical instruments, and other articles
for the use of the men. The same committee
also organized lady helpers, who gave their
services and thus saved the necessity of em-
ploying men required for the fighting line.
These ladies, to the number of 300, performed
arduous duties in an admirable manner and
to the complete advantage of the work.

MR. J. J. VIRGO,
Field Secretary, Y.M.C.A.

LORD KINNAIRD,

President of the National

Y.M.C.A. Council.

MR. A. K. YAPP,
General Secretary, Y.M.C.A.

ISC,

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

The whole of the operations in France were
controlled on the spot by Mr. Oliver McCowen,
bL.I!.. who was originally V.M.C.A. secretary
in Burmah. He gradually built ' up a large
organization, which by August. l!)l(i, consisted
of a staff of 700 workers. Only a. small pro-
portion were men of military age, for whom
exemption had been claimed, and these
principally took the places of ladies who were
naturally prohibited from serving near the
firing line. Many of Mr McCowen's assis-
tants were active clergy and ministers who
obtained leave of absence lrorn their home
duties. Many well-known people gave their
services for special duties. Professors from the
Universities lectured on war or literary subjects
and found eager audiences. Miss Lena Ashwel!
organized concert parties, which brought keen
enjoyment and pleasure to the men in the
huts and in the hospitals. One and all
roughed it with no thought for the dis-
comforts of wind, rain, and heat, and the
long hours.

The British camps in France not only per-
mitted the usual features of the work at home —
such as the religious services, letter -writing,
games, and " sing-songs " — but afforded many-

interesting additions. When a British battalion
arrived at a French port, tired, unwashed
and unshaven after a rough passage across the
Channel, they found hot refreshments awaiting
their purchase. Wearied by the long journey
over land and sea, they had the chance of a
rest, and relieved their home -sickness — a feeling
common to many lads on first landing on a
foreign soil — by writing home. On such days
thousands of communications passed through
the letter-box.

Under normal conditions a great stream of
men started daily from the trenches on their
seven days' furlough. They arrived at. the
railhead laden with their kit and with the mud
of the trenches thick upon them. Here they
foimd the sign of the Red Triangle and secured
a wash, food and sleep until the leave train
passed on its way. At the principal stopping-
places hot refreshments and other necessaries
could be purchased.

Another boon was a series of hostels for the
use of relatives of wounded soldiers. The
V.M.C.A. gradually increased the number of
these hostels to eight, and further arranged
to meet the soldiers' friends at the boat's side
and motor them direct to the hospital where

A REST HUT IN THE LITTLE THEATRE, ADELPHI.
In the reading and writing room.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR

187

HUTS IN LONDON.

A building in Euston Square erected for soldiers.
Sleeping accommodation was also provided for
twenty-three men. Circle picture : In a rest hut
in the Little Theatre, Adelphi. Bottom picture :
The Dormitory at the Earl Roberts Rest Home,
King's Cross.

their husbands, brothers, or other relatives
were to be found. This assistance was provided
without a penny of charge to friends of non-
commissioned officers and men. A beautiful
villa was rented for the use of officers' relatives,
where similar accommodation was provided at
moderate charges in order to cover the cost.

In various impromptu directions the Y.M.C.A.
rendered acts of kindness to the wounded.
The service shown to the Australians at a
clearing station after one of the " pushes "
supplied an illustration of the help that the
Y.M.C.A. was only too eager to offer :

When we arrived the sight which presented itself to
us beggars description [ivrote a Y.M.C.A. secretary 1.
Hundreds of men were lying about everywhere with
head, leg, and arm wounds, all of which had been
attended to by the medical staff, the work of which is
beyond all praise. The men were now waiting the
arrival of the train which was to convey them to a
hospital outside the range of guns. They were a cheerful
crowd, though bearing the unmistakable marks of battle,
and m-iny of thsm carried trophies captured in the
fight. . . . The men soon recognized and welcomod
the Y.M.C.A,, and we were immediately invited to
write postcards and fill in field cards acquainting the
people at horn^ of the wounds of which all of them
were proud. One of the Australian secretaries hastened
to the Tynemouth hut for cigarettes, as there was a sad
lack of smokes and money in this company of wounded,
heroes. . . . When the train arrived our work was by

188

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

no means finished ; men with leg wounds gladly availed
themselves of the Y.M.C.A. man's shoulder in treading
the painful path to a carriage door. Postcards had to
be written even here on the footboards of the train
and many times a comrade was heard to remark to some
poor fellow who was struggling with a borrowed pencil
and field card, " Oh, there is a Y.M.C.A. man there,
he'll do it for you."

Both the British and the French authorities
gave all possible assistance. The former facili-
tated transport and the latter removed hin-
drances harassing the workers. A French
admiral in charge of a port gave instructions
that the Y.M.C.A. was to be afforded every help
and not to be delayed by restrictions, even
though generally necessary. French sentries
on the roads outside towns became so accus-
tomed to the red triangle on cars that they
rarely demanded the production of cards of
authorization. Those high in authority in
France watched the enterprise with much
interest and commenced in an experimental
manner something similar for their troops. It
should be remembered that the French
Y.M.C.A. carried on a small but excellent work
for the French troops in the Vosges.

When the King was in France he inspected
the Y.M.C.A. huts and expressed his
great pleasure concerning its arrangements.
In a more formal but equally expressive manner
he sent the following message to Lord Kinnaird
on May 26, 1916 : — " His Majesty congratulates
the Association on the successful results of its
war work, which has done everything conducive
to the comfort and well-being of the armies,
supplying the special and peculiar needs of men
drawn from countries so different and so distant.
It has worked in a practical, economical and
unostentatious manner, with consummate know-
ledge of those with whom it has to deal. At
the same time the Association, by its spirit of
discipline, has earned the respect and approba-
tion of the Military Authorities."

If space permitted a story full of daring and
adventure could be told of the Y.M C.A. work
on the shell -strewn shores of Gallipoli, of its
less exciting but equally useful services in
Malta, and of its much-needed help in Mesopo-
tamia and East Africa.

As people realized during the first year of war
that men on furlough arrived home in the early
morning at Victoria laden with their com-
plete kit, and with nowhere to go before the
trains some six to eight hours later conveyed
them to their destination, an immediate demand
arose for more satisfactory arrangements. In
the majority of cases these soldiers lay about

the station precincts or tramped right across
to the northern stations, there to wait until the
morning. The Y.M.C.A. organized a staff of
workers who met the leave trains at Victoria
and conducted the men to a disused brewery in
Westminster, where they could secure bed and
refreshments at moderate charges. The build-
ing did not provide luxurious fittings amidst its
cavernous depths, but served its purpose. The
King permitted the use of the Royal Mews at
Buckingham Palace for the entertainment of the
men. Refreshments were supplied from the
Palace kitchen on arrival, and in the morning,
after a substantial breakfast, the royal carriages
conveyed them to the various railway stations.
The King's practical sympathy encouraged
various developments. The beginnings of this
service in the Metropolis developed into a net-
work of agencies, coordinated in a wise and
statesmanlike manner, in order to cater for the
wants of the incoming and outgoing soldier.
The railway stations became the strategic
points. Not only did the soldier depart from
London, but he arrived there at all hours of the
day and night on his way back to France or the
home camps, and frequently had long and weari-
some intervals between his journeys. To pro-
vide shelter for the thousands of men — sailors
as well as soldiers — using the route to the north,
or vice versa, the first station hut was erected
at Euston on ground placed at the disposal of
the Y.M.C.A. by the directors of the London
and North-Western Railway. This provided
sleeping accommodation at moderate prices,
so that for sixpence a man could obtain a bed
with clean sheets and everything comfortable.
If all the beds were engaged, he could secure
blankets and a shakedown on the floor for two-
pence. In the morning he purchased his food
on an equally economical basis, and the advan-
tages of the club, including books, papers and
writing materials, were open to him without
charge, while for a few pence he could enjoy a
game of billiards. Very often the police
brought in men the worse for drink who were a
danger to themselves and who invited punish-
ment. By tactful handling the Y.M.C.A.
secretary got them to bed, and in the morning
they were sober once again and ashamed of the
trouble they had occasioned. Such services
explained in part the popularity of the Y.M.C.A.
amongst the men.

Similar huts were in due course established
at King's Cross, Victoria, Waterloo, and Pad-
dington. As these buildings increased in num-

An entertainment in a Welsh camp. Smaller picture: At a concert in London.
THE Y.M.C.A. ENTERTAINING TROOPS AT HOME AND ABROAD.

189

190

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

bers, various improvements and additions were
made, such, for instance, as the provision of hot
baths. This boon proved welcome to the soldier
from France who had been subject to insect -
infested billets. Another addition of a prac-
tical character was the annexe erected at Water-
loo for the use of soldiers' wives., who frequently
came to meet their husbands or to witness their
departure.

At Victoria, in addition to a large hut for non-
commissioned officers and men, a hostel was
erected in Grosvenor Gardens, only a few
yards distant from the railway station, for the
use of commissioned officers. Its control was
undertaken by the Y.M.C.A., but its erection
and equipment owed everything to the generous
cooperation of Mrs. Charles Tufton and her
friends. This building was a comfortable club,
where young officers could secure bed and
breakfast and other meals. It was opened by
Queen Alexandra.

Linked up with the station huts the Y.M.C.A,
presently established still more commodious

PASTIMES IN THE HUTS.

Lady Askwith watching a billiard match at a hut

in Horseferry Road, Westminster.

Circle picture : A game at draughts.

buildings with a greater claim to architectural
litness in the inner cn-cle of the Metropolis. At
Aldwych, abutting on the Strand, an exception-
ally bright and convenient structure was erected
at a cost of between £7,000 and £8,000. This
was designed primarily for the requirements of
overseas troops, but was open to men of other
units.

A later enterprise was the Shakespeare Hut
at the rear of the British Museum, which owed
its inspiration to the Shakespeare Memorial
Committee and the Tercentenary Committee.
Naturally it was impossible to devote any por-
tion of the Shakespeare Memorial Fund to the
building or equipment, but £1,000 was collected
for the purpose from the Dean and Chapter of
Westminster, the Temple Church, University
College and Bedford College for Women. To-
wards the £7,000 or £8,000 required £2.000 was
also received from the New Zealand Y.M.C.A.,.
and substantial subscriptions came from
the boroughs of Westminster, Kensington and
Marylebone. The Shakespeare Hut was ad-
mirably designed with canteen, billiard room,
quiet room, verandah and sleeping and bath
room accommodation. It was probably the best
of its kind, and the fittings and colouring were
planned in memory of the groat dramatist who,
as already indicated, did not receive honour
from some of the members of the Y.M.C.A. in
its early days.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

The Y.M.C.A. also transformed the Little
Theatre in John Street, Adelphi, generously
placed at its disposal by the landlord, Mr.
Coutts, into a more or less similar rendezvous.
Its size and proximity to Charing Cross enabled
large numbers of men to enjoy the advantages.
Another development deserves mention here
because of its effect upon the internal organiza-
tion of the Y.M.C.A. and the coordinated
facilities for entertaining the soldier in London.
Practically speaking, from the start of the
Y.M.C.A. movement the Central Y.M.C.A. pro-
vided the metropolitan headquarters. Origin-
ally this central branch possessed Exeter Hall,
and whilst using a portion of the building for
club purposes let the halls for religious and
philanthropic gatherings. After the death of
Sir George Williams a new and more convenient
building was proposed as his fitting memorial.
Exeter Hall was sold, and at a cost of £100,000
an island site was purchased in Tottenham Court
Road and a new Institute was erected. This
provided the features of a young men's club —
including lounge, swimming baths, shooting
gallery, gymnasium — besides being thoroughly
equipped as an educational and religious centre
for men. Its management was undertaken by
Mr. J. J. Virgo, who was specially invited to
accept the post of secretary because of his
Australian experiences. The Central Y.M.C.A.
was entirely responsible for its erection and
management and the National Council did not
share either liability or control. The latter
body had its own headquarters in Russell
Square in a house (called the Sir George
Williams' House) presented to it by the
family of Sir George Williams. When a large
addition to the clerical staff proved necessary
the adjoining house was secured and in this
enlarged building the National Council pursued
its work until the autumn of 1915 Just before
this period the two organizations had conducted
their operations in separate channels, but the
exigencies of the war suggested cooperation, and
the respective officers and committee considered
and approved fresh arrangements for wiser and
ampler provision on behalf of the soldiers
Under this scheme the Central Y.M.C.A trans-
ferred the Tottenham Court Road centre to the
National Council. This arrangement not only
coordinated oxisting agencies but provided
adequate accommodation for the National
Council staff and enabled this handsome and
commodious building to be utilized day and
ni<*'ab for the war work. From this

period Mr. Virgo becama Field Secretary to the
National Council and later started on a world
tour for the advancement of Y.M.C.A. interests.
With Tottenham Court Road, its station huts,
and other metropolitan centres, the Y.M.C.A.
accommodated on an average 7,500 men every
week in its cubicles. The whole of these huts
and buildings were connected by the military
authorities at their request with the telephone,
so that pressure at one place could frequently be
relieved by vacant beds at others — each and all
bearing the description of " ever-open " huts.
With the assistance of scouting parties supplied
with motors the streets were scoured for
soldiers stranded late at night.

From the headquarters flowed a perennial
stream of new ideas and activities. En-
quirers from all parts of the world desired
particulars of husband, son, brother or friend
who had been missing in such and such
engagement. Usually it was the story of
an officer, non-commissioned man, or private
who was last seen in attack and no record
could be obtained concerning his whereabouts.
Through the good offices of the American
Y.M.C.A. in Germany, to whom the official list
of British prisoners in Germany was available,
immediate steps were taken to get in touch with
the facts. Again there were difficulties with the
prisoners' letters, and in many cases it was
possible to secure an avoidance of delay. On
other occasions the Y.M.C.A. obtained news
respecting men who through various reasons
had not communicated with their friends. An
oft-repeated request was for a photograph of the
grave where loved ones lay buried

Disabled soldiers turned to the Y.M.C.A, after
their discharge from the Army for assistance in
securing suitable employment. These inquiries
suggested an Employment Bureau, and through
its agency hundreds of men were brought into
touch with employers and saved from the neces-
sity of tramping about in search of work.

A novel method of bridging over the
period of separation between soldiers and
their friends was initiated by the Y.M.C.A.
through its Snapshots League. With simple
but efficient machinery 1 1,000 amateur photo-
graphers were enrolled who secured 500,000
snapshots illustrative of the sailor's or soldier's
family and friends. This work was performod
without charge. Men of H.M. Forces were sup-
plied with forms upon which they stated that
they desired photos of their wife, parents or
sweetheart living in the place specified. These

192

THE TIMES H1ST0BY OF THE WAR.

were returned to the Y.M.C.A. Snapshots
League, Tot tenham Court Road, and forwarded to
the, nearest voluntary helper. When the photos
were prepared the photographer dispatched
copies in special weatherproof envelopes to the
soldier in France, Salonika, Egypt or elsewhere.
The enterprise cost about £10,000, which was
subscribed privately by those who recognized
its value and significance. It was also adopted
by the Y.M.C.A. organizations m Australia,
New Zealand, South Africa and Bermuda in
order to perforin for their troops serving under
the British flag a similar service to that enjoyed
by the home armies. Throughout the Com-
monwealth the necessary forms of application
could be obtained in the Post Offices.

Through the cooperation of the General
Council of the Bar and the Council of the Law
Society arrangements were made for providing
in the Y.M.C.A. huts free legal advice to non-
commissioned officers and men in H.M. Forces.
This help was given by barristers and solicitors
on active service and confined absolutely to
civil matters. The Y.M.C.A. stipulated that
litigation would not be undertaken either at its

expense or with its help. In special cases the
men were put into communication with the
official department at the Royal Courts of
Justice established under special rules of
Court.

The Navy required the assistance of the
Y.M.C.A. as much as the Army, though
the circumstances of its work did not pre-
sent the same opportunities. To serve the
sailor on board ship was not yet practicable,
and therefore the Red Triangle greeted him
when he came ashore on leave. At places like
Portsmouth, Chatham, Harwich, Newcastle,
Rosyth, Cromarty and Invergordon — to name
a few such centres — the National Council, in
conjunction with the Scottish Y.M.C.A. (of
which Sir Andrew Pettigrew was chairman anrl
Mr. .las. Mackenzie secretary), which was
responsible for the agencies in the north, made
provision for naval men. In all essential
respects the naval and military departments
were organized on kindred lines. The appre-
ciation ot officers and men of all ratings in the
Navy testified to the value of the work.
Admiral Jellicoe and Admiral Beatty gave

A "CABBAGE PATCH" IN LONDON
Turned to good account : A hut erected on an old building site in Kensington.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

193

every possible facility and supported the
undertakings both privately and in public.

During the early days of September, 1914,
the Y.M.C.A. commenced operations at the
Crystal Palace for the benefit of lads training
for the Royal Naval Division. At certain
periods nine to ten thousand were at the Crystal
Palace, before being drafted to other spheres of
action. They were enlisted from the North of
England, from Wales and the Midlands and
from many quiet villages, east and west, as well
as north and south. The opportunities for
service in this H.M.S. Crystal Palace, as it was
styled, were therefore considerable. For its
accommodation the authorities granted the use
of a large amount of floor space, including the
Egyptian, Grecian and Roman Courts in the
centre transept, and later placed at the disposal
of the Y.M.C.A. the Morocco and Alhambra
Courts, as well as the North Tower Gardens and
theatre. The services were varied and in-
teresting and included quite unconventional
agencies. Owing to necessity the organization
acted as washerwoman to thousands of these
naval men in training. The laundry business
developed into a great concern and necessitated
a large staff and a careful methodical system
in order to avoid confusion and delay, Dut its

sole genesis was the comfort and convenience
of the men.

In ordinary course the naval postman
delivered the various mails as these arrived at
the Palace, but in such a huge building the men
could not be easily found, especially when on
duty, and letters were frequently delayed in
consequence. Times of great pressure prevented
the naval authorities from employing a special
staff to deal with " dead " letters or parcels.
To the men, however, these communications
from their friends were all-important, and much
relief was experienced when, at the request of

'J -I

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAK.

INSIDE THE EUSTON HUT.

the officers, the Y.M.C.A. undertook an
important share of the postal service. During
twelvemonths the Y.M.C.A. dealt with 1,000,000
letters and parcels ; the sale of stamps in
that period was valued at £3,000 and postal
orders were purchased by the men to the amount
of £9.000. The Savings Bank possessed, on an
average, between two and three thousand
depositors with a substantial amount standing
to their credit.

By request also of the officers the Y.M.C.A.
published a little book at the price of one penny
enabling particulars to be recorded concerning
the man's pay, the amount he had received and,
where necessary, the amount due to the Divi-
sion. It was of a size made for his cap — the best
of pockets for a sailor. Concerts and lectures
were regularly organized in the theatre, and on
certain evenings, as well as on Sundays, services
arranged of a definitely religious character.
Help of a more personal nature was rendered on
behalf of wives and mothers, who unfailingly
turned to the Y.M.C.A. in times of necessity.
Two or three workers attended specially to
such cases. Parental anxieties were relieved,
and when the wives of married men did not
receive regular letters, a tactful word frequently
pulled them up to the scratch. Thousands of
men signed temperance and purity j]ledges, and
every effort was made by the Y.M.C.A. to assist
the men of the R.N.D. to keep sober and healthy
for the campaign on which they would enter
when the period of training was completed.

The Scottish National Council of Y.M.C.A. 's,
whose executive worked in conjunction with
Tottenham Court Road, devoted considerable
care and thought to the sailors in the northern
part, of the kingdom, and established naval
centres at Rosyth, Invergordon, Cromarty,
and elsewhere. The places at which sailors
put in for a few hours were but ill provided
with reasonable means of recreation or enter-
tainment, and were not designed for a crowd
of men anxious to make amends for a fairly
long spell at sea.

The presence of the Fleet off the coasts of
Scotland changed the social conditions of many
northern towns. Little Highland burghs were
caught up in the machinery of war, and accom-
modated themselves and their institutions to
thousands of men passing to and from the ships,
and to the large staff of artificers engaged on
repairs and refittings. At one small town, when
the trams were usually late on the journey up,
hundreds failed to reach their ships, and had
to wait until the morning. These situations
provoked the despair of the provost and leading
townsmen. Every public building sheltered
the men, and on occasions even the small lock-
up with its one or two cells was utilized for the
purpose of affording relief from the streets, and
as a protection from the weather. In this
emergency the Y.M.C.A. came to the rescue.
Plans were designed for a permanent building
and obtained the approval of the Admiralty,
who made a grant for its immediate erection, as

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

19S

well as that of the Admirals on the Division.
Experience quickly showed that the institute
was too small, and in the course of a few months
a substantial addition became necessary. Like
the Y.M.C.A. station huts in the metropolis,
which were equally open to the sailor, it
provided rest, refreshment and recreation, and
gave much satisfaction to the sailors.

When the cry went up for shells and big
guns and labour became mobilized in a way
never before witnessed in England, occasion
arose for meeting the bed and breakfast require-
ments of battalions of men posted to districts
already crowded with workers. Even where
the question of lodgings presented few diffi-
culties, the midday meal for thousands of men
had to be met adequately by outside agencies
so that localities concerned could be relieved
of the impossible strain. From the circum-
stances of its foundation the Y.M.C.A. had
not received the support of Trade Union
members to any considerable extent. Until
the war its operations wre assigned principally
to the shop assistants, clerks, buyers and
managers of retail and wholesale houses. It
possessed a sprinkling of professional men,
but the working classes were uninfluenced.
Some of the Y.M.C.A. leaders sought the co-
operation of the industrial workers, but they
held aloof and the gulf seemed wide and insur-
mountable. Temperament and outlook prob-
ably accounted for this division of interest, which
grew deeper and wider as the years advanced.

When the abnormal situation created by
the enlargement of munition factories became
acute in various parts of the country the
Y.M.C.A. had already made good on its war
work. To the Y.M.C.A., therefore, people
turned for help on behalf of the munition
workers, and the Red Triangle responded eagerly
and willingly. As a rapprochement had been
established with soldiers and sailors, the
Y.M.C.A. leaders gladly embraced the oppor-
tunity of another and unexpected extension of
their activities. The Munition Workers' Auxi-
liary Committee was established by Mr. A. K.
Yapp, the General Secretary, and Princess
Victoria of Schleswig-Holstein accepted the
office of president, attending the committee
meetings with almost invariable regularity,
and showing the keenest interest in the various
undertakings. Lord Derby, who had recognized
the necessity for special voluntary efforts in
order to deal with the problem, became chair-
man of the committee. Mr. R. H. Swainson
was organ zer. Some of the committee became
responsible for the operations organized in
important areas. Lady Henry Grosvenor, for
instance, had charge of the Y.M.C.A. services
for munition workers at Woolwich, Cra.yford,
and the adjoining district1- ; Mrs. Winston
Churchill superintended the agencies at Enfield
Lock and Waltham Cross ; Countess Fitz-
william supervised the arrangements at Shef-
field ; Lady Hugh Grosvenor was responsible
for work in Cheshire ; Mrs. Williams (of Miskin)

MIDNIGHT AT THE WATERLOO HUT.

196

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

performed a similar duty in connexion with the
munition centres in South Wales ; and the
Scottish National Council undertook the ar-
rangements in Scotland.

Everything had to be evolved and co-
ordinated as the circumstances demanded.
The lady superintendents were responsible for
securing lady workers and for equipping their
district centres, even to kitchen utensils,
cutlery, crockery, and the details incidental to
supplying heavy meals and sleeping accommo-
dation. Within a short time they organized
3,000 ladies who did not receive a penny
in salary, and where they lived at the
hostel paid for their mm board and lodging.
These voluntary helpers performed a variety
of work, necessitating in many instances night
shifts or early morning duties. To their tact,
womanly qualities, and arduous work were
due the attractiveness, cleanliness and good
management of the establishments in munition
centres.

At Woolwich, owing to the large influx of
workers, the question of supplying meals
became urgent. During the dinner hour every
public house and refreshment shop was crowded ,
and men often waited in long queues to be
served. The Y.M.C.A. did not desire to com-
pete with legitimate trading concerns when
these met the need, but an impossible situation
was created, and men and women who worked
long hours in munition factories could not
secure nourishing food at moderate prices
served with some degree of comfort. The
supply of guns and shells suffered as well as the
workpeople, and employers and employees
equally rejoiced when the Y.M.C.A. organized
a great undertaking. When in full work-
ing order Lady Henry Grosvenor organized
20,000 meals every day, the majority of
which consisted of the heavy midday order.
For the highly paid operative the popular
demand was a shilling three-course dinner, of
excellent quality. An orchestra was provided
and the diners enjoyed their meal whilst
listening to a capital musical programme.
Later it became, necessary to meet the require-
ments of those who preferred something less
expensive on the a la carte basis. The men
who went on night shifts also found their
wants studied, and in order to serve them a
staff of ladies worked through the night.
Inspection of the Woolwich centre satisfied the
conditions of cleanliness, quality of food, and
the attractiveness of the general surroundings.

In the London Dock centres, where Lady
Askwith was in charge, the labourers appre-
ciated a sevenpenny dinner of hot meat and
potatoes supplied in liberal quantities. They
were accustomed to large portions and did
not require sweets or coffee. But for the
Y.M.C.A. Hut they would perforce have had
to make shift with the helping of cold meat
and bread carried with them from home in the
typical red handkerchief.

Similar provision was made in the provinces
for the labourer or artisan on war work. Thus
at Liverpool, where the need existed for can-
teens on the dock premises, the Dock Board and
Shipowners' Association formed a company with
a capital of £10, 000 for the erection of huts, which
were handed over to the Y.M.C.A. Originally
the Dock Board subscribed £5,000, but when
the first two or three buildings proved successful
the Board immediately doubled the capital.
Absolute necessity demanded these places of
rest and refreshment for the dock labourer.
Some of the eating houses previously fre-
quented by the men were extremely dirty, and
they had to be content with indifferent
food and unpleasant conditions. (n the huts
by the Liverpool Dock side the equipment was
clean and the sevenpenny dinners well cooked
and of the best quality. The result must in the
majority of instances be credited to the lady
workers who volunteered from some of the best
middle-class families in the city of Liverpool,
and took a regular share of the duty, some
giving one or two days every week while others
attended during the whole of the six days. The
test of the pudding is in the eating. These
ladies when the dinners were served were con-
tent to purchase a cut off the joint from
which the customers had been supplied or a
helping from the same make of puddings.
Those competent to judge of the effect of the
arrangements stated that the men performed
their heavy work under improved health con-
ditions, while its volume was greater and there
was less heavy drinking or striking. The opinion
of the Liverpool Dock Board and Shipowners'
Association may be gathered by the readiness
with which the capital was doubled.

At Sheffield, Newcastle and elsewhere the
committees under lady presidents met the
needs of the workers according to local con-
ditions. Cast-iron plans were avoided and the
locality allowed to determine the best way of
meeting the emergency. At Newcastle, for
instance, with the cooperation of the firm of

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

197

THE SHAKESPEARE HUT IN GOWER
STREET, LONDON.

Opened by Princess Victoria of Schleswig-Holstein
(in smaller picture) August 11, 1916.

Sir Wm. Armstrong, Whit worth & Co., the
Y.M.C.A. served midday meals in a building in
close proximity to the firm's works. Special
pro vision was established for the women, who
came at 12 o'clock and retired from the
building in time to permit of the male workers
obtaining their meal. One general rule ob-
tained in all thess Y.M.C.A. dining rooms —
cleanliness, quality of food and reasonable
prices.

A more ambitious scheme included hostels
for the workers where they could not only
obtain meals but sleeping accommodation
and the usual recreative and other attrac-
tions. Owing to the abnormal conditions
lodgings were difficult if not impossible to
obtain by the man suddenly dumped down in
a district many miles from his home ties.
Where obtainable the bedroom often proved
unsatisfactory owing to the crowded state of the
dwelling. Scores of cases occurred of landladies
letting the bedroom in turn throughout the
whole 24 hours. Men had either to endure such
places or seek quarters several miles distant
from the factory. The latter course involved

tiresome journeys after long hours and an
absence of comfort or home life during the meal-
times. To meet an unquestioned need the
Y.M.C.A. initiated an experimental scheme at
Enfield by which the workers could live under
healthier and pleasanter conditions. This
developed in many other districts. At Enfield
it provided for the erection of wooden huts with-
in easy distance of the factories as sleeping
quarters, so that the worker could secure a
small but clean and convenient cubicle to his
own use. He had a comfortable bed, clean

HIS

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

sheets, a box for his clothes, the vise of baths and
other necessaries. In close proximity to the
cubicles a common hall was erected for meals,
recreations and letter writing. The food was
well cooked and served by lady helpers on
dainty-looking tables always bright with freshly
cut flowers. For an inclusive sum (averaging
usually about 20s.) per week the munition
worker secured full board, lodging and washing.
Moreover, he enjoyed many club facilities
impossible in the ordinary private lodgings.
Without leaving the common hall he could play
billiards, listen to the concert or write his
letters.

Employers recognized the advantages offered
by the hostel and in many instances contributed
liberally to its equipment. According to the
conditions for the assessment of war profits the
Exchequer sanctioned the payment of a certain
proportion to schemes for the betterment of
their employees. Advantage was taken of this
arrangement, for instance, by Messrs. Stewart
& Lloyd, of Glasgow, who financed the whole
requirements of a hostel for their workers
situated close to their factory.

Lady Hugh Grosvenor undertook the charge
of a small garden city in Cheshire which
developed through the generosity of Messrs.
Hrunner, Mond & Co., who were engaged on war
work. In order to meet the needs of their
employees, many of whom had been brought
from the front, provision was made for 500
cubicles erected in blocks and fitted with
baths and washhouses. The club accommo-
dation for meals, games, lectures and con-
certs was excellent, whilst the kitchen equip-
ment was equal to that of a first-class restaurant.
Lady Hugh Grosvenor and her staff of lady
workers made an innovation at this centre by
the supply of hot midday meals carried to the
works two or three miles distant for those res;-
dents who could not return to the hostel fcr
dinner. Those who visited this large hostfl
were delighted with the artistic fittings and the
bright and attractive curtains which guarded
the place from any susjjicion that it was a poor-
law institution or an ordinary philanthropic
home.

The munition worker received his money's
worth, plus sympathy and cooperation, and
whilst he was a customer he had a personal
relationship to the whole undertaking. The
Y.M.C.A. did not attempt to pauperize him, but
ran the enterprise on business lines, charging
against it a fair interest on capital expenditure.

The profits were not devoted to the general work
of the Y.M.C.A. but placed to a fund for the
betterment of the institute itself. Moreover, he
was not badgered with religion. It was there all
the time, and probably he remained conscious
of the fact, but its influences were pervasive
rather than aggressive. He was taught to
realize that Christianity was making its con-
tribution to the requirements of the war by the
provision of the hostel. Mr. Lloyd George, who
was then Minister of Munitions, visited several
of the Y.M.C.A. hostels, and expressed his warm
approval of the arrangements. By friendly
arrangement, the Young Women's Christian
Association undertook the provision of huts and
equipment for the women workers, and places
started by the Y.M.C.A. were later handed over
to this organization in order to create a proper
division of labour between the two Associations.

The linking up of the Mother Country and the
Overseas Dominions to face a common foe
showed the necessity for fresh efforts. The
first contingent to reach England preparatory
to service in France was that from Canada.
Thirty thousand strong, it proceeded to
Salisbury Plain for training. The Canadian
Y.M.C.A. obtained permission from the Cana-
dian Militia Department for seven secretaries to
accompany the Expeditionary Force. With the
idea of facilitating military discipline, they
received honorary rank as captain and wore
officer's uniform, but did not perform military
duties, and were quite free in carrying on social,
religious and recreational work amongst the
Canadians. When the first division proceeded
to France in 1915 it was accompaned by five
secretaries. The second Canadian contingent
arrived in the spring of the same year with six
secretaries, five of whom crossed to France when
the training of this division was completed.
Another five secretaries came over with the
third division and the whole of these went to the
front. Fifteen Y.M.C.A. secretaries were there-
fore in association with the Canadian Divisions
in France, and later a score of secretaries arrived
from Canada to meet the requirements of
Dominion soldiers in English camps, whilst
retaining fifty Y.M.C.A. centres in Canada for
the troops still under training.

Opinions varied concerning the honorary
rank of the Canadian Y.M.C.A. secretary and
whether he could perform his duty with greater
success than the British Y.M.C.A. worker who
remained a civilian. The rank possessed some
compensations mixed with disadvantages. But,

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

199

■officer or civilian, British or Canadian, the
Y.M.C.A. methods remained much the same.

Reference should here be made to the con-
nexion between the Canadians and the Y.M.C.A.
at home. When the first Canadian Division
reached Salisbury Plain the parent branch
prepared for their entertainment some of the
earliest huts used in this country. Their letters
for home were written in these buildings. At
night they gathered round the piano and sang
" The Maple Leaf." Faraway from shops, they
besieged the counter for necessaries, including
cough mixtures and oil stoves. By this time the
Plain was soaked with the late autumn rains,
and they required much ingenuity to keep the
bell tents dry and no little persistence and
patience to exorcise the colds and coughs that
infected almost the whole division. The
Y.M.C.A. hut was the one warm, light and
cheery place in the whole camp, and the
Canadian appreciated the contrast. Lord
Roberts wrote to the Y.M.C.A. on the day he
left England for France — four days before he
passed away — as follows : " Lord Roberts
hears nothing but praise for what the Y.M.C.A.
is doing at the various camps. The latest tribute
he has received is from the Canadian contingent,
who, when he inspected the men on Salisbury
Plain, said that they did not know what they
would have done without the facilities afforded
them by the accommodation provided by the
Y.M.C.A." On behalf of the 13th Battalion
Royal Highlanders of Canada the captain and
adjutant wrote as follows : " Allow me to
express our appreciation of the hospitality
shown by the Y.M.C.A. to us as individuals and
as a regiment. Many members of the regiment

have benefitted by hours spent in your tents,
and the accommodation granted us by you has
made our weekly church parade possible."

By September 1, 1914, 70 to 80 transports
were on their way from Australia and at
frequent intervals during the progress of the war
continued to arrive. In January, 1915, these
troops took part in the defence of Egypt and
in April proceeded to Gallipoli, where with the
New Zealanders they performed brilliant and
daring feats which brought them deathless
renown. Their own Y.M.C.A. secretaries were
permitted to accompany the troopships, and
later were asked to go forward to Gallipoli,
where they experienced similar adventures
and dangers to those of the men. Australia
and New Zealand always encouraged the
Y.M.C.A. movement. The large buildings
erected in the principal cities and the confidence
shown in this enterprise by the governing and
commercial classes evidenced that the Y.M.C.A.
before the war represented something that
was more important and essential to the
Commonwealth than the Y.M.C.A. at home
ap]oeared to the British people. Even at the
period of the Boer War the Australian Y.M.C.A.
secretaries accompanied the troops to South
Africa, and during peace times met the needs
of the Volunteers in their annual encampments
much in the same manner as in Great Britain.

The stay of the Anzacs in Egypt, however,
revealed the weakness of the Y.M.C.A. terri-
torial divisions during a great emergency.
The Australian and New Zealand secretaries,
in the absence of mutual arrangements, kept
naturally to their own patch until the situation
was reviewed in the light of new circumstances.

THE Y.M.C.A. HUT AT ALDWYCH.

200

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

From that period Australia and New Zealand,
the American Y.M.C.A. at Cairo, and the
British Y.M.C.A. joined hands and promoted
a National Y.M.C.A. Council for Egypt. This
fact indicated the trend of events and proved
one of the strongest arguments for the inter-
dependence and cooperation of the whole
Empire Y.M.C.A. movement. When in the
beginning of 1916 the Anzacs were fighting
on the Western Front they enjoyed the hos-
pitality of the British Y.M.C.A., who by that
time were pushing their huts and marquees
nearer to the firing line. Later on thousands
came over for training in the home camps, and
at places like Salisbury Plain found large
centres organized for their comfort and recrea-
tion as well as for moral and religious assist-
ance. Diu-ing this stage no fewer than 4,000
Anzacs poured into the Metropolis for week-
end furloughs. To a great extent it was
an aimless throng with little idea of the where-
abouts of notable or historic sights and buildings
and yet desirous of seeing something. By com-
bination of the home and overseas Y.M.C.A.
staffs, a system of personally conducted tours
was arranged, which avoided dangers to the
health of the men and worked to their pleasure
and advantage.

In staff and policy the Indian Y.M.C.A.
National Council always maintained a high
level. This was due partly to cosmopolitan en-
vironment and in some measure to the condi-
tions under which it commenced operations.
It sought, for instance, to influence the highly-
educated young Hindus and Mahomedans to
an appreciation of Christianity as well as to
make provision for the Englishman in the
Civil Service or engaged in banking and com-
mercial houses. Many of the Indian Y.M.C.A.
secretaries were University men who had
studied Indian thought and literature. They
engaged in notable social experiments, and whilst
remaining true to their primary religious aim
endeavoured to introduce improved methods
of agriculture, seed-growing, and the better
breeding of cattle amongst the agricultural
classes. They also sought the advancement
of cottage industries and the development of
the cooperative credit movement. In these
objects considerable success followed their

efforts, so that on the outbreak of hostilities,
the Indian Y.M.C.A. enjoyed a position of
confidence and appreciation on the part of the
authorities.

For the purposes of the war the Indian
National Council set free some of its trained
secretaries, including Mr. Oliver McCowen,
LL.B., who, as already mentioned, took
charge of the Y.M.C.A. operations in France
and Mr. Wilson who went to Salonika.
Others served in France, Mesopotamia,
and British East Africa. A section of
the men devoted themselves to the social
necessities of the Indian troops who arrived
in France, having accompanied them from
India. Tins arrangement was made on the
distinct understanding with the authorities —
and duly and strictly observed — that prosely-
tizing should not be attempted. These Indian
Y.M.C.A. secretaries rendered a variety of
personal services, such, for instance, as visiting
wounded men in hospital, writing letters to
their homes, the erection of huts or marquees
for games, the arrangement of tea parties — an
innocent form of pleasure much enjoyed by
the Indian soldier — and similar acts of sym-
pathy and hospitality.

The depletion of staff in India which followed,
received compensation by the services of Rev.
Dr. Moulton of Manchester, Dr. T. R. Glover
of Cambridge, and several clergymen, ministers
and young Divinity students from England
and Scotland. Some of these men delivered
lectures on religious and other subjects, with
reference to the war and its lessons, for the
benefit of the highly educated Hindus and
Mahomedans. Others devoted themselves
to the ordinary Y.M.C.A. organization. Not
the least valuable part of the war contribution
made by the Indian National Council was its
endeavour to afford the thousands of Terri-
torials, sent to India on the outbreak of war,
an opportunity of visiting some of its historic
sights and of appreciating the material and
social advantages of British rule in the Great
Dependency. For the most part these Terri-
torials were untravelled, and their stay in India,
through the assistance of the Y.M.C.A.,
became educational and formative in its
character and influence.

CHAPTER CXLIII.

THE RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE OF 1916
SECOND PHASE.

Survey of the Second Phase of General Brusiloff's Offensive — General Lesh's Advance
on the Lower Styr — The Battle on the Stokhod — General Sakharoff's Advance south-
west of Lutsk — The Battle of Mikhailovka — The Battle on the Lipa — The Battle for
Brody — The Advance against the Lvoff — Tarnopol Railway— General Lechitsky's
Campaign — Its Objectives — The Capture of Kolomea and the Cutting of the Stanislavoff-
Marmaros Sziget Railway' — The Fall of Stanislavoff and the Capture of a Dniester
Crossing — Count Bothmer's Retreat and General Shcherbacheff's Advance in the Centre
— Changes in the Higher Commands of the Austro-German Armies south of the Marshes.

ON June 4 the Russian armies had
broken through the enemy lines in
Volhynia and on the Bukovinian
frontier. What the first phase of
the great Russian offensive in the summer of
1916 accomplished was to develop these suc-
cesses within the districts in which they had
been achieved. Lutsk and Dubno were re-
covered ; the battle -lino was advanced within
some 40 miles of Kovel and Vladimir-Volynsk,
and within less than 10 miles of Brody. Almost
all the ground gained in Volhynia between
June 4-15 was maintained against a most
violent Austro-German counter-offensive car-
ried on throughout the second half of the
month. South of the Dniester our Allies con-
quered in not quite three weeks practically
the whole of the Bukovina, and extended their
lines into south-eastern Galicia, beyond
Sniatyn and Kuty. These territorial gains
were accompanied by crushing military defeats
of the enemy ; two Austro-Hungarian armies,
that of Archduke Joseph-Ferdinand in Vol-
hynia, and that of General von Pflanzer-Baltin
in the Bukovina, lost more than half their
effectives, and also the other three Austro-
German armies operating south of the Pripet
Marshes (the Third Austro-Hungarian Army,
Vol. IX.— Part 110. 201

under General Puhallo von Brlog, on the
Lower Styr; the Second Austro Hungarian
Army, under General von Boehm-ErmoDi, on
the Brody-Tarnopol, and the Army of General
Count Bothmer, on the Tarnopol-Butchatch
front) suffered very severe losses. The Petro-
grad official eoimnunique of June 27 stated that
the prisoners and trophies captured by the
armies of General Brusiloff between June 4-23
amounted to 4,031 officers, 194,041 men, 219
guns, besides 644 machine-guns, 196 bomb
mortars, 146 artillery ammunition wagons and
38 searchlights.

The enormous importance of the Russian
victories of June, 1916, as a step in the attrition
of the enemy forces was patent ; the losses
suffered by the enemy on the Eastern front
during those three weeks were about equal to
those he had suffered at Verdun in 130 days
of fighting. Still, all that the Russians had
accomplished so far in the field left more to be
done. The Austro-German front south of the
Marshes had been pierced, but it was not as
yet broken up to the extent of necessitating a
general retreat. In the course of the War
both sides had had to learn that where the
greatest nations of the world are fighting, it
takes much to render a victory final and a

20-2

THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAR.

NEAR THE DANGER ZONE.
Russian Officers and peasants watching a battle.

decision irreversible. Each side had passed
through defeats and recoveries. Was a new
recover}' on the Eastern front still possible, for
the Central Powers ? This was the question
which had to be answered by the second and
third phase of the fighting between the Pripet
Marshes and the Carpathian Mountains.
Generalship and available reserves were the
factors in its solution. In the first phase of
the offensive our Allies had gained two salients
— in Volhynia and in the Bukovina. But as
much as ''nature abhors a vacuum" the strategy
of railway and trench warfare abhors salients.
Was the approximately straight line to be
regained by the flattening out of the Russian
salients or by a completion of the Russian
advance ? The battles on the Lower Styr, on
the Loshiiioff-Zalost.se and the Tlumatch lines,
the fall of Brody and Stanislavoff, and finally
the retreat of Count Bothmer's Army in the
centre supplied the answer to that question.
They constitute the second phase of the great
Russian offensive of 1916.

Towards the end of June, four divisions
could be distinguished south of the Marshes :

(1) In the extreme north, on the Lower
Styr, between the Pripet Marshes and the

district of Kolki, the enemy front had remained
practically intact.

(2) Between Kolki and Novo-Alexiniets (on
the Galician border), on a stretch of about 80
miles, the enemy front had been knocked in,
the line now forming an enormous salient
toward the west, in some sectors as much as
45 miles deep.

(3) Between Novo-Alexiniets and Visnio-
vtehyk, on a front of about 40 miles, the enemy
lines were again practically intact, and even
in the sector between Visniovtchyk and the
Dniester, the regression of the Austro-German
forces was as yet slight.

(4) South of the Dniester the defences of the
enemy had been completely broken up and our
Allies were advancing in full force to the west,
against Kolomea and the Carpathian passes.

The centre in the Sereth-Strypa sector formed
the pivot of the Germanic defences south of
the Marshes. It was based on a strong river
line, on which like beads on a string one might
see numerous villages and manors, each of thein
transformed into a small fortress. On a
stretch of about 50 miles it was connected with
the west by no less than four railway lines. Its
right flank was covered by the Dniester, and

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

203

although our Allies had crossed the Lower
Strypa round Butchatch and were approaching
the line of the Koropiets, Bothmer's position in
the centre was not really outflanked as long
as he maintained his hold on the Dniester
crossings. Below Nizhnioff the difficult nature
of the Dniester belt prevented the Russian Army
on the southern bank of the river from making
its pressure seriously felt in the right flank of
Count Bothmer's Army. The left flank of the
Austro-German centre on the line Brody-
Zalostse was protected by an exceedingly
strong front of hills, marshy rivers, ponds and
thick forests. Finally the existence of a series
of excellent lines of defence in the rear of the
Strypa front, along the many parallel northern
confluents of ■ the Dniester, allowed Bothmer
to hang on to his original positions to the
last moment ; he knew that he could always
effect his retreat by short and quick move-
ments without any danger of being cut off.
His position would then resemble that of the
Russians in the late summer of 1915 when
they slowly retreated through Eastern Galicia,
fighting stubborn rearguard actions, after they
had already been outflanked in all appearance
both south of the Dniester and in Volhynia.
But as long as the centre held out, all hope of

a recovery on tho Eastern front was not lost
for tho Central Powers. Their first effort to
re-establish their line was by a counter-offensive
against the northern flank of the Volhynian
salient, in the region between the Stokhod and
the Styr. An attempt was made by the
Germans to cut in at its base in the sector where
they were still holding the line of tho Styr or
its neighbourhood. A successful thrust across
the river in that region would have forced a
general Russian retreat in Volhynia. The
German counter-offensive, which was developed
and defeated in the second half of June, was
followed up by tho Russians by an attack
against the German positions on the Lower
Styr. In the course of June the Army of
General Lesh had been brought south, across
the Marshes, thus enabling General Kaledin to
concentrate his forces in the Lutsk salient.
On July 4 General Lesh opened a brilliant
advance on both sides of the Kovel-Sarny
railway. The line of the Stokhod, in that
sector some 30 miles to the west of the Styr,
was reached in the course of a few days. The
northern flank of General Kaledin's Army was
now completely covered. The longitude of
Lutsk was passed by the Russian troops and the
Volhynian triangle of fortresses ceased to form

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AFTER THE RUSSIAN BOMBARDMENT.
View of the Austrian entanglements showing the effects of artillery fir

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Ed

204

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

205

a salient. North of it " the problem of the
straight line " was thus settled in favour of our
Allies. The enemy was definitely thrown back
on to the defensive, and the battle for Kovel
now developed on the entire Stokhod line, from
Kisielin to Stobychva.

The next attempt at a countor-offensive was
planned by the enemy against the southern
flank of the Volhynian salient. Big forces
were collected north of the Galician frontier,
between the Upper Styr and the Bug. The
attack was timed for July 18. It was fore-
stalled by General Sakharoff, who on July 16
opened a new offensive against the Austro-
German lines. In a week's fighting he dashod
all chances and hopes of the enemy of being
able to regain the initiative in that region.
Then, after a few days' lull in the fighting,
General Sakharoff opened in full force his
own offensive. On July 28 his troops entered
Brody. The Lutsk salient was thus being
extended to the south, its left wing was moving
forward Then, in the first days of August,
followed an offensive against the right flank of
the German centre. The Russian troops were
approaching the first-class railway leading from
Lvoff by Tarnopol to Odessa, the most impor-
tant line of communication of Count Bothmer's
Army. By August 9 the Russians stood
within striking distance of that railway. The
problem of the Lutsk salient was solved also
on its southern flank. A straight line was being
gradually established at the expense of the
enemy.

In the southern theatre of war, between the
Dniester and the Carpathian Mountains,
General Lechitsky continued after the fall of
Czernovitz his rapid advance to the west. On
June 29 his troops entered Kolomea, on July 4
they cut the Stanislavoff-Vorokhta-Marmaros
Sziget railway in the district of Mikulitchin.
Then after a month's lull in the fighting, in the
beginning of August, General Lechitsky's Army
entered Stanislavoff and captured the Dniester
crossing at Nizhnioff.

Count Bothmer's Army in the centre was
thereby effectively outflanked from the south.
Its communication with the west by the so-
called Transversal Railway (the line which runs
through Galicia east and west at the foot of the
Carpathians and is the base of the lines across
those mountains) was cut, whilst General Sak-
haroff had got within reach of the Lvoff-
Odessa railway. The retreat of the " German
Army of the South " could not be delayed any

longer. Two days after Genoral Lechitsky's
troops had entered Stanislavoff, those of
General Shcherbacheff's Army were in posses-
sion of the whole length of the Sereth-Strypa
front which the Austro-German armies had
held for the last 11 months and which
they had defended with the most desperate
stubbornness during the preceding 10 weeks of
the Russian offensive.

With the retreat of the enemy on to the
Zlota Lipa the last sector of the original front
south of the Marshes passed into the hands of
our Allies. A new approximately straight line
was established. North of the Dniester it
extended about 20-45 miles east of the original
positions ; south of the river the Russian pro-
gress reached an average of over 60 miles. As
in the Russian retreat of 1915, so also in their
advance of 1916, the movements were slowest
in the centre in Podolia, more rapid in Volhynia,
quickest of all in the corridor between the
Dniester and the Carpathians. Of the three
vital centres behind the original Austro-
German f ront — Kovel, Lvoff and Stanislavoff —
only the last was captured by our Allies. Still,
that capture was of capital importance. For
during the lull which intervened between the
second and the third phase of the offensive, a
new Ally joined Russia in the attack against
Transylvania. On August 27 Rumania de-
clared war on Austria-Hungary with a view to
liberating her kinsmen from a 'oreign yoke.

Whilst north of the Marshes the great battle
was raging round Baranovitche, and on the
northern flank of the Lutsk salient the Germans
were exhausting their forces in fruitless
attacks against the Gruziatyn-Rozhyshche
front, in his own unmistakable style General
Brusiloff carried out another offensive stroke.
This time the blow was delivered on the Lower
Styr, in the southern Poliesie, between the
Pripet Marshes and the Volhynian theatre of
war. Carefully prepared beforehand, and ex-
ecuted with the suddenness and vigour character-
istic of General Brusiloff's strategy, the advance
from the Styr to the Stokhod, on a front of
35 to 40 miles, and to a depth of about 25 miles,
was achieved in four days, across ground
which before the war would have been con-
sidered altogether impracticable for big mili-
tary operations. In the gigantic drama which
unfolded itself on the Eastern front in tha
summer of 1916, these operations tended to sink
to the level of a minor episode ; before tha

110—2

200

THE TIMES H1STOBY OF THE WAR.

THE KOVEL FRONT.

attention of the public had had time to con-
centrate on the activities of General Lesh's
army, its advance had been completed. And
yet this battle in the southern fringes of the
Pripet Marshes marks one of the strides of the
Russian giant -nation on its path to victory.

Only the barest outlines of General Lesh's
offensive can be gathered from the Russian
official communiques The Petrograd report
of July 4 gave the first intimation of a new
battle developing on the Lower Styr. It
recorded Russian gains on both sides of the
Kovel-Sarny railway, in the districts of Vulka
( laluzyiskaya and of Kolki, the one about
twelve miles to the north-west, and the
other about the same distance to the south-
west of Tchartoryisk. The advanced angle
which the enemy positions formed in this
district was thus subjected to a concentric
attack. The next day further progress was
reported in both directions. " In the region
of Vulka Galuzyiskaya," says the Russian
communique, of July 5, " we broke through
three lines of barbed wire entanglements

fitted with land mines. In a very desperate
fight on the Styr, west of Kolki, we over-
threw the enemy and took over a thousand
prisoners, including 170 officers, together
with 3 guns, 17 machine guns, 2 searchlights,
and several thousand rifles. The bridging
detachment lent the troops most useful aid,
keeping pace with the fighting units and
working close to the firing line."

The report of July 0 enumerated further
captures of men and material effected in the
fighting, which by then had reached the region
of Kostiukhnovka in the north, and had
extended beyond Raznitse on the southern side
of the Tchartoryisk salient.

Whilst from the direction of Kolki the ad-
vance was carried on due north, the Russian
troops which had crossed the Styr below
Rafalovka were changing their direction from
west to south-west. The Petrograd communi-
que, of July 7 reported the capture of the villages
of Grady and Komaroff south of the Kovel-
Sarny railway, and the forcing of organized
°nemy positions on the Galuzya-Optova-

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

207

Voltchesk line north of that railway ; finally an
advance of Russian cavalry resulting in the
occupation of the railway-station of Manie-
vitche. These operations, carried out on con-
centric lines with extraordinary speed and
precision, led to the capture of thousands of
prisoners and of numerous guns (e.g., near
Voltchesk the Russian cavalry took an entire
Krupp battery of six guns which had fired only
a few shots). By July 7 the two concentric
movements resulted in a junction of the forces.
The Russian communique issued early on July 8
marks the re-establishment of a straight front
facing west ; the line mentioned in the report
runs from Gorodok and Manievitche in the
north, through Okonsk and Zagarovka to Kolki.
Simultaneously with the news of this advance
towards and beyond the Kovel-Sarny railway,
the first mention was made of another offen-
sive developing almost in the thick of the
Marshes. As a matter of fact, this was not
a new movement ; on the same day on which
the first enemy positions had been forced near
Volka Galuzyiskaya and near Kolki, our Allies
had begun to advance also on the Yeziertsky-
Novo Tcherevishche line. These operations
now resulted in the capture of Griva and
Leshnevka. The important road which crosses
the River Stokhod at Novo Tcherevishche

and leads by Manievitche to Kolki, was now,
west of the Stokhod, in the hands of our Allies.
" General Brusiloff's troops," says the Petro-
grad communique issued on the night of July 8,
" are approaching the Stokhod, routing the
enemy everywhere, in spite of his desperate
resistance." In the next few days they not
merely reached but even crossed the river.
The three days' battle between the Styr and
Stokhod was terminated, the subsequent
operations of General Lesh's Army merging
with those of General Kaledin's right wing and
centre into the battle for Kovel.

The Russian communique, published on the
night of July 8, summarizes in terms of captures
the results of General Lesh's advance : " Ac-
cording to an apjDroximate estimate in the
course of fighting between the Styr and the
Stokhod from July 4 to 7 we took prisoners at
least 300 officers, including two regimental
commanders, and about 12,000 unwounded men,
and we also captured not fewer than 45 guns,
heavy and light, about 45 machine-guns, and a
large quantity of shells, cartridges, arms,
supplies and forage. ' ' Nor could the enemy any
longer hide the fact of his defeat. " The angle
projecting towards Tchartoryisk, owing to
superior pressure on its flank near Kostiukh-
novka and west of Kolki was given up and a

WITH GENERAL BRUSILOFF'S TROOPS.
A halt to examine wounds.

208

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

shorter defensive line was chosen," ran the
Berlin report of July 7 — brief, harsh and un-
pleasant. Vienna on the other hand showed
terrified courtesy for its allies, more pity for
itself, and even less regard to truth. Another

A CORNER OF THE BATTLEFIELD.

Wounded Russians and Austrians waiting for the
ambulances. Smaller picture : Lady Muriel Paget
working at a field hospital on the Russian front.

part of the line which the Germans had left
mainly in the care of their Austrian allies was
gone ! Their elaborately embroidered version
of the three disastrous days in the southern
Poliesie ran as follows : " The troops fighting in
the Styr salient, north of Kolki, which through
four weeks have been holding their own against
enemy fighting forces which increased to a
superiority of from three to five-fold, received
instructions yesterday to withdraw their first
lines, which were exposed to being surrounded
on two sides. Favoured by the arrival of
German troops to the west of Kolki and by the
self-sacrificing attitude of the Polish Legion near
Kolodye, the movement was carried out
without any disturbance on the part of the
enemy."

The Russian official reports, in their extreme,
matter-of-fact brevity, yielded but the dry bones
of the events and even so supplied only parts of
the skeleton ; published whilst the struggle was
still in progress, they had to be most particular
in the choice of information to be given out tu
the world. Knowledge recalling these events to
a new life has to be gathered from other sources.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

203

In the course of June, whilst General Kaledin
was first advancing, and then defending his gains
in Volhynia, the army of General Lesh, which
had previously stood north of Pinsk, was
transferred across the Marshes, taking over
from the Eighth Russian Army the sector on
the Lower Styr. It was faced by the Third
Austro-Hungarian Army of General Puhallo,
which included, among others, the army corps
of General von Fath and the Polish Legions
luider General Puchalski round Kolodye,
opposite Rafalovka. In the early days of the
Russian offensive only feint attacks had been
made by our allies on the Lower Styr, below
Kolki. Spring was very late in 1910, and
in the first days of June the ground and roads
were not as yet sufficiently dry to admit
of any important operations in that classical
land of birch and pine forests, bogs and
marshes. In the few encounters which occurred
in it in June the percentage of " missing " was
unusually high on both sides ; most of these
were the men, very often wounded men,
who found their death in the treacherous
swamps.

The enemy reserves in the East were never
abundant from the time when, in disregard
of the requirements of the Russian front, the

Germans had begun to squander their divi-
sions at Verdun, and the Austrians had con-
centrated all their available forces on the
Italian front. Whatever reinforcements had
been brought up after the. disastrous defeats
in Volhynia and in the Bukovina were
used to fill the gaps caused by the mass sur-
renders or were formed at chosen points into
phalanxes for counter-offensi\e movements.

WOUNDED RUSSIANS AND AUSTRIANS.

Russian Cossacks outside a dressing-station waiting for attention. Smaller picture : Austrian

prisoners carrying a wounded comrade.

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210

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

211

In the first days of July tho attention of the
German commanders was concentrated on
Baranovitche and the Middle Styr. The district
on the Lower Styr below Kolki was to some
extent neglected. Its reserves consisted of a
single Bavarian division ; and even the dis-
position of whatever forces there were, seems to
have been made on a wrong assumption.
Russian attacks were expected on the higher
ground round Tchartoryisk, in the vicinity of
the Kovel-Sarny railway. Once more the mili-
tary intelligence of our Allies and their skill in
masking their own movements and hiding their
intentions from their opponents proved superior
to those of the enemy, much of the superiority
attained in reconnoitring in the Poliesie being
due to the self-sacrificing devotion of the Little
Russian peasantry inhabiting these regions.

Between Komaroff and Vulka Galuzyiskaya
extends a wide, low, sandy plain, so flat as to
hamper observation. Whenever observations
could not be made by means of balloons
the direction of the artillery fire proved very
difficult. Across the plain the opposing
fronts formed continuous lines, although
their organization could hardly be described as
equal to the average obtaining under normal
topographical conditions. In many parts the
wet, sandy soil did not admit of deep earthworks
and dug-outs.

North of the plain traversed by the Kovel-
Sarny railway, between Galuzya and Nobel, the
positions no longer formed a continuous front,
most of the ground being completely impassable
during by far the greater part of the year.
" Here in the Poliesie," wrote M. Sumskoy in
the Russlcoye Slovo of July 17-30, " there is no
continuous front, but merely a series of forts,
scattered almost as on a chess-board. And each
such fort by itself represents an entire history
of technical craft, containing a number of
ingenious devices calculated to render them
strong with the smallest possible use of human
force." Each isolated fort was dressed in
" shirts of iron and steel," surrounded by
barriers, obstacles and pitfalls such as no
imagination had ever invented in ancient
legends of enchanted, unapproachable castles.
The forts were naturally placed on higher
ground, the only spots capable of bearing
human habitations. The tracks leading to
them across the marshes were limited in
number. The approaches were protected by
strong barriers lavishly covered with barbed
wire. In some places even a peculiar kind

of net was used, incandescent when cut,
and thus at night signalling movements of
the enemy. As far as weapons were con-
cerned, here, as everywhere in the Austro-
Gerinan lines, machine-guns, cleverly placed
and carefully hidden, played the most important
part.

Inside the settlements everything had been
re-arranged by the Germans, who garrisoned
most of the ground in the thick of the Marshes,
so that the Russians should not be able to
direct their artillery fire by their previous
knowledge of the country. But it was
not merely for their safety that the Germans
took careful thought. Nice little gardens,

MAJOR-GENERAL PUCHALSKI.

pleasure-grounds, and even tennis-courts were
laid out in those settlements ; whatever
fields there were around, were tilled. The
scattered forts were connected with one
another by a well-developed net of telegraph
and telephone lines, and the whole system
had light field-railways for its backbone.
Most of the native population had left with
the Russians ; yet a certain number had
remained behind, many of them without the
knowledge of the German invaders. They
were roaming about the forests, across paths
and by means known only to themselves.
They were slipping through the meshes of the
network of enemy forts and carrying inforina-

212

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

AUSTRIAN PRISONERS
Captured on the Galician front.

tion to the army which was to reconquer for
them their homes and liberate their country
from the invader. In some places they formed
themselves into bands, conducting guerilla
warfare. The services rendered by these
men to the Russian intelligence service were
simply invaluable. Raids in this district
had been proceeding throughout the winter,
and some were carried out even in May and
June, 1916. Yet the actual Russian advance
tlirough the region of forts could only be
effected as an operation subsidiary to the main
movement across the Manievitche-Tchartoryisk
plain, of which the milestones are named in the
official Petrograd reports.

Hot, dry weather had prevailed throughout
June. The shallow ditches, rivulets and
swamps in the plain were slowly disappearing,
filling the air with the awful stench of drying
slime. Everywhere one could see those hot-
beds of innumerable swarms of midges, flies
and mosquitoes which were feeding on the
rapidly-decaying corpses and carcases, and
harrying those who dared to live . in tliis
usually forlorn region. In the close heat of
a July night in the low-lying marshes, our
Allies opened their bombardment of the
sectors singled out for attack. Striking the

sandy soil, the shells raised up a wall of
dust ; the sun rose that morning over the
battlefield not in the white mist usually
spreading above the waters, but in a ruddy
cloud composed of dark smoke and yellow,
burning sand. It was a live cloud, shaken
by the violent explosions of shrapnel and
illuminated by fiery lightnings. If ever hell
was revealed on earth it was on the battle-
fields of the Southern Poliesie. Parapets were
razed, villages stood in flames, forests were
breaking under the weight of the bombard-
ment ; the defence was being disorganized ;
in the shallow trenches lateral movements were
becoming increasingly difficult, the telephone
wires were being torn, different sectors were
getting isolated. The living were buried in
their trenches and on the old battlefields the
dead were raised from their graves. In the
forests the trees themselves seemed as if
paralysed in the agonizing expectation of
death. Not a sound, not a movement, but
the fearful screeching and howling of sheik
and shrapnel, and the sound of bullets hitting
the mighty pine trunks. The crowns and
branches of the trees were breaking, and a
rich shower of their green needles was filling
the air and covering the ground. Below the
dying giants human beings were moving like

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

213

shadows, inaudible in that cataclysm of
destruction.

And then, in the midst of that orgy of horrors,
the Russian attack began, both near Kolki and
on the Rafalcvka front. Across the plain afford-
ing but scanty cover, and into the forests
carefully fortified by the enemy, the Russian
infantry was advancing with the usual heroic
equanimity of the Slav peasant. What were
they thinking, those quiet, kindly ploughmen
on that day which saw so many of them
die ? Individually, of things which matter
only to the individual ; as a mass, they,
with their unequalled instinct of the living
community and crowd, were dreaming, in the
midst of visions of horror, the great mystic,
shining dream of their nation.

" We stormed a fortified position " or " we
broke through three lines of barbed-wire
entanglements fitted with land mines " were
the short, business-like announcements from
Russian Headquarters. How much was there
in those events which no reports can ever
express ! Before the frontal impact of the
Russiwi attack the Austrian defences broke
down, their forces fell back wherevor a
retreat was still possible. The only troops

that held out in their sectors for two days,
until outflanked, were the Bavarians near
Kolki and the Polish Legions near Kolodye.
Their help, it will be remembered, was grace-
fully acknowledged in the Vienna communique
of July 7, and honours were conferred on the
surviving remnants of what once had been
regiments. " The losses are serious," said a semi-
official Polish report, " though one cannot
speak of a general catastrophe." As a matter
of fact, some of the Polish regiments were
practically wiped out ; thus— e.g., the 5th lost
almost all its officers, no less than 12 re-
maining dead on the battlefield of Kolodye.

In the night of July 6-7, the last enemy
rear guards were withdrawing to the west,
firing in their retreat villages, causeways and
forests. A curtain of flames was to cover the
defeated army from its pursuers. Undei the
pale stars of the short summer night, across
the plain covered with delicate purple poppies,
past the treacherous marshes, they were trek-
ing towards the distant blue range of hills,
where the remnants of the Austrian forces had
already found a temporary shelter and com-
parative safety. In spite of the curtain of
flames and the destruction of causeways, the

ON THE RUSSIAN FRONT.
Austrian prisoners at work relaying a narrow gauge railway.

110—3

•214

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

FIGHTING BEYOND THE STOKHOD.

A party of Infantry advancing in the open.

intrepid Cossacks clung to the defeated enemy,
harassing his worn-out columns.

Towards the end of June, in the days of the
most violent German attacks between the
Stokhod and the Styr on both sides of the
Rovno-Kovel railway, oiir Allies had had to
withdraw their line in several sectors by
some four to six miles. That the withdrawal
was quite insignificant was admitted even
by the German official summary of the Russian
offensive published on September 8, 1916 :
it tried to explain away " the comparatively
small progress made by the counter-offensive."
But even that they were unable to maintain.
Simultaneously with the advance of General
Lesh's army the troops of General Kaledin
resumed the initiative, and between July 4—8
regained most of their previous positions on
the Rozhyshche-Gruziatyn front, and enlarged
their holdings between Gruziatyn and Kolki,
capturing 341 officers, 9,135 unwounded soldiers,
and rich booty.

On July 8 the two Russian Armies under
Generals Lesh and Kaledin had reached the
River Stokhod practically on the entire front
between the Kovel-Sarny and Kovel-Rovno
railways. At two points, near Arsenovitehe
and near Ugly (in the bend of the river between
Kashovka and Yanovka) they even forced the
passage. At Ugly, Colonel Kantseroff, com-
manding the 283rd Pavlograd Regiment, a
Knight of the Order of St. George, at the head
of his troops, crossed the river over a burning
bridge. When the fire had been extinguished
three German mines were found under the
bridge ; by some miracle they had failed to
explode. In the course of the next day our
Allies extended their positions on the western

bank of the Stokhod, capturing practically the
entire district within the Kashovka-Yanovka
curve, and also carried the bridges near Bogus-
hovka on the road and railway leading from
Rovno to Kovel. The latter gains seem, how-
ever, to have been abandoned in the fighting of
the next few days.

The forcing of the Stokhod line was certainly
to prove neither an easy nor a short affair.
The fighting on that front extending round
Kovel at an average radius of slightly more
than 20 miles was the first stage of the battle
for that important strategic centre and railway
junction. " On the issue of these battles,"
said an explanatory statement issued by the
Russian Staff about the middle of July, " un-
doubtedly depends not only the fate of Kovel
and its strongly fortified zone, but > also to a
very considerable degree all the present opera-
tions on our front. In the event of the fall of
Kovel and its zone, fresh important perspec-
tives will open out to us, for the road to Brest-
Litovsk, and to some extent also the roads to
Warsaw, will be laid bare." No wonder, then,
that the Germans were determined to hold the
line of the Stokhod to the last gasp. Kovel
was to them what Verdun had been to the
French.

The defence was decidedly favoured by the
topographical conditions of the country. The
Stokhod itself, it is true, is but a shallow stream
fordable at many points. Yet its passage is
impeded by the wide, marshy areas on both
its banks. The country round, except near
Kashovka, is completely flat, with a slight
tendency to elevation on the western side.
Through that low -lying plain winds the slug-
gish Stokhod, in the midst of banks of reeds
and beds of water-lilies. Artillery, especially

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

215

that of the heavier kind, can approach its belt
only in certain sectors, and the conditions in
that respect were especially bad on the eastern
side.

The defensive positions of the enemy on the
left bank had been partly prepared by the
Austrians in the autumn of 1915. Ever
since the Russians had broken through in
front of Lutsk, the Germans had been busy
converting them into first-class defences ; tens
of thousands of prisoners of 'war and of local
inhabitants, pressed for the purpose, were
compelled to work under the direction of
German engineers Consecutive lines of
trenches were built, land mines were laid,
mazes of barbed wire were simk among the
thick water growth, under the surface of the
slow-flowing river. A very considerable force
of artillery was brought up for the defence of
the Stokhod line ; according to the best
Russian authorities no less than 100 heavy
guns and 180 of a lighter calibre were gathered
in front of Kovel. Nor was there any la"k of
men — by now far less abundant with the
enemy than material. Picked troops — Bava-
rians, Magyars, Austrian Germans and Polish
Volunteers — were facing the Great Russian

Finnish, Siberian and Turkestan divisions of
our Allies. The numbers of the enemy were
even sufficient to enable him to answer with
vigorous and costly counter-offensives the
attacks of the Russians.

The gathering of troops and material
for the defence of Kovel seems to have
begun directly after our Allies had resumed
their offensive in Volhynia — i.e., in the
first days of July. " Fighting continues in
the Stokhod district," said the Petrograd
communique of July 11. "The enemy having
brought up reinforcements and advanced
powerful artillery, is offering a stubborn
resistance." A battle more fierce than any
that had as yet been seen in the Volhynian
offensive developed now on both sides of the
Kovel-Sarny and the Kovel-Rovno railways,
both armies suffering heavy casualties.
" Though we are already across the river at
several places," wrote The Times special
correspondent, Mr. Washburn, under date of
July 13, "it must not be expected that the
Russians will be able to rush in a few days
positions which are unquestionably stronger
than any since the enemy departed from his
first line before Rovno. Up to this time the

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THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

MAP TO ILLUSTRATE GENERAL SAKHAROFF'S ADVANCE.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

217

BEHIND A FORTIFIED LINE.
Russian officers outside a house in an Austrian rustic
village. Circle picture : An altar in the village.

enemy has certainly been out-manoeuvred,
out-marched, and fairly out-classed in all
particulars." Now, however, the fighting re-
sumed the character of trench warfare, resem-
bling the battles of Baranovitche and on the
Somme rather than those fought in Volhynia
and the Poliesie during the preceding five
weeks.

A few days after the line of the Stokhod had
been reached, about the middle of July, the
Russian offensive began to slow down, our
Allies contenting themselves with repelling
German attacks. At several places even some
withdrawals were made from the exposed
positions on the western bank of the river. It
seems more than likely that the statement of the
Russian Staff concerning the vital importance
of Kovel, issued at the time of the hottest
battles for the river-crossing?, was really-
meant as a blind, to cover the impending
offensive of General Sakharoff. It was well
known to Russian Headquarters that the
enemy was gathering considerable forces on
the southern flank of the Lutsk salient. It
would therefore have been, to say the least,
risky to engage very considerable forces (and
such would have been needed for a serious

offensive against Kovel) in an advance even
beyond the farthest existing salients to the
west, whilst Bothmer's army still maintained
its original positions in the centre, and fresh
trooops were being concentrated on its northern
flank, on the Stoyanoff-Brody front, for a
counter-offensive against Lutsk and Dubno.

It was not until the operations on the north-
western border of Galicia were reaching their
victorious conclusion that our Allies resumed
their offensive in northern Volhynia and on the
Stokhod. " To the west of Lutsk," said the
Petrograd report of July 28, " our troops took
the offensive and broke through the whole
first lino of the enemy, inflicting severe losses
upon him. Our troops are now advancing, and

218

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

our cavalry is pursuing the fleeing enemy.
In this district we have captured 46 guns
(including G howitzers), 6 machine-guns, about
50 officers (including 2 generals and 2 com-
manders of regiments), and over 9,000 men. '

On the Stokhod itself the two armies of
Generals Lesh and Kaledin opened their
offensive on July 28, at 1 o'clock in the after-
noon. The first day's fighting proved extremely
successful, resulting in important strategic
gains, and in the capture, within the first hour
of the attack, of 38 guns, two being heavy and
all German, and 4,000 (mostly German)
prisoners. In the region of Gulevitche, not far
from the spot where the Kovel-Sarny railway
crosses the Stokhod, Russian troops, having

GENERAL SAKHAROFF,
Commanded the Eleventh Russian Army.

built bridges, passed to the left bank of the
river, where they took up strong positions.
Similarly a crossing was again forced in the
district of Kashovka. The most important
move, however, was made, and the greatest
success was scored, in the direction of the
village of Ozeriany, along the head-waters of
the Stokhod, where the river is less wide. The
simultaneous pressure on the entire front round
Kovel made it difficult for the enemy to shift
the local reserves which he had at his disposal
in that district. But " on account of the
extraordinary nature of the German defences,"
wrote, under date of July 29, the special corre-
spondent of The Times, Mr. Washburn, then
with Headquarters on the Stokhod front, " we
must not expect the Russians to run over them
in a few days. The results already attained
are extraordinary, when the strength of the

German positions and the quantities of guns
and ammunition are considered. Our losses
are incredibly small, viewed in the light of
what has been accomplished."

Even the Germans had to acknowledge the
signal success of their opponents, though they
did so with hardly veiled annoyance. " North-
west of Lutsk," said the Berlin report of
July 29, " after several unsuccessful attacks,
the enemy succeeded in penetrating our lines
at Trysten, and obliged us to evacuate the
positions we still held in front of the Stokhod."
During the following days the successes of
July 29 were systematically developed. By
noon of July 30 — i.e., within 48 hours
from the commencement of the offensive, the
number of captured guns had risen to 49, that
of prisoners to 9,000. A desperate battle was
proceeding at Gulevitche. Meantime, the
Russian troops which had crossed the Stokhod
at Kashovka extended their gains for 5£ miles
beyond the river, whilst on the left bank the
movement was slowly swinging forward with
the village of Perehody for its approximate
axis. On July 31 further captures of ground
and men were made in the bends of the Stokhod.
At one point the whole 31st Honved Regiment
was taken prisoners by our Allies, together
with their regimental commander and his
entire staff. As a further illustration of the
enemy's losses may serve the fact that in the
battles fought during the last days of July the
41st Honved Division was cut to 4,000, and the
4th Austrian Division to 3,000 men. No less
heavy were the losses of the G ermans and of the
Polish Legions. And again the Berlin report
of July 30 growled out its unwilling, distorted
admissions :

" Army Group of Von Linsingen. — Enemy
attacks in increased strength are reported.
With the exception of some sectors, these at-
tacks are now being made on the whole front
from Stobychva to the west of Berestechko.
They all collapsed with gigantic losses. . . .
During the night the. withdrawal, which had
been planned for a long time from the Stokhod
curve, which projects towards the east and
north of the Kovel-Rovno railway, to a shorter
line was carried through without interference
by the enemy."

In the first days of August further fighting
took place on the entire front — round Stoby-
chva, Smoliary, Gulevitche, Sitovitche and
Syeltse, down to Kisielin, culminating on
August 3-4 in the battle for Rudka Mirynska,

Russian engineers repairing bridges destroyed by the Austrians. Centre picture :
Cavalry crossing a hastily built bridge.
ADVANCE OF GENERAL SAKHAROFF'S TROOPS.
219

Russian

220

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

a village on the east bank of the Stavok (a left-
hand tributary of the Stokhod). Having
reached, on August 2, the front Sitovitche-
Yanovka within the big bend of the Stokhod,
our Allies proceeded to attack the next defen-
sive line of the enemy. On August 3, before
dawn, the Russian artillery opened a heavy
bombardment of these positions. About 1 p.m.
Turkestan regiments broke through the Austrian
defences north of Budka Mirynska, occupied
the hamlets of Popovka and Yastremiets, and
reached the Miryn-Poviersk road. Then Rudka
Mirynska itself was attacked. The battle
developed into bayonet fighting in the streets
of the village, which changed hands several
times. About 4.30 p.m., the enemy opened a
counter-attack along the entire line. Bava-
rians, the Third Brigade of the Polish Legions
under Count Sheptyski, and Germans from
Lower Austria and Southern Moravia belonging
to the army corps of General von Fath, opened
an encircling movement against the Turkestan
troops holding the village and district of
Rudka Mirynska. A series of enemy attacks
were repulsed. Finally, however, about 3 a.m.,
our Allies evacuated the salient, which the
village was now forming, and fell back 400-600
yards to the east.

The battle of Rudka Mirynska closes the
second stage of the fighting on the Stokhod.
The result of the week's operations consisted in
the river line having been forced on almost the

entire front. The enemy troops holding the
district had thus lost one of their main natural
defensive lines, and a good start had been
gained by our Allies for an attack against
Kovel, should the developments in other parts
of the line make such a movement desirable.

On a level with the greatest feats of the
armies of Generals Kaledin, Lechitsky and Lesh
stands the offensive undertaken in the second
half of July from the southern flank of the
Lutsk salient by General Sakharoff, command-
ing the Eleventh Russian Army, and well known
from the time of the Russo-Japanese War as
Chief of General Kuropatkin's Staff. The
enemy, in view of the utter failure of his offen-
sive against Lutsk, on the Kovel-Rozhyshche
line, had decided in July to make another
desperate attempt at driving in the Russian
salient in Volhynia by means of an attack from
the south. A highly developed net of roads
and railways radiating from Lvoff in the direc-
tion of the Volhynian frontier supported the
movements of his forces ; besides the double-
track Lvoff-Krasne-Brody line, he had at his
disposal the Lvoff-Stoyanoff and the Lvoff-
Sokal-Vladimir Volynsk railways. In view of
their superiority in communications the Austro-
German commanders hoped to be able to effect
a sudden concentration of men and material,
and then, by a sharp flank attack against Lutsk
and Dubno, to undo the results of the preceding

RUSSIAN ARTILLERY ON THE WAY TO THE FRONT.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

221

GENERAL SAKHAROFF'S ARMY
A Russian General conducts an attack by field
telephone. Smaller picture : The Russian Com-
mander consults General Turbin.

six weeks of Russian operations in Volhynia.
The phalanx of Linsmgen and Boehm-Ermolli
was to include on this front 20 divisions, and
July 18 was the date chosen for the opening
of this Austro-German counter-offensive

Our Allies could hardly have assembled an
equal force in such short time. The movement
had therefore to be forestalled and frustrated
by an attack whilst the enemy concentration
was still incomplete. On July 15, south-west
of Lutsk and Dubno, the Austro-German com-
manders had gathered as yet only some seven
infantry and four cavalry divisions. Among
the infantry divisions were the 7th, 48th and
61st Austro-Hungarian and the 22nd, 43rd and
108th German divisions — the 48th and 61st
Austro-Hungarian divisions havingbeen brought
up from the Trentino, the 22nd German division
from the Dvinsk front, and the 43rd from Ver-
dun. Their front extended from about Shklin,
past TJgrinoff, Zlotchevka and Mikhailovka
(sometimes called Boremel) to Novoselki on
the western bank of the Styr ; on the right
bank of the river it stretched across the region
of Verben to the Pliaskevka and then in a
southerly direction, across fairly high wooded

hills, to Radziviloff on the Lvoff-Brody-Rovno
railway.

Four stages can be distinguished in the
offensive of General Sakharoff which opened
during the night of July 15-16 and lasted for
about a month. The object of the first attack
(July 15-17) was to frustrate the offensive plan
of the enemy by deranging and destroying his
preparations. The aim was brilliantly achieved,
and the Austro-German forces had to fall back

222

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAE.

ENEMY TRENCHES IN VOLHYNIA.

on the line of the Lipa (a left-hand tributary of
the Styr). Then, between July 20-22, followed
the second battle which resulted in the forcing
of the Lipa and the capture of Berestechko.
The Lutsk salient, of which the enemy had
planned to drive in the left flank by means of a
thrust from the south, was rapidly extending up
the western bank of the Styr. The battle for
Brody which opened on July 25 and closed with
the fall of that town on July 28 formed the
third stage of the offensive. The fourth and last
step in General Sakharoff 's advance came as the
result of an attack against the Brody-Zalostse-
Vorobiyovka front. The victories gained on that
iine brought his forces into the direct neighbour-
hood of the Lvoff-Krasne-Tarnopol railway, and
this, in conjunction with General Lechitsky's
offensive against Stanislavoff, caused the with-
drawal of Count Bothmer's Army from its
unconquerable positions on the Sereth -Strypa
line.

On July 15 a minor engagement was fought
on the Sviniukhy and the Ostroff-Gubin front
with results favourable to our Allies. On
the same day, at 4 p.m., began the Russian
bombardment on the entire Bludoff-Shklin-
Zlotchevka front. The night which followed was
wet and rainy, and as the fire was distributed
in equal voliune all along the line, the enemy does

not seem at first to have taken any alarm as to
what was coming. Soon afterwards the Russian
artillery commenced, in its usual style, cutting
breaches in the barbed wire entanglements.
Thus, for instance, in front of a Siberian
army corps which had achieved world fame
in the battle on the Bzura in January, 1915,
and was now to play a leading part in the
attack, the Russian guns had cut by midnight
10 avenues, each approximately 20 paces
broad. The attack was timed for 3 a.m.
The chief blow was struck from Shklin and
Ugrinoff in a due southerly direction. Wading
under the machine-gun and rifle fire in water
and marsh above their waists, often to their
armpits, the Russians crossed the river and
forced the Austrian and German positions on
its southern bank. At the same time, in the
angle between the Styr and the Lower Lipa, an
attack was delivered in a westerly direction.
In an interview with the Petrograd Corre-
spondent of The Times, on July 22, General
Alexeieff, Chief of the Russian Staff, made the
following comment on the first stage of General
Sakharoff'.s offensive : " General Sakharoff
accomplished a brilliant feat of arms on
July 16 at the expense of the 48th and 61st
Austrian Divisions. Pivoting his army on
Bludoff he manoeuvred on the enemy's flank,

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

223

shepherding the Austrians and driving them in
full rout during the night a distance of nearly
seven miles ; he badly mauled the 22nd German
Division, transferred from the Dvinsk front,
and also the above-mentioned 43rd Division,
which tried to save the hard-pressed soldiers of
the Archduke Joseph-Ferdinand. The latest
accounts show that General Sakharoff is
developing his success with extraordinary
rapidity and is crossing the two rivers in pursuit
of the foe."

No less important than from the strategic
point of view was the victory on the Mikhailovka
front when measured in terms of captures of
men and material. As the enemy had been
preparing in that region for a big offensive, his
accumulation of stores proved enormous.
Every peasant's hut was stacked with shells
and small-arm ammunition, while huge supplies
were accumulated in all the important villages.
Of the three biggest ammunition stores captured
by the Russians on July 16, one alone contained
35,570 projectiles of different calibres, 5,230
grenades, and an enormous quantity of car-
tridges, as well as three searchlights, a band, a
military tailoring depot, field kitchens, and a
large quantity of barbed wire, telephone wire,

and other war material. On the same day 317
officers (including two commanders of regiments
with one entire regimental staff) and 12,037
men were taken prisoners, and 30 guns (of
which 17 were of heavy calibre — 4-inch and
9-inch), 49 machine guns and 36 bomb and
mine-throwers were captured. Some of the '
heavy guns were in perfect condition and could
almost immediately be turned against their late
owners. The counter-attacks meantime under-
taken by the Germans on the western flank, in
the Zviniany-Elizaroff region, proved of no avail.
And again Vienna made its acknowledgment
of defeat — with its inevitable compliments to
the saving Germans and its customary lies con-
cerning Russian numbers and the character of
their own retreat. "To the south-west of
Lutsk," says the Austrian official communique
of July 17, " the Russians attacked with
superior forces. The front sector near Shklin
withdrew into the district to the east of Coro-
khoff. Covered on the western flank by a
counter-attack delivered by German bat-
talions, the allied troops fighting to the south
of Lutsk were thereupon withdrawn behind
the Lipa without being disturbed by the
enemy."

WITH GENERAL SAKHAROFF'S ARMY.
Dawn on the battlefield : Russian and Austrian wounded.

224

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

The heavy rains about the middle of July
tlireatened to put serious obstacles in the way
of a further Russian advance ; the rivers were
rising and the marshes were becoming almost
impassable. Still General Sakharoff pressed
forward his advance, and that across most
difficult ground, at points where it was least
expected. It was on historic fields that the
second battle of his offensive was fought
on July 20-22 Previous to the eighteenth
century the Crimean Tartars, emerging from
the Wild Fields of Southern Russia, used to
invade periodically the Ukraina, Podolia and
even Volhynia. Crossing the Dnieper at the
so-called Tartars' Ford, they followed certain
regular paths. One of their main roads —
named the Black Route — led past Loshnioff
(about half-way between Berestechko and
Brody). In 1651 they were advancing along
that road as allies of the Cossacks, who since
1648 had risen in arms against the attempts of
the Polish magnates and gentry to convert into
serfs them, the free peasants of the Ukrain?,
On the fields of Berestechko their armies were
defeated by the Poles under King John Casimir.

This time it was a vanquishing army which
was advancing on Berestechko. The Russian
attack was carried out on concentric lines, the
pincers closing in from the north and from the
east, across the Lipa south of Mikhailovka and

across the Styr, south-west of Verben. On the
Lipa, having once overcome the difficulties of
crossing the marshy valley under concentrated
fire, the Russian troops broke fairly easily
through the Austrian front. On the Styr,
having dislodged the enemy from the village
of Verben and from the organized works south
of it, General Sakharoff's troops routed the
Austrians, intercepting big numbers of the
demoralized enemy. Thus — e.g.t between Ver-
ben and Pliashevo, on the right bank of the
Styr, south of its confluence with the Lipa — the
entire 13th Austrian Landwehr Regiment was
surrounded and captured. With their moral
fallen to such a low level, the Austrians could
no longer offer any serious resistance.

The Styr was crossed by the Russians on the
same day, and after a short fight on the sur-
rounding heights our Allies entered the town
of Berestechko.* In this battle fell Colonel
Tataroff, the conqueror of Kozin f ; wounded
in the heart by a shrapnel bullet, he exclaimed,
" I am killed," and then by a supreme effort
got up, and with his last breath gave the word
of command : " Regiment — Charge ! "

By the end of the next day (July 21) the
defeat of General von Boehm-Ermolli's left

* The town of Berestechko was known in the 16th
century as an important centre of the Polish Unitarians,
the so-called Socinians.

t Ci. Chapter CXXXVII., p. 26.

AN AUSTRIAN BOMB-PROOF TELEPHONE SHELTER.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

225

COLONEL TATAROFF.

The Russian officer, who on the Styr, was wounded
in the heart by a shrapnel bullet. Before dying he
gave his last word of command : Regiment — Charge I

wing was complete. The Russians, having
captured in these two days more than 300
officers and 12,000 men, were on both sides of
the Styr closing in against the Galician frontier.
General Sakharoffs offensive was changed in
character and direction. All danger of an
enemy attempt against the Lutsk salient from
the south was now gone, its line was improved
and its left flank covered. General Sakharoffs
operations which had begun as a movement in
defence of the convex Russian line in Volhynia,
passed, after the first task had been accom-
plished, into a flank attack against the Austro-
German centre on the Strypa-Sereth line.
The offensive now developed south-east of the
Styr, on Galician ground, and was directed
against the Brody-Zalostse-Vorobiyovka front.
By July 22 the fate of Brody was sealed.
The military hospitals were cleared. The
Austrian authorities began to evacuate the
town. The post office left on July 25. On
the same day " evacuation trains " were
placed at the disposal of the civilian popu-
lation. Stores were removed. In short, pro-
fiting from their vast experience in retreats,
the Austrians were carrying out this one in a
most systematic manner. Indeed, the evacua-
tion was so thorough that during the next

days whatever population had remained behind
was in danger of starvation, as no sufficient
stores had been left for them. The following
is the description given by an eye-witness of
the last days in Brody : " The town is empty.
Of its 20,000 inhabitants hardly 6,000 are left.
Few civilians are seen in the streets, and all
traffic ceases early at night. The shops are
closed, the public gardens, crowded a short
time ago, are now deserted and forsaken. The
battle-front is but a few miles out of Brody,
and so the roar of the guns is deafening. The
nights are frightful, no one can shut an eye.
There is some kind of new Russian guns of a big
calibre ; when these start booming, mirrors and
pictures fall off the walls, the window-panes
clatter like mad, and the houses shake as in an
earthquake. One can also clearly hear in the
town the continuous rattle of machine-guns ;
the voices of war and the breath of death
reach the town and pass even beyond it. . . .

" Austrian captive balloons continually soar
above the town. Frequently we hear the
rattling of Russian aeroplanes, which recon-
noitre the entire district ; some of the aviators
are French or British. . . ."

Tho last two " evacuation trains " left Brody
late at night on Thursday, July 27. Of these
one passed through Lvoff on Friday at 1 p.m.,
the other remained throughout the day in a
little station on the road, waiting for orders
where to take the unfortunate " evacuated."
Although the Austrian Government is very
particular to carry away all population which
might be of any use to the Russians, or show

Heights in Metres.

MAKUTRA^ -'/

THE BRODY FRONT.

226

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

sympathies lor the " enemy cause," it is
much less careful about their future. The
barracks for Galician " refugees " at Chocnia
will for all time remain one of the most out-
standing examples of the criminal indolence
and thoughtlessness of the Austrian bureau-
cracy. " They are built in a marshy region,"
writes the Cracow daily Glos Narodu of
August 0, 191(5, "where there is no good
drinking water available. The barracks were
hastily constructed and do not answer the
requirements of hygiene. In fact, it is diffi-
cult to speak of hygiene when 500 or more
people have to live in a dark hut, which
can hardly be properly heated m winter,
and where vermin of all kinds has taken up
for good its abode." The Austrian censor-
ship has never allowed the statistics of mor-
tality at Chocnia to be published, but it
can be learned from a statement made in
June, 1916, by Count Lasocki to the Austrian
Minister of the Interior, and printed, though
with deletions by the censor, in the Glos Narodu
of July 3, that 1,300 cases of death had oc-
curred in the camp harbouring an average of
5,000 refugees. In July, 1910, typhus was no
longer prevalent, but typhoid and scarlet

fever and small-pox were still claiming scores
of victims. Into that camp hundreds of fresh
" evacuated " were moved in the course of the
month.

The following was the disposition of the
enemy defences round Brocly on the night of
July 24 — i.e., on the eve of the Russian offen-
sive against the town : His left flank rested
on the Styr, near its junction with the Slonovka
(about two miles north-east of Loshnioff).
Here it was perfectly safe against any possible
attempts at outflanking from the west. The
corner between the Styr and the Slonovka
is an impassable marsh several miles wide.
South of it, on the Upper Styr, between
Loshnioff and the Brody-Lvoff railway,
stretches a forest, about 15 miles long and
about 12 miles wide. This forest could not
have been crossed without long and elaborate
preparations, and even then, in view of the
complete absence of good roads, this could
have only been done at a very slow rate. East
of the Styr the enemy positions followed up
to about Batkoff the line of the river Slonovka
(in its upper course, above its junction with
the Sitenka, called Sestratyn). The wooded

FROM THE AUSTRIAN ENTRENCHMENTS.
Bursting of a shell: Russian infantrymen taking cover in the long grass.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR

227

THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE: EXAMINING GERMAN PRISONERS.

heights round the village of Butchina,* at the
headwaters of the Ikva, formed on the right
flank the corner bastion of the enemy positions,
which thus stretched from north-west to south-
east for about 10 miles on each side of
Brody.

The positions in front of Brody themselves
were very strong by nature. Everywhere the
broad belt of dangerous marshes on both sides
of the Slonovka-Sestratyn river formed the
first line of defence. South of Loshnioff, the
entire space between the Slonovka and the
parallel stream of the Boldurka is filled by the
forest called Gaydzisko ; on its south-western
flank extend the marshes of the Boldurka,
more than a mile wide. And again, between
Height 238 (north-west of the Brody-Radzi-
viloff high road) and the village of Gaye
Dytkovietskie f extends another forest as
long as, though narrower than, the Forest
Gaydzisko. Thus there are only two gaps in
this belt of forests, one north-west, the other
south-west of Brody. In the north-western
gap, about three and a half miles wide, lie the

* The Makutra, Mogila, etc. Their average height is
about 1,200 feet, and they rise about 400 feet above the
ground north-east of them and about 700 feet above the
level of the Sestratyn valley.

t The name itself of this settlement^GayeDytkoviet-
ekie— means " the Woods of Dytkovtse."

three villages of Shniroff, Klekotoff and
Opariptse, which were to be the scene of the
severest fighting in the battle for Brody.
Between Shniroff and Klekotoff lies a wood
called Volanik. The southern gap, at the foot
of the Makutra Height, is hardly a mile wide,
and may best be denoted by the name of the
adjoining hamlet of Vieselova.

July 25, 1.30 a.m. Petrograd time — i.e.,
3 a.m. Central European summer time — marked
the beginning of the battle for Brody. The
Russian attack proceeded in three directions :
against Loshnioff, against the Klekotoff-
Opariptse front, and against the Vieselova
line. The most serious of the three was the
attempt in the centre, striking directly at
Brody ; the other two movements aimed
merely at outflanking the key of the enemy's
positions, the fortified heights of Klekotoff
AYhilst in the centre several hours of bombard
ment preceded the infantry attacks, in the
sector of Loshnioff the Russian batteries did
not open fire until the infantry had reached
the southern bank of the Slonovka. Unseen
by the Austrians, soon after dark, the Russians
had laid a causeway across the swamps among
the reeds of the valley, and the first line of
Austrian trenches south of Loshnioff, on the
left bank of the Slonovka, was carried by

228

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

surprise. By the morning our Allies had
captured the fortified village of Lasovo, * in
the north-eastern corner of the forest Gay-
dzisko. But inside the forest the Austrians
held strong fortified lines, which enabled their
beaten forces to withdraw beyond the river
Boldurka, though not without heavy losses in
guns and prisoners. Only the south-eastern
part of the forest, on the line of the Heights
246 and 219, remained in the hands of the
enemy.

On the other flank, near Batkoff, where the
valley of the Sestratyn is very narrow, the first
step — the crossing — did not present any serious
difficulties, but the further advance was exceed-
ingly slow work ; the country round was
dominated by the heavy Austrian batteries on
the Makutra.

In the centre the Russian infantry opened
in the early morning an attack against the
Opariptse front. The town of Radziviloff and
the surrounding forests on the Russian side
offered the attacking troops favourable con-
* " Lasovo " means the " village in the forest."

ditions for approaching the river. Here,
however, they had to face most serious diffi
culties. On the northern side, in front of
Shniroff and Klekotoff, the marshes are too
wide to be crossed ; and in the more favourable
sector in the south almost the entire front is
taken up by the village of Opariptse, which
had been strongly fortified by the enemy.
(Opariptse, and the village of Berlin on the
Boldurka north of Brody, were originally
German settlements, and are not clustered
villages of the Slav type, but are laid out as a
single long street of substantial, well-built
homesteads. Opariptse is about a mile and a
half long.)

One Russian attack against Opariptse fol-
lowed the other ; many of them broke down
under the intense fire of the enemy's artillery
and machine-guns. Whenever our Allies suc-
ceeded in gaining a foothold on the Austrian
side, the enemy, with a total disregard of
losses, delivered desperate counter-attacks.
Many of the best troops of General von Boehm-
Ermolli's army were engaged — Magyar, Vicn-

THE DESERTED BATTLEFIELD.
Austrian trenches and dug-outs captured by the Russians during the great advance.

THE TIMES HISTORY OE THE WAR.

•229

FOR CONSPICUOUS BRAVERY.
Cossack troops quartered in the late Austrian
Custom House, ltskani, Bukovina. The Cossack
on the left was thrice decorated for bravery.
Smaller picture : Russian soldiers receiving the
Cross of St. George on the battlefield.

nese, Bosnian and Galician regiments fought
in the battle for Brody. Opariptse was not
taken until the sixth Russian attack. Yet
even this success was no more than a first
step : our Allies had merely obtained a safe
crossing of the Sestratyn. Even now they
stood only at the foot of the hills which extend
from Klekotoff to Height 238, and which
formed the main Austrian line of defence.

But at this stage help came from the division
which had crossed the Slonovka, at Loshnioff,
and had been working its way through the
Forest Gaydzisko. Advancing step by step,
they emerged from the forest and captured
the village of Shniroff. On the morning of
July 27 the Austrian line of defence followed
the Boldurka as far as the village of Bielavtse ;
from here it extended through the forest of
Volanik to Klekotoff ; from Klekotoff, along
the range of hills facing Opariptse to Height
238, and the forest on both, sides of the Brody-
RadzivilofT road and railway. The Russian
infantry continued on July 27 its attacks
against the positions above Opariptse, the
enemy counter-attacking immediately when-
ever any gain was effected. At 5 p.m. our
Allien had captiv»d the main positions south

of Klekotoff. Still the Austrians did not give
up the game for lost. One of the best Magyar
regiments was ordered to counter-attack.
But whilst this movement was developing, all
of a sudden Russian troops appeared on the
left flank and in the rear of the attacking
Magyars. Our Allies had forced their way
through the Forest Volanik. The Klekotoff

280

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

AFTER CZERNOVITZ.
Hire engines from the Railway Station, Czernovitz, being conveyed across the Rumanian frontier.

positions were lost to the enemy. About the
same time the Russian forces began to emerge
from the forest near the village of Gaye
Dytkovietslrie. These two movements decided
the battle for Brody. Throughout the night
rearguard actions were still continued by the
enemy on the heights and in the forests and
villages north of the town. On July 28, at
0.30 a.m., our Allies entered Brody for the third
time during the War, after almost a year of
Austrian occupation.* "The plan for General
Sakharoff's offensive against Brody," wrote
the special correspondent of The Times, Mr.
Washburn, under date of July 28, " was laid
out on a schedule. I have watched every
phase of it, and it has moved without a single
hitch, and Brody has been taken within 24
hours of the exact time planned by the General
when he began the movement two weeks ago.
I think that this represents one of the most
remarkable achievements of the war, for even

* Russian cavalry entered Brody for the first time oh
August 14, 1914, but had to withdraw on August 18.
Two days later our Allies re-entered the town, and
remained there until September 2, 1915. From Sep-
tember, 1915, till June, 1916, the headquarters of the
Second Austro-Hungarian Army under General, von
Boehm-Ermolli were at Brody.

the clever Germans have never been able to
keep their movements up to schedule time."

During the three days of fighting for Brody
(July 25-28), General Sakharoff's troops took
prisoners 210 officers and 13,569 soldiers,
besides capturing a great amount of arms and
ammunition. The total of their captures since
July 16 amounted now to 940 officers, 39,152
men, 49 guns (17 of heavy calibre), and an
enormous amount of other booty.

With the fall of Brody opens the last stage
of General Sakharoff's offensive. On a front
of about 50 miles his army was facing the
Krasne-Zlochoff-Tarnopol line, the best-built
railway in Eastern Galicia, and the most im-
portant line of communication in the rear of
Count Bothmer's Army. A distance varying
from about 10 miles in the region of Zalostse to
about 20 miles round Brody intervened between
that railway and the Russian troops. To
break through along the Brody-Krasne railway
would have proved a practically impossible
task. Hardly any roads lead across the wide
marshes and through the forests which extend
round the head-waters of the Bug and Styr.
Moving along the railway from Brody to

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

231

Krasne, one passes in the first 12 miles hamlets,
■woods, and fields bearing these names : " Near
the ponds," "on the islands," "in the mud,"
"in the hollows," " behind the swamp,"
" behind the mud," " the great island," " the old
pond," " next to the swamp." No wonder, then,
that the road avoids that district, and runs
further east past Sukhodoly (" dry valley ") and
Podhortse ( "next to the mountain"). This, the
only first-class high-road running from the
frontier of Volhynia and Galieia to the Krasne-
Tarnopol railway — namely, from Brody to
Zlochoff — keeps to the north-western side of
the ridge which forms the watershed between
the Bug, the Styr, and the Sereth — i.e., between
the basins of the Vistula, the Dnieper, and the
Dniester. The road from Brody, which encir-
cles that ridge from the east, has its terminus
at Pieniaki. These two roads were the only
lines of communication at the disposal of
General Sakharoff's forces in their advance
against the left flank of Count Bothmer's
Army.

Still, even these roads could be used only
to a very limited extent. In the triangle
Brody - Krasne - Tarnopol all the numerous
marshy rivers flow north-west and south-
east— i.e., parallel to the Brody-Tarnopol
side of the triangle, and all the ridges (except
the irregular heights of the watershed) follow
the same direction. An attack, cutting this
series of strong defensive lines at right angles,
was perfectly unthinkable. Hence General
Sakharoff had to adopt a different plan.
From Brody he moved his army across
the heights round the watershed on to
the Podkamien-Pieniaki line (and also for
about two or three miles south-west of
Pieniaki), whilst in the direction of the Krasne-
Tarnopol railway he advanced only as much as
was necessary to cover the flank of the forces
on the Pieniaki-Podkamien front. The forces
on that front stood with their flank to the
Krasne-Tarnopol railway, but as this railway
cuts the upper valleys of the Strypa and Sereth
and their confluents, a movement down these
valleys was bound, if successful, to strike
at the railway in the rear of Count Bothmer's
positions, which faced Tarnopol on the Voro-
biyovka-GIadki line.

General Sakharoff's strategy seems to have
taken the Austro-German commanders by
surprise. They had withstood for many
months attacks from the north-east, on the
Zalostse-Novo Alexiniets line. They did not

expect an offensive moving parallel to their
basic lines. Especially unlikely did such a
movement appear in view of the obstacles which
it had to encounter on the Nushche-Zagozhe
front. A transversal depression cutting the
lines of the ridges and streams marks there the
border line between the wooded district of
Brody and the more open coimtry round
Tarnopol. The hollows in that depression form
a string of small lakes ; these are as the base
of a trident, of which the three arms are the
Sereth on the left, the Graberka in the centre,
and the Seretets on the right. Three streams
unite in the lake of Ratyshche, and from here
flow as the River Sereth in a south-easterly
direction, through the lakes of Zalostse, past
Gladki towards Tarnopol.

On August 4 General Sakharoff opened liis
offensive against the Nushche-Zagozhe front.
Following the Graberka from Pieniaki the
Russians advanced against the village Zvizhyn.
The Atistrians offered absolutely desperate
resistance on ground on which, had it been
properly fortified and held, probably any attacks
might have been resisted. Our Allies, however,
did not leave them the time to repair their
mistakes. Their advance was most impetuous ;
by the night of August 5 they had carried in
bayonet charges the villages of Zvizhyn,
Mezhdygory, Ratyshche, Gnidava and Chysto-
pady, whilst another Russian force broke
through from the eastern flank across the
Zalostse line. The victory was decisive.
Although the Germans were now throwing
in reinforcements in great numbers, they
could merely delay, but never more reverse,
the movement. On August 6 our Allies
occupied the villages of Renioff and Trost-
sianiets Vielki. The number of prisoners
captured by the Russians in the. three days of
fighting, August 4-6, by itself gives an idea of
the size and success of those operations : they
captured 166 officers and 8,415 men.

Their advance continued past Neterpintse,
Nosovtse and Vertelka. On August 10 they
reached the outskirts of the village of Neste-
rovtse, only about four miles north-west of the
Gladki- Vorobiyovka line. The northern end
of Count Bothmer's positions on the Sereth-
Strypa front was outflanked and even turned.
The eleventh hour had struck for the retreat
of his army — especially as south of the Dniester
General Lechitsky was threatening to cut off
his line of communication along the Trans-
versal Railway.

•232

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

THE AUSTRIAN RETREAT: RELICS ON THE BATTLEFIELD.

By June 23 the Ninth Russian Army under
General Lechitsky had practically completed
the conquest of the Bukovina. In the west it
had already crossed the Galician frontier, on
the border of Transylvania it had advanced
within short distance of the main passes. It
was not, however, the occupation of the
Bukovina itself, but its further consequences,
which were of the greatest account from the
strategic point of view. The Bukovinian
border is the most open and most vulnerable
frontier of Rumania Most of the Bukovina
forms not merely linguistically, but also geo-
graphically, an integral part of Rumania. In
the Bukovinian mountains lie the sources of
the three most important rivers of Moldavia,
the Sereth, the Moldava, and the Bystrytsa.
Their valleys are so many gates opening to the
south ; important roads and railways lead along
these rivers into Rumania. Of all the belli-
gerent States, Rumania, if she intervened,
would have in proportion to her size and
population by far the longest frontier. Hence
it was of considerable importance to her that
the gates into Moldavia should be secured
before she entered the war. Moreover, the
Russian advance into the Carpathian passes
on the north-eastern frontier of Hungary

was certain to assist her considerably in her
main task in the War — the liberation of
Transylvania.

Exactly those factors which made the
strategic importance of the Bukovina for
Rumania deprived it of strategic value with
regard to the Galician theatre of war. The face
of the Bukovina is turned to the south-west.
Its net of roads and railways in no way inter-
venes between those of Galicia and Hungary ;
it can be cut off without any appreciable
loss to the systems of communications of the
two neighbouring countries. In the spring of
1915 the Russians had occupied most of Galicia
and had been crossing the Carpathians without
holding the Bukovina or even Kolomea.*
Could the Austro-Hungarian armies have
stopped the Russian advance on the line
Chortoviets - Gvozdziets - Zablotoff - Pistyn, the
mere loss of the Bukovina would have had no
serious direct influence on the position on the
Galician front. All the points and lines of

* For the Russians, however, the loss of the Novosie-
litsa-Czemovitz-KoIomea line in January-February,
1915, meant more than, under normal circumstances, it
would have implied to the Austrians. It cut their direct
connexion with Bessarabia and Southern Russia. That
is why they tried hard to re'cover it in May and June of
the sains year.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAIi.

233

considerable strategic value in south-eastern
Galicia lie to the west of Kolomea. They may
be grouped under four headings :

1 The Dniester Crossings. — The river can
be crossed most easily between Halitch and
Nizhnioff. Its banks are free from marshes such
as surround its upper course above Halitch,
and do not form as yet a deep, winding canon
as below Nizhnioff. Two railways and three
roads cross the Dniester within the 20 miles
between these two towns. The side which holds
these crossings can establish a much more
effective cooperation between its armies on the
two banks of the Dniester than is possible for
its opponents.

2. The Transversal Railway. — There are two
big trunk railways crossing Galicia east and
west : the Cracow-Przemysl-Lvoff-Tarnopol-
Volotchysk line in the north, and the Khabovka-
Yaslo-Sanok-Sambor - Stanislavoff - Butchatch -
Husiatyn line at the foot of the Carpathians.
This latter, called the Transversal Railway,
formed for the Austro-German forces in Eastern
Galicia one of their main lines of communication
with the west. In the summer of 1916 the part
of it most directly exposed to a flank attack by
General Lechitsky's forces was the Stanislavoff-
Tysmienitsa-Nizhnieff sector.

3. The Stanislavoff '-Delatyn-Marmaros Sziget
Railway is the only line which connected the
East Galician theatre of war with Transylvania.
The next railway across the Carpathians, the
Lvoff-Stryj-Munkacs line, runs GO miles farther
west. It is obvious how great was the import-
ance of the Stanislavoff-Marmaros Sziget line
for the Austro-German armies in East Galicia
with a view to supplies, and also for the
general coordination of military operations in
Galicia and Transylvania.

4. The Yablonitsa and the Pantyr Passes,
opening into Transylvania.

At almost equal distances (about 30 miles)
from the Yablonitsa Pass, from Stanislavoff and
from Nizhnioff lies the town of Kolomea. The
"strategic zone" of south-eastern Galicia
extends west of Kolomea, the nearest point of
it being Delatyn, a station on the Stanislavoff-
Marmaros Sziget railway. Both these towns —
Kolomea and Delatyn — lie in the Pruth valley,
and the distance between them is about 20
miles. Kolomea, the junction of six railways
(two of them are local lines leading to the oil
district of Pechenizhyn) and of six high roads,
is the natural base for operations against the
" zone " to the west of it. After General
Lechitsky's Army had captured Czernovitz

WITH GENERAL SAKHAROFF'S ARMY.
German prisoners collecting their wounded and placing them in a Russian ambulance cart.

284

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

and secured its left flank in the Carpathians
against a counter-offensive from Transylvania,
Kolomea became its immediate objective.

A fortnight had passed since the defeat on
the Berdo Horodyshche and the capture of
Sniatyn (June 13). The attention of the
Russian forces having been taken \ip by the
forcing of the Pruth near Czernowitz and by the
conquest of the Bukovina, the enemy troops
which had withdrawn to the west had had time
to take \ip new positions. Their lines east of
Kolomea now stretched from near Niezviska
on the Dniester, up the River Chortoviets to the
district of Gvozdziets, then down the Cherniava
to Zablotoff on the Pruth, and from there
towards Pistyn in the Carpathians. On June 28
fieneral Lechitsky's army opened a general
offensive practically against the entire front,
whilst a regiment of Cossacks, having swum

RUSSIAN CAVALRY.

Scouts in South-Eastern Galicia. Smaller picture :
A typical cavalryman.

across the Dniester near Snovidoff, emerged in
the rear of the Austrian positions on the
Chortoviets. The attack of June 28 was a
most striking case of a carefully coordinated
plan, carried out with extraordinary vigour.
Before the impact of the blow the Austrian lines
simply collapsed ; they broke in and crumbled
like an empty shell. By 7 p.m. the captures
made by our Allies amounted to 221 officers and
10,285 men ; near Gvozdziets a Trans-Amur regi-
ment succeeded in taking a battery of four
6-inch guns, with their officers, gunners, horses
and ammunition. On the next day the Russians
entered Kolomea ; the panic -stricken Austrians
fled, unable to offer any further serious resist-
ance. They did not even find time to blow up
the railway station and its sidings. By July 2
the Russians were able to reopen it for traffic.
The town of Kolomea suffered hardly any
damage, as no serious fighting occurred within
its area. Only on its eastern outskirts some
five or six houses suffe ed from fire. But of the
normal population of Kolomea, which in peace
time exceeded 40,000, hardly 10,000 had been
left after the Austrian evacuation.

The further Russian advance to the west
proceeded both north and south of Kolomea.
An advance due west by the direct road leading
through the Pruth valley to Delatyn was
impracticable. Several strong defensive lines
across it had been prepared by the enemy,
and it would not have been possible to force
them as long as the hills and mountains south
of the road remained in his hands, as from
those heights his artillery was able to direct
a flanking fire against troops advancing from
Kolomea against the west. The attempt to
reach the Stanislavoff-Marmaros Sziget rail-

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

?35

way had, therefore, to be made in a
south-westerly direction, across the wooded,
mountains.

Meantime, the right wing of General Lechit-
sky's army and the adjoining troops of General
Shcherbacheff were pressing forward along
both banks of the Dniester. Having broken
through the Niezviska lines, they entered the
town of Obertyn on June 29. On the next day
one of the most extraordinary battles of the
war developed next to the Xiezviska-Tlumatch
road, east of Yeziezhany. The Austrians were
holding there a strong line of trenches covered
by the usual barrier of barbed wire entangle-
ments. Without waiting for any artillery pre-
paration, a brigade of Circassian cavalrv
opened a charge against the enemy lines. " The
sight was grand, though terrifying," is the
account given by a non-combatant eye-witness.
" With truly Circassian daring, the cavalrymen
attacked the trenches, carrying sabre and lance
in their hands, and the short kindzlml (Cir-
cassian dagger) in their teeth. As soon as the
riders appeared in the valley the machine-guns
started their horrible work. Confusion occurred
in the front rank. The wild cries of men and the
neighing of wounded horses mixed with the
rattling of machine-guns and the cracking of
rifles. Even more awful was the sight of the
riders who perished in the wire entanglements.
Still, with a wild contempt of death, the Cir-
cassians started cutting the wire. Many perished,
but the road was open for the surviving
squadrons. A fresh charge followed, and a real
massacre started in the trenches. The Cir-
cassians worked with sabres and kindzhals . . ."
Whoever from among the Austrians was able to
escape, fled in terror. On June 30, at noon, the
Circassian troops entered Yeziezhany. In
conformance with the Austrian retreat south
of the Dniester, the army of Count Bothmer, on
the left bank of the river, had also to withdraw
several miles to the west, on to the Koropiets
line, thus bending back still farther its right
wing. In this retreat, in the first days of July,
they suffered severe losses at the hands of the
pursuing Russian troops, especially in the
district round Monastezhysha.

Had the Russians been able to push forward
another 10 miles to the west, and had they
succeeded in capturing the Dniester crossings,
Bothmer's position in the centre would have
become untenable. Their advance had, there-
fore, to be stopped by the Austro-German
wmies on the Tlumatch line, or a general

retreat in East Galicia would have become
for them unavoidable. After General von
Pflanzer-Baltin's army had been broken up in
the Bukovina, its main body withdrew into the
Carpathians. That part, however, which had
effected its retreat on to Stanislavoff was linked
up with the " German Army of the South.''
Count Bothmer's line was thus extended to the
south, and he was put in charge of the defences
of the Dniester crossings. Towards the end of
June he received considerable reinforcements,
consisting mainly of fresh Prussian divisions.
On July 2 he opened his counter-offensive along
the southern bank of the Dniester. After a
violent bayonet fight in the village of Yeziez-
hany, our Allies had to withdraw before the
superior forces of the enemy. Still, in spite of
the most desperate attacks, the Germans did
not succeed in reaching the Niezviska Obertyn
line, and had finally to settle down on
the Yeziezhany-Khotsiiniezh-Zhukoff front.
"During these battles," wrote the Roman
Catholic curate of Yeziezhany, about the middle
of July, 1916, " 12 civilian inhabitants of my
village were killed and 20 wounded. In the
neighbouring village of Issakoff more than 100
people are said to have perished. On July 6
the Germans ordered the complete evacuation
of my parish on account of the artillery duel
which was proceeding, and which destroyed part

TST J"^ tiv

: i

M§

r ,;

Wrjr^^^^^L

GENERAL SHCHERBACHEFF.

236

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

of our village. About 1,500 people had to leave
their homesteads.

" On the way to Tlumatch, where we were
ordered to go, I saw many dead men and
horses lying unburied in the fields, poisoning
the air. Between Yeziezhany and Zhyvachoft
— i.e., between the opposing lines of trenches —
they are lying to the present day.

" I found Tlumatch deserted by most of
the town inhabitants, but rilled with peasants
who had been evacuated from the neighbouring
villages. These people do not want to go
any farther, but wish to weather here the
storm and return to their farms."

For the time being Count Bothmer had saved
his right flank from complete outflanking.
''The German troops which delivered repeated

WOUNDED RUSSIANS AND AUSTRIANS.

A novel form of Russian stretcher. Smaller picture:

War-worn Austrian prisoners.

heroic counter-attacks south of the Dniester,"
wrote the military correspondent of the
Frankfurter Zeilung under date of July 9,
" are preventing further envelopment." But
the Austrians west of Kolomea have again
" proved unable to make a stand." And
then he winds up his remarks in this pathetic,
desperate plea : " But in the interests of the
whole front it is necessary that the Austrians
should stand fast in that district. For even
the most heroic valour of our troops cannot
realize its aim if the adjoining positions are
not maintained."

Yet, however keen the Austrians must
have been to satisfy their irate allies, they
were unable to withstand the Russian offensive.
On June 30 the Russians entered Pistyn,
about 12 miles due south of Kolomea, and,
on the same day, pushed forward against
Berezoff, some six miles farther in a west-
north-western direction. Continuing their
advance through the mountains they reached
on July 3 Potok Charny, only six miles east
of the Delatyn-Marmaros Sziget railway.
On the following day they cut the railway
in the district of Mikulitchin, due west of

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

237

Berezoff, and 10 miles south of Delatyn.
Parallel with this movement, another advance
across the hills was carried out from Kolomea
against Pechenizhyn. Supported by some
excellent artillery work, the Russian infantry
forced its way into that town, about seven
miles west of Kolomea, on the very same day
on which the movement had been started.
The Austrians in their retreat were not even
able to destroy the bridges at Pechenizhyn.
The clearing of the mountains south of the
Kolomea-Delatyn road of enemy forces enabled
our Allies to effect their advance also along that
main highway. On July 4 they carried at
the point of the bayonet the Austrian positions
in the village of Sadzavka (more than half the
distance to Delatyn). Finally, on July 9,
the Petrograd official report was able to
announce the capture of Delatyn itself, which
had been effected on the previous day by the
army of General Lechitsky. One of the
main objectives of his offensive, the cutting
of the railway which connects East Galicia
with Transylvania had thus been attained,
and the second stage of the advance of the
Ninth Russian Army had reached its victorious
conclusion. In view of the slower development

in the north no further advance was now
intended by Russian Headquarters south of
the Dniester. In their evening communique
of July 9 they published a summary of the
captures made during the second stage Of
General Lechitsky's offensive — i.e., since the
conquest of the Bukovina had been completed.
" According to the reckoning made by the
army of General Lechitsky. in the period
from June 23 to July 7 it took prisoners
674 officers and 30,875 men, and captured
18 guns. 100 macliine-guns, and 11 caissons of
ammunition."

The heavy rains and floods which occurred
in the Dniester region about the middle of
July rendered the lull in military opera-
tions in that district longer than had been
intended. The Dniester had risen nearly
10 ft. and the Pruth more than 10 ft. The
plain south of Stanislavoff, which, on a width
of about 18 miles is traversed by some 14 rivers
and streams, was becoming impassable. " The
overflow of the Dniester continues," was the
Petrograd report of July 20, " the valleys
situated in the neighbourhood are flooded
through the rivulets overflowing their banks.
The slopes of the heights are so slippery as to

RUSSIAN SCOUTS AFTER FORDING A STREAM: CREEPING TOWARDS

AN ENEMY POSITION.

238

THE TIMES! HISTORY OF THE WAR.

GENERAL KELLER.

Holding an important command in General

Lechitsky's Army.

be almost unclimbable. At many points the
bridges have been washed away." Only in the
high mountains, round Tartaroff and Vorokhta
and in the regions of the heights of the Magura
and Capul, were our Allies able to continue
extending their positions towards the Transyl-
vanian border.

In the first days of August fresh fighting was
reported north-west of Kolomea, and also
north of the Dniester, where our Allies suc-
ceeded in gaining a foothold on the western
bank of the Koropiets. On August 7, after a
month's interval, General Lechitsky resumed
his offensive, which now entered on its third
stage. The first attack was carried out round
Tlumatch, on a front of about 16 miles. The
" heroic valour " of the German troops did not
prove in this case much different from the
" inability to resist," ascribed by them to their
allies. On the same day on which the offen-
sive was begun the Russians broke through
the German front and captured Tlumatch.
On the next day the movement extended into
a concentric advance from the east and south
against Stxnislavoff ; at 6 p.m. our Allies
entered the town of Tysmienitsa, whilst farther
north, round Nizhnioff, they captured the right
bank of the Dniester. On the next day also
the northern bank was reached in that dis-

trict by the Russian troops (of General
Shcherbacheff s Army), which by -a vigorous
attack against the VelesniofT-Koropiets line
had forced their way across the River Koro-
piets. Thus the first Dniester crossing had
fallen into the hands of our Allies. On August 9
they captured the railway station of Khryplin,
the junction of the three railways which
approach Stanislavoff from the south and east
(the Transylvanian line, the Czernovitz-Kolomea.
railway, and the eastern sector of the Trans-
versal railway). On the same night the
Austrian Army Command evacuated Stanis-
lavoff. On the next day our Allies entered the
town for the third time during the war.

Count Bothmer could now no longer delay
his retreat. In the north General Sakharoff
was rapidly approaching the Lvoff-Tarnopol
railway, and turning his positions on the
Gladki-Vorobiyovka front ; in the south his
retreat by the Transversal line and his con-
nexion with Transylvania were cut by Genera'
Lechitsky, whilst the troops of General
Shcherbacheff were turning his flank on the left
bank of the Dniester. By August 10 they
had captured Monastezhyska and even crossed
the River Zlota Lipa in the neighbourhood of
Nizhnioff. By August 12 the last remaining
part of the enemy's winter line of fortifications
was captured by our Allies. The entire enemy
centre had to be withdrawn from the Strypa.
Suffering severe losses at the hands of the

GENERAL VON TERSZTYANSKY,
Commanded the Fourth Austro-Hungarian Army.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

239

WITH GENERAL SAKHAROFF'S TROOPS.
Periscopic work on the field.

pursuing Russians, the Austro-German armies
fell back on the Zlota Lipa line, though that
front had already been passed by our Allies
in the direct neighbourhood of the Dniester,
where they had reached the River Horozhanka.
On the Krasne-Tarnopol line they abandoned
even the important district and town of
Zboroff which but a week earlier had been
visited by Field-Marshal von Hindenburg.
And, ' again, tens of thousands of peasants
from these districts were compelled by the
Austrian Government to evacuate their home-
steads and trek into exile amongst strangers.
For. many weary days they travelled in carts
and on foot towards the west — a picture of
hopeless, unrelieved misery. In the centre the
Austrians withdrew to Bzhezhany, the town
itself being included in the battle-front. "On
August 11," wrote an eye-witness, 'all the
Austrian civilian authorities suddenly left the
town. The last train left it on August 13,
at 2 p.m. With the flight of the authorities,
greater liberty came for the people ; passports
and permits were no longer .required, and we
were free to leave our houses at night ; bread,
sugar and flour cards lost their use. Still
there is hardly anyone left to avail himself

of the new freedom. . . ." Again, the
Austrians had carried out their thorough
" evacuation."

By the middle of August, when a new lull
intervened on the Eastern front, the problem
implied in the second phase of the great Russian
offensive of 1916 had been solved completely
in favour of our Allies. The enemy had aban-
doned his entire front south of the Marshes,
having lost in ten weeks' fighting in prisoners
alone well over 300,000 men. The total
casualties suffered by him in that campaign
almost equalled the original strength of his
armies between the Pripet Marshes and the
Carpathian Mountains.

Our Allies could watch with amusement the
changes which, as a consequence of the defeats
suffered at their hands, were made in the
higher army commands of the Central Powers —
it was now clearly beyond the power of any
human being to reverse the verdict of the pre-
ceding weeks. It will be remembered that
directly after the first defeat near Lutsk and
Dubno the Austro -Hungarian armies in Vol-
hynia had been put under the command of the
Prussian general von Linsingen. Moreover,

240

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

GERMAN PRISONERS IN A CORNFIELD.

Archduke Joseph-Ferdinand, who since the
winter of 1914-15 had been in command of
the Fourth Austro -Hungarian Army, was
replaced by General von Tersztyansky ; and
General Puhallo von Brlog, who in May, 1915,
had taken over the command of the Third
Austro -Hungarian Army,* was succeeded by
General von Fath, previously in charge of an
army corps in Puhallo's army. In the south
Count Bothmer's line and powers were ex-
tended, and a new army under General KSvess
was formed in Transylvania to hold the
lengthened front in the Carpathians.

It was generally known that as a result of
the defeats suffered by the Austro -Hungarian
Armies in the first weeks of June their Com-
mander-in-Cliief, Archduke Frederick, and the
Chief of the General Staff, Baron Conrad von
Hotzendorf, had had to relinquish their posts.
With the possible exception of the extreme
" Great-Austrians " no one regretted their fall.
The Magyars even rejoiced over it, as these
two generals were known as enemies of the
Dualist Constitution and of Magyar separatism,
and were considered enthusiastic votaries
of a unified, centralized Hapsburg Monarchy
(die Gesammtmonarchie was their ideal). Still,

* His predecessor, General Borojevic von Bojna was
transferred to the Isonzo on the outbreak of the war with
Italy.

it was a real humiliation to Old-Austrian pride
\vhen, on August 2, the Prussian Junker, von
Hindenburg, was proclaimed sole commander
on the Eastern Front. A few days later
a Hapsburg amendment was added to the
announcement. Hindenburg's command was
to extend only from the Baltic Sea to a
point south of the Lvoff-Tarnopol railway,
thus including, south of the Marshes, the
armies of Linsingen's group, and, moreover,
on its right flank, the Second Austro-Hun-
garian Army under General von Boehm-
Ermolli. The remaining three armies (those
of Bothmer, Kovess and Pflanzer-Baltin) were
put under the command of a new genius from
the House of Austria, the Heir-Apparent
Archduke Karl Franz Josef. Born in 1887, he
had received his commission of second lieutenant
in 1903, became a major in 1909, and a colonel
on July 25, 1914 — at the age of 27. A year
later he advanced to the rank of major-general,
and in March, 1910, to that of a Field-
Marshal-Lieutenant. In May he was put
at the head of the ill-fated Austrian offen-
sive against Italy, and now he was placed
in command of the forces on the Transyl-
vanian border — to retrieve in a struggle
against Russia, and soon also against our new
Ally, Rumania, Austria's fortunes and the
military reputation of the Hapsburg^.

CHAPTER CXLIV.

THE MEDICAL SERVICE OF THE

ROYAL NAVY.

The Naval Doctor and His Work — Problems of Modern Warfare — Prevention of Disease
— Nerve Strain and the Seaman's Psychology — The Naval Medical Department — Dan-
gerous Diseases — The Typhoid Peril — Ventilation of Ships — New Devices — The Naval
Action off Heligoland — Treatment of Wounded — The Value of Experience — Hospital
Accommodation — Hospital Ships and Trains — Medical Work in Minor Actions — The
Pegasus — The Emden — The Tiger in Action, January 24, 1915 — The Dardanelles — Naval
Mission to Serbia — Royal Naval Air Service — The Battle of Jutland Bank — On Board
the Warrior — In the Lion — Honours for Naval Doctors.

IN earlier chapters the story of the work
of the Army doctor has been told. It
has been shown how that work fell
naturally into two divisions, the work
of attending to the wounded and the work
of guarding the health of the forces in the
field. The latter duty was, perhaps, of para-
mount importance, since upon the mental,
moral, and physical well-being of its fighting
men depends at all times the efficiency of an
army.

The army doctor, however, was not the
only member of the medical profession into
whose hands a great trust was committed when
war broke out ; equally with him the naval
doctor shared the heavy responsibility. Disease
was perhaps a less instant menace to the fleets
at sea than to the troops ashore, but the task
of the naval doctor was no whit less difficult,
no whit less important than that of his Army
colleague. It was, moreover, a task of a special
kind, differing in essential particulars from that
of the army doctor, demanding knowledge of
an unusual sort, and presenting many complex
problems of a kind not met with in other
spheres.

It is a tradition of the Navy to keep silence ;
silence, also, is the tradition of the medical
Vol. IX.— Part 111.

profession. In the Naval Medical Service the
traditions were joined, and so little was heard
by the world of the great work which these
sea doctors accomplished, of the heroism
revealed by them, of the sacrifices which they
offered. Yet it is certain that the men of the
Naval Medical Service performed a task, the
value of which cannot be reckoned too high.
They themselves were the shield of the " Sure
Shield " of our coasts, in that they stood
between our seamen and the influences threaten-
ing their efficiency ; they were guardians of the
well-being of our fleets, just as our fleets were
the guardians of our national well-being ;
behind the gun was the man, but beliind the
man, again, responsible for his steadiness in
emergency, his fighting capacity, his untram-
melled use of all his faculties, was the doctor.

The naval doctor was ready when the call
upon him came, so ready, indeed, that within
four days from the declaration of war hospital
sliips were fully equipped and on their way to
j oin the Grand Fleet. The equipment had been
thought out and prepared long before ; had
been packed and stored in readiness ; it in-
cluded everything which the wit of experienced
man could suppose might be wanted during
and after an action at sea. There was only

241

•24'2

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

ON BOARD A WARSHIP.
Passing wounded down to the Sick Bay.

to speak the word and to proceed forthwith to
the war stations.

As it happened, this early equipment was
not required at once ; the great battle which
many expected during the first days of war
did not take place, and the calls upon the
hospital ships were few. This, however,
is no reason for minimising the importance
of the preparations made, nor yet for for-
getting that, in the hour of need, the Naval
Medical Service was ready just as the
Navy was ready, fully equipped, fully
trained, in a position to handle the work
occasioned by a great battle. Jutland Bank,
with its fierce incidents, its terrible calamities,
might have occurred in August 1914 instead
of in May 1916, so far as the ability of the
doctors to cope with it was concerned. The
administration at Whitehall had done its work
thoroughly in the light of knowledge ; readiness
had been its watchword for years.

Nor was this readiness destined to become
the prelude to a policy of laisser faire while
the long days of waiting and watching which
followed the declaration of war ran their
course. In the Navy, as in the Army, a new

conception of medicine had during the years
before 1914 become firmly established. Men
remembered with glowing pride the gracious
figure of the surgeon pictured in attendance
upon the dying Nelson. They recalled, perhaps,
with wistful thought the fierce setting of
smoke and flame in which that picture ever
presents itself ; they thrilled as the eyes of
the hero rose in their minds. But they knew
that those old days had passed for ever. The
greatest office of their service was still, in a
sense, the office of mercy and of healing, but
in a sense only. Naval battles were no longer
as the battles Nelson fought ; vast ships carried
to sea vast numbers of men ; the Grand Fleet
was a town, a city, subject to all the dangers
and troubles which beset the health of cities,
needing protection from these dangers, depen-
dent for its efficiency upon the vigilance, th6
knowledge, and the devotion of its health
officers.

This was the new doctrine of preventive
medicine ; the doctrine that while few diseases
are really curable, almost all diseases, certainly
all infectious diseases, are preventible. The
Naval surgeon fovind himself faced with a

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

243

harder task than healing the wounds of battle.
He realized that to his care had been committed
the health, the fighting capacity of those
highly trained, irreplaceable men, the gunners,
the engineers, the signallers, and all the ratings
who go to make up the strength and efficiency
of the Royal Navy. He was the health officer
of a community in which every man counted,
and in which the value of any particular man
was beyond assessment.

The conditions of work, too, were not easy.
Much was written at the time about the long
strain of waiting and watching undergone by
our seamen during those early months, but
probably the full extent of the penalty exacted
was not then grasped by anyone outside of the
Service. On the one hand there was the
prospect of battle at any hour, on the other
the weariness of hope indefinitely deferred.
And later came the anxiety of mine and
torpedo, demanding a ceaseless vigilance.

These were menaces to health without
question, for it is an established fact that a
man who has been subjected to prolonged
mental strain falls an easier victim to disease.

"The nervous strain of being under- shell-
fire day after day, week after week, and
month after month might," wrote a surgeon
of the Royal Marines in Gallipoli, " be ex-
pected to cause a large amount of mental
depression and even insanity amongst the
troops. The expectation was not realized
in this battalion. During the first six months
of war on board a battleship in the North Sea
I saw many more eases of conditions allied to
melancholia than I did during my stay on the
Peninsula. Surgeon Beaton, R.N., whom I
had the privilege of serving with in that ship,
found, after an exhaustive inquiry, that the
number of mental cases (both severe and slight)
was less than 5 per cent, of the ship's company.
Though I had neither the time nor the skill
he possesses, in the investigation of the minor
forms of mental disturbance, my impression is
that in this battalion there were much fewer
eases. The mental strain of being under shell-
fire appeared to be much less than that of being
exposed to the hidden dangers of mines and
submarines."

These observations of Surgeon Beaton, R.N.,

THE SICK BAY ON BOARD A WARSHIP.

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THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

245

which were published in the " Journal of the
Royal Naval Medical Service," were indeed
of a remarkable character as showing one side
of the great problem which had to be faced.
The ship's company which formed the material
of the investigation was perhaps exceptional,
for most of the men were married and had
held, during their shore life, positions demand-
ing considerable intelligence and necessitating
much self-reliance. Some had had a certain
amount of responsibility in civic life,

The ship under consideration lay for a long
period at the beginning of the war (over four
months) in an exposed position on the East
Coast ; next she went to sea for two days ;
lastly, she lay six weeks in a protected harbour
on the South Coast. Surgeon Beaton com-
mented : " Roughly speaking, the influence
of the first period was in the nature of a pro-
longed and monotonous stress. Owing to the
nature of the position the routine demanded
was of an extremely irksome type, consisting of
continual watches, night and day, daily repeti-
tion of the measures for defence and offence
possessed by the ship and, save for a very
occasional route march, giving the men two or
three hours away from the ship, notliing to
break the monotony or to give some little
change to the environment. Recreation, while
off actual duty, too, presented many difficulties,
owing to the need for darkening the ship and
the shortness of tho daylight at the time of the
year. There was the always-present possi-
bility of attack by submarine or by ships of
superior f<5rce, at some times more apparently
imminent than at others."

A very careful and important analysis
was then given of the steps by which a man
passes from one mental state .to another
under this strain. This record presents the
situation with deadly clearness and deserves
to bo studied by all who would learn how
much our sailors did and suffered on our
behalf :

"The man takes up his duties," wrote Surgeon
Beaton, " it may be assumed with more or less
eagerness and pleasure, the unpleasant facts
of leaving his home and his ordinary life and
the possibility of danger in the new sphere
lieing more than counterbalanced by the
emotional satisfaction arising out of the grati-
fication of his patriotic instincts. Largely
influenced by this self-satisfaction, he smooths
over his absence from his home ; the life on
board ship obtains a certain glamour : and the

little difficulties to be encountered do not
appear on the horizon. There is also the
feeling of returning again to a life belonging
to his younger days, of which he undoubtedly
recalls much that is inviting. He meets a
large number of entirely fresh faces, and in the
interest to be found in such circumstances
his mind is fully employed.

" It was remarkable to notice how quickly
the men settled down and merged their in-
dividuality into the component of the ship's
conmany. Given a short space of time the
man has sorted out the new acquaintances
into friends and otherwise ; the novelty of the
situation has passed off ; the routine no longer
demands that close attention which was
necessary at first, and there is nothing further
to be discussed in the ship. His mind then
turns to other more remote matters; the
possibilities of the duration of the war, the
probabilities of the employment of the ship
and the part he himself will actually play in
the war. Such topics are naturally of great
importance to him, and consequently they are
discussed everywhere in the ship. Pass along
another week or so and these matters have
been threshed out to the bone ; everyone's
opinion has been given many times over. The
newspapers do not help by bringing any fresh
material as food for discussion, and he is
completely in the dark as to any movement
on the part of the ship herself.

" It is only to be expected that under such
circumstances discussion of these topics be-
comes unprofitable and highly unsatisfying
To a man accustomed to foresee his own course
of action, it is very difficult to maintain a state
of intelligent anticipation with so little material
to work upon. More than that, the effort to
maintain it in the face of such difficulties,
coupled with the feeling of helplessness in his
own destinies, becomes an irritating factor the
longer it continues.

" As a result it was found that, as a subject
of general interest, the war and its personal
application to the individual ceased to be
heard. Instead, as a defensive measure, the
man adopts a condition of more or less unstable
apathy to his future, unstable on account of
the setting on one side of his instincts of self-
preservation and self-control

" In the meantime, he has been going on,
day after day, repeating the same evolutions of
the routine ; and though, as regards the efficiency
of the ship, the automaticity with which these

111—2

246

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAS.

[Vamiyk.

SIR JAMES PORTER.

Director-Genera!, Naval Medical Service,

1908-1913.

come to be performed is very desirable, from
the individual's standpoint the results are not
so happy. Apart from the actual time while
on duty, the man has nothing of importance in
the ship left to think about. The effort, too,
at maintaining a sufficient interest in so
monotonous and trying a routine, becomes a
steadily increasing stress as tune goes on."

The writer then goes on to show that in these
circumstances small events tend to assume
great proportions, and continues : " It will be
seen from the fact of the underlying stress and
the failure of satisfaction of the primary
instincts and habits of the man that the
emotional background is more likely to be
dark than bright. The disproportion will there-
fore probably exist in a direction tending to
produce a state of anxiety and distress of the
mind. It must be remembered that this
anxiety, though outwardly attributable to the
insignificant event, is in reality the outward
expression of the general unsatisf action of the
mind."

The extent of such mental disturbance
depends on the cast of the man's own mind,
and necessarily varies in each individual.
Generally speaking, however, the doctors

had to weigh the factors just outlined when
visiting the men.

" The attendance at the sick bay towards
the end of the period under discussion, showed
quite plainly the necessity for taking these
considerations into view in dealing with
the various minor ailments and injuries
which came under notice. Mild conditions
of neurasthenia with hypochondriacal ideas
were prevalent. Minor accidents all had a
mental sequence of some kind."

From this period of writing, the story
passed to the second period of active service
at sea. It was productive of very striking
effects. The relief from the monotony was
very welcome, and the patriotic emotions
were stirred anew. Against this was the
new risk to the individual. What occurred
was tliis :

" By far the majority of the men showed
appreciable relief — a general rising of spirits
was to be noticed. Work was carried out with
an eagerness belonging to the early days of
the war — altogether a sense of satisfaction
could be felt throughout the ship. In one case,
however, a fatal result ensued, the man severing
his carotid artery on the second morning at
sea. In another, severe emotional crises arose,
attributed by the man to an alteration in his
home affairs of which he had just heard. In
others, the intensity of hypochondriacal ideas
in cases under observation became much
greater."

In the final period the conditions were
entirely different ; the men were not continually
subjected to the stress of imminent danger, and
they could have a little time ashore away from
the ship and its discipline. Also they saw new
people. The writer concludes :

" It may be said that so far the men have
come through exceedingly well. Mental troubles
of a really serious nature have occurred in less
than 1 per cent, of the ship's company, while
the mild neurasthenic conditions amounted to
under ?, per cent, or 4 per cent. The conclusions
to be drawn can only be that such lengthy
periods as the, first four months under the
conditions which prevailed in the first part of
the war are highly undesirable, and should be
prevented if military exigencies will permit.
All the attention possible should be paid to the
need of change in the mental environment
while the men are under the influence of such
continued stress, especially as adequate recrea-
tion could not be obtained owing to the military

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

247

precautions necessary in such a situation.
That the results were not more regrettable can
only be due to the standard of the men and
their moral, and of that nothing too good can be
said."

Here, then, was a lesson learned early in the
war by the naval doctor. But let there be no
illusion ; the lesson was not learned by doing
nothing and waiting for events to force them-
selves upon attention ; these doctors went out
to look for their lessons. In their own sphere
they were as watchful as the fighting men
were in theirs. The minute description of the
mental state of the men afforded by Surgeon
Beaton shows how carefully he carried on his
investigation, how diligent were his observa-
tions, and how shrewd liis deductions.

The value of the work scarcely needs
emphasizing. After all, the good spirits of
a great fighting unit are one of its chief assets :
loss of enthusiasm, of freshness of mind, means
deterioration of all other qualities ; every man
is then less a man than he was. The discovery
of the factors which, if given free play, must
sap energy and damp interest was no small
service ; the abilil y to indicate a better way
was. a service of infinite worth. Not in vain
did the naval doctor constitute himself thus
early in the war the guardian of that "jolly
spirit " of the Navy which throughout the
world has always been it title to love and
admiration.

But this after all was only a fraction of the
great work which the doctor accomplished
aboard ship. While ennui and depression and
the strain of prolonged expectancy were
attacking the minds of the seamen a host
of dangers no less threatening were attacking
their bodies. For a great city, be it ashore
or afloat, is not, as we have seen, kept in health
by good luck. Hard work, clear thinking, and
strenuous preparation are the only means by
which this end can be accomplished.

No one knew this better than the heads of
the Naval Medical Department, Sir James
Porter and, later, Sir Arthur May. Sir James
Porter, who was Director-General from 1908
to 1913, laid the foundations of a great new
system of naval health ; to Sir Arthur May,
who succeeded him, it was given to carry
the system into execution and to amplify
it in accordance with the needs of the hour.
The broad principle adopted may be summed
up in the word "supervision." Nothing
was to be left to chance ; no detail, however

SIR ARTHUR MAY.

Director-General, Naval Medical Service,

in the War.

insignificant, was to be overlooked ; no pains
were to be spared.

It is easy to make light of a policy of this
kind ; but it is not easy to discount the fact
that by the exercise of it a number of men
equivalent to the complete crews of two
super -Dreadnoughts were presented during
the first year of war as a gift to Britain.
Before these measures of protection and pre-
vention and of inspection were instituted
these men were in hospital as a permanent
incubus. Had the measures not been instituted
they would have stayed in hospital at a time
when the need of them was overwhelming !

The object of these health measures was
expressed in the phrase " to secure for the
officers and men in their unavoidably crowded
conditions on board freedom from infectious
disease, an adequate supply of pure air, pure
water and good wholesome food." This object
was, of course, as old as the Navy itself, and
the history of the efforts made to attain it is
a fascinating one. All the great naval com-
manders, including Anson, Rodney, Howe,
St. Vincent, Nelson and Collingwood, took an
interest in work of the kind, and not without
good reason. For the Navy had been fear-

248

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

ON BOARD A

Method of lowering

fully scourged by disease on more than one
occasion. Commodore Anson, for example, in
his famous voyage round the world lost four
out of five of his original crew, and in the first
nine months 066 men out. of 961 who made
up the crews of the three ships of war — the
Centurion, the Gloucester and the Tryal —
that succeeded in rounding Cape Horn during
the worst and most tempestuous period of
the year and reaching the coast of Peru.
I'izarro, who followed him in pursuit with a
Spanish squadron, fared worse ; he failed to
weather the Cape and returned with only one
ship, the Asia, and 100 men out of an original
squadron of six battleships and 3,000 men.
Most, of Anson's men had died of fever and
scurvy, while Pizarro's men had died of scurvy
and hunger. Some of our expeditions actually
failed because of sickness, and among these
was Sir Francis Wheeler's attack on Martinique
in 1693. But much later than this, disease
was the great enemy of the sailor.

Scurvy was at one time one of the worst
of the foes, but a naval surgeon, Lind, killed
scurvy by his discovery of its origin in a faulty
diet. There remained as dangers up till the
beginning of the Great War the ordinary
fevers, especially typhoid and eerebro-spinal

HOSPITAL SHIP,
a man into the wards.

fever ("spotted fever") and venereal disease.
From the following table, which is taken from
an article by Prof. VV. J. Simpson in the
" Journal of the Royal Naval Medical Service,"
may be gathered how steady was the progress
of health work in the Navy before the war.

Annual Death-Rate in the British Nav"!
from Disease.
Average Rate of Mortality.
Years.

1776-1780

1810-1812

1830-1836

1885

1895

1905

1907

1910

1913

It was evident that

death in 8 men.

30 „

72 ,,

.. 112 „

,. 143 .,

., 256 .,

,, 298 „

.. 311 „

„ 309 ,

mobilization having

taken place, steps must at once be taken to
arrange for the nipping in the bud of any
epidemic which might threaten An epidemic
in the Navy, it must be remembered, no matter
how light its character, would have been a
calamity which might even conceivably have
assumed tragic proportions. Therefore it was

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

•2VJ

greatly feared, and every kind of precaution
was taken to prevent it.

The Xavy for one thing was a vaccinated force.
Every man had been vaccinated against small-
pox, and inoculation against typhoid fever was
general. It being quite certain, in spite of the
declarations of well-meaning faddists, that
vaccination does protect against smallpox, the
Navy medical authorities rightly refused to
take the risk of shipping persons who might
originate an epidemic. And so successful was
their policy that naval men on leave were free
to enter areas closed to soldiers because of out-
breaks of the disease. No ill effects were noted.

Typhoid fever was always an enemy and the
utmost vigilance had to be exercised. The
danger, of course, was greater in the Mediter-
ranean than in the North Sea ; but nowhere
was the danger a negligible quantity. A case
was recorded, for example, in which a particular
ship showed a constantly recurring series of
eases of typhoid fever. No cause could be
found in the water or food, and so it became
clear that a " carrier " must be responsible.
A " carrier " is a person who has had the
fever and made a good recovery, but who does
not cease to harbour the bacillus. A search

was made, the blood of the crew being carefully
examined by the test known as the Widal re-
action and by other methods, and., finally, the
evidence pointed to a particular man. Inves-
tigation proved that this man, who had suffered
from typhoid fever 10 years previously, had
infected men in every ship in wliich he had
been stationed. In all some 53 persons were
infected, of whom 11 died. The following
note was made upon the disposal of this man :

" From the naval point of view he was not a
safe man to have in any ship where any number
up to 900 men live under cramped conditions."
He was accordingly invalided out of the
Service, the medical officer of health ashore
being warned about him.

An even more remarkable case, which
illustrates how vigilant the naval doctor
had to be, occurred in Portsmouth Harbour,
in October, 1914, on board H.M.S. Euryalus.
In this case some oysters had been bought
from a local fishmonger, and were eaten
at dinner, at 7.30 p.m., when most of the
officers and ward-room servants partook
of them. Next day the ship went to sea
Within 48 hours of eating the oysters several
officers were attacked, and similar cases

ON BOARD A HOSPITAL SHIP.
A ward set apart for officers.

25(J

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

occurred among the ward-room servants, and
within the next week other cases appeared.
Finally, typhoid fever was diagnosed in
the case of a lieutenant, a midshipman,
and a marine servant. The oysters were
traced to a contaminated bed, and in several
specimens obtained the bacillus of typhoid
fever was found. Unhappily there was no
law to prevent oysters from this bed being sold
in Portsmouth, and as ships were constantly
coining and going to the harbour, the utmost
vigilance became necessary, since a case of
typhoid fever on board ship is an ever-present
menace.

The efforts made to control typhoid fever
met with full success, and except for an occa-
sional case the disease did not show itself.
On the other hand the naval doctors had to
cope with an outbreak of cerebro-spinal fever
(spotted fever) which reached the dimensions of
170 cases. A very small number of these cases
occurred afloat, however ; ten in the Impreg-
nable, an establishment consisting of three
ships, used for training purposes, and 12 in
sea-going ships. As the means nl propaga-
tion of this fever was not known, the outbreaks
were difficult to cope with, but a solution of
a more or less satisfactory kind was found in a
careful search for '" carriers " and in hygienic
measures, the chief of which was good ventila-
tion, the prevention of overcrowding, and
personal cleanliness.

The outbreak, which was a land outbreak.

was prevented from going to sea — a tribute to
the doctors who laboured to prevent it, and a
tribute to the organizers who had made ready
against such a chance. These organizers. Sir
.Arthur May and the men associated with him,
were kept as fully informed of the movements
of their enemy — disease — as were the admirals
of the movements of the German fleet. Every
week there came to Sir Arthur May's desk a
report on the health of every unit, every
destroyer as well as every super-Dreadnought.
In that report exact figures were given, and an
average presented. As a general rule, the
average of sickness was a point per cent. ; but if
it rose for any reason, instantly the chiefs of
the Medical Service knew that it had risen. It
was as though the foe had been sighted upon the

3. ~~^^- — ■"""" 4.

1. Cot-carrier on cushioned tressels, showing the rollers and movable tail-boards in their slots. 2. Tail-
tail-board has been removed at one end for the purpose. 4. Tail-board replaced and patient ready to be

FOR TRANSFERRING SICK AND WOUNDED

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

251

horizon. The flecks were cleared for action ;
measures of protection and measures of offence
were initiated until the dangerous rise in the
figures had declined again, and the enemy been
driven back. Any case of infectious disease,
measles or typhoid fever or any other fever,
was notified when diagnosed, and transferred
at once to an isolation hospital ashore. And
all the men who had been in contact with it
were watched to make sure that they had not
been infected, or that, if infected, they would
not spread infection from one unit to another.

These weekly health reports from the ships,
from the North Sea, from the South Sea, from
the Mediterranean, from the coasts of India,
were, indeed, inspiring documents. Each of
them told of honest work performed in the

light of an ever-present sense of duty, a love
of the Service and a pride in it, and also in the
" doctor-man's " own ship, which made the
remarkable sick percentage — 0"6 — something
more than a mere triumph of organization.

Thanks to these devoted ship's doctors the
health of the Navy improved during the war
in spite of shock and alarm, and the long weari-
ness of inaction. In fact, the health of the
Navy had never been so good. Writing in the
first war number of The Practitioner, Surgeon-
General Rolleston, R.N., stated that the health
of the Navy had been "much bettor" in war
than in peace time, and that the figures given
(1 per cent, to 0'6 per cent.) would have been
lower, but for the higher percentage incidence
among the men of the Royal Naval Reserve
and the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve. " In
two battleships with a complement of over
1.000 each," ho wrote, "which I happened to
visit on two successive days, there were only
two men in the sick-bays. . . ."

Setting aside for the moment the work of
inoculation and of inspection, two things
undoubtedly contributed in an especial degree
to this splendid result : these were improved
systems of ventilation and the instruction in
health matters given by the doctors to the
crews. The latter was indeed a most important
adjunct to success, for it achieved the double
purpose of enlisting the sympathy of the men,
and of opening their eyes to the dangers sur-
rounding them. Lacking knowledge, a man is

5, 6.

boards partially removed from their slots. 3. Canvas-cot being passed into carrier on the rollers. The
hoisted out. 5. Patient hoisted. 6. Cot and carrier being passed outboard.

FROM SHIP TO HOSPITAL : A COT-CARRIER.

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THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

253

apt to chafe under restraints placed upon him
by his doctor ; possessing that knowledge, he
gladly accepts them, and may even carry them
a stage farther on his own behalf. Sir Arthur
May, whose policy was ever to encourage the
friendliest relations between patient and doctor,
both of whom, he was at pains to emphasize, he
regarded as brother " sailor men," was an
enthusiastic supporter of the lectures on health
subjects which were a feature of battleship life.
He reaped a speedy reward, for the men entered
into the spirit of their medical officers. They
showed their pleasure by taking the advice
offered to them, and by spreading it ; the
effects were soon evident.

The lecturers spoke simply of the great fight
with disease upon the issue of which so much
depended. They told of the terrible effects
of dirt and insanitary condition among men
living a life aboard ship in quarters necessarily
cramped ; they indicated the dangers of bad
teeth, of abuse of tobacco and alcohol, above all
of venereal disease. Further, they gave in-
struction in first aid, so that during a battle,
when the doctor could not be reached, help
might be afforded to wounded comrades. The
lectures gave the men a new interest, and helped
to brighten the monotony of the long winter
evenings, and they sowed valuable seed, the
fruits of which were gathered during the
course of the war.

But if this method was important, the work
accomplished upon ventilation was revolu-
tionary. Ventilation ashore is important, but
not perhaps very interesting ; ventilation upon
a battleship proved to be often a matter of life
and death. A battleship lived by her ventila-
tion, for unless the air below decks was kept
sweet and pure, disease had an opportunity ;
and in actual combat efficient ventilation was
found to mean clear heads and eyes, and so to
double the fighting capacity of the men in the
gun turrets, the signallers and the telephone
operators who were the nerves between brain
and hand, between those who planned and those
who executed.

The ventilation of many of the older ships
was notoriously bad, and the crews suffered
in consequence. In the presence of the fumes
of exploded charges good shooting became
difficult in the extreme. On the other hand, a
man could not remain in that condition of
physical well-being which was so essential to
modern scientific fighting if he was being
" blown away " by a strong blast of air pumped

into the room in which he worked. The
difficulty had always been to find a method of
ventilation which would ensure an evenly
distributed supply of fresh air without draughts
The air should, it was seen, be " breathed '
throughout the ship, not driven in blasts
through it.

In- 1912 a Committee, with Fleet Surgeon
R. C. Munday as Secretary, was appointed by
the Admiralty to investigate and report on
the best methods of ventilating modern
warships. It is no exaggeration to say that
the work of this Committee was as important
in its way as the work of those who devised
the huge guns they did so much to render
efficient. A new era in naval ventilation
was inaugurated. By means of most ingenious
devices a free and full supply of warmed air
was secured for every part of the ship ; while
the ventilation of destroyers was improved
to such an extent that even the fastest of them
in the roughest sea could have their living
spaces supplied with fresh air which might
be warmed.

Many men had reason during the fierce
hours of the Jutland battle of May 31- June 1,
1916, to bless these ventilation schemes.
In the gun turrets lives were saved by them,
while down in the bowels of the great ships
activities were made possible which other-
wise had been stayed from the outset of the
engagement.

The Battle of Jutland Bank, however, was
not the first engagement in which the naval
surgeon had opportunities for practising his
craft in actual warfare. In a hundred small
affairs he was called upon to play his part,
and played it as na\'al surgeons from the
great Beatty, to whom Nelson addressed his
last brave words, onwards have ever played
their parts. At the Falkland Islands, at the
Cocos Islands, in the harbour at Zanzibar, off
Heligoland, and elsewhere the same heroism
characterized this Service, and the same quiet,
brave work was carried on.

It is impossible in a chapter such as this
to do justice to all these deeds, and some must
be passed over in silence ; but a more or less
careful survey is essential to a true under-
standing of the work which was accomplished,
for our naval actions were very few as com-
pared with the actions of the armies in the
field, and each possessed special features in
respect of time, place and circumstance.

111—3

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

AN AMBULANCE TABLE.

The Mono-wheel Stretcher and Carrier devised

by the Rev. Bevill Close, Chaplain, R.N. I his

stretcher was used in the trenches of the Royal

Naval Division at Callipoli.

The naval action off Heligoland in August,
1914, stands first in chronological order and
offers a good illustration of the state of affairs
in the early days of the war. Happily an
excellent record of its medical aspect was
preserved by a surgeon who played his part
in it.*

" On 28th August (says this writer) ' action '
was sounded off. Two cruisers (supposed
enemy's ships) having been suddenly observed
had caused us to take up ' stations ' somewhat

* Th& Naval Action off Heligoland. By Fleet Surgeon
Walter Hopkins, R.N. Journal of the Royal Naval
Medical Service.

earlier than had been anticipated. It was
quickly discovered, however, that the cruisers
were our own. Shortly after, therefore, break-
fast was piped to each watch in turn, and at
about 7 a.m. the enemy's ships were actually
sighted. From this time on to close upon
2 p.m. successive actions were fought between
various opposing forces in the two fleets.

" The day was fine and calm, while the sun
gleamed through a very hazy atmosphere in
which patches of fog shortened up the visual
distance from time to time. I remained on
the upper deck during the earlier part of the
affair and found it a most interesting and
inspiring sight to watch our destroyers and the
Arethusa and her divisions dashing at full
speed after the enemy, while soon the frequent
spurts of flame from their sides, the following
reports and the columns of water and spray
thrown up by the enemy's shells pitching
short or over began to create in most of us
a suppressed excitement which we had not
hitherto experienced, telling us that the ' real
thing ' had begun, that an action was actually
in progress.

" Shortly our interest was to multiply four-
fold when the order to fire our own guns was
given. After a time, shells beginning to drop
ominously near, I retired to my station, a
selected spot just below the waterline in the
after bread-room, one of the few available
places in a ship of this class where some of my
party of first-aid men could be accommodated ;
the other half of the party, in charge of the
sick-berth steward, being situated at a similar
station forward. This period one found trying.
For knowledge as to how matters were pro-
gressing we had to rely upon fragments of
information shouted down the nearest hatch-
way from someone in communication with
those on the upper deck.

" The rat-tat-tat ! rat, tat, tat, tat, on our
sides from time to time as we got into the
thick of it told vis plainly of shells pitching
short and bursting, whose fragments struck but
did not penetrate the ship's skin ; it was a
weird sound, occasionally varied by a tremen-
dous ' woomp,' which once at least made the
paymaster, who was reclining near me on a
flour-sack, and myself look hard at the side
close by us, where we fully expected, for the
moment, to see water coming in. As a matter
of fact, this shell entered some 40 feet away,
bursting an entry into the Lieutenant-Com-
mander's cabin, while its solid nose finally

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

255

fetched up in the wardroom where later on it
was christened ' our honorary member.'
For this trophy I believe we have the Mainz
or the Koln to thank. The wardroom steward
found a similar piece of shell in his hammock
that night. It had penetrated the ship's side
and a bulkhead before finally choosing its highly
suitable place of rest.

" The Fearless appears to have borne a
somewhat charmed life — a large number of
shells pitched just short and ju-t over her—
she was hit fair and square by seven, one of
which played a lot of havoc with middle deck
forward and the mess gear there. Her sides
showed some 23 holes of varying sizes, and yet
her list of casualties was only eight wounded,
none dangerously ... for suppressed excite-
ment and vivid interest I should say that the
seeker after excitement could scarcely ask
for more than a modern naval action."

The eight wounded did not give the doctor
very much work to do. But the engagement
revealed the fact that work in the distributing
station of a warship during an action was
of a kind to test the strongest nerves, and that
many precautions would require to be taken.
The doctor was ordered presently to go aboard
the Laertes, which had been taken in tow,
and there he found some severe cases awaiting
him, and he says :

" Arriving on board I found the worst case
was that of a young stoker in a serious condition
from shock and loss of blood. Ho had sus-
tained several shell wounds, one of wliich
involved the left tibia and fibula. . . . Around
this patient the deck was covered in blood and
so slippery that I had to send for cloths to be
put down to enable me to keep a footing.
Near by were two others, somewhat less
severely wounded, lying on the deck, while just
beneath me lay two figures covered with the
Union Jack."

Thanks to the skill of their comrades the
vounded had all received first aid, but still
considerable haemorrhage was going on.

From this engagement dated the knowledge
that in modern naval action wounds were either
very slight or else terribly severe. Further, the
part which burns were to play in swelling the
casualty lists became evident. Huge areas of
burning were seen, " the whole length of the
upper limb from finger-tips to shoulder as well
as the face, ears, neck, and upper part of the
chest." Many of these burns were inflicted
by the flash of bursting shells, yet it was

interesting to note that the eyes themselves
almost invariably escaped injury by the
flame. This happened even in cases in
which the eyebrows and eyelashes had
been singed and the skin of the eyelk's
badly damaged. It proved that " instan-
taneous " as was the flash of the bursting
shells, the power of the eye to detect it and
protect itself against it was quicker in its
action. The eye saw and the brain understood
in time to cause the eyelid to shut before the
scorching sheet of flame could do its work.

These burns were not the same as those
caused by explosions in gun turrets which
had been hit, and which will be described belr w

AN AMBULANCE SLING
Devised by Fleet-Surgeon P. H. Boyden.

25G

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

257

They were usually superficial, and it was to
the credit of the naval doctors on board ship
and in the shore hospitals that in very many
instances injuries that seemed at first sight to
be irreparable were so treated that complete
recovery took place and deformity was avoided.
Dressings of picric acid were found to be most
beneficial, though other forms of treatment
had their adherents — notably the method of
irrigating by salt solution, introduced by Sir
AJmroth Wright during the war and described
fully in an earlier chapter.*

Of the total of 27 cases seen by this doctor
there were 5 burns or scalds and 22 shell and
splinter wounds, 10 of the latter cases being
Germans. The wounds were mostly lacerated
and punctured, deep and shallow, of all shapes
and sizes ; several of them involved bones.

The men bore their wounds with cheerful
unconcern: A young sub -lieutenant was found
sitting in the wardroom with his leg, which
had a shell wound in it, stuck up on a chair.
. His only anxiety was to get back to his work.
Other men showed the same spirit, and the
Germans were not behind their captors — and
rescuers — in this.

The wounds healed well, but it became clear
that the fact of being at sea did not save
a wounded sailor from the danger of blood-
poisoning — it had been believed that on the
sea this danger was small. The problem of the
cleansing of wounds which loomed so large in
the military hospitals of France and Belgium
at this time therefore engaged the attention
of the naval service also, and solutions of it
were quickly devised.

This battle of Heligoland was a small affair,
then, from the doctor's point of view. The
list of casualties, when comparison is made
with the Army, seems almost ridiculous. Any
street accident might yield as many. But it
would be a grave mistake to suppose that on
this account the lessons learned were unimpor-
tant. On the contrary, they were of the
highest importance. They showed the doctors
what to expect, and they revealed the fact
that in any great engagement, where smaller
craft might be expected to suffer heavily, the
casualties would be severe. New ideas were
generated ; new possibilities opened up ; new
methods called for.

The naval medical authorities at Whitehall
profited by the lesson in various ways. A
Committee presided over by Sir Watson
* See Vol. VI, p. 57.

Cheyne was set to work to consider the question
of the treatment of wounds ; the treatment of
burns received attention ; the danger from the
fumes of bursting shells, which tended to sink
down on the decks and penetrate to the cabins
below and so to cause suffocation, was con-
sidered and the testing of respirators begun
forthwith. These steps were doubtless in
advance of actual requirements, but on the
day of the Battle of Jutland Bank they had
their justification.

Experience dictated the modification of other
arrangements and more especially of the
arrangements for the safety of the wounded
during action. The sick bay was the
ship's hospital during periods of inaction, and,
thanks to the work of Fleet Surgeon D. W.
Hewitt and Fleet Surgeon M. C. Langford,
these ships' hospitals were splendidly equipped
and had been brought to a state of the highest
efficiency. No pains had been spared to make
them as complete as possible, and it was easy
to carry out any surgical measures required in
them. But their position on deck, above the
armour, rendered them quite unsuitable for
use during a battle, and against this contingency
other rooms had been prepared and set apart —
a precaution the wisdom of which was shown
when a sick bay and all it contained was
smashed to pieces by a bursting shell.

These other rooms were known as distributing
stations, and were situated one forward and one
aft, under the armour. It was essential that the
transference of material from the sick bay to
the distributing stations should take place at
the earliest possible moment after the call
" prepare for action," and as action might be
imminent at any moment, day or night, it was
necessary that all preparations should be so
far advanced that little or nothing remained to
be done when the order was given.

As little gear as possible was, therefore, left
in the sick bay. Further, those responsible were
advised as to their duties and trained in them.
When action was sounded, the water-tight
compartments were, of course, closed and inter-
communication became impossible ; therefore
mistakes made or omissions committed could
not be rectified. A man had then to do the best
he could with the material to his hand and he
might be situated in very terrible circumstances
for the doing of it. Equipment of the dis-
tributing stations was, therefore, of paramount
importance and received careful thought and
consideration.

258

THE TIMES HISTORY OE THE WAR.

The difficulty was space. But ingenuity
solved this and made it possible to have an
operating table fully rigged, dressings, anti-
septics, and other appliances always ready, and
also to prepare accommodation for the wounded.
As we shall presently see, these rooms were
destined to witness some strange and terrible
spectacles during the course of the fighting.
For accommodation of the wounded after
action, the best available compartments in
proximity were used ; by special fittings
previously prepared the wounded could be
slung in stretchers from the roof, one tier of
stretchers above the other, and in this way
a large number could be taken in at one time.

Ashore, preparations as complete as those
made afloat had been instituted, and the
wounded from the Heligoland battle were thus
soon brought to great comfort in well-equipped
hospitals. Some of them came to the Royal
Naval Hospital at Chatham, which they reached
within 24 hours ot being struck down. In each
case a dose of anti-tetanic serum was given to
secure against possible attack by lockjaw and
careful operative measures carried out. An
arm, a leg, and an eye were part of the price paid
by the sailors for this engagement, and some
of the other conditions were of a terrible
character, yet the cases did exceedingly well ;
the great cheerfulness of the men and their

FROM THE GERMAN COMMERCE RAIDER.
Prisoners from the " Emden " going through physical drill exercise on board a British warship. Captaiii

Mu'ller (x), who commanded the " Emden."

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

259

LANDING WOUNDED AT PLYMOUTH.

heroic attitude even when suffering the most
acute pain won the admiration of doctors and
nurses alike.

The hospital accommodation at the disposal
of the Navy was not extensive when judged by
Army standards, but of its efficiency no doubt
could exist. There were, in the first place, the
three great naval hospitals — Haslar (Ports-
mouth), accommodating 1,434 patients ; Ply-
mouth, accommodating 1,173 patients ; and
Chatham, accommodating 1,107 patients. In
addition to these, the Navy had numerous
hospitals in the British Isles accommodating
some 11,129 patients, and further possessed a
hospital for mental diseases at Great Yarmouth.
Abroad, there were naval hospitals at Gibraltar
and Malta and other points.

Nor was private help wanting to add to these
establishments. Lady Bute converted her
house, Mount Stuart, Isle of Bute, into a Naval
hospital, and it was fully occupied from the
beginning of the war. It had beds for 125
patients and proved a boon, both on account

of its beautiful position and healthy sur-
roundings. Lady Nunburnholme also made
generous offers of hospital accommodation,
and provided for Naval patients a fully equipped
hospital for 220 patients in a locality where
Naval hospital accommodation was much
needed. The British Red Cross Society
equipped a hospital for 160 patients at Truro,
Cornwall, and the Church Army one for 100

260

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND BANK, MAY 31, 1916: ADMIRAL BEATTY'S

Wrom plutographst'l""

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

261

Kj^"*^ — i fc

BATTLE-CRUISERS ENGAGING THE GERMAN BATTLE-CRUISERS.

duting the battle.)

■2(i2

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAB.

patients at Dunvagel, Lanark. Princess Christian
provided funds with which the former bed
accommodation at Queensferry Hospital was
doubled, and Canadian women generously sub-
scribed a sum of £40,000 with which a new
block was built at Haslar Hospital. In addi-
tion, many kind offers of help flowed in to the
Admiralty from all parts of the country, and
were accepted.

The wounded men reached these hospitals by
hospital ship and hospital train, though in many
cases they were landed directly by the warship
in winch they had been serving. Weather and

FOR REST AND TREATMENT.
From hospital ship to train. A train at Toulon with
wounded passengers about to start for the Riviera.

circumstance were the determining factors, for
manifestly in a gale transferences could not be
made at sea, and, again, a ship which had been
badly hit might not stay in her rush for port to
unload wounded. As a rule the Grand Fleet
returned to its anchorages with the wounded
aboard ; these were then transhipped to the
hospital ships, which brought them to some
landing port whence they were removed to a
local hospital, or if able to travel comfortably,
put on the ambulance trains for transport to
one or other of the naval hospitals.

The Navy owned 12 of these hospital ships,
splendid vessels fitted with every kind of
surgical appliance and fully staffed by doctors.
Of these 12, nine were constantly employed in
home waters and three in the Mediterranean.
The trains were as well equipped as the ships,
and the hammock-like cots gave them a distinctly
naval appearance. The system was an admirable
one, for it allowed of thorough cleansing and
ensured that no bumping should disturb the
severely wounded. These trains, like those in
use for the transport of soldiers, were hospitals
on wheels in a true sense, so that it may be said
that from the moment he reached the dis-
tributing station on his own ship a man was
never out of the doctor's hands or cut off

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR,

263

from expert attention. As the distributing
station was waiting to receive him, in most
cases, the moment ho fell, his chances of
salvation were excellent. It is not possible to
avoid comparing this happy lot with that of
the wounded soldier eking out terrible hours
upon the No-man's Land, beyond the reach of
succour until darkness should have covered
him. Yet it must not be forgotten that against
that the sailor had to face the perpetual peril
of mine and submarine and the chance that at
any moment his ship might be sunk and all
chance of salvation lost — for how should a
sorely wounded man fare in the great hazard
of the sea ?

The naval medical service played its part in
handling the' great exodus from Belgium in
August, 1914, and also in treating the wounded
from the ill-starred Antwerp expedition. Men
from the latter were taken to the Chatham
and Plymouth hospitals ; wounded Belgian
soldiers were transported across the Channel
in the hospital ships Plassy and Magic, and
about 2,000 wounded French soldiers from
Dunkirk to Cherbourg in the hospital ship
China. The medical officers of these ships
had their hands very full during the voyages.
The wounds seen were of incredible severity
in many cases, for at that period field treat-

ment was not in the advanced stage to which
it came later.

Before leaving this part of the subject the
directions issued to the medical staff of the
Neptune in 1913 for dealing with wounded may
be alluded to. They serve to show how well the
difficulties likely to be encountered had been
forestalled ; they show also how true an esti-
mate of the actual needs had been formed. The
directions were divided into three parts, those
" On Leaving Port," those " During Action,"
and those " After the Action." With the first
two we have already been concerned ; the last
provided that as soon as the action was over
or there was a lull the stretcher parties would
march to the places appointed, as shown by
luggage labels attached to the stretchers. They
would take first-aid bags of dressings with them
and hot coffee or beef-tea and drinking vessels.
On arrival they would move the wounded from
the turret or other place to the deck and out of
the way of the guns. They would render first
aid but not otherwise move the wounded.

The senior medical officer would then make
a rapid tour of the upper deck to estimate the
number and condition of the wounded, and give
any necessary hypodermic injections, attaching
labels to prevent the possibility of duplication.
At the same time the staff surgeon would inspect

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264

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

265

the main deck. During a lull the surgeons
would supervise the removal of the wounded
to a place below the armour, where they would
remain under care till the end of the action.

Of great naval actions in the early days of the
war there were few, if indeed we except the
battle in the Pacific and the battle of the Falk-
land Isles. About the former there is nothing
to be said so far as the surgeons are concerned,
for unhappily the disaster which overwhelmed
our ships was fatal to doctor and patient alike.
Of the latter there is only this to be said — the
total British casualties in this great battle were
10 men killed and 16 wounded. This battle,
indeed, illustrated the tremendous hazard
of naval warfare and showed to what an
extent the fate of ships and of men is deter-
mined by gun power and gun reach.

But if great actions were very few, there
occurred a number of small actions of a deeply
interesting kind. Of these the two which com-
mand attention most evidently were that be-
tween the Pegasus and the Kbnigsberg and that
between the Sydney and the Emden, for these
were fights of a special character, each showing
relatively heavy casualties and each revealing
the naval surgeon in a heroic light.

The action between the Pegasus and the
Konigsberg took place off Zanzibar on the
morning of September 20, 1914. The Pegasus
was refitting and was therefore taken unawares,
and though a brave resistance was offered, she
suffered heavily, being literally battered to
pieces. In consequence the surgeon, Fleet
Surgeon A. J. Hewitt, R.N., found himself faced
with the following casualty list — 24 men of the
Pegasus and 1 native servant killed, 8 officers
and 69 men wounded. Of the 3 officers and
25 men admitted to the European hospital 2
officers and 4 men died the same day, and sub-
sequently 8 more men died of their wounds.

When the action began, two collectingstations
for the wounded were selected, the stokers' mess
deck forward on the lower deck below the sick
bay and the torpedo flat aft, on the lower deck
below and forward of the ward-room. The
deck of these spaces was about four to six inches
below the water-line. The sick berth steward
had charge of one station and he was assisted
by a cook from the galley, the foremost stretcher
party and forecastle party, the other station was
in charge of the ship's surgeon, who was assisted
by one cook and the after stretcher parties and
the poop bearer party. On action being soun-
ded the cooks brought with them to their respec-

tive stations a " fanny " of hot water and some
cold water.

Each gun had been supplied with a canvas bag
containing a tourniquet, in case of bleeding,
bandages, and other appliances. These bags
were secured under the shields of the guns. A
similar bag had been supplied to the fore-bridge,
and various other precautions, which were now
fully justified, had been taken.

In his report on the action published in the
" Journal of the Royal Naval Medical Service "
Fleet Surgeon Hewitt stated that the most re-
markable feature of the wounds was the large
number of minute superficial wounds and burns
looking like the pitting of black powder, also the
small penetrating power of the fragments in open
spaces like the iipper deck. The clanger zone,
so far as life was concerned, seemed to be
confined to a small area round the bursting
space, and although the initial velocity of the
fragments appeared to be very great, this seemed
to diminish rapidly, perhaps owing to the
irregularity of their shape. For example, a large
number of fragments were removed at a depth
of from two to four inches, some embedded in
bone and some in the soft tissues. In two
penetrating wounds of the skull the entrance
wounds were of identical shape and size with the
shell fragments found, but in neither case did
the missile penetrate more than four inches.
A leading seaman had his right arm so shattered
that a primary amputation was necessary, but a
fragment of the same shell hit the brass buckle
of his belt, breaking it but not even bruising the
abdomen. " Small fragments " (continued Fleet
Surgeon Hewitt) " were also the cause of the loss
of four eyes, and I am of opinion that a pair of
motor goggles would have saved all these. A
case of aneurysmal varix occurred in the right
common carotid and jugular vessels caused by
a minute particle of shell which probably could
have been stopped by a linen collar. In my
opinion a coat of light chain armour, or even
leather, with a pair of goggles made from
toughened motor screen glass would be invalu-
able to captains of destroyers, navigators and
others in exposed positions who are likely to
encounter ships armed with similar guns."

These suggestions were made at a period long
before our soldiers and those of our Allies wore
helmets in the trenches ; they were reproduced
in an article on the need of protective shields
and helmets which appeared in The Times in
the summer of 1915, and the effects of which
were soon evident in France. Thus the

266

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

SURVIVORS OF H.M.S.

Eight minutes after the warsh

experience gained in Zanzibar was destined to
help in the agitation which secured for our
soldiers the great additional safeguard which
helmets proved to be.

Many of the wounds met with in the Pegasus
were of a terrible description and showed the
devastating effect of naval gunfire. A leading
stoker had his shoulder smashed to pulp, another
poor fellow had both eyes and the whole upper
part of his face shot away, broken limbs and
lacerated flesh were seen on every hand.

" Most of the casualties," the doctor wrote,
" occurred on the upper deck, and the scene that
this presented can scarcely be imagined. Yet
there was very little noise on board from the
wounded, and one was impressed by the death-
like silence between the periods of appalling din
caused by the salvoes. Although the ship was
in harbour and only a short distance from the
shore no one attempted to jump overboard and
there was no panic. The moral of the men was
magnificent."

In this inferno the doctor, Fleet Surgeon
Hewitt, went about his work according to the
grand tradition of the service he represented.
The fumes of the high explosive powder had a
stupefying effect, causing a feeling of dizziness ;
the bursting of the shells smote the decks with
blasts of air which had an unnerving effect ;
but the good work was not suffered to fail on
that account. Indeed, the awful scene, so far
as it affected himself, was dismissed by the
doctor in a line : " I personally had been

MAJESTIC," MAY 27, 1915.
ip was torpedoed by a submarine.

breathing more deeply than normal in assisting
a wounded man up a ladder from the after
torpedo-flat where these fumes were particularly
dense, and experienced a feeling of nausea and
dizziness. For several days aft3rwards on deep
breathing one seemed to exhale the fumes."

The wounded were taken from the Pegasus
by boats from the cable-layer Banffshire as
soon as the firing ceased. All had first aid
dressings applied and nearly all the serious
cases had had a hypodermic injection of
morphia. All were landed within an hour. The
landing was difficult owing to a rapidly ebbing
tide and boats being required to return and
stand by the ship as soon as the wounded were
landed, for it looked as if it would be necessary
to abandon the ship.

Probably this action was, individually, the
most terrible of the first year of war, so far as
the doctor was concerned. Fleet Surgeon Hewitt
faced his ordeal single-handed, and splendidly
did he vindicate the good name of the medical
service. His quiet courage and his ability
undoubtedly went far to mitigate a most fearful
situation, to save gallant lives, and to relieve
the pains of those sorely injured.

The action between the Sydney and the
Emden attracted the attention of the whole
world. The exploits of the German raider had
added to her name a romantic association ;
her destruction, w-hen it came, was hailed with
feelings in which admiration had a large place.

The Emden was sighted about 9 a.m. and the

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

267

battle began shortly afterwards. The doctors
soon found themselves busy. The senior medical
officer had begun a tour of the guns as soon as
the raider was sighted.to see if the first-aid bags
were ready, but before he could return to his
station the guns of the Sydney had opened
fire. The Emden soon returned the fire and
within five to ten minutes from the beginning
of the action the first wounded man was brought
below. He had a fracture of the right leg and
thirteen shell wounds and was in great pain.
Following him came a stream of wounded
demanding immediate attention. The second
case had been shot in the chest and the apex of
the heart was seen beating through a hole in the
chest wall. Many of the other wounds were of
a dreadful character.

At 11.15 a.m. the order "Cease fire " was
sounded. The medical staff had now been
working two hours in a confined atmosphere at a
temperature of 105° F.

" During the action," wrote Surgeon Leonard
Darby, R.A.N., in the " Journal of the Royal
Naval Medical Service," " the spaco below was
very congested, the tunnel being fidl of men
belonging to the ammunition and fire parties.
At the best of times there is little room here, so
the regular transport of wounded was con-
siderably impeded. All the time we knew not
how the fight was going — we could only hear
orders for ammunition and the continual rapid
fire of our guns. At one time, when we heeled
over and the operating tablo took charge, it

seemed as though the ship had been badly hit,
but we soon found out that this was only due to
a sudden alteration of course."

The wounded meantime were in considerable
pain and every effort was being made to help
them. As soon as possible after the action the
sick bay was prepared as an operating theatre.
This meant hard work, because during the battle
this room had been flooded with water from the
fire mains. Moreover, the task of getting the
wounded up to the operating room and dealing
with them was not made easier by the continual
arrival of new patients in the shape of German
sailors fished up out of the water, most of
whom were in a very collapsed state indeed
One man had been in the shark -infested sea
for nine hours, but was brought round after
some trouble and next day was none the worse
for his immersion.

Operative surgery was therefore not begun
in earnest until the day after the battle. This
was inevitable, for the wounded demanded
constant attention at first. Early in the morn-
ing of that day (November 10, 1914) the Sydney
had reached Cocos Island and shipped the
Eastern Extension Telegraph Company's Sur-
geon, Dr. H. S. Ollerhead, to help with the
German wounded. This addition to the staff
was welcome — the Sydney carried two medical
officers of her own — and operations began at
once.

" Our chief difficulties " (wrote Surgeon
Darby) " were lack of space and trained

SURVIVORS IN BLANKETS AFTER BEING RESCUED FROM THE DISASTER.

268

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

2G9

assistance, and we had vised up all the sterile
towels on the day of the action ; also there
was much delay in getting instruments re-
sterilized . . Late in the day we organized
a theatre staff from volunteers. They helped
to clear up, held basins, handed stores and
dressings, and did much remarkably useful'
work with a composure that was astonishing, as
they were present at many bloody operations to
which none of them previously had been in any
way accustomed. Surgeon Wild acted as
anaesthetist and Dr. Ollerhead assisted me with
the operations."

The operations went on all day, the doctors
as usual refusing to spare themselves until
their patients had been given every possible
attention. Next day the Sydney returned to
the Emden, which was flying signals of distress,
and arrangements began for transferring about
80 German wounded. All available stretchers,
hammocks and cots were sent to the Emden
with a party under Dr. Ollerhead, who did not
return till the last patient left the ship some
four hours later. Even then some men who had -
got ashore could not be brought off till next day,
November 12.

This transhipping was an exceedingly difficult
business, as there was a huge surf running on
the beach where the Emden was ashore ; the
collecting and lowering of the wounded into the
boat was attended, unavoidably, by a good deal
of pain. The wounded were taken aboard the
Sydney in the cots and stretchers by means of
davits, but there was no davit available in the
Emden. One German surgeon was uninjured,
but he had been unable to do much, having had
24 hours with so many wounded on a battered
ship, with none of his staff left and with very few
dressings, lotions, or instruments.

" The Emden," says Surgeon Darby, " was
riddled with gaping holes ; it was with difficulty
one could walk about her decks, and she was
gutted with fire. The wounds of the Germans
who were brought off to the Sydney by this
time, only 24 to 30 hours after injury, were
practically all very septic, with maggots \ in.
in length crawling over them. Little had
boon done for them, but now they were attended
to by our party and transhipped to us as
quickly as possible."

This fresh rush of cases soon crowded out the
wardroom and the sick bay had to be used as a
dressing station. Soon there was scarcely any
room to move, for besides the 70 wounded
received that day there were over 100 prisoners

and 20 Chinamen from the sunken collier which
had been attending on the Emden. Operations
had thus to be discontinued at noon on Novem-
ber 11, but they began again at 6 p.m. and did
not stop till 4.30 a.m. on November 12 — a
period of 10| hours of continuous operating.
The German surgeon stood at the table beside
his English professional brethren and took his
share of the work.

" All this time," Surgeon Darby concluded,
" we had to organize and arrange a hospital
with its equipment and the feeding and nursing
of patients ; up to now this was turned over
to the first-aid and volunteer nursing party,
and they received the cases straight from the
theatre. In the case of the Germans we had
a party told off from the prisoners to help our
staff. We had two large wards, the wardroom
and the waist deck, and various special wards,
a few cabins being given up by officers. . . .
By nightfall (November 12) one could look
round with a feeling that some impression had
been made on the work, and later that evening
the German surgeon and myself went round
sorting out the cases we could send off next
day to the Empress of Russia, an armed liner
which had been dispatched to help us with
the wounded and relieve us of our 230 extra
men. It would be difficult," added this gallant
medical officer, " to imagine a more severe
test for the medical staff of a cruiser." All
credit then to those who faced the test and
emerged from it triumphantly.

These two isolated actions show clearly ol
what splendid material our Naval Medical
Service was constituted. Aboard ship the
doctors combined with their professional know-
ledge a seaman's power of adapting himself to
circumstances and of adapting circumstances
to the need of the moment.

This spirit was shown again and again, but
never more conspicuously than on board the
Tiger during the North Sea action of January 24,
1915. The Tiger went into action on that
day at 7.15 a.m., and at 9.3 the first shot was
fired. Fleet Surgeon John R. Muir had origin-
ally intended to deal with the cases seriatim
as they came to him, operating on each one at
once ; he soon found that this was an Utopian
idea. The violent concussion from a gun turret
near by made operation an utter impossibility
and necessitated the use of first-aid methods
only. At 10.50 an urgent telephone message
came down to the doctor from " Q " turret
asking for a medical officer and an ambulance

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAN.

AT THE DARDANELLES.
Admiral de Robeck inspecting sailors on board

H.M.S. " Canopus."
party. The doctor, however, knew that it
was impossible to handle men in stretchers
through the working chambers and going on
deck was not to be thought of. He refused
the request and soon found he had done wisely.
The wounded readily found their way to the
dressing stations themselves.

About 11.30 a 12 in. shell entered the dis-
tributing office on the upper -deck. This shell
was very destructive because it exploded
upwards.

" Tt blew up the trap hatch in the roof of the
distributing office," wrote Fleet Surgeon Muir
("Journal of the K.oyal Naval Medical Ser-
vice"), "which communicated with the gun
control tower, killed one officer who was
standing on the hatch, seriously wounded
another, and severely scorched the face of a,
third, all of whom were in the gun control
tower. In its explosion in the distributing
office it killed six men and wounded five men.
In the port 6 in. gun control the same shell
killed a boy and injured a midshipman and
two boys.

" An urgent telephone message was received
from the gun control tower and an ambulance
party was sent off in charge of a surgeon to see
what could be done. This party had consider-

able difficulties, as the lights had all gone out, the
alley way was wrecked and the escape up past
the distributing office, which was the only
possible route, was blown to bits and threatened
by fire from the intelligence office, which was
immediately below the distributing office.
Thanks to the heroism and bravery displayed
by a sick berth attendant and two boys all the
cases mentioned except one, who was discovered
after the action was over, were brought down to
the forward distributing station.

" When they arrived seven were dead or
expired as they were laid on the floor. The dead
were laid on one side as decently and quickly
as possible, covered with a flag, and the wounded
attended to. . . . There was complete absence
of moaning or complaints. The explosion of
the shells caused a black, oily, sooty deposit in
the skin of nearly all these patients. This was
readily removed with turpentine, but nothing
else seemed to have any effect. Soap and water
and spirit were useless."

During the summer and aaitumn of 1915
the naval doctor had opened up to him a new
field of operation in the Dardanelles. Through-
out the Gallipoli campaign the naval medical
service cooperated with that of the Army,

V > - r.%* 1

T^Sm:

m 1 B*

^■1

R L-**fc 1

f™3 . -

FROM THE DARDANELLES.

Wounded being landed from a hospital ship at
Plymouth.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

271

AT THE DARDANELLES.
Transferring wounded from a British warship.

rendering most valuable assistance and, indeed,
so far solving the difficulty of the transport of
wounded from the shore as to convert a situa-
tion of grave anxiety into one of comparative
security. Naval hospital ships were in attend-
ance, and one of the largest of these was the
Soudan, of which Fleet Surgeon Trevor

Collingwood, R.N., was the Senior Medical
Officer. On February 25 this ship arrived
at Tenedos, and in the evening of the same
day seven wounded were transferred to her
from the Agamemnon, which showed signs
of having been hit by a shell. The following
day a party of men landed from the Vengeance

THE TIMES HISTUEY OF THE WAR.

and the Irresistible and more wounded arrived.
Other wounded came in, and then, on
March 6, two flight officers fell from a con-
siderable height into the sea and had to be
succoured. Wounded were taken in from time
to time until March 22, when the Soudan left
for Malta and landed 113 cases. It is interest-
ing to note that there were no cases of gangrene
and only one case of tetanus, which resulted
from shell wounds ; this must be considered
somewhat exceptional.

This first voyage of the hospital ship took
place before the great landing on the beach, and
it compares strangely with the second voyage,
which ended on April 25, when the Soudan

appeared again off the entrance to the Dar-
danelles. By the evening of that day no fewer
than 10 military officers and 342 soldiers had
been received ; by 8 p.m. a total of 430 cases
were aboard, and the sliip drew off in order to
allow the staff to work in quietness. They
performed numerous operations, and then on
April 27 all the wounded were transferred to a
so-called " hospital carrier ship " and taken to
Alexandria. Subsequently, in Ma}', 411 Anzac
soldiers were treated in five days. During this
period only four naval wounded were received
from the Amethyst, which had been under fire
at Smyrna — a fact which emphasized once
more the difference between sea and land
fighting.

The hospital ship Rewa also rendered splendid
service at the Gallipoli beaches between June
and August 1915, during which time she carried
some 7,000 cases. It was noted by her medical
officers that while it seemed to matter little
what types of antiseptics they used to clean
the wounds, efficient cleansing was all-impor-
tant ; and they observed further that the length
of time which elapsed between the infliction
of a wound and its attention on board the ship
was an important determining factor upon the

HEROES OF 1HE JUTLAND BANK BATTLE.
Wounded seamen enjoying a trip in Surrey.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

27B

result of treatment The doctors had an
interesting proof of their view, for they had
cases sent to them from three different beaches,
each one situated at a different distance from
the ship than the others.

Hellas Beach provided by far . the most
septic type of case. The average time which
elapsed between wounding and arrival on board
was from 22 to 24 hours, some cases spending
as long as three days on the journey. The
reason lay in the distance of the front-line
trenches from the beach and also the exposed
character of the intervening territory. These
patients too suffered much from insects and
were hoisted aboard, in the words of the medical
staff, " black with flies," and very soon after
the first load or two had been received " the
decks and wards are also black with flies."
Many wounds were found on arrival to be
already swarming with maggots. Gas gan-
grene came from this beach and from this
beach only.

The best beach was the Anzac Beach,
where the front line of trenches was near the
shore, and the a\'erage time taken to put men
on board after they had been wounded was
five to six hours. Also the Anzac soldiers
were very fine men physically ; and the flies
were fewer. Suvla came between Hellas and
Anzac, the time here being between nine and
ten hours.

This experience corresponded with the
general experience of the war and made rapid
evacuation of wounded a matter of paramount
importance everywhere. It bore out the view
stated by Sir Almroth Wright that it was not
the wound which killed, but the dirt — bacteria
and flies' eggs — introduced into the wound.

The experience, however, meant that when
a batch of wounded arrived in this and other
hospital ships the staffs had to work, literally,
till they dropped. Every moment of delay-
meant so much more danger for the wounded —
not merely so much more discomfort. Great
as the tasks were which often faced these
doctors, they did not spare themselves ; in
four trips they actually performed 383 opera-
tions of various kinds, and that number does not
include a host of smaller measures : for example,
easy removal of bullets. A number of interest-
ing tacts emerged from this huge body of work,
not the least of which was that the men as a
whole took anaesthetics exceedingly well. The
reason was, perhaps, that alcohol had not been
consumed in any quantity for a long time.

IN A SUBMARINE.
Men from the engine room enjoying the sunshine.

" Most text-books," wrote one of the doctors,
" give tobacco as a reason for ansesthetic
difficulties, but this did not seem to be the
case, as smoking amongst all of them is quite
heavy, especially cigarettes, and indeed a good
proportion of them arrived on the table with a
cigarette in their mouth."

Nursing sisters of the Queen Alexandra's
R.N. Nursing Service rendered splendid help
in these hospital ships which lay off the terrible
Gallipoli beaches, and their task wa^ no less
onerous and exacting than that of the doctors.
They did not spare themselves in any way, and
a,n idea of what they had to do may be gathered
from the following account written by one of
them, Nursing Sister Hilda F. Chibnall
("Journal of the Royal Naval Medical Ser-
vice ") :

" Our chief difficulties are the endless
struggles to get them (the patients) properly
clean and decently clothed, to endeavour to
combat the acute collapse, exhaustion, and
mental shock from which many of them are
suffering when they reach us — especially those
from Hellas Beach, who have often been lying
out for 24 or 36 hours without food, exposed
to the sun and tormented with flies — and the
hopelessness of trying to make comfortable
the men who are wounded in so many different
places that they can find no easy position in

274

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

which to rest. They all arrive on board in the
clothes they have worn for many weeks or
months ; these are usually quite stiff with
blood and sand, alive with vermin, and almost
black with flies. . . . The dressings are done
under some difficulty, especially in rough
weather, and the most fortunate people are
those who are slightly built and can easily
squeeze between the cots ; light wooden
dressing tables have been made by the car-
penter's crew, easily carried along the gangway
but large enough to hold all that is necessary,

" Work in the operating theatres is very
different from anything we have ever seen
before. . . . The patients have had no previous
preparation. They are carried straight on to
the table and their dirty blood-stained clothes
have to be cut right off and the skin scrubbed
clean before any actual surgery can begin.

" Owing to the tremendous number of
dressings done in the ship each day we fird
that keeping up the stock is a very big item
in our work. There is no time to cut up
dressings when the ship is full of patients, but
after landing them at a port on our return
voyage to the Peninsula we all work hard to
make up and sterilize sufficient dressings for
the next trip As our numbers are limited
only one night sister can be on duty at a time,
and with so many cases in the ship her task is
not particularly easy. However, on one point
we are all agreed — that we have never before
nursed men who suffered so much and com-
plained so little nor seen patients show so
much unselfishness towards each other and
gratitude to those who are nursing them."

These nursing sisters thus rendered noble
service and took great risks, for it is the way
of the Navy to discount danger in the discharge
of duty and the hospital ships came very close
to the Beaches. They were not attacked from
the shore, for the Turk fought cleanly ; but the
presence of German submarines was an ever
present danger, the German being a very
different kind of opponent from the Turk.
Moreover there was danger from the ah-. On
one occasion the hospital ship Soudan, to the
work of which reference has already been
made, had a most unpleasant experience.
Two trawlers were alongside taking away
minor cases when a hostile aeroplane appeared
overhead and dropped four bombs quite
near the ship ; two of the bombs indeed
" straddled " her, throwing up fountains
of water on explosion. There were no other

ships near at the time and the Soudan was
lying outside the temporary boom well away
from the transports. On another occasion
bombs from an aeroplane fell near this vessel
and it was considered advisable to have
two large red canvas crosses sewn on to the
upper surface of the fore and aft awnings
in the hope that they might be seen and
respected.

It is impossible in this chapter to deal with
the activities of the naval doctor in other
spheres than those which have been indicated,
but mention must be made in passing of the
British Naval Mission to Serbia and of the
heroic work accomplished during the epidemic
of typhus which raged in that unhappy country,
A very full report on this epidemic was presented
by Temporary Surgeon Merewether, R.N.,
Who saw it for himself and took part in the
brave efforts to cope with it, thus incurring the
gravest personal risk.

Mention must also be made, of the work done
by naval doctors in connexion with the Royal
Naval Air Service. This work was exceedingly
interesting because experience soon showed
that a high measure of physical fitness was
essential to a successful pilot and hence upon
the doctor devolved the heavy responsibility
of selecting or rejecting candidates for the
service. Some curious conditions were also
met with, not the least of these being " Aeros-
thenia," to use the word coined for it by Staff
Surgeon Hardy Wells. It was found occa-
sionally among aerial pupils ; the pupil pilot
was not comfortable in his flying ; he had not
got that self-confidence which was so necessary.
He was perhaps too keenly apprehensive lest
he might make a bad landing or might get an
engine failure over bad landing ground and
smash the machine. He went on flying,
nevertheless, hoping that he might overcome
this feeling. But he did not overcome it ;
instead he slept badly, worried, and eventually
got into a really nervous state. It was found
that there was only one thing to be done in
those cases. The pupil had to give up flying ;
he was not suited for it. Men of proved courage
sometimes suffered from this trouble, and the
conclusion was that " it is not given to every
man to fly ; and to be left alone in the wide air-
world with no one to consult is a strange feeling."

Height effects were another type of con-
dition upon which the naval air service doctor
had to keep a watchful eye. The trouble arose
usually through too rapid a descent being

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

AFTER THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND BANK.
Wounded . Heroes in a Hospital Ship.

made. In regard to the question of age, it
was found that 30 was the highest limit advisable
in selecting pilots. At first 23 was fixed as the
lowest because it was feared that boys under
that age would be reckless in their handling
of the machines, but this rule was later relaxed,
and indeed experience showed that lads of 18
and 19 are most excellent material and that
very few of them were rejected subsequently
owing to failure to show aptitude for flying.

These, many activities gave to the naval
medical service a broad and catholic character,
but the actual work upon the fighting ships
remained the chief claim to honour. How
supremely heroic that work was was not
revealed until the terrible day of May 31, 1916,
when the Battle of Jutland Bank, the greatest
naval engagement in history, was joined.

It is clearly impossible to do full justice to
the work of the naval doctors in this engage-
ment, but quite enough material is available to
justify unstinted admiration and to evoke
heartfelt gratitude in every mind. In all the
great traditions of the service no nobler record
can be found than the record of the men who,
in darkness and danger, laboured without
thought of self or safety for the benefit of
their friends and the honour of their uniform.

Of all the wonderful deeds of that great day
perhaps those enacted upon the Warrior
were the most wonderful. The Warrior be-
longed to Sir Robert Arbuthnot's squadron,
and at 6.16 in the evening with the Defence
was observed passing down between the
engaged lines under a very heavy fire. The
Defence, flying Rear-Admiral Arbuthnot's flag,
disappeared and the Warrior passed to the
rear disabled. They had only a short time
before been observed in action with an enemy
light cruiser which was subsequently seen to
sink. The ships' companies of both the Defence
and Black Prince were lost, but that of the
Warrior was saved by the Engadine.

On the afternoon of May 31 the doctors of
the Warrior were in their dressing stations
making ready for the grim work ahead. After
the first few minutes of the action, however, a
terrible catastrophe occurred which in an
instant cut down their effectives and threw
upon those who survived a terrible new
burden of responsibility. A shell crashed into
the ship and destroyed utterly the after dressing
station ; other shells followed, and finally a fire
broke out resulting in many casualties.

As soon as possible, and while firing was still
in progress, one of the surgeons went along the

276

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

277

upper deck and the after part of the ship and
rendered first aid, and in this he was assisted
by the doctor in charge of the wrecked station,
who had escaped miraculously. The wounded
were carried along the decks from the scene of
the disaster to the forward station, and this
dangerous work was carried out in most efficient
and speedy fashion.

Then, to add to the terrible character of the
situation, the electric lights went out and gas
and smoke began to fill the mess decks and
especially the forward dressing station ; and
although candles and an electric torch had been
provided it was very difficult to see owing to
the dense smoke and consequent irritation of
the eyes.

These various circumstances rendered the
dressing station a kind of inferno. But courage
and devotion discounted even so great troubles.
As soon as the watertight doors, which shut
off one part of the ship from the other parts,
were opened, the doctors went forth again with
their stretcher parties to collect wounded
from the various parts of the ship and to carry
them to the sick bay and forecastle mess deck,
which were still intact. Mess tables were
rapidly cleared away and the wounded brought
to a place of comfort with all speed.

But down in the forward dressing station the
conditions had meanwhile become so bad that
the atmosphere was dangerous by reason of the
gas and smoke in it. One of the doctors was
actually " gassed," but soon recovered ; on
recovery he began his work again without a
moment's delay or hesitation, for there was
much work waiting to be accomplished.

When the wounded were collected all serious
cases were placed in beds on deck and in cots
in the sick bay. Some of the wounded died
here, but none from bleeding, for efficient
dressings had been applied. About 9.30 the
' Senior Medical Officer was ready to begin his
operating work.

A bathroom forward of the sick bay was
selected as an operating theatre. As soon as
it was ready the surgeons set to work, for
several men required their attention very
badly. All through the long hours they toiled,
knowing little or nothing of what passed upon
the sea about them, of the position of their own
ship, of the chances of personal safety ; perhaps
caring little ; toiling with dogged perseverance
towards the aim of bringing help and comfort
to their fellow sailors.

The work went on without a break, and by

the light of candles, till 4 a.m. of June 1, when
all the wounded had been attended to and
made comfortable. Indeed, at this time many
of them were asleep. But the work was as yet
only half done, for just as the surgeons com-
pleted their task orders came to abandon the
ship ; the Warrior, which was then being towed
by the Engadine, was sinking.

It was well that this order came after a
measure of comfort had been restored, and
after the patients had recovered from the
effects of the anaesthetics administered to
them, for there was a heavy sea running and
the ship was moving restlessly as she went to
her doom. Fierce was the ordeal awaiting the
doctors, who must transfer their tliirty-one
patients in that maelstrom.

Yet the task was carried out, in spite of the
sea and the rolling and plunging ships. Life-
belts were put on the patients and in cots,
stretchers, and sick-bay iron cots they were
moved from one vessel to the other. All
watertight rooms were then rapidly closed.
The Warrior by this time was very low in the
water, and might sink at any moment ; numer-
ous seas swept the upper deck as she lay
secured to the Engadine. It was difficult
work to prevent the wounded from being
soaked through. The stretchers and cots were
held up by men, walking on either side of them ;
but the movements of the ships rendered this
task exceedingly dangerous and difficult, and
unfortunately one man fell overboard owing
to the breaking of a stretcher. He was,
however, rescued by an officer of the Engadine,
but subsequently died. The heroic character
of that rescue between the bumping, plunging
ships may be left to the imagination.

The injuries received by members of the
Warrior's crew were of the most terrible kind.
Several bodies were rent in pieces ; many
limbs were torn from bodies ; some men were
stripped naked. Among the operations per-
formed by the light of the guttering candles,
upon a sinking ship in a gale of wind, were
amputations, ligaturing of bleeding vessels, and
removal of shell splinters.

Magnificent as was this conduct, it was
typical of that prevailing throughout the whole
fleet ; indeed on such a night of heroes dis-
crimination between gallant deeds was almost
impossible. Nevertheless a few other cases
may be mentioned in order to show how
universal was the response to duty by the
medical service. In the Lion, for example,

278

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

the trouble from gas fumes was experienced just
as it had been on the AYarrior. Respirators
and anti-gas goggles were issued to each
turret, compartment and mess deck As a
result of this precaution no case of " gassing "
occurred. Nearly all the casualties occurred
within the first half-hour of action. During
the first lull the medical officers emerged from
their stations to make a tour of inspection.
The scenes that greeted them beggar descrip-
tion. Most of the wounded, however, had
already been dressed temporarily. Tourniquets
had been applied in one or two cases, and
haemorrhage thus arrested. But many of the
wounded were terribly mutilated and broken.

Happily in this ship the light did not go
out — though precaution against this eventu-
ality had been taken — and so it was possible
to get to work in comparatively good conditions.
As usual, morphia was administered at once,
and acted like a charm, relieving the terrible
sufferings of the stricken men.

Thrice during the evening the battle was
renewed so far as this ship was concerned, but
as each lull came it was found possible to
remove the wounded to a place of safety by
means of the admirable Neil Robertson
stretcher (devised in 1910 by the late Fleet
Surgeon Neil Robertson, R.N.) which proved
so great an addition to the equipment of the
naval doctor.

After the action was over the injured were
nursed carefully throughout the night, and
were supplied with warm blankets, hot-water
bottles and hot beef-tea and medical comforts.
Some of the men were terribly burned and
others mutilated, so that all hope of saving life
was vain.

The burns, as has already been indicated,
were of two kinds, both of which were seen in
large numbers in the Jutland battle —burns
from exj^loded gim -charges and burns from
bursting shells. The former type were oc-
casioned when an enemy shell managed to
ignite some of our explosives in gun turrets.
In these cases the bodies of the unhappy
victims were often charred instantly so that they
resembled mummies ; it was an instantaneous
process of death, and but rarely cases of this
kind concerned the surgeon. The other type of
burn was due to a shell bursting near the victim,
and often involved large areas of his skin. It was,
however, a superficial burn and very amenable
to treatment. Various forms of treatment
were employed, but probably that by picric

_ _ - -,

■""■ ~ -^.

THE NEIL ROBERTSON HAMMOCK .
STRETCHER.

acid was the most successful. The objection to
picric acid, however, was that it adhered,
rendering dressing difficult and painful. So a
trial was given to the method of using
liquid paraffin, recommended by Dr. Sandfort,
Medecin-Major in the French Army. The
preparation was used at a high temperature ;
it solidified and formed a coating which ex-
cluded the air, stopped pain in ten to fifteen
minutes, and afforded painless redressings.

Not until 7. 30 a.m. on June 1 was it thought
safe to bring the Lion's wounded up from
below. The Vice-Admiral's and Captain's
cabins were accordingly cleaned, dried, and
thoroughly ventilated, a process which occupied
a considerable time as they were both full of
water and smoke, and the Captain's bathroom
was rigged up as an operating theatre. By 8.45
a.m. operations began, and 51 cases were dealt
with. Almost 50 per cent, of these cases had
burns of the face and hands alone, the reason
being that the clothing completely protected
the rest of the body against the momentary
flash of the bursting shells. The staff worked
< ontinuously in the operating theatre till
12.15 a.m. on June 2 — some 16 hours — when
all the wounded had been attended to.

" The cheerfulness and pluck of the wounded,"
an observer stated, " were simply magnificent.
Content to be alive, they waited to be dressed
with a silent patience admired by all. In
every case we found that the wounds were

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

279

far more severe than we had been led to antici-
pate by th3 attitude of the patient."

This heroic attitude was commented upon
by all the doctors ; one of them also told how
on glancing over the side of the ship when
going into action he saw a raft crowded with
'•sailor-men" from one of the sunken vessels.
As the raft floated by the men gave three
lusty cheers, and then began to sing " Keep the
Home Fires Burning " until the battleship
was out of earshot.

These terrible series of operations, coming
upon the top of the fierce strain of action, were

THE NEIL ROBERTSON STRETCHER IN
TOPS.

the doctor's most severe test. On some of the
light cruisers 10 and 11 hours were spent by
the surgeon in disposing of the mass of work
awaiting him ; during this period there was no
pause, a new case being hurried on to the
table as soon as the case just finished with had
been removed. Nor was this a mere mechanical
exercise. The doctor had to exercise judg-
ment upon matters affecting the whole future
life of young men in their prime. Upon the
answer to the question, Must this limb be

amputated at once or can it be saved ? depended
often the issues of life and death.

It is, indeed, remarkable that these men
were able to carry out their work with so great
success, and the value of a piece of advice given
to his colleagues by one of the surgeons who
bore the brunt of the action is obvious :

" It is necessary," he declared, " that evpry
Naval Medical Officer should keep himself
phvsicallv fit. as the strain of a prolonged night
action is severe."

It was found that hospital ships could hope
to play but a small part in a great naval battle,
for those ships which had most wounded
aboard were necessarily those which had been
most severely handled. Those ships were
forced in some cases to return quickly to their
bases and there was no time to unload wounded,
nor, indeed, any necessity since they could be
unloaded in much greater comfort in port.
Nevertheless, many incidents of the Jutland
fight pointed to the conclusion that ' ' rescue
ships " might fulfil a useful purpose by picking
up men out of the water and restoring them.
In the heat of action fighting vessels could not,
of course, undertake this work.

The true sphere of the hospital ship, as has
already been indicated, was found to lie
between the anchorages of the Grand Fleet
and the home ports. Many ingenious devices
were in use for conveying the wounded from
the battleship to the hospital ship (several of
which are illustrated in the present chapter).
The hospital ships performed splendid service,
and to their good equipment and excellent
organization it was due that the horrors of the
great fight were not prolonged an hour more
than was necessary.

Of the men themselves, the doctors, little

THE NEIL ROBERTSON STRETCHER
STOKEHOLDS.

2 HO

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

requires to be said. Their work, indeed,
revealed them and was their true mirror. No
less was it the mirror of the staffs who co-
operated with them, the sick berth stewards,
the cooks, the firemen. Nor must the surgeon
probationers be passed without mention.
Medical students, they showed again and again
superb qualities of courage and endurance and
much more than justified those who had tried
the experiment of appointing them. Finally,
the Admiralty surgeons and agents, civil
practitioners appointed at most large and
small ports round the British Isles, rendered
valuable service, one of them treating no fewer
than 43 wounded from the Battle of Jutland
Bank. There were some 1,122 medical officers
serving in the British Navy, including 528
entered for temporary service ; and in addi-
tion there were 370 surgeon probationers
who held the relative rank of Sub -Lieutenant
R.N.V.R.

In the list of naval honours appended to
Sir John Jellicoe's dispatch on the Battle of
Jutland Bank the doctors were well represented.
Fleet Surgeon Alexander Maclean was recom-
mended for promotion because of his gallant
conduct when " the medical staff was seriously
depleted by casualties, and the wounded and
dying had to be dressed under very difficult
conditions on the mess deck, which was flooded
with a foot of water from damaged fire mains."
Fleet Surgeon Penfold, though knocked down
by a bursting shell and severely bruised and
shaken, went on with his work " for forty

hours without rest." He also was recom-
mended. Surgeon Quine, R.N.V.R., received
mention because of his " assiduous care of and
attention to the wounded, of whom he was in
sole charge for over forty hours," the Staff
Surgeon having been severely wounded. Staff
Surgeon Bickford had actually to be ordered
to place himself on the sick list, and his superior
officer declared of him that " though severely
wounded by a shell splinter, he persisted in
attending to the wounded, only yielding to a
direct order from myself." A surgeon pro-
bationer who amputated a leg in the dark also
received honourable mention.

These cases, as will be evident from what
has been said, represent the hundreds of others
of which no record has been preserved ; they
show that from top to botlom the Royal Naval
Medical Service, like the Royal Navy itself,
was sound, a splendid organization with
splendid traditions of service, and with a
sense of duty and of honour which was stronger
than death. This grand body of men placed
England in its debt a hundred times ; to
its Chief, Sir Arthur May, and his staS,
the Empire likewise owed her thanks. Upon
these men devolved indeed a heavy re-
sponsibility. They were the guardians of
the guardians of the Empire ; day and night
their vigil continued, for to their hands had
been entrusted the health, the well-being and
the happiness, and so the efficiency, of the
Royal Navy during the years of its supreme
trial.

ON BOARD A PATROL SHIP.

CHAPTER CXLV.

THE SENUSSI AND WESTERN

EGYPT.

The Western Frontier of Egypt and the Senussi Danger— Tripoli and Cyrenaica— British,
Italian and French Objects— The Senussi Sect— Its Part in Recent Wars— Turco-German
Conspiracy Against Italy— Italian Operations 1914-15— Turco-German Plans for Senussi
Invasion of Egypt — The Kaiser as " Protector of Islam " — Beginning of the Campaign-
General Maxwell's Offensive — Analysis of the Operations — The Action on Christmas
Day, 1915 — General Peyton's Operations — Defeat and Capture of Gaafer Pasha —
Armoured Cars in the Desert — The Crew of the Tara and Their Release — Occupation of
the Oases — Sir Archibald Murray's Command in Egypt — The Pacification of Darfur.

THE general position of Egypt in
relation to the world war and the
first attack, in February, 1915, by
the Turks on the Suez Canal have
been described in previous chapters. That the
Turks would endeavour to invade Egypt from
Syria was clearly foreseen from the moment
when, through German influences and the
ambition of Enver Pasha, the Ottoman Empire
was drawn into the war on the side of the Central
Powers. An attack upon Egypt from the west
— from the direction of Tripoli — was not,
however, anticipated. Therefore when in No-
vember, 1915, it was announced that it had
been necessary to withdraw the Egyptian
garrisons from the western frontier posts
stirprise was felt at this extension of the theatre
-of war. Shortly afterwards a considerable
force of Arabs, Turks and Berbers, under the
leadership of Sidi Ahmed, the head of the
Senussi fraternity of Moslems, invaded Western
Egypt from Cyrenaica, and were joined by
some thousands of Egyptian Bedouin. After a
campaign which lasted about five months the
invaders were decisively beaten, and the danger
to Egypt from that quarter, if not wholly
removed, was rendered nearly negligible.

Although it was hardly realized, the danger
to Egypt from the Senussi movement had been
Vol. IX.— Part 112. '

very serious — much more serious than the
Turkish attempts made from the Sinai Penin-
sula to cross the Suez Canal. General Sir John
Maxwell, then commanding the forces in
Egypt, put it on record that throughout the
summer and autumn of 1915 his principal
cause of anxiety was the possibility of trouble
on the Western Frontier, for such trouble
" might lead to serious religious and internal
disorders." No danger of that kind arose in
connexion with the Suez Canal operations. A
jihid proclaimed by the Senussi sheikh might,
however, have met with a wide response in
Egypt, for the order of which he was the chief
was the most powerful Mahomedan sect in
North-East Africa, and the only brotherhood
exercising sovereign rights and possessing a disci-
plined armed force on a permanent war footing.
Up to 1915 the Senussi had maintained friendly
relations with Egypt, but the position was
anomalous, for Sidi Ahmed had for many years
fought hard to oppose the extension of French
authority in the Central Sudan, and he was,
when the war in Europe broke out, conducting
a campaign against the Italians in Cyrenaica.

Tripoli and Cyrenaica (Bengazi) had, it will
be remembered, become Italian possessions as
the result of Italy's war with Turkey in 1911-12.
The Turks, however, had never withdrawn the

181

292

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

whole of their troops from Cyrenaica, and
these, aided by the Senussi, continued the con-
flict with the Italians. At the end of 1914 the
whole of the interior of Cyrenaica was held by
the Senussi, and, as the western border of
Egypt is conterminous with Cyrenaica, the
Senussi had every facility they needed to cross
the frontier, where, except along the Mediter-
ranean and at the oasis of Siwa, there were no
forces to oppose them. Nevertheless, but for
Turco-German intrigues Sidi Ahmed would
not have turned his troops against Egypt.
The Turks, as has been indicated, had never
loyally attempted to carry out the provisions

BK1GADIER-GENBRAL H. T. LUKIN,

Commanded (he South African Troops, Yeomanry,

and Territorial Infantry and Artillery.

EUiott S Fry

MAJOR-GENERAL A. WALLACE,
Commanded Western Frontier Force. '

of the Treaty of Lausanne, which closed the
Tripoli war, and their endeavours to stir up
trouble for the Italians were greatly aided by
German agents. Long before Italy had entered
into the European conflict the familiar German
methods were employed to undermine her
authority in North Africa. The efforts of the
Turks and Germans succeeded in provoking
revolts throughout Tripoli of so serious a
character that in view of the European situa-
tion the Italians withdrew their garrisons from
the whole of the hinterland, and in Cyrenaica
they were unable to occupy that part of the
coastline which adjoined the Egyptian frontier.
This was an opportunity of which the Germans
quickly took advantage when the European War
began. Large quantities of ammunition,
field and other guns, German and Turkish
officers, well supplied with treasure, were
smuggled into Cyrenaica in innocent-looking
neutral vessels. The presence of these officers,
and the arms and money they brought with
them, strengthened German influence with the
Senussi, and together with the activity, later
on, of German submarines off the Cyrenaican
coast, finally induced Sidi Ahmed to break of
his friendly relations with Egypt.

The invasion of Western Egypt was thus the
sequel to the campaigns in Tripoli and Cyrenaica,
and was directly traceable to Turco-German

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

283

influence. Italy's part in the war in Africa
has not hitherto been told, nor its relation to
the invasion of Western Egypt made clear.
Neither has the significance of the Senussi
movement in relation to the European. Powers
whom it has affected been adequately described.
In this chapter, therefore, these matters are
dealt with in sufficient fullness to make the
whole question intelligible. It will be seen
that in the campaign against the Senussi the
British, Italians and French were not animated
by any anti-Moslem feeling ; their objects were
purely political. The following pages consider
first the position of the Senussi fraternity and
their first clash with the European nations who
had partitioned Africa among themselves, then
the campaign in Tripoli and Cyrenaica, and
finally the story of the failure of the invasion
of Western Egypt — a failure due to the able
dispositions of General Sir John Maxwell, to
the leadership of Major-General A. Wallace,
C.B., and Major-General W. E. Peyton, C.B.,
and to the gallantry of the force they com-
manded. That force was notable in its com-
position as representing almost every part of
the British Empire. It included battalions
from the British Army, Indians, Australians,
New Zealanders, and South Africans, the last-
named making their first appearance on any
battlefield outside the bounds of the southern
half of the African Continent.

The Senussi sect is of modern origin. Its
founder, Sidi or Seyid — i.e.. Lord — Mahommed
ben Ali, was a native of Algeria, and was called
es Senussi, after a famous saint whose marabout
is near Tlemcen. He was recognized as belong-
ing to the Ashraf or descendants of Mahomet,
and in early life was a student of theology at
Fez. Attached originally to the Khadirite-;, he
founded his first monastery in Arabia in 1835.
His connexion with the puritan sect of the
Wahhabis led to his being suspect by the
idema of Mecca, and shortly afterwards he
removed to Cyrenaica (or Bengazi, as it was
called by its Turkish masters), where in the
hill country behind the ancient seaport of
Derna he built the Zawia Baida, or White
Monastery, which for years was his head-
quarters. Es Senussi speedily gained a large
following, notwithstanding the alleged hetero-
doxy of his theology. He himself claimed to
belong to the orthodox Malikite rite, and sought
to revive the faith and usages of the early
days of Islam. The distinctive tenets of the
Senussi it is not necessary to discuss here ; it
may, however, be mentioned that to the
Prophet's prohibition of alcohol was added a
prohibition of the use of tobacco. Religious
tenets apart, the Senussi fraternity differed
from other Moslem brotherhoods in the exer-
cise of a steady and continuous political
influence. Mahommed es Senussi became the

BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. D. T. TYNDALE BISCOE(x)
With members of his staff.

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284

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

285

virtual ruler of Cyrenaica, so much so that he
aroused the jealousy of the Turks, who re-
inforced their garrisons and made efforts to
strengthen their position. The White Monastery
was inconveniently near the coast and the
Turkish garrison at Derna, and es Senussi,
fearing a surprise raid, moved south — in 1855 —
to the edge of the Libyan Desert. There in
the oasis of Jarabub (now the most westerly
point of Egyptian territory) he built another
monastery, and there he died, some four or
five years later. A splendid tomb-mosque
marks his last resting-place. He was succeeded
by his younger son, known as Senussi el Mahdi,'
who enjoyed his father's reputation for sanctity
and greatly extended the political influence of
the fraternity. Not only were the Arabs* of
Cyrenaica ever ready to obey him, but the
Bedouin of Western Egypt embraced the doc-
trines of the sect, and a Zawia was established
in the oasis of Siwa — the oasis in which is the
once famous oracle of Jupiter Arnmon, con-
sulted by Alexander the Great. West of Siwa
throughout the Libyan Desert Senussi el Mahdi
was the acknowledged sovereign of all the
wandering tribes, and from them and from the
Arabs of Cyrenaica he drew his standing army.
Of greater advantage, however, to Senussi el
Mahdi's revenues and prestige than his lord-
ship of half a million square miles of the
Eastern Sahara and the allegiance of the
turbulent Arabs of Cyrenaica was the domi
nating influence he possessed over Wadai,
Kanem, and the other States of the Central
Sudan, from Nigeria in the west to Darfur in
the east. The power of the Senussi and his
reputed- hostility to Christians led him to be
regarded as a source of danger to the European
Powers with possessions in North and North
Central Africa, while Abdul Hamid, then Sultan
of Turkey, discerned in- him a possible rival
for the Caliphate. The unwelcome attentions
of the Pasha of Bengazi, who, on Abdul Hamid's
instructions, visited Jarabub, eventually led
Senussi el Mahdi to retire into the heart of
the Libyan Desert. The new headquarters
of the fraternity were established at Jof,
in the Kufra oases, as inaccessible a spot

* It is cmtomary and convenient, though striclly
incorrect, to speak of the inhabitants of Cyrenaica as
"Arabs." There are genuine Arab tribes among them
but the majority of the Cyrenaicans are of Libyan (Ber-
ber) stock. They are of the same race as the Tunisians,
Algerians and Moors, a distinctly white race which has
adopted Islam and the Arab language. In Cyrenaica
the Berbers are perhaps more Arabized than in the other
Barbary States.

for an invader to reach as any that exists in
regions at all traversable. At Kufra, too, the
Senussi sheikh was midway between Wadai
and Cyrenaica and was in touch with the
Egyptian Sudan through Darfur and with
Egypt through Siwa and the string of oases
lying west of the Nile from Aswan to Cairo.
Many of the inhabitants of these oases — Dakhla,
Baharia, Farafra and Kharga — were Senussites.

Senussi el Mahdi refused to have anything
to do with Mahommed Ahmed, the Dongolese
boat-builder who proclaimed himself the Mahdi
— i.e,, " the expected guide " of Islam — and
wrested the whole of the Eastern Sudan from
Egypt. The Senussi shiekh had already estab-
lished friendly relations with Egypt, and his
cousin and agent, who lived at Alexandria,
was a much-courted and wealthy nobleman,
lavish in his hospitality to Europeans and
Egyptians alike. Senussi's disapproval of the
Mahdist movement in the Eastern Sudan won
for him the esteem of Sir Reginald Wingate,
and until 1915 the relations between the
Egyptian and Sudanese authorities and the
Senussi continued friendly — no doubt in part
because the political ambitions of the Senussi
were not directed to the Nile valley. The
reconquest of the Eastern Sudan by Anglo-
Egyptian forces under Lord Kitchener in
1896-98 did not affect adversely the relations
between the Senussi and Egypt ; indeed, as
illustrating the anti-Mahdist tendencies of the
Senussi, it may be noted that the revolt in
Darfur in 1888-89 against the Khalifa had been
successful because the tribesmen used Senussi's
name, though they received no material help
from him.

To the French Senussi el Mahdi offered
bitter opposition, but his action proved that
he was fighting mainly as a temporal sovereign
to preserve his authority over the Central
Sudan States. All the merchandise from these
semi-Arabized negro sultanates which fringe
the southern edge of the desert passed north-
ward through the Sahara, along caravan routes
controlled by the Senussites. (The merchandise
included valuable consignments of eunuchs for
the harems of the East, and slaves smuggled
into Egypt and Turkey as domestic servants.)
The Central Sudan had come nominally within
tne French sphere of influence as the result of
agreements concluded in 1898 and 1899 with
Great Britain, and in 1901 the French began
to occupy the country. At once they encoun-
tered the opposition of the Senussi, the first

112—2

28G

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

THE WHOLE AREA OF SENUSS1 ACTIVITY.

campaign being for tlie possession of Kanem,
a State on the north east shores of Lake Chad.
It ended in the defeat of the Senussi in January,
1902, and the loss of Kanem so greatly affected
Sheikh Senussi el Mahdi that his death in May
following was attributed to grief. He was
succeeded as Grand Sheikh of the order by his
nephew, who was still head of the fraternity in
1915, Sidi Ahmed-el-Sherif, generally styled in
Egypt Seyid Ahmed, or the Grand Senussi.

Sidi Ahmed continued the struggle against
the French until 1913-14. The conquest of
Wadai, during 1909-10, by the French was a
great blow to the power of the Senussi, and the
capture in 1913 of Am Galakka in Borku by
Col. Largeau* wrested from the Senussi the
last stronghold they held in the Sudan. This
was followed by the occupation by the French
in July, 1914, of Barda'i, the chief town in the

* Col. Largeau later on organized the French expe-
dition which invaded Cameroon from Lake Chad.
Keturning to France, he was killed at Verdun. (See
Chap. CXXXI.)

Tibesti Highlands — a great mountain range
stretching north to the confines of Tripoli.
Sidi Ahmed was definitely ejected from tho
French sphere ; into the Libyan Desert they
made no attempt to follow Mm. It would
have brought them into the sphere reserved
by international agreement to Great Britain.
Two facts are noteworthy regarding the long
struggle between the French and tho Senussi —
first, that the majority of the forces which
opposed the French were not the immediate
followers of the Senussi, but the troops of the
States, such as Wadai, whose rulers were
virtual vassals of the Senussi ; secondly, that
the struggle against the spiritual head of a
widely spread Moslem fraternity did not arouse
any special anti -Christian feeling among the
Moslems of North Africa. There was no jihid,
no holy war, partly because, perhaps, the true
Arabs do not form even a fourth of the popula-
tion of North Africa, and on the Berbers — the
great mass of the people — Moslem doctrines sit
somewhat Lightly.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

287

It will have been noticed that the final defeat
of the Senussi in the Central Sudan occurred
in the middle of 1914, just before tho great
war in Europe broke out. During the latter
stages of that conflict Sidi Ahmed had also
been busily engaged in the north. As has been
shown, relations between the Senussi and the
Turks had been far from cordial, but in 1910
Sidi Ahmed received at Kufra an embassy
from the Young Turks, who sought to enlist
the sheikh's aid in the Pan-Islamic ambitions
which they took over from Abdul Hamid.
There is evidence to show that the Senussi
sheikh did not share those ambitions. What-
ever may have been the views of his grand-
father and uncle, his predecessors in the
headship of the Order, Sidi Ahmed, who was
well versed in European politics, and, through
his many agents abroad, in close touch with
the outer world, set at least as much store on
his position as a temporal sovereign as on
his spiritual lordship. But when in September,
1911, Italy declared war upon Turkey and
invaded Tripoli and Cyrenaica he was moved
to action.

It is necessary to remember the distinction
between these two provinces, the custom in
England to include Cyrenaica in Tripoli being

misleading. They formed separate govern-
ments under the Turks, and remain' separato
provinces under the Italians.* Though they
have many characteristics in common they are
distinct entities separated by the Gulf of
Sidra. Tripoli adjoins Tunisia ; Cyrenaica
Egypt, and had the fate of Tripoli alone been
in question the Senussi sheikh might have
remained indifferent to Italian action. Tripoli
not being directly in the Senussi sphere of
influence. In Cyrenaica it was otherwise.
Here, as has been seen, the Senussi were in
strength, and it was through its seaports —
Bengazi, Derna, etc. — that, with or without
the permission of the Turks, they drew their
supplies of arms and munitions and passed
the merchandise coming from the Central
Sudan. Through Cyrenaica also the Senussi
largely maintained their contiu.t with Egypt,
along the great limestone tableland, the
Libyan Plateau, which forms the land bridge
between Egypt and North Africa. Farther
south the arid expanse of the Libyan desert
renders extremely difficult any communication
with Egypt from the west. Tne control of Cyre-
naica, itself mainly a sterile rocky tableland,

* The common name for Tripoli and Cvrenaiea under
Italian rule i* Libya.

A COUNCIL OF WAR IN THE DESERT.

■26b

THE TIMES HISTOBY OF THE WAB.

was therefore a vital point in Senussi policy.
Turkish control of the seaports was one thing,
but Sidi Aluued knew that Italian control of
the coast would be another, and for him a
lar more disagreeable thing. He had lost, or
was losing, the Central Sudan to the French ;
therefore it was the more needful to keep open
his road to the sea. Little as he loved the
Ottomans, in liis own interests he instructed
his adherents in Cyrenaica to help Enver
Pasha (then Enver Bey), who commanded the
Turkish troops in Cyrenaica, and the Arabs
formed a valuable part of Enver's army

In October, 1912, the threatening situation
in the Balkans induced Turkey to choose the
lesser of two evils, and on the 18th of that
month the Treaty of Ouchy (Lausanne) was
signed, Turkey renouncing her sovereignty in
Tripoli and Cyrenaica,"' and agreeing to with-
draw her troops. By a clause which later on
gave opportunity for much intrigue on the
part of the Turks, the Italians, in accord with
their wish to deal fairly with Moslem suscepti
bilities, agreed to recognize the religious autho-
rity of the Sultan as Caliph. When the Treaty
of Ouchy was signed the Italians held in
Cyrenaica only the chief seaports, Bengazi,
Derna, Bombah and Tobruk. Their authority
extended inland nowhere more than three or
four miles. The position in Tripoli was similar
and the energies of the Italians were directed
first to the pacification of that province, whose
inhabitants showed less determined opposition
to the extension of Italian authority than did

* By the Turks, as already stated, Cyrenaica was
known as Bengazi, after its chief town. Another
usual name for the province is P.arca.

the Arabs of Cyrenaica. This task, the occupa-
tion and pacification of the hinterland of
Tripoli, was completed in August, 1914, the
month in which the Great War began. Besides
Tripoli proper the Italians had occupied
Chadames and Ghat, as well as the sub-provinco
of Fezzan, with its capital of Murzuk. This
had not been accomplished without consider-
able fighting, but the opposition was less
serious than might have been expected. By
the French authorities in Tunisia and Algeria
the advent of the Italians was officially and
cordially welcomed as putting an end to a state
of anarchy on the frontier which had caused
unrest in the French Sahara.

When the pacification of Tripoli was nearly
complete the Italians turned their attention
seriously to Cyrenaica, where, towards the end
of 1313, the situation was much the same as it
had been twelve months previously — that is,
the Italians held only the seaports. General
Ameglio was then appointed Governor of
Cyrenaica, and a considerable force was placed
under his command for the reduction of that
province. He had made a promising beginning,
when, in view of the situation in Europe, he
rcceivod orders to suspend operations. Italy
was still a member of the Triple Alliance, but
she had doubts as to the loyalty of her Allies,
doubts that diplomatic revelations proved
to be 'well founded. She therefore determined
not to lock up large bodies of troops in Africa
when their services might be needed in a nearer
theatre of war. Her original rupture with
Turkey had been precipitated by the know-
ledge of German designs to obtain a footing on
the Mediterranean in agreement with the Porte,

INDIAN TROOPS IN THE DESERT.

THE TIMES HISTOEY OF THE WAR.

289

TAKING CAMELS TO

while her conduct of the war of 1911-12 had
been hampered by objections raised by Austria-
Hungary to action in Albania and the /Egean,
and she now had to encounter covert intrigues
directed to undermining her position in her
newly acquired territory.

Bad faith on the part of the Turks Italy had
experienced ever since the signing of the
treaty which was supposed to have ended the
war in Tripoli. From Tripoli itself the Otto-
man troops had been withdrawn, but a con-
siderable body of Turks remained in Cyrenaica.
There, with the aid of the Senussi forces, they
carried on the war. The Italian troops cap
tured during the year of fighting were not
released. For several weeks after the peace
treaty was signed Enver Pasha himself con-
tinued to direct the operations against the
Italians ; on Ms return to Constantinople,
Aziz Bey took up the command, and held it
till the end of June, 1913. After the departure
of Aziz Turkish officers continued to arrive in
Cyrenaica — the Italian Government was in
possession of the names of over 100 of these
gentry — and arms and ammunition reached
the Turco-Arab force by various means, chiefly
through the small ports between Tobruk and
the Egyptian frontier. That the Italian
Government acted wisely in ordering the sus-
pension of operations was soon demonstrated.
In September, 1914, the Fezzani broke out
in revolt, and the whole of the hinterland of
Tripoli was shortly involved in the movement.
This conspiracy against Italian rule was
attributed to the intrigues of German-inspired
Turkish agents, though at the time the Italians
made no charges in public against either
Turkey or Germany. The German method of
stirring up discontent in the over -sea possessions

RAILHEAD, DABAA.

of States with which she was at peace had been
exposed in the French Yellow Book issued just
after the war began. It contained a secret
memorandum, dated Berlin, March 19, 1913,
in which the writer stated that it was —

absolutely necessary that we [Germany] should open
up relations by means of well-chosen organizations with
influential people in Egypt, Tunis, Algeria and Morocco,
in order to prepare the measures which would be neces-
sary in the case of a European war. Of course, in case
of war we should openly recognize these secret allies ;
and on the conclusion of peace we should secure to them
the advantages which they had gained. The?e aims are
capable of realization. The first attempt which was
made some years ago opened up for us the desired re-
lations. Unfortunately these relations were not suffi-
ciently consolidated. Whether we like it or not, it will
be necessary to make preparations of this kind, in order
to bring a campaign rapidly to a conclusion.

Tripoli and Cyrenaica were not mentioned in
this secret Memorandum, but the Italians knew
that it was idle to expect that German agents
would refrain from practising in Libya the
methods adopted elsewhere in North Africa.
They had had already proof of the manner in
which Germany regarded her obligations to her
Ally, for in the war of 1911-12 German naval
and military men in the Turkish service had
been ordered to take part in the operations
against Italy — action which contrasted with
that of Great Britain, who during the con-
tinuance of the war recalled her officers serving
in the Turkish navy.* Sincerely desirous, if
it could be done with honour, of keeping out
of the great war which was devastating Europe,
the Italian Government ignored as far as

* Long afterwards — on July 6, 1910 — the German
Government officially announced that " in the case of
men who by supreme orders took part in the Italo-
Turkish war of 1911-12, one year of war is calculated for
pension purposes." The text of the order was repub.
fished in the Italian newspaper, Idea Nazionah, in
September. 1916.

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THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

291

possible the repeated provocations from Turco-
German sources ; they even passed over at the
time the proclamation of the Holy War against
the Italians. It was not until August 20,
1915, that Italy again declared war on Turkey.
Towards Germany, for reasons not directly
connected with the situation in Africa, she
was still more patient. At the outset of the
war Germany had sought to take advantage
of Italy's position to make Tripoli the base of
intrigues with the natives of Tunisia and
Algeria against the French. The arrest and
deportation by the Italians of a party of Arabic -
speaking German officers who reached Tripoli
and were making for the Tunisian frontier,
showed that Italy was loyal to her inter-
national obligations. Thereafter the intrigues
were directed into what proved a more fruitful
channel, the stirring up of disaffection in
Tripoli and bringing pressure to bear on the
Senussi sheikh to induce him to abandon his
friendly attitude towards Egypt. In July, 1915,
the Italians, through the seizure of documents
in the houses of Arab notables living in Tripoli
city and in Derna, became possessed of many
details of the movement conducted by German-
inspired Turkish agents, which had already
led to the revolt in Fezzan and other parts of
the province of Tripoli. Events in Cyrenaica
developed somewhat later ; it is necessary to
deal first with the rebellion in Tripoli.

In the operations for the occupation of the
hinterland of Tripoli the Italians employed, in
addition to troops from Italy, a considerable
number of men from their Red Sea colony of
Eritrea, as well as native — i.e., Libyan —
partisans. The Eritrean troops are nearly all
Abyssinians — excellent soldiers and Christians.
Priests of the Abyssinian Church accompanied
them as chaplains. Their faith and race dis-
tinguished them sharply from the Arabs and
Berbers, and their loyalty and bravery were
unquestioned. It was otherwise with some of
the tribes who had joined the Italian standard.
On March 3, 1914, Col.' Miani, with a force
which was mainly composed of 2,000 Eritreans
and 1,200 auxiliaries (Libyans), occupied
Murzuk, the chief town in Fezzan, and a
column undor Col. Giannini occupied Ghat —
600 miles from the coast — on August 12
following. Thus every important point in
the hinterland was in Italian occupation, and
an era of peace appeared to have dawned.
Appearances were deceptive for towards the

end of September the Fezzani suddenly
attacked small Italian garrisons between
Murzuk and the coast and inflicted serious
losses on the Italians. At first the authorities
believed that they had only to deal with a
local affair, but the movement spread, and at
the end of November the Italian Government
directed that Fezzan should be evacuated.
The gallant Col. Miani and his troops fought
their way back to the coast via Sokna. This
withdrawal left the garrison of Ghat isolated,
while that of Ghadames was also in a perilous
position. Both Ghadames and Ghat are situated
in oases of the Sahara on the caravan route
from Nigeria to Tripoli ; ancient towns, now
in decay, famed as entrepots for European
and Sudanese merchandise. The townsmen
were fairly friendly to the Italians, but could
afford them no protection against the nomads
of the desert. For the troops to cut their way
north to the coast was impossible, and that
reinforcements would reach them in time was
most unlikely. In this extremity the French
Government came to their aid, although not
yet allied to Italy. In Africa, indeed, the
solidarity of European interests was recognized
by all the Powers except Germany. Both Ghat
and Ghadames are close to the French Saharan
frontier, and the garrison of Ghadames with-
drew into the Tunisian Sahara, while that of
Ghat marched over 200 miles across the
Algerian Sahara to Fort Flatters, where they
were made welcome. This was in December,

1914, and the generous action, spontaneously
taken, of the French was deeply appreciated
in Italy.

The ramifications of the conspiracy to over-
throw Italian authority in Tripoli were not
then fully known, and General Tassoni, Gover-
nor of Tripoli, organized expeditions to re-
occupy both Ghadames and Ghat. After some
fierce fighting, Col. Giannini again entered
Ghat on February 18, 1915, and shortly after-
wards Ghadames was re-garrisoned. The im-
provement in the situation was only temporary.
In April, in an engagement with the rebels in
the Sokna region, the Libyan auxiliaries of the
Italians went over to the enemy on the field
of battle, and the Italian and Eritrean troops
only saved themselves from complete disaster
by a very skilful retreat. This defection led
several tribes whose attitude had been doubt-
ful to turn against the Italians, and in June,

1915, the Italian Government announced a
general temporary withdrawal of all garrisons

292

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

in the Tripoli hinterland. The withdrawal was'
not carried out without serious loss ; loss which
would have been much greater but for the
effective help given by the French in Southern
Tunisia. The last place in the interior to be
evacuated was Ghadames, the garrison crossing
tho Tunisian frontier on July 19. By a decree
of July 15, 1915, General Ameglio was named
Governor of Tripoli, while retaining liis post of
Governor of Cyrenaica. Thus the direction of
the affairs of both provinces was concentrated
in the hands of one man. Under General
Ameglio the coast district of Tripoli was per-
pared for defence. During the summer of
1915 rebel forces approached within fifteen
miles of Tripoli city, but the measures taken
by General Ameglio freed the region to which
the Italians had withdrawn from enemies. The
reconquest of the interior was a measure post-
poned to a more propitious season.

One object of the Turks and Germans in
stirring up sedition in Tripoli was to create
trouble for the French in their adjoining pos-
sessions. In this they failed. The state of
anarchy re-created in Fezzan had some effect in
Southern Tunisia, but the great majority of
Tunisians remained absolutely loyal to the
French. In September and October, 1915,
bands of Tripolitans, led by Turkish officers, and
joined by Tunisian rebels, attacked some French
outposts. They were defeated by Lieut. -Col.

Le Bceuf in three or four stiff engagements and
peace on the Tunisian border was reestablished.
In Algeria and the Algerian Sahara the work of
German agents remained absolutely fruitless.

The Tripoli revolt was, as it were, supple-
mental to the main plan of the enemy, whose
cliief energies in North Africa were concen-
trated on Cyrenaica, Egypt and the Anglo -
Egyptian Sudan. In the Sudan the con-
spicuous loyalty of the Morghani,* tho principa
Moslem fraternity in that region, counteracted
the efforts of the Turks and Germans, and only
in Darfur was there any anti-British movement.
The Darfur incident itself was a sequel to the
Senussi movement, and is dealt with in its
proper sequence. The plots of the Neufelds.
Priifers, Hatzfelds and others in Egypt and
the Sudan, though backed by the Egyptian
"Nationalists," did not have the effect de-
signed. In Cyrenaica the Turco-Germans had
a more promising field for their enterprise.
The Italians had been willing to come to an
arrangoment with the Senussi Sheikh, and
though negotiations were not officially opened,
Arab notables who had thrown in their lot
with Italy were allowed .to visit Sidi Ahmed
with a view to effecting an accommodation.
No interference with the Sheikh's religious
authority was contemplated, nor did Italy

* Sayed Ali, the head of the sect, was in January, 191U
created K.C.M.G.

AUSTRALIAN TROOPS IN THE DESERT.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

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BEDOUIN PRISONERS IN THE BRITISH LINES.

propose to occupy Kufra or other oases in the
Libyan Desert — whether those places would fall
eventually within the Italian or British sphere
of influence was still uncertain — but an ackno%v-
ledgment of Italian sovereignty was required.
The pourparlers failed, for Sidi Ahmed refused,
as he said, to accept the position of " a protected
Bey." He was master of the interior of
Cyrenaica, and even had access to the Mediter-
ranean at various points west of the Egyptian
frontier. While he could not dislodge the
Italians from the ports they held, nor even
prevent them from consolidating their ground
between Bengazi and Derna, he saw that they
had withdrawn from Fezzan and Ghat, and,
left to himself, he would probably have been
satisfied with the situation as it was. Details
of his relations with the Turks in Cyrenaica
are naturally lacking, but his actions showed
that he hesitated long to take their advice and
commit himself to an attack on Egypt. Had
the Allied Fleets in the Mediterranean been
able to prevent any supp'ies reaching the
Senussi he would in all probability not have
broken his traditional good relations with
Egypt. Even as it was, throughout the latter
half of 1914 and the opening months of 1915,
notwithstanding the pressure brought to bear
upon him by the Turco-German party, he
maintained a correct attitude towards the
Egyptian authorities.

Signs that the pressure on the Senussi Sheikh
to invade Egypt were beginning to take effect

were first apparent in May, 1915. In the
previous month Gaafer Pasha, " a Germanized
Turk of considerable ability," to quote General
Maxwell's description of him, had arrived in
Cyrenaica with a large supply of arms and
ammunition. He joined Nuri Bey, a half-
brother of Enver Pasha, who was the leader of
the Turkish party in Cyrenaica. That Turkey
and Italy were still at peace with one another
did not in the least affect the action of Nuri or
Gaafer. At what spot Gaafer landed or for
how long Nuri Bey had been in Cyrenaica does
not appear ; a number of Turks and Germans
gained access to the country by passing them-
selves off as Tunisians; Egyptians or Moors.
But not all those who tried to smuggle them-
selves in succeeded. In June, 1915, the French
Ministry of Marine notified the capture in the
Eastern Mediterranean of a sailing boat flying
the Greek flag, provided with false papers and
carrying a party of Turks, whose luggage
consisted of valuable presents for the Senussi
Sheikh. Other boats were also captured, but
it was not until the beginning of 1916 that the
Cyrenaican coast was so well patrolled by Allied
warships that Nuri Bey and Sidi Ahmed were
entirely cut off from over-sea supplies. Among
those who reached Cyrenaica before the arrival
of Gaafer Pasha was a senator of the Turkish
Parliament with special knowledge of the
Senussi organization. He came, accompanied
by Turkish military officers, and visited the
Sheikh, then encamped near the Egyptian
frontier, using all his eloquence to induce Sidi

112—3

294

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

Alimed to break with Egypt and proclaim a
jihad. At that time Sidi Ahmed, who was to
some extent dependent for his commissariat
upon supplies imported through Solium, was in
correspondence with Lieutenant-Colonel Snow,
the British officer then commanding on the
Western Frontier of Egypt, and it was chiefly
owing to Colonel Snow's tactful handling of a
very delicate situation that a rupture with the
Senussi was so long deferred. The Senussi
Sheikh represented to Colonel Snow that he held
his Turkish visitors as prisoners, and he sent to
Cairo as his special envoy a leading member of
the fraternity, Sidi Mahommed el Idris, who,
on his part, endeavoured to maintain peace
between his people and Egypt. The aim of Sidi
Idris appears to have been to get a recogni-
tion of Senussi autonomy, a matter which,
however, could only be settled by agreement
between Italy and Great Britain. It may be
added here that, when affa.irs had reached a
critical stage, Sidi Idris was sent by the British
to Cyrenaica ' ' to arrange negotiations whereby
the Senussi should get rid of his Turkish
advisers in return for a sum of money." (Sir J.
Maxwell's despatch of March 16, 1916.) This
plan had obvious merits and had it been tried
at an earlier stage it might have succeeded.
But it was adopted too late, for the Senussi
coffers were already filled largely with German
gold. Heedless of his international engage-
ments, and of the fact that his country was
still at peace with Italy, the Kaiser himself did

not disdain to make a direct appeal to Sidi

Ahmed. In one of the boats captured while

endeavouring to carry gifts to the Senussi was

found an embossed casket containing the

following letter in Arabic, written by William II.

in his favourite role of the protector of Islam : —

Praises to the most High God. Emperor William,
son of Charlemagne, Allah's Envoy, Islam's Protector,
to the illustrious Chief of Senussi. We pray God to
lead our armies to victory. Our will is that thy valorous
warriors shall expel infidels from territory that belongs
to true believers and their commander. To this end we
send thee arms, money, and tried chiefs. Our common
enemies, whom Allah annihilate to the last man, shall
fly before thee. So be it. — William.

This was not the only appeal of the kind made

to the Senussi Sheikh. Among the documents

found in January, 1916, by the Allies in the

archives of the enemy consulates at Salonika

were 1,500 copies of a long proclamation in

Arabic addressed to the " Chiefs of the Senussis."

This proclamation, urging Moslems, on religious

grounds, to wage war on Christians, was

discovered in the consulate of Austria, whose

sovereign bears the title of Catholic and

Apostolic Majesty. The special correspondent

of The Times at Salonika who sent extracts from

this document said that it was not signed, but

its pseudo-oriental wording clearly betrayed its

Germanic authorship. The following are some

passages from this precious document : —

In the Name of Allah the Compassionate and

Merciful !

Chiefs of the Senussis !

You have seen that in consequence of the oppression

ceaselessly inflicted on your Musulman brethren by

BEDOUINS CAPTURED DURING THE FIGHTING.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

295

CONVEYING WOUNDED ON CAMEL BACK.

their enemies, France, England, Italy and Russia, that
the Musulmans, who once enjoyed freedom, have been
reduced to slavery and humiliation. These tyrannical
nations have no other aim but to blot out the light of
Islam throughout the world.

Of all the instruments Allah has chosen for the pro-
tection of our religion the surest is the German nation,
with its sympathy for Musulmans. These our allies
have placed the precious help of their policy at our ser-
vice. They have begun to help us in every way in their
power to emancipate ourselves from the afflictions which
our oppressors deal out to us.

In these circumstances we have realized the imperious
necessity of proclaiming a Holy War throughout Africa,
th9 north of which continent has been corrupted by the
dissolute morals: ntroduced by France, England and
Italy, and dishonoured by the contempt in which
Musulmans are held by those Powers.

In all that region the most powerful ruler and the one
possessing most authority in the Musulman world is His
Excellency The Imaum, the Illustrious Exemplar, the
Champion of Islam in the cause of Allah, who is our
Lord and Master, Seyyid es Senussi, the Sure Guide of
All Elect.

This leader is bred in the truth of the Koranic Law,
and his soul, shining with its pure effulgence, has under-
taken the task of purifying all corrupt souls and directing
them in the path of life revealed by the Holy Book given
to all Musulmans.

Your glorious renown, Your grand designs and incom-
parable bravery, Oh, Chiefs of the Senussis, are known
throughout the world. All the Musulmans of the earth
count on your bravery and noble conduct in proclaiming
and waging a Holy War by which the bright rays of
Islam will once more shine on African soil, and the
Musulmans of North Africa recover the rights of which
they have been bereft by tyrannical nations.

Appeals to him as a leader of Islam had less
effect upon the Senussi Sheikh than the
demonstration that Germany and Turkey could
r.fford him material aid. A factor that helped
in his decision to invade Egypt was the appear ■
ance of German submarines off the coast of

Cyrenaica in the late summer of 1915, and the
success which attended their operations. It
was some four months after the arrival of
Gaafer Pasha in Cyrenaica that the first un-
toward- incident of importance between the
Senussites and the British occurred. On
August 16, 1915, two British submarines were
sheltering from the weather under a headland
of the coast of Cyrenaica when they were
treacherously fired upon by Arabs under the
leadership of a white (? German) officer,
casualties being suffered on either side. " The
incident," wrote Sir John Maxwell, " was,
however, closed by the acceptance of the
Senussi's profound apologies, and of his
assurances that the act had been committed
in ignorance that the submarines were British "
— the Sheikh may have assumed that the
submarines were Italian. Nothing noteworthy
occurred for the next few weeks, but in Novem-
ber events happened which placed beyond doubt
the hostile intentions of the Senussi towards
Egypt. The sequence of events in that month
showed, too, close cooperation between the
acton of German subma ines and the Tur:o-
Senussi forces.

On November 5 H.M. auxiliary cruiser Tara
was torpedoed off Solium by the IT 35 ; on the
6th enemy submarines shelled the Egyptian post
at Solium, and two coastguard cruisers then
stationed in its harbour. One of them the
Abbas, was sunk at her moorings, the other, the
Nur el Bahr, being badly damaged. The next

i y

^'JQ

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

297

day, November 7, the British horse transport
Moorina was also sunk off the Cyrenaican
coast ; on the 15th the camp at Solium was
sniped ; on the 17th the Zawia (monastery) at
Barrani — 50 miles within the Egyptian frontier
— was occupied by some 300 Senussi regulars ;
on the 18th the coastguard barracks at Barrani
were attacked ; on the 20th another coastguard
station was also attacked.

The long threatened campaign had begun.
There is no need to suppose that Germany and
Turkey, the Powers which had dragged the
Senussi into the adventure, expected from it
any great military success. They hoped, how-
ever, to create such unrest and disaffection
throughout Egypt that British action in the
Near East would be much hampered. The
Senussites believed that even if they could not
hold, they would be able to raid, the rich lands
of the Nile Delta.

The strength of the force at the disposal of
the enemy is conjectural ; it was not, however,
less than 30,000. It consisted of a nucleus of
Turkish troops, with Turkish, German and Arab
officers, the Muhafizia or Senussi regulars (a
well disciplined uniformed body some 5,000
strong) and a varying number of irregulars,
every adult male in Cyrenaica being accustomed
to arms. The troops were supplied with
machine guns, pom-poms and a number of
field pieces. There was ample camel transport,
and a considerable number of the Senussites
were well mounted. The particular in which
they were most lacking appears to have been
food. Certainly some of the Senussi camps
were very badly off for provisions. The
conduct of the operations against Egypt was
entrusted to Gaafer Pasha (who was destined
to become a prisoner of the British). Sidi
Ahmed and Nuri Bey were also usually with
the main body of their troops. Whatever the
strength of the combined Turco-Senussi army,
a proportion of it had to guard the rear, that is
to watch the Italian garrisons at Bengazi,
Derna and Tobruk, while another part was
detached to seize Siwa and other oases west of
the Nile.

British troops, the 1/lst North Midland
Mounted Brigade, with the Berks Battery,
R.H.A., were sent to garrison the Fayum, and
cavalry of the Egyptian Army with a Bikaner
Camel Corps detachment occupied the Wadi
Natrun. These were the two oases nearest the
Nile. Other measures, such as placing a garri-

son at Damanhur, between Cairo and Alex-
andria, were taken to ensure the tranquillity of
the Delta region west of the Nile. As to the
Bedouin of the Libyan Plateau, mostly mem-
bers of the Walid Ali tribe, all within the
sphere of Sidi Ahmed"s operations, which rapidly
extended over 200 miles of Egyptian territory,
joined his standard. Thus in numbers his force
was more than doubled, though its miUtary
value was not greatly increased. But should
the Senussites have gained any striking
advantage hostile outbreaks in Egypt itself,
where agitation was rife, would have been very
probable. Even in Alexandria the Senussi
had many adherents, and his prestige was
increased by the measures which Gen.
Maxwell now ordered, the withdrawal of the
Egyptian garrisons from Solium, Sidi el Bar-
rini, and other outposts. Siwa also fell to the
Senussi as well as el Gara (Qara) and Moghara,
oases, at the foot of the southern escarpment of
the Libyan Plateau, on the way to Cairo by
the Wadi Natrun. The more southern oases,
Baharia, Farafra, etc., were for the time
unoccupied either by enemy or British troops.
They too led to the Nile, but the main advance
of the enemy was necessarily along the plateau
which separates the Libyan Desert from the sea.
This plateau, known as the Libyan Desert
Plateau, rises abruptly above the Mediter-
ranean. Its level varies from 300 to 600 feet,
it is composed of limestone, and large areas
of the surface are bare rock, golden coloured.
Other areas are covered with a thin layer of
soil and in depressions and dry river beds camel
thorn and coarse grass are found. Numerous
isolated hills rise above the tableland. The sea-
ward face of the plateau is almost everywhere
precipitous. The country receives a fairly
heavy winter rainfall, but it has no streams
and is therefore only traversable along routes
where water can be found in wells or springs.
From time immemorial the main road across
this desolate land has kept close to the Mediter-
ranean, and the only considerable centres of
population are found along the coast. The
chief town is Mersa Matruh, about 200 miles
west of Alexandria, and 150 east of Solium.
As its name (mersa=harbour) implies, it is a
port,* and around it is a fairly large cultivated
area, barley of excellent quality being raised.
At Matruh itself there is a European popula-
tion, mainly Greek and Italian, of about 200.

*It replaces theParatonium of Ptolemaic and Roman
times.

2JS

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

Within 12 hours' journey by water from Alex-
andria, Matruh was chosen as the British
base, and to it the advanced garrisons at Barrini
and Solium were withdrawn — not without the
defection of 12 native officers, two cadets and
120 other ranks to the Senussi. These all
belonged to the Egyptian Coastguard Camel
Corps, and their desertion was significant of
what might happen on a larger scale if circum-
stances favoured the enemy. While the sea
route to Matruh was the chief means of trans-
port, a secondary means of communication was
afforded by the railway which runs west from
Alexandria. This line, when hostilities began,
had reached Dabaa, 85 miles short of Matruh.
Thence by Matruh as far as Solium a motor
service was ordinarily maintained.*

Starting from Bir Warr and Msead, camps
some .v hat west of Solium, the enemy rapidly
overran the country as far east as Dabaa,
but the prompt measures taken by Gen.
Maxwell prevented any danger of Matruh and
Dabaa being captured Gen. Maxwell wisely
decided that the best way to deal with the
situation was by a vigorous offensive. In view

* Both railway and road were built by the ex-Khedive
Abbas Hilmi Pasha, the railway being generally known
as the Maru.it line, while the road is called the Khedivia!
Motor Road. A road, however, was in existence and
in constant use in Roman times between Alexandria
and Matruh, and along it are many broken wells and
cisterns dating from the first to the fourth centuries.

of the danger of a rising in Egypt, should the

enemy approach the Nile, it was imperative to

keep the sphere of hostilities as far as possible

west of the Delta. This meant as bold an

offensive as was consistent with not running

the risk of a serious reverse. For all that the

force immediately available for service was

neither large nor homogeneous. Orders for

the formation of a Western Frontier Force,

consisting of a Composite Mounted Brigade and

a Composite Infantry Brigade, were issued on

November 20, Major-Gen. A. Wallace, C.B.,

being given the command.

This force, the best available in Egypt at the moment,
was by no means well adapted to the task which lay be-
fore it. Regiments and staffs had been somewhat hastily
collected, and were not well known to one another.
The Composite Yeomanry Brigade, to give an instance,
contained men from 20 or more different regiments.
. . . The composition [of the force] was constantly
changing, and it was not until the middle of February
that the condition of the Western Frontier Force could
be considered really satisfactory. (Sir J. Maxwell's
Dispatch, March 1, 1916.)

It is interesting to set forth the original
composition of this force and to note how it was
gradually changed till it came to represent
practically every part of the Empire except
Canada. On December 7, when Gen. Wallace
took up his headquarters at Matruh, the
Mounted Brigade, which was under Brigadier-
Gen. Tyndale Biscoe, was made up of :

Three Composite Yeomaniy Regiments (from details
2nd Mounted Division).

A STEAM PUMP IN THE DESERT.

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

299

WATERING HORSES AT A DESERT WELL.

One Composite Regiment Australian Light Horse
from details Australian L.H. Brigades).
Notts Battery R.H.A. ( I'.F. ) and Ammunition Column.

Part of this Brigade (five squadrons) was. at

Dabaa ; the rest at Matruh. Brigadier-Gen. Lord

Lucan commanded the Infantry Brigade, which

was made up as follows : —

l/6th Batt. Royal Scots (T.F.).
2/7th Batt. Middlesex Regt. (T.F.).
2/8th Batt. Middlesex Regt. (T.F.).
15th Sikhs.

There was also a squadron of the Royal
Flying Corps. The Divisional Train was
supplied by the 1st Australian Division and, no
Royal Engineers being available, Gen. Wallace
was given a detachment of the Egyptian Army
Military Works Department. Besides this
newly raised force, Gen. Wallace also had the
normal garrison of the Western Frontier. This
consisted of a small British force and detach-
ments from the Egyptian Army. There were,
in addition, a squadron of the Royal Naval
Armoured Car Division, which had been rushed
up at the first sign of serious trouble and
stationed along the Alexandria-Dabaa railway ;
the 2nd Batt. New Zealand Rifle Brigade.*
150 men of the Bikanir Camel Corps (with an
Egyptian Army machine-gun section) ; and one
armoured train, manned by the l/10th Gurkha
Rifles, with two 12J-pounders of the Egyptian

* A few weeks later the 161st Brigade (54th Division)
relieved the New Zealanders on the lines of communica-
tion.

Army Artillery. Thus Gen. Wallace began his
campaign with " a scratch lot " of Yeomanry,
Territorials, Australians, New Zealanders,
Indians and Egyptians. No " scratch lot " of
men rendered better service than did the
original units of Gen. Wallace's command.
Only the three Territorial regiments and the
Notts Battery R.H.A. , however, saw the cam-
paign through from start to finish. The
commander, it will be realized, had many dif-
ficulties to meet heyond those caused by the
enemy. One of the most serious of these
difficulties remains to be mentioned — the lack
of sufficient and suitable transport made it
necessary for Gen. Wallace to withdraw his
troops to Matruh after every engagement.

The first encounter with the enemy occurred
on December 1 1 , and on that day and on the
13th there were sharp fights west and south of
Matruh, the Senussi holding in considerable
strength the Wadi Senaab, which runs south
from the coast. Owing to the " bad going " the
infantry employed (the Sikhs) could take no
part in the fight on December 1 1 , but the
Yeomanry, aided by a squadron of the Aus-
tralian Light Horse and the armoured cars,
cleared the Wadi Senaab, the enemy losing
over 100 in killed and wounded. The British*

* Here as elsewhere in this chapter the term " British
casualties" is used to include all ranks under British
command — whether Dominion or Indian or the British
Army proper.

300

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

THE FORT

Occupied by the Force under Maj

casualties were 32. Lieut. -Col. Snow, who,
until the formation of Gen. Wallace's force
had been in command on the Western Frontier,
was killed by an Arab whom he was endeavour-
ing to persuade to surrender. He had been 25
years in the Egyptian Coastguard Service and
was intimately acquainted with the country and
its inhabitants, and his death was a severe loss
to the force. The column camped on the field

AT SOLLUM.
or-General Peyton, March 14, 1916.

on the Uth, and on the 12th rounded up some
prisoners. On the 13th, reinforced by the
Royal Scots, the column started, at 8 a.m., to
engage the enemy at a spot 1 3 miles distant ;
but, on crossing a wadi (the Wadi Shaifa) they
were themselves attacked with considerable
vigour by a force estimated at about 1,200,
with two guns and machine-guns. Only the
opportune arrival of reinforcements from

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

301

BRITISH CAVALRY IN WESTERN EGYPT.
Searching a Senussi encampment outside Solium.

Matruh turned the day against the Senussites,
who lost 180 in killed alone. The British
casualties were nine killed and 56 wounded.
The column pursued the enemy till dark and
the next day returned to Matruh. The chief
result of these actions on December 11 and 13
was to show Gen. Wallace that he was not
strong enough to risk a decisive engagement.
He asked for reinforcements and, in the third

week of December, was given the 1st Batt.
New Zealand R.B., two naval 4'1 in. guns,
and " A " Battery Hon. Artillery Co.

Thus strengthened, Gen. Wallace again
engaged the enemy, the action being fought
on Christmas Day, 1915. The main Senussi
force was then near Gebel Medwa, a hill some
eight miles south-west of Matruh. Gaafer
Pasha was in command, and from air recon-

302

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR..

MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE BRITISH OPERATIONS.

naissance and other sources the British esti-
mated his strength in infantry, cavalry, and
artillery, to be about 5,000, of whom more
than half were Mahafizia (regulars). Gebel
Medwa was within a few miles of the sea, and
on the 25th Gen. Wallace arranged with the
commander of H.M.S. Clematis — which vigil-
antly patrolled the coast — that he should
sujiport the attack on the hill with gun-fire
from the sea. Gen. Wallace, in personal com-
mand, moved out from Matruh before daylight
on Christmas morning. He divided his force
into two columns. The Right Column, under
Lieut. -Col. J. L. R. Gordon, 15th Sikhs, included
the bulk of the infantry, with the Bucks Hussars
and a section of Horse Artillery, and its task
was to advance along the coast road directly
on the enemy. The Left Column, under
Brigadier-Gen. Tyndale Biscoe, was made up of
mounted troops and Horse Artillery, and was
directed to make a wide detour round the
right flank of the enemy and cut off his retreat
westward. As Col. Gordon's column moved

out, it came under sharp artillery and machine-
gun fire, but by 7.15 a.m., having marched
seven miles. Col. Gordon was in front of the
main enemy position — an escarpment about
a mile south of Gebel Medwa. The 15th Sikhs,
temporarily commanded by Major Evans, were
sent forward to attack the enemy's right flank,
the Bucks Hussars and the 2 /8th Middlesex
delivering a containing attack on his front.
Meantime the Notts R.H.A. silenced the
enemy's artillery (obtaining a direct hit on the
largest of the enemy's pieces), aided by the
C-in. guns of the Clematis, which opened "an
accurate and useful fire " at a range of about
six miles. The enemy fought with resolution,
and three companies of the 1st New Zealand
Rifle Brigade were sent to help the Sikhs.
After nearly three hours' struggle the Sikhs and
New Zealandors cleared the crest of the escarp-
ment, driving the white-robed Arabs into a
long rocky nullah, studded with caves and
small gullies into which many of the enemy
retreated. The nullah was cleared bend by

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

303

bend and the edge of the tablo-land, beyond
which lay the enemy's camp, was reached.
Here the mounted column, which had met
with determined opposition from the Sonussi
horsemen, could be seen two miles away.
Working their way towards Col. Gordon, the
mounted troops joinod in the assault on the
enemy's main position in the Wadi Majid,
which was carried, about 4 p.m., at the point
of the bayonet. By that time, however, the
bulk of the enemy had made good their retreat
along the sea-shore and the approach of dark-
ness prevented pursuit. So hurried had been
Gaafer Pasha's flight that he left behind his
office and personal effects

The British casualties were light — 14 rank and
file killed and 3 officers and 47 other ranks
wounded. Over 370 enemy dead were counted
and 82 prisoners were taken. Much live stock,
30,000 rounds of small-arm ammunition and
three boxes of gun ammunition were also
captured. The honours of the day fell to Col.
Gordon and the Sikhs and New Zealanders
(the latter under command of Major Austin).
It was the first time these New Zealanders
(among whom was a Maori contingent) had
been in action, but they fought with the
steadiness of seasoned troops. Col. Gordon's
column bivouacked at Gebel Medwa.

The troops (wrote an officer who took part in the fight )
slept for a few hours, during which time a volunteer
party went back to rescue certain wounded reported to
be in the long nullah. They feared for the lives of any
men left behind. Their fears proved only too well
founded. No wounded were found, but some cf the
dead had been grievously maltreated. The men probed
every cave and crevice in the vicinity, and not a lurker
there escaped the terrible revenge they took. The light

of the burning fodder shone on evidence that we do not
box with kid gloves when the punching is below the
belt.

At daybreak to-day (Boxing Day) the column moved
back into camp, tired out, it is true, with its long march
and running fight across the sand, and then through
boulder-strewn ravines, but high in spirits.*

One result of the Christmas Day fight was
the withdrawal of the Senussi main body to
Halazinf, 25 miles south-west of Matruh. The
enemy had received a severe handling, but was
far from beaten, and the last week of 1915 and
the first half of January, 1916, had to be
employed in clearing out parties of the enemy
who were threatening the line of communica-
tions between railhead and Matruh. These
operations were interrupted by torrential rains
— perhaps the last thing most members of the
Kxpeditionary Force expected — which lasted
a week and turned the land into alternate
stretches of sand and mud. This work of
clearing the rear of enemies was performed by

* Morning Post, January 19. 1916.

f This place was in the official dispatches at first-
incorrectly spelt Hazalin.

NAVAL ARMOURED CARS AT MERSA MATRUH.

304

THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

305

a column under Lord Lucan, helped by the
Naval Armoured Car Division. Meantime, the
enemy at Halazin received reinforcements.
Careful watch was kept over that place by the
Flying Corps. The camp comprised at least
100 European tents and 250 Bedouin tents,
including that of Sidi Ahmed, it being recog-
nized by Capt. Royle, the observer. The
strength of the enemy was estimated at 0,000,
and once more Gen. Wallace awaited the
arrival of reinforcements before attacking.

At that time the first of the South African
troops raised by the Union for service overseas
(the campaign in German South- West Africa
had been regarded as a domestic affair) had
reached England and the 2nd Regiment (under
Lieut. -Col. W. E. C. Tanner) of the 1st South
African Infantry Brigade was sent to rein-
force Gen. Wallace. It disembarked at Matruh
on January 20 and 21, and at once was given
a share of the fighting. On January 22 Gen.
Wallace moved from Matruh and, marching
16 miles, encamped that night at Bir Shola.
There he formed his troops into two columns
and, at 6 a.m. on January 23, went forward to
engage the enemy. As in the action on Christmas
Day, Col. Gordon commanded the infantry,
which formed the Bight Column, and had with
it one squadron of Yeomanry (the Duke of
Lancaster's Own), and Brigadier-Gen. Biscoe
the mounted men. The action that ensued, the
hardest fought of the whole campaign, demon-
strated, among other things, that the Senussi
army had capable and daring leaders. Among
them were German officers. Col. Gordon
advanced direct on the enemy's camp, Gen.
Biscoe's men being echeloned to the left front
of the Right Column, moving parallel to and in
close touch with it. Col. Gordon had with him
his own regiment, the 15th Sikhs, the 2nd South
African Regiment, the 1st Batt,, New Zealand
R.B and the Notts Battery, R.H.A. In two
hours and a half they had covered about seven
miles ; a very trying experience, especially for
the South Africans, most of whom had been
originally cavalry. The advance was made in
abnormal conditions. The whole country had
been turned by the recent rains into a quagmire,
which hampered the movements of the mounted
troops and deprived the infantry of the support
of the Naval Armoured Car Division. " Through-
out the day," wrote Sir J. Maxwell, "this factor
— of mud — played an important and unfortu-
nate part." Though it hampered, the mud did
not prevent the advance of the troops. At

8.30 a.m. the Left Column reported the enemy
in sight, and shortly afterwards Biscoe's
advanced squadron of Australian Light Horse
became engaged. Gen. Biscoe sent the Bucks
Hussars and the H.A.C. to support the Aus-
tralians and, at the same time, Col. Gordon's
column pushed on in attack formation, the
indomitable Sikhs leading. After an engage-
ment lasting eight hours the enemy were de-
feated and fled. The course of the fight is
succinctly told in Gen. Maxwell's dispatch as
follows :

Relieved by the advance of the Infantry, the mounted
troops pressed on, endeavouring to work round the

EGYPTIAN TROOPS.
Boarding a steamer at Solium.

enemy's right, and at the same time covering the left
flank of Col. Gordon's attack. The latter, spread
over a front of nearly a mile and a half, led across
ground absolutely destitute of cover, while mirage in
the early stages made it impossible for a considerable
time to locate the enemy's positions. During this
advance the Infantry suffered somewhat severely from
artillery and machine-guns, the enemy's fire being both
rapid and accurate. Nevertheless, the enemy was
gradually pressed back, but his retirement of nearly
three miles on to his main positions was conducted with
great skill, denying all our efforts to come to close
quarters.

By 2.45 p.m. the Sikhs and South Africans, with part
of the New Zealand Battalion, on the left of the Sikhs,
had reached the enemy's main line. But in the mean-
time the flanks had not made equal progress, and bodies

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THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR.

307

of the enemy were working round both north and south,
the line gradually forming the arc of a semi-circle.

Soon after 1 p.m., so great was the activity of one
of these detachments on our right, or northern flank,
that the reserve Battalion (l/6th Royal Scots) had to
be put in to restore the situation, but by 2.30 p.m. all
danger from that quarter was past. On the extreme
left, however, by 3.30 p.m. the Cavalry of the Left
Column had been forced to give some ground, and with
the H.A.C. guns were occupying a position nearly
1,000 yards in rear of the Field Ambulance.

Col. Gordon was called upon to detach two com-
panies of New Zealanders to assist the Cavalry, who
were being pressed. With this reinforcement the threat
against our left rear was finally repulsed and the enemy
driven off.

In the meantime the main attack by Col. Gordon's
Column had progressed satisfactorily. By 3 p.m. the
enemy had been driven from his positions, and shortly
afterwards his camp was occupied and burnt, the work
of destruction being completed by 4.30 p.m.

This account may be supplemented by
extracts from a letter written immediately after
the engagement by an officer who fought at
Halazin, and printed in the Morning Post :

While advancing on the enemy's position some
hundred Springboks [South Africans] were sent back as
unfit to march any further, but when the first gun
boomed they halted undecided. Then the wind wafted
down their battalion's weird war cry on its wings.
Catching up the echo, they " about-turned " with a
roar, and, boots carried in their hands, they struggled
back to the opening fray, and saw it through to a finish —
a likely looking lot these.

The enemy contested the day with the utmost deter-
mination. For four hours there was a struggle for
supremacy in rifle fire which rivalled in rattle the old
Gallipoli days. These native troops carried as many
machine-guns as we did, and under German (two of them
naval men) and Turkish officers, worked them with
valour and precision. Their artillery threw poor-
quality shrapnel with more accuracy than hitherto.

A profitable stratagem was brought off by the cavalry
screen. When we were more than holding our own a
portion of the cavalry on the left retired under orders
at a hand gallop. Encouraged by this, the Arabs who
had opposed this portion of the line pressed forward in
masses, to be blown to pieces by three of our guns just
then placed in a new position. Concentrated rifle fire
blotted out several of the Senussi's machine-gun crews,
including a German captain.

Our troops passed through the hostile camp, and
found every evidence of European supervision. Oppor-
tunity had been taken by the enemy during their
determined resistance to remove much booty, but a
good deal remained to b